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MONSERRAT LLAIRO-RAIMUNDO SIEPE

*Cuba, Perón, Frondizi's fall and the North American press
(February, March 1962)*

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INTRODUCTION

The present study has, as its main purpose to explain the way in which the North American press analysed the last phase of Arturo Frondizi's administration, as the President of Argentina.

Of course, it's important to include the wide range of opinions that in this regard were managed in the United States. The opinions about Frondizi's international and internal politics didn't quite differ from those of The State Department of Kennedy's administration.

Some events rushed. The Cuban case was the first piece of interest between Argentina and the United States relations during the 7th Consulting Conference of American Foreign Relations Ministers held in Punta del Este the last week of January. The refusal from Argentina, to break off Diplomatic Relations with La Havana, caused the immediate reaction of the anti-Castro military who never approved of Frondizi's approach in mediating in favour of an understanding between Washington and Fidel Castro (we should remember the Che Guevara's visit to Olivos the previous year and the waves of protest that it raised).

The second fact was the victory of the Peronist Party in the several provinces of Argentina which hastened the last phase of Frondizi's administration and its later fall. The North American press which informed about the events in Argentina interpreted quite exactly the adverse movements that Frondizi tried to solve between February and March in 1962.

These were the military opposition to go on recognising Castro's communist regime and the triumph of the former dictator Juan Perón in the election of 18th March.

The pressures that Frondizi could not surpass in the external policy (Cuba and its identification with the Soviet Community) together with the staunch antiperonism of the military were clearly revealed by the main North American news agencies offering an explanation which mostly agreed with the real events and which will allow us to go deeper into a question which at the moment is still valid because of the analysis of its consequences: that is to say the troubles caused by the Cuban revolution, the victory of the Peronist Party, the role of Armed Forces in the Democracy and Arturo Frondizis administration.

The Peronism pressure demanded compensations due to the support they had given to Frondizi so he might win the elections.

If we take into account the Argentina ideology of the time, we can observe that it was ruled by conservative out lines, facing the "desarrollista" tendency.

Therefore, our political analysis will be in a triangle of powers:

Namely: A legal power represented by Frondizi; a real power represented by Juan Domingo Perón and the command of the situations represented by the army.

This balance of forces was broken when Frondizi lost the support from the real power: Perón, and also from the political parties that somehow led him to the Presidency. Therefore, the Armed Forces imbued with a conservative and anticommunist ideology took advantage of the differences among the political, union and civilian groups and provoked a coup in 1962

CONDITIONS OF THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICY DURING FRONDIZI'S GOVERNMENT

When Frondizi assumed the presidency in 1958 a new developing policy started. It included some of the changes preannounced during Perón's second government.

Argentina's economy was not very encouraging and the country was going through a structural crisis with hardly any agricultural production, a debit of the commercial scale a light industry which was unprotected and lacked infrastructure, an obsolete and deficit rail net, a poor energy system which could not supply the industrial and urban demand and insufficient car park industry unable to fill the basic necessities. The internal situation was delicate, very near the ceasing of payment and there were strong social tensions because of the freezing of salaries.

Between 1948 and 1958 the PBI per inhabitant had gone down a 6% reducing the available capital per each in employment man; the cultivated area had not varied significantly, 80% of the energy derived from oil was imported. The

external debt overcame the 1,000 millions dollars which was equivalent to less than three months of import.

In the international environment the deterioration of the exchange terms was intensified. At the same time a reduction of the international markets for food and basic prime materials was registered. All this affected the chronic inflationary process of the country.

In addition to this outlook there was a state apparatus that employed and excess of personnel, a bureaucratic system that hindered the private activity, while the companies which had been nationalized during the peronism period had not been returned to the private area.

In such conditions, the impoverishment of the labour classes, and small bourgeoisie, started to be noticed.

While this happened in the economic area, the country suffered great social and political separations between Peronists and antiperonists that disabled any sort of common project.

In the international calendar a new stage of world distension started, it included the United States, the Soviet Union, Occidental Europe, Asia and Latin America. But the Cuban revolution and fear of communism produced certain insecurity in managing a wide international policy in most of the conservative groups (military men). Therefore, they insisted in privileging the Old World balance.

