Agata Mazurkiewicz

NATO and EU approach towards civil-military relations in military operations

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One might say that the relations between the civilians and the force conducting a military operations are as old as the history of war itself. For centuries, soldiers have been interacting with the civilian sphere on the frontlines. Yet, the nature of this relationship varied and evolved over the time and space together with the evolution of warfare. Probably the biggest change was the effect of the last 25 years. The military was never enthusiastic about their involvement with the police and civil administration but after the fall of the bipolar system the interaction between soldiers and civilians became inevitable and constant. This called for a new approach towards civil-military cooperation.

The objective of this article is to analyse and compare the approach to the relation between the military and the civilian domains of two peace-oriented international organisations: NATO (North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation) and EU (European Union). Both organisations have their own, specific policies concerning civil-military cooperation. Their respective definitions and principles vary sometimes to a vast degree.

In order to achieve the objective of the article I will first present short historic overview of the evolution of the concepts of civil-military cooperation of each organisation. After that, I will analyse those concepts using three categories: definition, place within the overall strategy and the approach towards the concept of comprehensive approach, and finally the institutional setting. The closing part of the article will be focused on identification of the most important drawbacks and challenges within each concept.
Evolution of the concept

NATO

The origins of NATO’s institutionalisation of the concept of civil-military cooperation are strictly connected to the international setting of the 1990s when the Balkan wars led to the new perception of the operational environment. The role of the military during an operation in the “pre-Balkan” environment did not require much consideration of the civil-military interaction. The analysis of the civil dimension was mostly limited to military intelligence (CIMIC Peacekeeping Intensive Training, 2010). Yet, due to the asymmetry of the conflict, the interaction between soldiers and the local population became inevitable. Military forces are now operating in a complicated environment where the distinction between battlefield and relatively peaceful area beyond is blurred. NATO operations are conducted in an environment where “the people in the streets, and houses and fields – all the people anywhere – are the battlefield” (AJP 3.4.9..., 2013).

Another factor that influenced the development of a concept of civil-military cooperation within NATO was the rapidly growing number and importance of civilian actors working in the field. In 1999, along with the deployment of the mission of Kosovo Force (KFOR), approximately 500 organisations started their work in the theatre of operation (Mockaitis, 2004: VI). The coordination of their activities was an enormous challenge for the military administration. After the signing of peace agreements, some civilian international agencies took responsibility for key areas of post-conflict reconstruction like monitoring governmental structures and local police, delivery of humanitarian aid and help in organisation of elections (Mockaitis, 2004: 14).

After the Balkan wars, NATO’s Command realised that the objective of armed forces is not only to lead to a ceasefire and maintain the peace. Their task should also comprise of assistance and facilitation in the delivery of humanitarian aid and in the reconstruction of infrastructure and civilian institutions (Mockaitis, 2004: 1). In all types of NATO operations, commanders are more and more obliged to take into account political, social, economic, cultural, religious, environmental and humanitarian factors (AJP 3.4.9...2013: p. 2–1). Consequently, there was a need for a mechanism which would enable and facilitate a framework for cooperation between the armed forces and civilian actors with different profiles and mandates. In order to achieve an enhanced coordination of actions within the area of operation, NATO’s Command initiated the process of institutionalisation of the approach towards civil-military cooperation.
Changes in the operational environment have led to the development of a new Strategic Concept in 1999. According to its provisions “(t)he interaction between Alliance forces and the civil environment (both governmental and non-governmental) in which they operate is crucial to the success of operations. Civil-military cooperation is interdependent: military means are increasingly requested to assist civil authorities; at the same time civil support to military operations is important for logistics, communications, medical support, and public affairs.” (Alliance’s Strategic Concept…, 1999: art.60). The Strategic Concept thus stressed the importance of civilian entities in the area of operation and declared the Alliance’s commitment to cooperation.

NATO’s policy on civil-military cooperation was established by a Military Committee document MC 411/1. This text is not a formally agreed NATO document and, therefore, does not necessarily represent the official views of individual member governments on all policy issues discussed. In general, NATO Member States are allowed to interpret NATO’s policy on CIMIC in accordance with their national provisions.

