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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

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DEFINING A VALUE IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF REHABILITATION

Rehabilitation is directed at people being subject to a variety of social menaces. The process of rehabilitation involves, among other things, establishing a dialogue between positive and negative values, with the intention of supplanting the latter by the former.

As a philosopher J. M. Bocheński claims, “the value of a given object is the property that renders the object valuable” explaining later that the above concept is used derivatively (not very precisely though) in reference to valuable objects¹. According to sociologists, on the other hand, value constitutes a criterion for making judgements about phenomena².

“The Dictionary of Psychology” defines value as “an interest shown to an object, or a respect given to a person”³.

M. Patuszyński, in turn, states the meaning of value as “a judgement (opinions, beliefs) evaluating certain objects or phenomena, which serves as a basis for humans to regard these objects or phenomena as deserving a positive appraisal”⁴.

There are numerous and very diverse designations of the term “value”, referring to such values as good, utility, effectiveness, beauty, tragicallness, charm, nobleness, rightness, realness, certainty⁵. All of them are specific values.

Discussing the functions fulfilled by values, T. Mądrzycki claims they regulate the process of need satisfaction as well as influence an individual’s self-

¹ J.M. Bocheński, *Sto zabobonów*, Wyd. Phileo, Kraków 1992, p. 135.

² H. Świda, *Młdzież a wartości*, In: *Wartości i ich przemiany*, ed. A. Pawełczyńska, Wyd. Archidiecezji Warszawskiej, Warszawa 1992, p. 48.

³ N. Sillamy, *Słownik psychologii*, Wyd. Książnica, Katowice 1995, p. 319.

⁴ M. Patuszyński, *Hierarchia wartości u poborowych a postawa wobec wojska*, In: *Studia z psychologii*, vol. 2, ed. K. Ostrowska, ATK, Warszawa 1990, p. 152.

⁵ W. Stróżewski, *Istnienie i wartość*, ZNAK, Kraków 1981, p. 22.

evaluation. According to the author, a set of values also has an effect on one's choice of long-term goals and the ways to fulfil them⁶.

K.J. Brozi's analysis of values in the perspective of the functional conception of a cultural standard reaches the conclusion that "norms and values are included in the mutually overlapping systems of needs and systems of actions and it is only the synthesis of those systems that enables the identification of their real essence – i.e. a brief summary of the organisation and orientation of human lives in a given culture"⁷.

Values are combined into systems (sets). K. Ostrowska describes a set of values in accordance with the assumptions of a general theory of systems; according to the author, it is "a hierarchically ordered set of an individual's attitudes toward all those values which, from the perspective of his existence and the fulfilment of his life tasks associated with his personal existence, are important, necessary, valuable and desirable"⁸.

Let us now provide some instances of the systematisation of values. As a matter of fact, it dates back to the ancient times and is largely connected with the figure of Plato (427–347) – its main contributor. As early as then a triad of three highest values was established, including the values of truth, good, and beauty⁹.

For Saint Thomas (1225 or 1227–1274), a representative of medieval thought, spiritual goods exceed corporal goods. Consequently, the Highest Good is God, who is both a necessary being (He must exist, as it is determined by His nature) and an independent being (existing by His own nature)¹⁰.

M. Scheler, a philosopher from the turn of the 19th and 20th century (1874–1928), distinguishes between hedonistic, utilitarian, vital, spiritual and cultural as well as religious values – the latter possessing the highest rank¹¹.

One of the most well-known psychological typologies of values is undoubtedly the conception proposed by Ch. Morris. The author mentions thirteen "ways to live", all of which are equipped with their own corresponding values¹². The names of these values have been given by S. Siek¹³:

⁶ T. Mądrzycki, *Osobowość jako system tworzący i realizujący plany*, GWP, Gdańsk 1996, pp. 108–109.

⁷ K.J. Brozi, *Antropologia wartości*, Wyd. UMCS, Lublin 1994, p. 331.

⁸ K. Ostrowska, *W poszukiwaniu wartości*, vol. 1, GWP, Gdańsk 1994, p. 15.

⁹ W. Tatariewicz, *Historia filozofii*, vol. 1, PWN, Warszawa 1968, pp. 95, 104, 107–108; W. Srózewski, *op.cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁰ W. Tatariewicz, *op.cit.*, pp. 303–304; J. Majka, *Filozofia społeczna*, Wyd. Wrocławskiej Księgarni Archidiecezjalnej, Wrocław 1982, p. 155.

¹¹ A. Węgrzycki, *Scheler*, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa 1975, p. 50; M. Scheler, *Aprioryczne powiązania o charakterze starszeństwa między modalnościami wartości*, In: A. Węgrzycki, *op.cit.*, pp. 161–168.

¹² Ch. Morris, *Varieties of Human Value*, Univ. Of Chicago Press, Chicago 1956, p. 1.

¹³ S. Siek, *Wybrane metody badania osobowości*, ATK, Warszawa 1993, pp. 366–367.

- Path (P.) 1. Directing yourself toward (DYT) preserving the highest human values;
- P. 2. DYT seeking the inner independence and freedom from the pressures on the part of people and things;
- P. 3. DYT openness to people and showing sympathetic concern for them;
- P. 4. DYT experiencing an epicurean festivity and sensuous enjoyment of life;
- P. 5. DYT acting and enjoying life through group participation;
- P. 6. DYT continuous altering and shaping the surrounding reality;
- P. 7. DYT the harmonious combining of action, experience and contemplation;
- P. 8. DYT a carefree enjoyment of health and the simple, easily obtainable pleasure;
- P. 9. DYT the passive receptivity of stimuli from the outside world;
- P. 10. DYT controlling the self and facing adversities with a stoical disposition;
- P. 11. DYT analysis and meditation on the inner life;
- P. 12. DYT acting daringly and taking risk;
- P. 13. DYT being subject to the purpose of the cosmic forces of nature.

A widely-known psychologist J. Koziński mentions the following value orientations: the Dionysian orientation (o.) – possessing and self indulgence, convenient life, comfort, abundance, consumption; the Heraclean o. – domination over others, gaining power; the Promethean o. – moral principles, altruism, social service; the Apollonian o. – creativity, knowing the world, development of art and science; the Socratean o. – knowing and understanding oneself, self-actualization and self-reflection, autcreation¹⁴.

Lastly, I would like encourage rehabilitative educators to shape the values of their charges through the fulfilment of three major goals, specified by K. Ostrowska¹⁵: 1. helping them to attain the highest levels of humanity, 2. teaching them to cooperate with others, 3. accompanying them in the process of uniting with the universe.

OKREŚLENIE WARTOŚCI W PERSPEKTYWIE RESOCJALIZACJI

Streszczenie

Resocjalizacją obejmowani są ludzie z szerokiego spectrum zagrożeń. Resocjalizacja to m.in. uruchamianie dialogu między wartościami pozytywnymi a negatywnymi po to, aby te drugie zostały wyparte przez te pierwsze. Artykuł prezentuje wybrane definicje oraz przykłady systematyzacji wartości. Przykładowo – znany psycholog J. Koziński wylicza następujące orientacje wartościujące: dionizejską, heraklesową, prometejską, apollinijską, sokratejską.

¹⁴ J. Koziński, *O człowieku wielowymiarowym. Eseje psychologiczne*, PWN, Warszawa 1988, pp. 239–240.

¹⁵ K. Ostrowska, *op.cit.*, pp. 16–17.