On the contrary, Argentina's government considered that a wider international opening was necessary. As a consequence of the different positions of these two groups together with the internal political uneasiness a coup took place in 1962.

THE CUBA CASE: THE ABSTENTION

In the "Washington Post" edition of 2nd February there was published an article entitled "Argentina in conflict because of Cuba".

The information revealed that in Bs. As. the Military Chiefs had requested the ceasing of diplomatic relations with Cuba by means of an ultimatum sent to President Frondizi. The threat of a new political – military crisis grew day by day after Argentina abstention in the almost general resolution to expel Castro's regime from "The American States Organization".

The Military Chiefs had presented their demand after a number of meetings with the Internal Affairs and Defence ministers together with President Frondizi. The three chiefs of the Armed Forces were disgusted by Argentina's position in "not joining to most of the fourteen nations against Cuba. They had also demanded Frondizi to remove the Minister of External Relations, Miguel Angel Carcano and some other officials who adopted a soft attitude towards Cuba".

The American States Organisation had just concluded a Conference in Punta del Este signing a declaration, which condemned Castro's regime. Twenty out of the twenty-one countries there represented signed the document with the exception of Cuba. The document containing 6,000 words included an order for the Council of the OEA in Washington to act immediately on the fact of separating Cuba from the Interamerican system. All the Latin American countries agreed with the concept that the Marxist – Leninist Castro's regime was not compatible with the American system. "That was the strongest mass accusation to the communism set out in an assembly of the Western Hemisphere", declared the American Associated Press.

Castro's delegation left the assembly some time before it ended and he returned to La Havana.

On the other hand the "Sun Times" of 3rd February picking up some piece of information that circulated in Washington titled this edition as follows: "Decision on the expulsion. Uneasiness in Latin America and explained that all the was in a state of uneasiness soon after the OAS had expelled Cuba". In Argentina, the armed forces were in a state of alert and ready for a possible demonstration of its strength regarding President Frondizi's regime.

In the edition of 3rd February "The Washington Daily News" echoed the above comments in an article that reflected the North American position. It said: Agitation in Latin American after the expulsion of Cuba. It added "Latin American has been thrown in a state of political agitation soon after the decision of expelling Cuba from the OEA".

With this measure, the United States happened to get complete seizure on the commercial exchange with Castro's regime. The decision of expelling Cuba brought complications to the six countries which abstained from voting in the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Punta del Este (Uruguay), the Chancellors belonging to those countries were charged of "soft" before the communism (attitude) Guatemala's delegate in the OAS expressed that he was astonished at the six abstentions in the voting of the resolution on the expulsion of Cuba in Punta del Este. In Quito, The Social Christian Party of Ecuador had expelled The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Francisco Jeyes to their lines owing to his support to Cuba. While in Bs. As. the "angry" Military Chiefs had an important meeting, which lasted at least three hours, with the President Frondizi and The Foreign Affairs Minister and they demanded the government to break off Diplomatic Relations with Cuba, later on Minister Carcano announced that an official statement would be emitted the next day.

"The government seems to have gained at least time with the new crisis"

The three Armed Forces secretaries have insisted on having Minister Carcano dismissed together with his assistants.

They disagreed with Carcano's policy of being cautious with Castro's regime.

It is said that the Armed Forces position had got worse owing to some rumours about a possible return of the ex dictator Juan D. Perón to the country.

He had been separated from the Argentine government in 1955 and sent into exile.

He returned from Spain and intended to carry out a campaign for his candidacy to governor of Bs. As. Province.

At the time, in Rio de Janeiro anticommunist elements had thrown bombs at the "Soviet Commercial Mission offices while the procommunist followers prepare a terror revenge for February 10th."

The "Time" edition of 5th February published the following article titled Kennedy cuts down imports from Cuba "adding that in Bs. As. on the 4th February Frondizi declared himself responsible for the soft attitude regarding Cuba in the American International Conference in Punta del Este, attacking those who he called politicians who tried to expel him from the government on behalf of the anticonmunism".

Frondizis policy regarding Cuba had provoked the dissident Military Chief anger and they had alerted the troops for any eventuality.