EU

In order to present the evolution of European Union’s concept of civil-military cooperation it is necessary to go back to the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It was introduced as one of the three pillars of the European Union as an effect of the Maastricht Treaty. CFSP was established as a step in “the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence” (Treaty on European Union, 1992: art. J4). Yet, despite ambitious objectives in the area of external security identified within the Treaty of Maastricht, no concrete provisions were introduced. It changed, similarly as in the case of NATO, after the Balkan wars in the late 1990s. After the St. Malo Declaration (1998) calling for creating European capacity for military action and after the following European Council summit meetings EU established Petersberg Tasks. They consisted of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking, meaning that they had both a military and a civilian dimension. In 1999 during the Cologne and Helsinki Meetings, the European Council laid foundations for European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, since 2009 CSDP). The next important step was the introduction of the first ever European Security Strategy (ESS, 2003), which identified key threats and challenges facing Europe. This document underlines a unique status of the EU, as a security actor with a wide range of instruments, both civilian and military.
The year 2003 was important also for two reasons other than signing the European Security Strategy. The EU has launched its first ESDP missions (EU Police Missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and signed an agreement on *European Defence: NATO/EU Consultation, Planning and Operations* (so-called *Berlin Plus* arrangement). The latter is of a big relevance for this analysis, as the agreement called for establishing within the EU Military Staff a cell with civil and military components which tasks would include among others: developing expertise in managing the civilian and/or military interface and conducting strategic advance planning for joint civil-military operations. Based on the *Berlin Plus* arrangement, the EU created a Civilian Military Cell (CivMil Cell) within the EU Military Staff which was responsible for generating the capacity to plan and run operations.

Together with the European Security Strategy, the *Berlin Plus* arrangement created the basis for institutionalisation of EU’s concept of civil-military cooperation. Those documents were developed by so-called Headline Goals. The Military Headline Goal 2010 (set in 2004) confirmed that “the EU has the civilian and military framework needed to face the multifaceted nature of these new threats” (Headline Goal, 2010: art. A1). One of the core goals set for the EU Member States in the Military Headline Goal was interoperability, defined as “the ability of our armed forces to work together and to interact with other civilian tools.” (Headline Goal, 2010: art. A3). Moreover, “EU will further strengthen the coordinated use of its civil and military capabilities acknowledging that modern Crisis Management Operations typically require a mixture of instruments” (Headline Goal, 2010: art. B9).

The Military Headline Goal repeated the commitment of the *Berlin Plus* arrangement to create a Civilian Military Cell which would have a capacity to rapidly create an operation centre for particular operations.

**Definitions**

**NATO**

According to MC 411/1 Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is “the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national populations and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisations and agencies” (MC 411/1, 2001: art.4).

NATO CIMIC is conducted in support of the mission of the military commander. This does not imply that the military takes control over the
activities of civil actors. CIMIC tasks are performed in order to accelerate achievement of the objectives of the mission and transition of the responsibility to the appropriate civil organisations and legitimised local authorities. Therefore all the activities conducted as a result of CIMIC have to be associated with an operational objective.

The core functions of NATO CIMIC are defined in Allied Joint Publication 9 (AJP 9) as: Civil-Military Liaison, Support to the Force and Support to Civil Actors and Their Environment. Civil-military liaison means establishing and maintaining a relationship with civil actors at all possible levels, though mandates of some organisations (e.g. International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement) might exclude any working relations with the force. Next, depending on the circumstances, NATO commander might need support from the civil environment. This might take shape of access to civilian resources or reduction of civilian disruption to the military operation. Last but not least, the military is obliged to support civil actors and their environment whenever it is required for the achievement of the objectives of the military mission. There are various types of support to civil actors, including: information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, expertise or training. Yet, the support by military means should be performed only as a last resort (AJP 9, 2003: pp. 2–3 – 2–5).

EU

With regards to the European Union there are two concepts applicable to the relations between civilians and the military. First one – Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is a military support function, similar to that of NATO. It is related to cooperation between different actors in the field at operational-tactical level. It is not of the primary concern as the EU has not so far deployed a truly mixed civil-military operation (Khol, 2007: p. 121). The second concept is Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO) and refers to the intra-area relations at the political and strategic level.

The definition of EU’s CIMIC was set in Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Concept for EU-led Crisis Management Operations (2002) and was based on the definition written by NATO. The purpose of EU CIMIC is to “establish and maintain on the one hand the co-operation between the military components and any external civilian actors including IO and/or NGO whose in theatre efforts are mutually supportive. On the other hand CIMIC will establish and maintain the co-operation with the civilian authorities and populations within the Commander’s area of operations, in order to create the best possible moral, material and tactical conditions for achievement of the mission’s purpose. The focus of CIMIC is to support the military mission.” (CIMIC Concept for EU-led…., 2002: para. 15).
Core functions of the European CIMIC are similar to those defined by NATO and include Civil-Military Liaison, Support to the Civil Environment and Support to the Military Force.

