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# Submitted Summaries

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Artykuł został opracowany do udostępnienia w internecie przez Muzeum Historii Polski w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł jest umieszczony w kolekcji cyfrowej [bazhum.muzhp.pl](http://bazhum.muzhp.pl), gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych.

Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

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### **Helena Eilstein, Some remarks on scientism and epistemological optimism**

Using a comprehensive quotation from a book of Władysław Krajewski a characteristic of moderate scientism (to be called scientism below) is given. That is the stance I share with Krajewski. I complement the characteristic presenting scientism as an approved by me „nad'we trust in science”. In the main part of the paper I discuss, however, the limitations imposed by contemporary science on the traditional epistemological optimism of scientism.

### **Filip Kawczyński, On attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions**

The main topic of this paper is the distinction between attributive and referential uses of definite descriptions. The first influential account of what is the logical form of a proposition expressed by a sentence 'The  $\phi$  is  $\psi$ ' was proposed by Russell. Donnellan noticed later that Russellian account does not apply to all such sentences and drew the distinction in question. First, we have to consider which language units are to be explored — said Donnellan. Speaking of *types* involves unwelcome generality while speaking of *tokens* overlooks the role of speaker's intentions. The finest approach then is speaking of *uses* (according to the characteristics given by Jerzy Pelc).

Specific feature which distinguish descriptions used referentially (in a sentence of the form 'The  $\phi$  is  $\psi$ ') from those used attributively is that the descriptive aspect of the former is not essential (in contradiction to that of the latter), i.e. the description used referentially can be exchanged for another one (such that it is literally false about the object referred to), and the extension as well as the proposition expressed by the sentence will not change.

To explain this effect (which is only described in Donellan's paper) we can adopt and extend Kaplan's view on propositions (originally designed for sentences with demonstratives) to sentences with descriptions used referentially and say that a proposition expressed by such a sentence consists of sense of the description used attributively in predicate and the object itself as a physical thing. This solution does not decide however, whether the distinction is semantic or pragmatic. To give the answer we would need to have precisely marked border between two mentioned disciplines.

**Katarzyna Kobos, D.J. Chalmers' non-reductionist functionalism in defense of the reality of sensuous experience**

In the article herein I address the issue of the non-reductive functionalist stance devised by David Chalmers and advocated by him in his 1995 paper entitled „Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia”. I attend to the argument provided in support of the thesis. The argument takes on the guise of neuron-to-silicon-chip switch thought experiment that involves two alternative-end scenarios of phenomenal consciousness, i.e. qualia, either gradually fading away as silicon chips prevail over neurons in the brain or disappearing abruptly with the removal of a single consecutive neuron and its replacement with a silicon chip.

I comply with the main thrust of Chalmers' account on the origin of phenomenal consciousness to the effect that it is the functional structure of the material bearer of mental faculties rather than the type of material that warrants the emergence of consciousness.

Yet I find fault with certain features of Chalmers' reasoning. My main criticism refers to the pivotal notion of functional structure that remains an abstract and requires substantiation. The attempt to trace the fact of having sensations and being aware of them back to an entity that is only hinted at and nowhere to be found within the neurophysiological, cognitive or biological domain falls short of a sound explanation. Thus I develop Chalmers' line of argument further to specify an adequate and exhaustive characteristic of the said functional structure. I suggest that, apart from the usual aspects attributive of ordinary functional structure which is considered in terms of input, output and the algorithmic operations in-between, „graininess” should also be discerned. A functional structure eligible for inducing conscious sensations should be sufficiently subtle or, in other words, complex.

**Wojciech Krysztofiak, The controversy over ontology of situations as the controversy over the compositionality principle. The argument of a metaphor**

In the paper there is presented the argument for the situational paradigm of theory of language. In comparison to the nominativistic semantics it is argued in the paper that the propositional semantics is a better tool of explaining various speech acts in which the principle of compositionality is collapsed. In the paper there are also described referential mechanisms of metaphorical speech acts. In accordance with

these mechanisms the metaphorical status of speech acts is determined by the collapse of Fregean referential compositionality of speech acts.