The local political observers declared that Frondizi's statements were not addressed to the Military but they assumed that his expressions contained a direct support and the ratification of Argentina's position regarding Cuba. These analysts say that the effect that this behaviour might produce among general and admirals who have attacked his policy is something the consequences of which are still ahead.

Speaking about his political opponents Frondizi said that for them any excuse is valid to overthrow a Constitutional Government.

THE BREAKING OFF WITH CUBA

The Herald Tribune edition of 10th February revealed that according to information picked up on the previous day through the "Associated Press" news agency, Argentina had broken off relations with Cuba. According to the announcement of 8th February in the Foreign Affairs Ministry in Buenos Aires, Argentina was the fourteenth country out of twenty one members of the OEA who broke off diplomatic relations with Castro's regime.

The Argentine Government had given the Cuban Diplomatic 48 hours time to leave the country. Some hours after the announcement, four bombs were dropped into the house of an official of the United States Embassy by some terrorists, who were driving a speedy automobile. Fortunately, nobody was wounded.

The Associated Press informed that Frondizi had given way to a request of the Armed Forces a week ago. They wanted him to adopt a hard line towards Cuba. The agency declared that the Argentine officers were not prepared to face a possible explosion of violence from the leftist pro-Castro members.

Through an official statement the government declared that he had broken off diplomatic Relations with Cuba owing to the repercussions of the Conference in Punta del Este (Uruguay).

The 11th February edition of the Washington Post published an article titled the results in Argentina. It said: It's not the worth American's job to judge Frondizi's government decision, as he is fighting against economic and political problems of an extreme difficulty. Still we doubt if President Kennedy or his State Secretary, Mr. Rusk will feel at ease about the sort of close intervention of the Argentine military men. In an article titled Dispute about The Prime Minister of Cuba and according to the Associated Press, news agency, The New York Times of the 12th February, partisans and opponents to Fidel Castro, became involved into a violent argument that lasted about 10 minutes. The argument had taken place during a farewell party to members of the Cuba Embassy who were leaving Argentina after the breaking off.

This was the second incident in the less than twenty-four hours.

On Friday night some of Castro's partisans and communist activists attacked the Embassies of the United States and Colombia and two American shops with fire and tar bombs.

When the nine Cuban diplomats were boarding a plane heading for Mexico at BA airport, a group of about 150 of Castro's followers sang "Cuba yes, Yankees no" shaking badges and Argentine flags at the same time. The police intervened, and a police was hurt, and arrested about twenty people. Before the disorder could be controlled, at the same time the Military Chiefs went on pressuring Frondizi. They demanded Minister Carcano's resignation. Miguel Angel Carcano, Minister of Foreign Affairs, represented Argentina in the Conference of Foreign Relations Ministers in Punta del Este. These ministers represented the American countries that had expelled Cuba from the American State Organisation "in spite of Brazil's and Argentina's opposition".

On an edition of the 13th February, "The New York Times" published an article titled "Argentina and Cuba". It said: "the rupture of Diplomatic Relations between Argentina and Cuba should be accepted with a mixture of satisfaction, anxiety and caution".

The dramatic events that surrounded the conference in Punta del Este took place in two different circles, one "on" the scene, the other "behind" the scene. The concordance and diversity of opinions were both real and they will continue being so. Besides, the fact that the President of Argentina was forced by the Military Chiefs to Break off Diplomatic Relations with Cuba against his will and better judgement was not a triumph likely to please "The United States Department". This situation revealed two important facets of Frondizi's policy. The first is the disturbing fact showing with almost brutal emphasis, that Frondizi's administration was under the command of the Army Navy and Air Forces Chiefs.

The second is the fact that the Democracy might be in danger in a country where The Armed Forces has an excessive power.

THE PERONIST VICTORY

The Tribune “published on its edition of 20th March, and article titled Frondizi’s measure to expel the peronism”. The article explained that Frondizi had ordered the federal control of all the provinces where Perón’s followers had won the elections.

According to a non-official information Perón’s forces won more than 30 seats in the National congress and ten Governors post including the province of BA which is the second in strength and prestige, just after the Presidency.

