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# Submitted Summaries

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## **Submitted Summaries**

### **Anna Brożek, On essential and inessential occurrence of expressions in another expressions**

Let us assume that the expression  $A$  is a segment of the expression  $B$ . Now, let us assume that we try to transform the expression  $B$  into the expression  $B'$ , removing  $A$  from  $B$  or replacing  $A$  with another expression, say  $A'$ . When shall we say that  $A$  is irremovable or occurs in  $B$  essentially? We shall do it, if we can neither remove  $A$  from  $B$  nor replace  $A$  with  $A'$ , not influencing upon important properties of  $B$ . On the other hand, when shall we say that the occurrence  $A$  in  $B$  is essential? We shall do it, if we can transform  $B$  into  $B'$  changing no «essential» properties of  $B$ .

Let us say it more precisely.

Let us assume – as concerns expressions  $x, y, x'$  and  $y'$  – that:

- (a)  $x$  occurs in  $y$ ;
- (b) the only structural difference between  $y$  and  $y'$  is that  $x$  does not occur in  $y'$ , or  $x'$  occurs in  $y$  instead of  $x$ .

Then:

$x$  occurs in  $y$  inessentially-with-respect-to- $w$  of  $y$ , iff  $y'$  is the same as  $y$  with respect to  $p$ .

Correspondingly:

$x$  occurs in  $y$  essentially-with-respect-to- $w$  of  $y$ , iff  $y'$  is different as  $y$  with respect to  $p$ .

The occurrence  $x$  in  $y$  may be essential or inessential with respect to syntactic, semantic or pragmatic properties of  $y$ . In my paper, I discuss a variety of detailed concepts of the (in)essential occurrence of expressions in another expressions with respect to semantic properties of these expressions, i.e. with respect to semantic

category, logical value, denotation and connotation. I also discuss some philosophical and methodological implications of presented solutions of the problem.

### **Piotr Brykczyński, Kazimierz Twardowski's conception of products of actions**

The aim of the paper is to provide a presentation and evaluation of Kazimierz Twardowski's conception, the subject matter and contents of which is delimited, roughly by (Twardowski 1965a). Since there is no separate problematization of the notion of action in Twardowski, it is maintained that the conception in question should be characterized rather as a conception of „products of actions” (hence the term „Twardowski's conception of products of actions”) and not as a conception of „actions and products” — contrary to what is suggested by the title of the above mentioned Twardowski's paper.

Twardowski's conception of products of actions includes a conception which has the general notion of products of actions as its central notion, and which belongs to philosophy of action. This conception has been called „Twardowski's general conception of products of actions”. It is supplemented by some conceptions which can be characterised, roughly, as based on it (I.3.). Among the theses that belong to the general conception are the theses that make together what has been called in the paper „the conception of nonpermanent products as events” (II.7.). There is also a thesis to the effect that each action has but one product (II.1.), and a thesis which eliminates the material of actions from their products (II.11.). As for the conceptions which are based on Twardowski's general conception of products of actions, all but one belong to the logic of language and semiotics. They include Twardowski's conception of meaning and, within its confines, his conception of proposition as the product of judgement.

The presentation and evaluation of Twardowski's conception of products of actions often requires preparatory considerations of a purely ontological, epistemological and/or methodological character. A separate section (II.8.) is devoted entirely to some ontological problems of complexity with the question of „empty” parts as the question in focus.

Twardowski's conception of products of actions has to be seen as making a contribution to the research on the ontological foundations of philosophy of action and philosophy of mind. If the objections that have been raised against it are correct, the importance of its contribution to this research may be questioned (IV.1.). Such is f.e. the import of the objections raised against Twardowski's conception of meaning: while this conception seems at first sight to substantially widen our perspectives in respect of the ontic status of meanings, the corrections proposed as a result of its critical appraisal reduce all that can have a claim to originality to a variant of the thesis to the effect that meanings are defective in respect of ontic autonomy (III.2.6.).