In the paper there are constructed two notions of compositionality. First of them may be called classical Fregean concept of compositionality which establishes a semantic correlate of a complex speech act on a functional basis of semantic correlates of constituents of a complex speech act. According to the second notion of compositionality, correlates of constituents of a complex speech act are recursively determined by a correlate of a complex speech act. Metaphorical speech acts possess such a property that correlates of their constituent expressions are determined in processes of de-coding by recursive compositionality functions. Maximal metaphors are speech acts in which recursive as well as Fregean compositionality collapse.

In the paper it is argued that the traditional nominativistic semantics is not able to explain communicational functioning of metaphorical speech acts. That is why the conclusion of the paper resolves itself to the thesis that the situational semantic paradigm which should base on recursive notion of compositionality, is better than the nominativistic paradigm.

#### **Teresa Obolevitch, Philosophy, science and theology in the modern Russia**

Between the Orthodox Russian Church and modern science were not any serious conflicts. For examples, in XVII century students of Academy of Kiev-Mohyla studied heliocentric system of Copernic and doctrine of Galileo. In 1724 According to the project of Leibniz Tsar Peter I founded Russian Academy of Science in St-Petersburg. There worked D. Bernoulli and L. Euler. The Russian philosophical though presents an attempt of accord of science and theology.

#### **Tadeusz Pabjan, A short history of nonlocality**

Nonlocality is one of the most uncommon features of the quantum world. This „spooky action at a distance” signifies a kind of instant interaction between places separated by space. This paper deals with a history of this notion and tries to answer the question of how and when this notion appeared as well as what were the factors of its evolution. The main source of information about this subject-matter is the history of science. In the paper the most important episodes concerning nonlocality are presented, excluding the Bell’s Theorem (1964), which proves nonlocal behavior of quantum objects and opens completely new period in the history of science. First, Newton’s gravitational action at a distance is discussed. Afterwards, the problem of nonlocal interactions in quantum mechanics is sketched; special attention is paid to the EPR paradox. Finally, the interpretative disputes about nonlocality in the years preceding the Bell’s Theorem are presented.

**Andrzej Stępnik, Laws of nature, scientific laws and miracles. criticism of Hume's arguments against miracles**

In the article I consider Hume's arguments against miracles and the notion of miracle. From Hume's perspective, miracles are violations of the laws of nature caused by the supernatural being or beings. In Part I of *On Miracles* Hume argues that miracles can never be believed by a rational person. In Part II he attempts to demonstrate that there is actually no evidence for a miracle. Using distinction between laws of nature and scientific laws, and the deductive-nomological model of explanation, I come to some conclusions:

1. The Hume's arguments against miracles are not conclusive.
2. The Mackie's defense of Hume's arguments is unsatisfactory. Moreover, Mackie himself gives the reasons which weaken his and Hume's arguments against miracles.
3. There is consistent notion of miracle: miracle can be understood as a result of bursting supernatural factor into relatively isolated system of nature.
4. Miracles can occur without the violations of the laws of nature or the scientific law — the Hume's notion of miracle is incorrect.

**Krzysztof A. Wiczorek, Why do we make mistakes in our reasoning. Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models**

In the article we are trying to answer the question why people make mistakes in their reasoning. According to the theory proposed by P. N. Johnson-Laird, reasoning is a semantic process based on mental models. Reasoners build models of the situations described in premises and then check which conclusion holds in all the models. Unfortunately, our working memory has a limited processing capacity, and so we often fail to represent all possibilities necessary to draw a valid conclusion. The more models we have to build, the higher the chance of making a mistake. Due to limitations of our working memory, we tend to represent in the models only what is true, but not what is false. One of the consequences of this fact is the occurrence of certain illusions: inferences that are compelling but invalid. The existence of such illusionary inferences have been corroborated by numerous experiments.