CMCO was defined as an “effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and the subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis” (Council Doc. 14457/03, 2003: para. 1). ESDP/CSDP missions vary greatly with regards to their mandates, length and types of instruments. Therefore, detailed structures and procedures are less practical while a greater coherence can be achieved thanks to a culture of coordination. CMCO should be established at the earliest possible stage of EU’s response to a crisis situation and then performed for the whole duration of the operation. CMCO was designed primarily to ensure internal EU coordination in crisis management but it was also a pre-requisite for cooperation with external actors.

**Overall strategy and comprehensive approach

NATO

NATO’s new Strategic Concept “Active Engagement, Modern Defence” (2010) offers the Alliance’s partners more political engagement and an important role in shaping NATO-led military operations. The Alliance is prepared to develop dialogue and cooperation and to consult any relevant organisations interested in securing peace and stability, and to deepen its already existing partnerships. It recognises that modern security environment contains a vast and evolving set of challenges. As a response to those “NATO has a unique and robust set of political and military capabilities to address the full spectrum of crises – before, during and after conflicts. NATO will actively employ an appropriate mix of those political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts; to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance security; and to help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security.” (Active Engagement; 2010: art. 4b)

Moreover, as the Strategic Concept states, NATO’s experiences and lessons learned from past and ongoing operations show that to conduct an effective crisis management there is a need for a comprehensive political, civilian and military approach. Therefore the Alliance will actively encourage collaborative analysis, planning and conduct of military operations. This will allow to maximise coherence and effectiveness of the
mission. During the stabilisation period of an operation “NATO will be prepared and capable to contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction, in close cooperation and consultation wherever possible with other relevant international actors” (Active Engagement; 2010: art. 24). In order to increase the effectiveness of crisis management NATO will “enhance integrated civilian–military planning (...); develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able, as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance; identify and train civilian specialists from member states, made available for rapid deployment by Allies for selected missions, able to work alongside our military personnel and civilian specialists from partner countries and institutions; broaden and intensify the political consultations among Allies, and with partners (...).” (Active Engagement; 2010: art. 25).

The operational environment of NATO military mission is complex and the challenges within are interlinked. Modern crisis management operations have expanded in terms of the tasks involved. The armed forces are only one part of the comprehensive approach and therefore are not able to address all the aspects alone. They are not equipped or adequate for performing civil tasks. In order to achieve the satisfactory end state, they need the assistance of civilian agencies to fill the humanitarian gap (CIMIC Field Handbook, 2012: pp. I-2-1 –I-2-2).

Comprehensive approach is based on an assumption that none of the activities aiming at creating sustainable peace can succeed in isolation – there is a need for concerted and coordinated action of all the actors involved, at all levels and during all phases of conflict (Jakobsen, 2008: 9). NATO’s engagement in comprehensive approach is built in three levels: political and strategic, operational and finally tactical. In order to achieve success, all three levels must function in a complementary manner (AJP 3.4.9, 2013: art. 0109). Comprehensive approach is created upon an aspiration to establish a unity of aim, rather than unity of effort or command.

In general, NATO recognises two types of comprehensive approach: narrow and broad. Narrow comprehensive approach concentrates on enhancing the ability to interact and to promote interaction. Broader comprehensive approach aims at equipping and training soldiers, so that they are capable of performing tasks related to humanitarian relief, reconstruction and development. As there is no consensus within the Alliance regarding additional tasks and civil capabilities of the military, NATO builds closer partnerships with civilian actors experienced and skilled in such areas as institution building, development, governance, judiciary and police (CIMIC Field Handbook, 2012: p. I-2-6).
EU

In the introduction of the *European Security Strategy* (ESS) it is stated that most of the conflicts in the 21st century had an intra-state, asymmetric character and most of their victims were civilians. The ESS therefore recognises the responsibility of the European Union for increasing global security and recognises key threats as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and state failure (*European Security Strategy*, 2003: pp.3–5). “None of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments” (*European Security Strategy*, 2003: p. 7). The European Union, as an economic and political organisation with a military capability, is therefore able to respond to multi-faceted threats. The ESS calls for a more active EU which would be able to respond to new threats with a large range of instruments (“including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities”; *European Security Strategy*, 2003: p. 11) and which would be able to conduct operations involving both military and civilian capabilities. Also, the ESS acknowledges that in order to ensure military efficiency, it is necessary to properly manage civilian sphere of the operation during and after the crisis. Finally, the ESS underlines the need for a greater coherence, both within different instruments and capabilities of the EU, and with regards to the external activities of individual member states.