The results presented in the paper have some bearing on the question of Twardowski's attitude towards psychologism, as well as his contribution to the battle against it: on the one hand there seems to be no reason to question Twardowski's po-

sition as a consistent antipsychologist (this contention does not apply to the „early” Twardowski); on the other hand in what remains of Twardowski’s conception of products of actions in the light of the above criticism nothing, roughly, is left that could count as Twardowski’s contribution to the systematic critique of psychologism (III.5.).

Twardowski’s conception of products of actions is essentially connected also with some of his other ideas, including his views on existence (the connection involves the conception of proposition as the product of judgement, and the conception of content). It has been pointed out that as the content of an act of judgement Twardowski might have been indicating (inconsistently) both existence as such and (in the background as it were) the appropriate instances of existence.

The summary of criticism which has been given in the last part of the paper (IV.1.) calls for comparison with the prospects of developing an „ontology of products of actions” on the basis of the views of other philosophers. The comparison includes Popper’s conception of the Third World, supplemented by his distinction: acts of production — products. It includes also Ingarden’s conception of meanings as products of the acts of consciousness.

### **Roman Piotr Godlewski, Logical and Psychological Concept of Meaning, i.e. Davidson vs Kuhn**

The objection raised by Davidson against Kuhn in article „On the Very Idea of Conceptual Scheme” that the argument presented in „The Structure of Scientific Revolution” was inconsistent is incorrect. Kuhn’s conception belongs to psychology and sociology and his work could be titled „An Outline of Psychology and Sociology of Scientific Research”. Consequently he is interested only and only in psychological reasons that affect scientists’ theoretical decisions. E.g. his considerations concerning neutral observational language are polemic against thesis that language like that could be somehow useful for interpretation of what scientists do and also against thesis that it could be useful for scientists themselves. The difficulty of understanding above paradigmata does not consist on conceptual schemata meant logically as Davidson reads it but on different cognitive attitude and different manual sets of concepts. To explain the controversy logical and psychological concepts of meaning are distinguished. Davidson means the proper, Kuhn does the latter. Psychological meaning consists on what associations and feelings are evocated by utterances in the receiver’s mind. When Kuhn says that after a revolution scientists live in another world he means only that the language with which they describe the reality has different psychological meaning. And this is that kind of meaning that cannot be translated and is lost when you discuss above paradigmata. From Kuhn’s point of view it is possible to translate logical meaning of scientific utterances from before a revolution, and he does it. The psychological meaning can be only described but not translated.

**Mariusz Grygianiec, Genidentity and the Metaphysics of Persistence: Endurantism, Perdurantism and Exdurantism**

The metaphysical explanations of genidentity are very important both for scientific researches and for everyday human activities. Endurantism, perdurantism and exdurantism (*stage view* and point-eventism) are the standard metaphysical theories, which provide descriptions and explanations of relations of change and persistence. The descriptions and explanations in question give simultaneously the truth-conditions for statements about an identity of objects, which persist and undergo changes in time. The main aim of the paper is to formulate the above-mentioned metaphysical stances and to give the general account of the relation of genidentity within a conceptual framework of these theories. The second aim is to provide a suitable reconstruction of criteria of genidentity, which are appropriate for the three metaphysical doctrines.

**Jacek Pańniczek, About Logic of Truthmakers**

The paper discusses main issues concerning truthmakers: (1) what is the ontological status of truthmakers (are they ordinary objects, situations, tropes etc?), (2) what are deductive properties of truthmakers. A simple logic of truthmakers is developed. The logic consists of an axiomatic system and a possible world semantics.

**Anna Wójtowicz, Local and global extensionality principle**

In this article the notions of local and global extensionality principle are defined; the problem of relations between extensionality of a language and theory of extension of a name and extension of a sentence is discussed.

**Michał Heller, Misplaced criticism**

The paper contains a comment on the criticism of the author's book *Początek jest wszędzie* (Prószyński i S-ka, 2002) by Marek Łagosz („Przegląd Filozoficzny — Nowa Seria, 14, 2005, 121-133). The comment focuses on the following issues: (1) the conception of philosophy of physics; (2) some methodological questions, especially the role of models in physics; (3) some explanations concerning the model proposed by the present author and his coworkers. A few „ideological remarks” are also made.