The International United Press expressed that the result was a vote of reject to Frondizi’s Government austerity program.

The election was for fourteen provinces and eighty-six national deputies including representatives for the provincial legislature and the local authorities.

“Electoral Argentine Storm” was the title of an article published in “Baltimore Sun” edition of 20th March. This is the text: “Last night the Argentine Army took quick measures to prevent the return of those in favour of Perón to the power. This attitude is owing to the electoral success of the Perónist Party in yesterday’s election”.

“Constitution” another newspaper, on the same date published an article saying: “Disorders in Argentina on the return of Perón. Victory of the election”. According to United Press “Argentina is in political disorder as a consequence of a categorical victory of those who support the deposed dictator: Perón”.

“The Communist joined the Perónist to win in ten out fourteen provinces”. “The President acts. Troops in the main points of Argentina”. In this way the “Daily News” titled the edition of 22nd March. The newspaper informed that on Wednesday, Frondizi had sent army troops to the main provinces of the country. “The tanks and troops have taken strategic positions” President Frondizi “decided to take these measures on the insistence of the Armed Forces chiefs”. “This action was planned to annul the results of ten elections where” the ex – dictator Juan Perón’s followers had won , thus breaking the official majority in the Deputies Camera in the National Congress, and winning several governments. “In this way and with the help of Castro’s supporters and the communism, the Perónism took revenge for the military blow that overthrew Perón in 1955”.

In their first tentative of returning to the power after seven years absence, the Perónism achieved 2.294.000 votes and they emerged as the strongest political group in the country. President Frondizi (Intransigent Radical Party) achieved 1.851.042 votes and the anti-Frondizi party: “Radical del Pueblo” “got 1.384.104”.

The areas occupied by the army were BA, Tucumn, Santiago del Estero, Rio Negro y Chaco. In these five officially intervened regions is where the government had more pressure.

The present governors had to be replaced by the successful Perónism on the 1st May.

In an article published the 22nd March under the title "Disorder in Argentina after the government annuls the victory of Perón". The post Dispatch announced that according to the Associated Press news agency "Argentina is in a state of political disorder after the remarkable political victory of a former exiled ex-dictator Juan Perón's supporters". The army had moved light tanks and armed vehicles in strategic points while the chiefs of the Armed forces met to discuss the position to take. The military measures were taken after a day's time indecision. Five provinces where the Perónist had won were taken by the Armed Forces and returned to the civil administration designed by the Government: "In generally well informed sources it was revealed that the army would probably refuse to give up the control of the five most important provinces: BA, Chaco, Rio Negro, Santiago del Estero and Tucumán. This would cause an open rupture with President Frondizi".

In Washington, Kennedy's administration expressed that "they were deeply impressed by the Perónism triumph and perceived it was a serious blow to the Alliance for the Progress help program to Latin America".

THE FINAL CRISIS

The 2nd March edition of "The Time" was titled, "Crisis in Argentina, a coalition cabinet created tension in the streets" the article explained that on Wednesday. President Frondizi and the Chiefs Officers came to an agreement about the designation of a civil military coalition cabinet to fight against the threat of the resurgence of the Perónism.

In official statement announced that eight ministers had resigned. President Frondizi had appointed four ministers in the new cabinet and the military had appointed the other four.

President Frondizi had previously announced the resignation of all the civil members of his Cabinet. These resignations levelled the way to a "Reforming Government" requested by the Chief Officers just after the Perónist victory in the elections.

Frondizi accepted the "ultimatum" from the Armed Forces giving his consent to the creation of a military-civil coalition, as a condition to go on in the government.

The Army Navy and Aviation secretaries had personally, pointed out their demands to President Frondizi in his residence in Olivos. Frondizi's agreement might have bought a relief on the three days crisis that overcame the country.

The Herald Tribune edition of 22nd March published the following: "Argentine Armed Forces are pressuring the President to dismiss the members of the Cabinet", it added that "on the 21st March, Frondizi survived a three days' time political crisis in Argentina".

However, the military Chiefs Officers have confirmed their decision of keeping the Perónism announced the resignation of eight civil members of his Cabinet.