The growing complexity of the operational environment calls for an enhanced synergy of efforts of different actors. The emphasis is also placed on the multidimensional security, which requires not only military means, but also capabilities allowing for reconstruction, stability and economic development. In 2000 Javier Solana, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy said “Military capabilities, civilian capabilities, diplomacy, and our extensive programme of development assistance and humanitarian aid – the European Union is and will be in a unique situation to draw on a comprehensive range of instruments to support its interests world-wide.” (van Osch, 2012: p.109).

This view is reflected in the Lisbon Treaty which establishes tools for a more comprehensive integrated approach. Based on its provisions European External Action Service (EEAS) was created in 2011 with a purpose to ensure consistency between different areas of EU’s external actions.

The European Union as the world’s largest economic organisation and one of the biggest donors of Official Development Assistance, is equipped with a large array of tools spanning the diplomatic, security, defence, financial, trade, development cooperation and humanitarian aid fields (Joint Communication…, 2013: p. 3). It also possesses multiple
diplomatic and economic ties with other states and organisations. Therefore, it is well suited to conduct operations in a complicated environment, engaging closely with other international organisations, as well as major international NGOs, civil society, think-tanks, academia and public and private actors. As stated in the *Joint Communication on the EU’s comprehensive approach*: “Effective and proactive EU policy responses to conflict and crises should draw on the different strengths, capacities, competencies and relationships of EU institutions and Member States, in support of a shared vision and common objectives” (Joint Communication…, 2013: p.7).

**Institutional setting**

**NATO**

At the strategic level NATO’s CIMIC element is embedded into Strategic Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). The J9 Division of SHAPE is responsible for promoting awareness on Civil-Military Interaction and CIMIC issues. Next, NATO Member States are allowed to freely interpret CIMIC doctrine, therefore some of them created their own separate units for CIMIC, often combined with other soft capabilities (InfoOps, PsyOps). Other Member States prefer to embed CIMIC elements within the military structure or use both organisational configurations (van Weezel, 2011: 15–17).

There are two international headquarters of NATO CIMIC: CIMIC Centre of Excellence (CCOE) and Multinational CIMIC Group (MNCG). CCOE was established in Enschede (the Netherlands) in 2001 as CIMIC Group North Headquarters and funded by Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and Poland. Its initial function was a multinational unit capable of deploying in international operations. In 2005 CIMIC Group North was transformed into CIMIC Centre of Excellence and in 2014 it was moved to the Hague (the Netherlands). CCOE is not a part of NATO Command structure. It is responsible for advice, training and education together with conceptual and doctrinal development, and contribution to the lessons learned processes. CCOE is currently sponsored by Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia (CCOE Webpage).

Multinational CIMIC Group was created in 2002 in Motta di Livenza (Italy) and was initially named CIMIC Group South. The founding Member States were: Greece, Hungary, Italy and Portugal. In 2009 the name was changed to MNCG. It is the only Operational CIMIC Headquarters within NATO and can be deployed in support of armed forces
conducting an operation. It also provides expertise and consultancy in the issues related to civil-military cooperation. Currently the participating Member States are: Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal and Romania (MNCG Webpage).

When it comes to operational and tactical level, CIMIC structure can widely vary as it is dependent on the nature and mandate of the operation, its phase and command. In general, CIMIC personnel should be present at all levels of command and force structure. At the tactical level it is possible to distinguish some standard arrangements such as: CIMIC Deployable Unit, Command Post Team, CIMIC Reconnaissance/Assessment Team, CIMIC Liaison Team, Project Management Team. Whenever there is a need for a special expertise, it is possible to employ Functional Specialists. They can be either military or civilian and they are employed only for the duration of their tasks. They might be specialists within the following areas: civil administration, civil infrastructure, humanitarian affairs, economy and employment, and cultural affairs and education (CIMIC Field Handbook, 2012: p. I-5-9).

EU

EU’s CIMIC concept implied that the EUMS is responsible for development and execution of CIMIC tasks at the political and strategic level. The Military Staff is also tasked with organisation of EU CIMIC Conference – a pro-active forum on CIMIC-related issues. Next level of the EU’s CIMIC structure are the institutions activated especially for EU-led operations: within the Operation Headquarters, Force Headquarters, under the Component Commander and in subordinate formations and units. Yet another level of the institutional setting are CIMIC centres located in the area of operation.

