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# Summaries

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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

## **Summaries**

Roman Murawski

### **On Development of the Awareness of the Difference Between Truth and Provability in Mathematics**

The author shows in his article how the awareness of the difference between truth and provability in mathematics has developed. He points out the role played in this process by Gödel's results concerning incompleteness of formalised theories and also indicates the attempts at overcoming these limitations by giving up the finitistic condition and by allowing infinitary methods in the notion of mathematical proof. The philosophical assumptions that one accepts are important for the problem under discussion. For strict formalists and intuitionists the problem of distinguishing between truth and proof does not exist at all. For them a mathematical statement is true if it is provable, where proofs are considered to be our own constructions — syntactic or mental. The situation is entirely different for the proponents of platonism (realism) in the philosophy of mathematics. It can be said that it is just the platonist approach to mathematics that made it possible for Gödel to both pose the problem and to understand and show the difference between provability and truth.

Krzysztof Wójtowicz

### **Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics**

In the contemporary philosophy of mathematics there is an ongoing discussion concerning the issue of the justification of mathematical axioms and independent sentences. The works of P. Maddy in which the author focuses on the set theory are extensive studies devoted to that problem. In one of the monographs she deals with the problem of the justification of set theory's sentences in a new way, assuming a different metaphilosophical standpoint. In the paper (which is the first part of the two-part whole) Maddy's conception is faithfully presented. The author makes no com-

ments of his own, except for the first — introductory — chapter and footnotes, in which some additional explanations and comments can be found.

Mieszko Tałasiewicz

**Semantico-Categorial Analysis. Examining the Syntax or Determining the Sense?**

In the paper the author tries to show that semantico-categorial analysis in the traditional Ajdukiewiczian application as a tool of evaluating semantic completeness of complex expressions is ineffective. There is, however, another application, to which the analysis is much better fitted. Namely, it allows to precisify the actual uses of natural language — in all those cases in which on the one hand precision is a superior value, and on the other hand, the formalisation is not possible and one has to stay within natural language. Obviously, in order to achieve this aim many particular problems, sometimes not at all trivial, have to be solved. Amongst the most important the author sees determining a binding canon of the rules of analysis and determining pragmatic criteria of the admissibility of paraphrases and of filling in ellipses.

Piotr Labenz

**Definitions of Existence**

Since ontology is to be the science which studies that what exists, every ontological enterprise has to be preceded by an agreement as to what „existence” means. This is best done by giving a definition of existence. In the article the author examines definitions of existence that are used, or could be used, in various ontologies. To this aim he introduces a systematics of the possible definitions and with its help studies definitions of existence given by various authors. Definitions that he considers have the form „ $\langle x \text{ exists} \rangle \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \langle p \rangle$ ”, where „ $p$ ” is a sentence (it is also possible to treat existence as an undefined primary term, but such a treatment in the context of ontology in which it is used may be regarded as a contextual definition). Thus, in fact the subject of the analysis is what is understood by the expression of the form „ $x$  exists”.

**SESSION: BETWEEN WISDOM AND SCIENCE**

Władysław Stróżewski

**Klemens Szaniawski's Thoughts about University**

In his collected works *O rozumowaniu, nauce i wartościach* [*On Reasoning, Science, and Values*] we will not find any remark directly concerning university. However, there are some texts there which suggest what Klemens Szaniawski would say about university if he were asked. Who is a man of university? The author has once replied „that he is a man who identifies himself in a sense with the purposes of university, lives its life and feels responsible for it”. Szaniawski satisfies that definition to the greatest extend.

Anna Jedynak

**Klemens Szaniawski — Person and Work**

The author is one of the pupils of Klemens Szaniawski. Szaniawski has lead a very active life as a scientist and a public activist. His public activity is quite well-known. His early period of life and scientific interests are not so well-known, however. And it is these latter matters that the author focuses on in her paper.

Marta Kuc

**Klemens Szaniawski's Methods of a Just Division of Goods**

Klemens Szaniawski has proposed two probabilistic principles of a just division of goods, based on postulates of egalitarianism and optimum conditions: the principle of equal chances of satisfaction and the principle of equal chances of choice. The differences between these principles follow from a different understanding of the issue of equality, which leads to the differences in procedures and final results. When egalitarianism is understood as the equality of chances of satisfaction, in many cases it cannot be reconciled with the postulate of optimum conditions. In the paper one can find some selected conclusions of the analyses of that issue and a comparison of the consequences of both principles: i.a. regarding the fulfilment of other criteria: proportionality and rightness.

Jan Woleński

**Naturalism, Antinaturalism and the Foundations of Statistics**

Klemens Szaniawski has been dealing with many philosophical problems, but the philosophical foundations of statistics and theory of decision were his main interest. Unfortunately, he did not present his results and considerations in a synthetic monograph. One can suppose, however, that it would be an attempt to look at science from the point of view of someone who makes epistemic decisions and to regard statistical inferences as paradigmatic scientific procedures. The material concerning that subject contained in Szaniawski's published papers justifies the claim that it would be an extremely interesting synthesis. The author presents consequences for naturalism and antinaturalism that the discussions surrounding the foundations of statistics and decision theory has brought about. He often employs the results obtained by Szaniawski.