This newspaper completed the information with an extensive article titled: "The Argentine elections" A profane alliance causes a problem to "Democracy", it added that neither Frondizi's Government in BA nor Kennedy's administration in Washington were prepared for the shock that the elections in Argentina caused. The nine million voters expected to express a vote of confidence in the austerity program of Frondizi's administration and therefore, in the "Alliance for the Progress" program, sponsored by the United States. But the electors voted the Perónism instead. Perónism counted on the support of the communists, this time ironically it was the Perónism supporters that assured President Frondizi's election in 1958, some months after their party only got the second place in the election. In the following elections, they spoiled their vote as protest because they were not allowed to have their own candidates. These votes exceeded the 2,000,000 or nearly the fourth part of the electorate Frondizi's government according to what was really "a humiliating political calculation didn't expect the Perónist to possess such a power as the one they showed last Sunday". When half of the votes were counted, it was obvious that, in spite of the campaign of the government to destroy Perón's image his name kept all its magic, at least among the workers, who represent most of the members of the Perónist movement. They are called the "shirtless" and they have often been courted by Perón since he took over in 1943.

Two important events were, in fact, the reason why the voters decided in favour of the Perónism. The unpopular measures that the government had implemented to contain the inflation and to keep stability was one of them. "These measures demanded an immediate sacrifice on behalf of future benefits".

The burden of the financial modifications fell on the "shirtless" "who missed" the good time they enjoyed under Perón's administration.

The other fact was the social and economic pressure that carried the Cuban revolution, and which threatened with the breaking of other revolutions in Latin America.

In the absence of a leader like "Castro" the dissatisfaction in Argentina was focussed towards the Perónism movement as the only popular force opposed to the regime. But in spite of the remarkable triumph of the Perónism, nobody expected a quick return to the government of the political exiled Juan Perón. The powerful Armed Forces have promised not to allow him to return to Argentina and they forced President Frondizi to take the corresponding measures to assure Perón's permanent exile.

Frondizi promulgated a decree annulling all the Peronist victories, he also assumed the control of six main provinces to prevent the victorious candidates from assuming on the 11th May, declaring illegal all the pro-Perón activities.

These measures “will certainly cause more problems than those they are trying to solve, invalidating the expression of the popular feelings, and we all agree the elections were: free, secret and honest and that Frondizi’s regime has assumed dictatorial power, indeed”, what mostly worried Kennedy’s administration was the support that, through the Alliance for Progress organisation, had to be given to a government that didn’t recognise the popular will expressed through free elections.

Considering that if they continued granting these loans under these circumstances, they would be charged of supporting a dictatorship (and they would deserve the critics of USA).

On the other hand, to stop their help, would therefore make President Frondizi’s efforts to stabilise the country more difficult and would open the way that Perónism and communism seemed to need to start the chaos.

“The political crisis” was the title of an article in the 23rd March edition of “Baltimore Sun” they informed that after President Frondizi had created a civil – military Cabinet under the military pressure, the 62 organisation (union organisation) controlled by the Perónism had called a strike for tonight.

“The President leaves a banquet, abruptly”. This was the heading of “Baltimore Sun” edition of 26th March, adding that according to the Associated Press and Reuter news agencies, on the 23rd March, Frondizi has suddenly left a banquet offered in honour of the Duke of Edinburgh. His sudden departure rose rumours that a coup was being prepared.

“Constitution”, other newspaper, on the 26th March edition and under the title “Government crisis, the Argentine Navy minister resigns” informed that on Sunday the Argentine Navy Secretary had resigned after a meeting held with President Frondizi where they discussed about the political crisis of eight day’s time”. This was the outcome of a night full of rumours about the President resignation at the request of “Contralmirante Clements who represented the Armed Forces”. With the heading “The Chief of the Argentine Navy resigns”, the “New York Daily News” of 28th March, informed that the resignation of Contralmirante Clement was due to the political crisis which was lasting eight days, now. However when this military left the Conference Hall, he declared that he hadn’t asked Frondizi to resign. This does not agree with official statement emanated from the Navy saying that the President refused to accept the Contralmirante demands, who consequently placed a written resignation on the desk, recommending Frondizi to give up.