As was already mentioned, the first attempt to create a CMCO structure responsible for planning and conduct of ESDP/CSDP missions was taken in the Document on EU-NATO consultation. At the end of 2003 a Civ-Mil Cell was established within the EU Military Staff, tasked with CMCO functions: assistance in early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning (Rehrl, 2012: pp. 66–67). The two main assumptions behind the creation of a civil-military cell were that it was to be distinct from national and multinational capabilities and that it should be developed from practical experiences (especially from the operation in the Balkans; Quille, 2006: 14).

The Cell was led by a military director and a civilian deputy. It was responsible to the EU Military Staff, unless the Council activated an Operation Centre (OpCen) for a particular operation. In the latter case,
the entire personnel of the Civ-Mil Cell was transferred to the OpCen and was responsible to the Operations Commander. The Operation Centre became operational in 2007. Its objective was to provide an additional command option.

In 2009 the European Council called for the establishment of a new, single civilian-military strategic planning structure for CSDP operations and missions. Therefore, the Civ-Mil Cell was merged with the relevant civilian and defence directorates in the Council Secretariat to create a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD). Two of the core activities of CMPD are: strategic planning of CSDP missions and operations and coordination of the developments of civilian and military capabilities (EU External Action Webpage).

**Challenges**

The challenges and drawbacks concerning civil-military cooperation can be divided into two groups: problems specifically regarding each organisation and problems common for all of them.

Common challenges derive from the essence of the relationship between soldiers and civilians. First, the force and civilian humanitarian actors operate on different principles. The military are focused on achieving the objective of the mission and providing security, including by the use of violence. This often contains actions supporting political goals, clearly directed against one side of the conflict. On the other hand there are humanitarian NGOs, which actions are based on the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality. It is hard to argue that armed forces can achieve their tasks while referring to similar values, but also in many cases it would be impossible for NGOs to conduct their activities without being perceived as neutral.

One of the strongest fears regarding the involvement in CIMIC derives from the perceived risk of humanitarian actors that they will lose their impartiality and neutrality while cooperating with the armed forces. Coordination with the military can be viewed as a threat for the security of humanitarian personnel and provoke attacks on NGOs. An example of the attacks on humanitarian personnel by militants are the events of May 2013, when armed extremists assaulted the office of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Jalalabad (Afghanistan), killing one and injuring three (ICRC Webpage). Involvement in CIMIC can also result in the loss of credibility and access to some areas or civilian (official or unofficial) authorities.

Next, the military and civilians have different organisational structures. However trivial this statement might seem, it is crucial for the
ability to cooperate and coordinate their actions. The humanitarian actors often complain on the prolonged and complicated procedures of the military, their rigid command structure and general inflexibility. For the armed forces it is difficult to adjust to loosely defined structure of NGOs and their lax approach towards priorities and procedures. Organisational structures also impact the attitude towards the objectives of both entities. While the military is mainly focused on quick impact projects which support the military commander and allow for a faster withdrawal from the area of the operation, the humanitarian actors are generally more concerned with long term perspective.

In some cases CIMIC military personnel assumes the responsibility of local authorities. Although, according to doctrines of NATO and EU, this takes place only when local authorities are not able or not willing to perform their tasks, it is perceived as a potential threat for the host nation and humanitarian environment. Such actions might lead to growing dependence of the host nation on the military mission. This however is contrary to the long term objectives of both military and civilian, as their primary goal is to create sustainable peace in the operational area.

As was already mentioned, NATO does not impose the approach towards civil-military cooperation on its Member States, therefore they present a whole range of attitudes towards this concept. As a result some of them treat this notion rather cautiously or even reluctantly, while others emphasise its importance and put a lot of effort to improve its provisions. Such differences do not increase the coherence of actions and even could be harmful when contingents form various Member States are deployed in one operation.

When it comes to NATO and partially EU approach towards CIMIC, there appears a concern that the strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ through CIMIC activities is not really aimed at achieving goals of sustainable stability and reconstruction, but it only leads to completing the military mission and political objectives. The definition of CIMIC as a cooperation in support of the military mission and military commander might be read as an attempt to exploit all available civilian means to achieve military aims.

