Artykuł został opracowany do udostępnienia w internecie przez Muzeum Historii Polski w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł jest umieszczony w kolekcji cyfrowej bazhum.muzhp.pl, gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych.

Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.
Submitted Summaries

Marek Tokarz, Why are we not convinced by convincing arguments

Sometimes, very often in fact, our persuasive efforts fail even though we are right and the arguments we use are logically correct. In the article we are trying to tell why this is so, and as it turns out there may be quite a few causes. First, the hearer may not be convinced because he has not been motivated to try and understand the speaker — understanding takes work, and as a rule we do not like to work. Or he may not be convinced because he does not like the speaker himself. There are also many other potential causes, such as: balancing cognitive dissonance, faulty attributions, phenomena of assimilation and contrasting, or psychological mechanisms of consequence, conformism and reactance.

Kordula Świętorzecka, The LCG Logic of Changes

The subject of the presented work is the analysis of situations changeability in frame of constructed logic LCG. In the suggested interpretation, substantial change (substantial movement), which consists of the disappearing of a certain substance $a_1$ and the coming into being of substance $a_2$, for which $a_1$ is an active potentia, is understood in the following manner — the elementary fact: $\text{essence } a_1 \text{ exists}$ becomes fiction and a new fact arises: $\text{essence } a_2 \text{ exists}$, which is enabled by the previous one. In the language of our formalisation this «transition» from fact to fiction, which occurs in the case of the situation: $\text{essence } a_1 \text{ exists}$, described as $C$-change. The second component of substantial movement (or rather its situational equivalent) is the occurring of a new fact: $\text{essence } a_2 \text{ exists}$, which is possible under the condition of an earlier occurring of the fact: $\text{essence } a_1 \text{ exists}$. We describe this aspect of movement as $G$-change, which is an expansion of a set of formulas by a new elementary sentence and expressions in which this sentence occurs. Within the range of the LCG calculus
operators C and G obtain an interpretation wider than the one which can be determined upon the basis of the Aristotelian theory of change expressed in terms of situational ontology. Semantical and syntactical characteristics of the LCG logic gives the possibility to compare it with such known calculi of changes like sentential systems of von Wright, Clifford and Wajszczyk.

Anna Brożek, Square, eagle, and Trygław — a comment on Jacek Jadacki’s conception of semiotic functions of names

The article contains the results of the analysis of concepts connected with semantic functions of names. The conception of Jacek Jadacki, exposed in his „Spór o granice języka” („Controversy on the limits of language”), is the point of departure of this analysis.

The following theses are formulated and argued for.
(1) There are two basic semantic functions of names: the referential and the descriptive one. The first function consists in indicating some objects; the second one consists in ascribing properties to some objects. (2) The concepts of indicating and ascribing are primitive ones. (3) The referential function of denotation and the descriptive function of connotation are mutually independent. The term „connotation” can be defined without using the term „denotation” and vice versa. (4) Names perform not only the function of designating, i.e. referring to particular objects, but also the function of denominating, i.e. referring to universal (resp. postulated) objects. (5) The connotation of a given name is genetically or conventionally connected with the pragmatic function of ascribing properties to respective objects. (6) In sciences, such connotations of names are sought after, which are, at the same time, essences of designates of these names.

Aleksandra Horecka, Empty names in the theory of Tadeusz Kotarbiński

The paper deals with the concept of empty name in the theory of Tadeusz Kotarbiński — one of the representatives of Lvov-Warsaw School. The aim of the article is to reconstruct Kotarbiński’s definition of empty names, his thesis concerning structure and connotation of empty names, his interpretation of categorical sentence with empty names and to point out problems which arise in consequence of these theories.

Only same expressions regarded traditionally as empty names are empty names according to Kotarbiński, e.g. „son of childless mother” or „centaur”. Expressions like „Brotherhood of the sons of childless mother” — in opinion of Kotarbiński — aren’t names at all, they are onomatoids. In Kotarbiński’s syntactic-semantic definition of empty name several vicious circles can be found. His theories of empty names and their connotation are at odds with his thesis of reism. He doesn’t make any distinction between different types of empty names, but he prompts to distinguish three types of such names: (1) names of objects the non-existence of which is known by experience and names of such non-existing objects, which could exist in
the past, (2) names of incoherent objects and (3) names of objects, which can exist in future. The semantic definition of empty names consistent with reism is possible on condition that empty names are only the names of objects that will exist in future.

**Pawel Rojek, Family Resemblances and Concrete Universals**

It has been widely recognized that Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblance solved the problem of universals. This theory may be considered in two ways, however. (1) Family resemblance may be understood in a manner of abstract universals theory. Most commentators accept this interpretation. Though in this case, I would argue, Wittgenstein's contribution to the problem of universals seems to be overestimated. (2) Wittgenstein's theory may also be considered, following one of contemporary Polish philosophers J. Szymura, as a view connected with the Hegelian theory of concrete universals. The article is devoted to put forward some arguments for this interpretation. Firstly, it is coherent with all Wittgenstein's theses on family resemblance and states that there is literally nothing common in things. Secondly, it fits to Wittgenstein's language (terms such as „family”, „Ähnlichkeit” and so on). Thirdly, there are some biographical pieces of evidence that Wittgenstein was inspired by Goethe’s concept of „Urpflanze”, which is very close to concrete universal.

**Mariusz Grygianiec, ‘Four-Dimensionalism’ — an Analysis and Interpretation**

There are several faces of Four-Dimensionalism. Sometimes 4D-ism is formulated as the thesis that the material world is composed of spatial as well as temporal parts. Another version of 4D-ism states that persisting objects are extended over time in the same way that they are extended over space. Some Four-Dimensionalists defend the thesis that all objects persist by perduring *i.e.* by having different temporal parts at different times. Sometimes 4D-ism means the same as eternalism — the thesis that past and future objects (and times) are just as real as currently existing ones. Finally it can mean the thesis that all objects are in fact four-dimensional *i.e.* they are in every case a filling of some subregions of space-time. The author examines some varieties of 4D-ism and tries to formulate both a precise meaning of those doctrines and an evaluation of them.