Under the heading “The crisis in Argentina. The Navy tries to remove Frondizi”, the same newspaper informed that on Monday the Navy authorities had requested Frondizi’s resignation as the only solution to the political –military crisis the country was going through. This situation was a consequence of the Navy’s demands and it revealed a division among the military chiefs. The

Army proposed a truce with President Frondizi, but the Air Force has not made clear about their position yet. The Army chief officer lowered the pressure they were having on President Frondizi, after the retired: General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu started to mediate in the crisis. The Army declared that General Aramburu should be allowed ten days time to mediate in the dispute.

"The resurgence of the Perónism divides the Armed Forces leaders" under this title and in the edition of 28th March, this newspaper explained that the political-military crisis was a consequence of the remarkable victories of the former-exiled President Juan Perón. The retired General Pedro E. Aramburu was the mediator between Frondizi and the Armed Forces and "he declared that the Argentine people would be facing a civil war if the crisis was not solved at once". In his fifteen minutes dissertation on radio and Aramburu declared "The Republic is in danger and many of us think everything is lost".

On the 28th March, "The Post Dispatch" published an article with this heading: Threat of open rebellion against Frondizi's regime "it added that the General Franklin Rawson, son of the late General Arthur Rawson, who in 1943 headed the revolution that overthrew President Ramon Castillo was in open rebellion against Frondizi". He said that the President was betraying the Nation as he refused to resign and he added that "force was the only mean left for those who demanded the end of Frondizi's administration".

Under the heading: "The President won't resign". The "Sun Times" edition of the same day informed that "Frondizi challenged the military's order to resign. "The former President General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu gave him a letter. It said: on behalf of the constitutional order, the Nation demands your noble resignation".

On the 29th March "The Tribune" published an extensive article heading: "To resign under the orders of the Armed Forces means that according to official sources on Wednesday a coup was being organised in the country".

The military officers ordered Frondizi to resign at 2 p.m. local time. The President had previously rejected the order.

On the 30th March edition "The New York Times" expressed: "Crisis in Argentina. President Frondizi lost the battle for his position and for keeping his government constitutionality at the same time, therefore nobody can deny the fact that a coup has taken place in the country".

The article added that "This event produces a sort of expectation as Argentina which is considered one of the most advanced and important countries of the Latin America was a cabinet where the Democracy and virtues of a free enterprise were exposed".

"Considering that the Alliance for Progress trusted Argentina's stability and co-operation". It concluded pointing out that "what happened in Argentina should remind us that the blow against democracy might come from the left tendency just as from the right one and it's a very important event which can make our future uncertain".

On the 31st March, "The New York Tribune" published an article titled: "The crisis in Argentina". In this publication they expressed their opinion about the crisis. They said that Argentina wanted to keep a constitutional facade, pointing Jose Maria Guido, who was the Senate President, as a legal successor of Frondizi. But, no doubt, the military (The Armed Forces) dominated the country.

The crisis was due to a double political calculation error. Frondizi didn't realise that the Perónism could be so electorally strong and the military ones misunderstood that strength, they thought that it was the victory of a man who could not return to the Government, they didn't realise it was a way of protesting against the economic and social situation".

They added that "United States was now in a difficult position because they had backed the economic policy which provoked Frondizi's fall. Now, they'll have to decide about their future help to Argentina". This article ended saying that USA hoped that the Armed Forces should think it over (mediate) before interfering with the constitutional process of the country, and that they should release Frondizi, who is still the President, considering that the dictatorship will not be able to bring any benefits, besides, it won't help to banish the Perónism threat, on the contrary, it would increase it.

THE LATER INTERPRETATIONS: PERÓN HAS GOT THE KEY

An extensive article was published in the "Time" edition of 7th April. This publication was about Frondizi's fall and Argentina's political crisis. They informed that after resisting the military pressure for eleven days, President Arturo Frondizi was deposed by the three Armed Forces of Argentina.

He is at present a guest of the Army in Martin Garcia Isle at thirty miles from BA. What President Frondizi did before being deposed (obviously, under strong military pressure) was to take advantage of the constitution, to intervene five of the Wandering Perónist provinces, BA, Tucumán, Santiago del Estero, Rio Negro and Neuquén.