The definition of NATO- and EU-CIMIC is based on the principle of the mission primacy. In case of NATO such approach is fully justified by its strictly military organisational profile. However, when it comes to the European Union, such a definition can raise doubts about the true nature of civil-military coordination in EU-led operations. EU’s focus on economic and political affairs suggests, that its approach towards CIMIC would be more balanced and present a softer attitude towards the civil-military relation.
EU’s second concept – CMCO is more consistent with the organisational profile, as it assumes intra-organisational culture of cooperation. Yet, for the same reason it also raises some doubts. A complex organisation like EU should in general be able to ensure successful coordination among its various structures. Is there a duly justified need for a separate concept which regards a culture of cooperation specific for only one type of action? Moreover, EU-CMCO was supposed to be a prerequisite for coordination with external actors. As far as the definition goes, this is the task for EU-CIMIC. Under those doubts, the concept of CMCO seems to be to a certain degree superfluous.

Summary

Due to the growth of the complexity of modern operational environment, both NATO and the EU adopted a doctrine of comprehensive approach. According to its provisions, no entity is able to provide peace, security and stability on its own. Modern crisis management requires a concerted and coordinated action of many actors specializing in different tasks. This means that the Alliance and the European Union recognize the necessity to cooperate with other organisations, including those with civilian and military profile. In order to assist in reaching this goal, NATO and the EU stress the importance of mainstreaming civil-military cooperation into their core documents and policies.

The Alliance’s understanding of CIMIC is that of a military capability which supports the commander by facilitating cooperation with civilians. It does not imply taking charge over civilian authorities and organisations, but rather creating conditions for viable working relations, communication and mutual support. The definition of NATO CIMIC is focused on the military perspective, which is understandable given the organizational profile and purpose of the Alliance.

On the other hand, the European Union promotes a dual approach towards civil-military cooperation. The first concept is identical with the Alliance’s understanding of CIMIC. The second one – Civil-Military Coordination – refers to intra-organisational coordination of different EU bodies engaged in the process of planning and conducting an operation. The purpose of CMCO is therefore to provide a greater coherence within the European Union’s CSDP architecture.

The beginnings of institutionalised civil-military cooperation were similar for NATO and the EU. The trigger for both were the experiences of the Balkan war and the necessity to adapt to new circumstances of conducting military operations. The Alliance was the pioneer in declar-
ing the need of new capabilities which would allow to establish closer working relations with the growing number of civilians in the area of operation. The European Union closely followed, underlining its ability to encompass both civilian and military instruments. Consequently, both organisations signed an agreement establishing grounds for joint civil-military operations.

Civil-military cooperation as a military facilitator and a certain type of culture of cooperation had to be mainstreamed into structures of NATO and EU. On the strategic level, both organisations created special cells and arrangements serving the implementation of CIMIC. As to the operational and tactical level, it is impossible to predetermine the shape of civil-military coordination structures, as they have to be individually tailored to each mission.

As a final point, it is necessary to state that the biggest issues concerning the implementation of civil-military cooperation and coordination in the field come from lack of will and lack of information sharing. CIMIC is therefore very much dependant on the personal skills of individual operators. Careful choice of personnel and their scrupulous training could enhance the effectiveness and ability to perform successful civil-military cooperation, even if it is not the answer to all concerns.

**Literature**

**Books and articles**


NATO and EU approach towards civil-military relations...

Documents


Other


PODEJŚCIE NATO I UE DO RELACJI CYWILNO-WOJSKOWYCH
W OPERACJACH POKOJOWYCH

Streszczenie

Stosunki między cywilami i żołnierzami są nieuniknioną konsekwencją istnienia wojny, jednak dopiero niedawno zaczęły być regulowane przez jedne z największych organizacji międzynarodowych zajmujących się utrzymaniem pokoju. Pierwszym celem niniejszego artykułu jest przedstawienie i porównanie najważniejszych regulacji NATO i UE, dotyczących relacji cywilno-wojskowych. Autorka prezentuje ewolucję koncepcji współpracy cywilno-wojskowej NATO i UE, wypracowane przez nie definicje oraz organy odpowiedzialne za implementację koncepcji, umieszczone w kontekście ogólnych strategii obu organizacji. Takie zestawienie najważniejszych regulacji pozwoli osiągnąć drugi cel artykułu, jakim jest zidentyfikowanie najważniejszych wyzwań związanych ze współpracą cywilno-wojskową, wspólnych dla NATO i UE oraz typowych dla poszczególnych organizacji.

Słowa kluczowe: CIMIC, NATO, UE, relacje cywilno-wojskowe, podejście kompleksowe.