Electors had voted Perón because up to 1940 Argentina has been a country where very few lived prosperously and in the rural areas their theoretical freedom wasn't much worth.

The country's wealth depended on the big estancias¹ which produced important incomes to their owners.

The Colonist and settlers (renters), the labourers or farm workers, who worked in these establishments lived as servants, indeed. They had important

¹ Estancia: Large piece of land used for agriculture and cattle, often with a big house for owners in the centre. Some of them have stables and barns.

debts in the company warehouses where they were obliged to buy everything they needed. In addition to this, there was the possibility of being discharged at any moment.

Together with the 1943 revolution, Perón's leadership arises, "He renounced to his military career, he assumed the role of the oppressed classes defender, he set up a great union movement, he married an ambitious and restless girl of the working classes, whose name was Eva Duarte and he won the elections in 1946 obtaining a remarkable majority of votes". This electoral success (result) represented the interest of Argentine workers.

During the year that lasted the Perónist Government, workers could truly say, that they had never been better off. Refined people were disgusted because of the slogan.

"In 1955, Perón was overthrown by the Middle Class. The Army and the Catholic Church but not by the people".

After Perón was overthrown, the country had a temporary military government. La Revolución Libertadora (The Liberating Revolution) and in 1958 there was a call to vote. Frondizi was chosen because of his promises to the Perónist who were instructed by their exiled dictator to vote in favour of the U.C.R.I. Party.

But, when they realised that President Frondizi intended to put into practice a different policy, most of them spoiled their vote in the subsequent elections. Since Perónism was banished, a blank vote (or a spoiled vote) was mostly a vote in favour of Perón. The last elections were a prove of this "what happens in Argentina now, is uncertain. But, evidently, the new President, Jose Maria Guido is not likely to govern for a long period".

On 5th May, the same newspaper published a report, which complemented the previous one.

Under the title "The return of the shirtless" it added that whatever the outcome of the Argentine crisis might be "It has taught us a disturbing lesson with consequences for beyond Argentina's limits or even south America's".

"That's why, seven years after the dictator was overthrown, his Mystique can still survive without the climate that surrounded his ascent to the presidency and his government. Even though his permanency at the head of the country would have been disastrous".

In spite of being banned, million of well-fed and educated citizens with no risk of constraint decided to vote the Perónist Party on 18th March. This was a mixture of Socialist, Fascist and Nationalist ideas. Without any intellectual ideology or doctrine.

Other of the analysed aspects was the fact that it had been impossible to create a coalition of political parties who could beat the Perónist Party in the elections, since Dr. Ricardo Balbn, from the "Radicales del Pueblo" party refused to cooperate with the "Radical Intransigente" party to which President Frondizi belonged. So, the coalition was strangled on its very start.

ARGENTINA'S NEED

The "Washington Post" of 23rd September published an extensive note to summarise the events we have mentioned above, under the preceding title.

According with this newspaper "Argentina needs a hero, someone with prestige, the authority and idealism of De Gaulle, someone who could keep the army away from confidence of the people, establish a steady government who could improve the deteriorated economy and someone who, by means of efficient long term administration could attract the Peronist working class, to democracy". If the economic problems were important, the political stability was necessary to solve them. The non regretful Peronist masses were who voted President Frondizi in 1958 and placed him at the head of the government. His need of taking into account their points of view destroyed his tentative to carry out a coherent economic policy. In addition to this the Peronist votes he got for the Congress in March, led to an interference of the non-Peronist sector of the army and the appointment of Jose Maria Guido as his successor.

Since then, President Guido whose legality is doubtful has governed under the Army's tolerance. But peace hasn't been assured yet, because the army is divided in two tendencies, those who demand an immediate return to the Constitution and elections, and those in favour of an Army's dictatorship hidden under constitutional decorations. The conflict between these two groups of the Army ended with the victory of the constitutionals and the promise of a call for elections from President Guido as soon as possible. The political parties were: "hopelessly divided, opposing to the new statute Perónism which, in trying to ban the limits of their freedom of action".

General Aramburu, who had announced his candidacy for President in the following elections looked like a possible hope considering that he had been able to provoke Perón's fall in 1955. But the fact that his prestige might unify this divided Nation is rather doubtful.

CONCLUSIONS

THE NORTH AMERICAN DIPLOMACY'S OPINION

On the 3rd April, the "Sun Times" informed that the North American State Secretary, Dean Rusk during a press conference in Washington, and in answer to a question made by the credited journalist of the white House, expressed briefly that, considering the last events that took place in Argentina, "The United State was somehow optimistic, and hoped that the country would solve the crisis in a pacific way. He added that Argentina was going through a critical and period that The United States hoped for a quick and pacific solution to the government

crisis. This would help this country (Argentina) to review its participation in the effort of The Alliance of Progress”.

It was evidently clear that The United States opinion about Argentina's situation was that: “Even, if the American implications were considered it consisted in a strictly internal problem of that country”.

THE OPINION OF CASTRO'S REGIME

On the 6th April edition “The Reporter” (newspaper) published some news that appeared in a Cuban newspaper called “Revolution”. “The Reporter”, informed about some statements made by Fidel Castro about Frondizi's overthrow.

On 5th April Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro, during a speech he pronounced in La Havana on the closing act of a Congress to organise “The Communist Youth Union” attacked the Latin American leaders violently though the main target was the President of Ecuador whose government had just broken off diplomatic relations with the Cuban regime.

He affirmed that the same events that had taken place in Argentina some days before, had happened in Ecuador. The only difference was that Arosemena had got the power with the support of the workers, labourers and students and could also have the popular support against the military demands, Frondizi, however, didn't have it, but in spite of this, he resisted much longer (offered a stronger resistance). He added that the Ecuadorian President had promised not to break off with Cuba 96, but when he accepted the military imposition, Arosemena was no longer the President of Ecuador.

Now, he is only with the reactionaries and with the military, who in the end will behave with him, the same as with Frondizi. He affirmed that with Argentina and Ecuador examples the imperialism has lost the vine leaf of the representative democracy, with violent and forcing actions in such a way that even their own marionettes succumb to the increasesment of contradictions.

On the 21st April “The Reports” informed that on the previous day Cuba's Prime Minister, Fidel Castro has pronounced a speech in La Havana on account of the first anniversary of the frustrated unsuccessful landing on Giron beach.

On referring to our country he spoke in a pejorative way, he said that “The social democratic government of Argentina didn't even survive to commemorate the first year's anniversary of the imperialistic defeat valuing the strength of the Cuban regime against those countries dominated by the North American capitalist regime”.

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STRESZCZENIE

Celem niniejszej pracy jest wyjaśnienie sposobu, w jaki prasa północnoamerykańska analizowała ostatni etap rządów Arturo Frondiziego jako prezydenta Argentyny. Ukazano szeroką gamę opinii na ten temat rozpowszechnianych w USA. Owe opinie na temat polityki międzynarodowej i wewnętrznej Frondiziego nie różniły się zasadniczo od opinii Departamentu Stanu Administracji Kennedy'ego. Sprawa Kuby była pierwszym punktem zainteresowania w stosunkach Argentyna – USA podczas 7. Konferencji Konsultacyjnej Amerykańskich Ministrów Spraw Zagranicznych, która odbyła się w Punta del Este w ostatnim tygodniu stycznia. Pozostałe kwestie to opozycja wojskowych co do uznania komunistycznego reżimu na Kubie i tryumf byłego dyktatora Juana Peróna w wyborach z 18. Marca. Naciski, którym Frondizi nie mógł sprostać w polityce zagranicznej (Kuba i jej utożsamianie się z blokiem sowieckim) a także zagorzały antyperonizm wojskowych były szeroko kolportowane przez północnoamerykańskie agencje prasowe, podające wyjaśnienia zasadniczo zgodne ze stanem faktycznym. Pozwala to na głębsze zbadanie kwestii, która jest nadal ważna w związku z analizą jej następstw, tzn. problemy spowodowane przez rewolucję kubańską, zwycięstwo Partii Peróna, rola armii w demokracji i rządach Arturo Frondiziego.