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United Nations vs irregular combatants

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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.
United Nations vs irregular combatants

This article discusses experiences and conclusions which can be drawn from the involvement of armed forces created under the auspices of the UN into various actions, starting with the operation in Kongo at the beginning of the 1960’s. The writer focuses mainly on the issue of the confrontation between the international forces and irregular local combatants. He discusses also the question of political determinants for creating a mandate of international forces, particularly in the scope of undertaking force actions by them. According to the writer, an example of an effective use of military power by the UN, which was possible mainly thanks to the compatibility of the mandate with the local conditions, is the suppression of the Katanga rebellion and the unification of this province with the Democratic Republic of Kongo. On the other hand, the UN mission in Somalia, started in 1992, was treated as an example of an operation that was carried out ineptly and inconsistently, which ended up with its total failure.

Foreword

Also the UN was confronted to irregular warfare and insurgencies. The two cases, hereby reported, marked the life and the fate of the organization, involved in operations of stabilization of countries/territories affected by serious turmoil. The first case analyzed is the Congo crises were the UN troops, faced an insurgency that unexpectedly forced them to carried out several campaigns against different armed groups. This was the first time that a peacekeeping force was confronted to a military threat.

The second case focuses the troubled Somalia scenario, where firstly a UN-authorized and US-led force, named UNITAF, and then full UN flagged mission, UNOSOM-II tried to stabilize the situation. In this case the international forces, dispatched to protect the humanitarian aid distribution plan and then to made the first steps for a nation building project (the establishment of a minimum security environment), were massively attacked by local militias, before involved in a ruthless civil war, late united against the international presence.

The two operations, but especially the one in Somalia, were affected by the so-called “mission creep” and “mandate creep”.

These two concepts are the expansions of a project/mission beyond its original goals, often after initial positive achievements. The terms often implies a certain disapproval of
newly adopted goals by the user of the term. Both are usually considered undesirable due to the dangerous path of each success breeding more ambitious attempts, only stopping when a final, often catastrophic, failure occurs.

Congo

Congo¹, a former Belgian colony, became independent on 30 June 1960, however the Belgian commander refused to “Africanize” the officers’ corps of the Force Publique (the local army). In the days that followed, disorder and mutinies broke out. While the Congolese President and the Prime Minister were trying to negotiate with the mutineers, the Belgian government decided to intervene to protect Belgians that remained in the country at the request of Moïse Tshombé, who advocated independence for the southern province of Katanga, one of the richest of the country. On 10 July, Belgian troops were sent to Elisabethville, the capital of Katanga, to control the situation and protect Belgian civilians.

On 12 July, the Congolese government asked the help of the UN. The Secretary-General addressed the Security Council at a night meeting on 13 July and asked the Council to act “with utmost speed” on the request.

Two days later, the Security Council established ONUC (Operation des Nations unies au Congo) by Security Council resolution 143 (1960) of 14 July 1960 (adopted by 8 votes in favour, including USA and USSR, none against, three abstentions), by which it decided “to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Republic of the Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance as might be necessary until, through that Government’s efforts with United Nations technical assistance, the national security forces might be able, in the opinion of the Government, to meet fully their tasks”.

In less than 48 hours, contingents for the newly established UN force, provided by a number of countries, especially Asian and African Member States, began to arrive in the Congo, with thanks to a massive air bridge, together with UN civilian experts to ensure the continuity of essential public services. The initial mandate of ONUC was to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces from Congo, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and was authorized to use force by resolution 161 (1961) of 21 February 1961, the Council urged that the UN “take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort”.

¹ Republic of the Congo (30.06.60-31.07.64), Democratic Republic of the Congo (1.08.64-26.10.71), Republic of Zaire (27.10.71-17.05.97), Democratic Republic of the Congo (18.05.97 to date).
Over the next four years, the task of the ONUC\(^2\) was to help the Congolese Government to restore and maintain the political independence and territorial integrity of the country; to help it maintain law and order throughout the country; and to put into effect a wide and long-range programme of training and technical assistance. At its peak strength, the UN force totalled nearly 20,000 troops\(^3\).

The arrival of first UN troops was the instant disagreement between Lumumba, the Congolese Prime Minister and the UN over the force’s mandate. Because the Congolese army had been in disarray since the mutiny, Lumumba wanted to use the UN troops to subdue Katanga insurgency-secession by force. Referring to the resolution, Lumumba wrote to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld: “From these texts it is clear that, contrary to your personal interpretation, the UN force may be used to subdue the rebel government of Katanga”. Secretary-General Hammarskjöld refused.

To Hammarskjöld, the secession of Katanga was an internal Congolese matter and the UN was forbidden to intervene by Article 2 of the UN Charter. Disagreements over what the UN force could and could not do continued throughout its deployment, despite the passage of two further Security Council resolutions. Passed on 22 July, Security Council Resolution 145 affirmed that Congo should be a unitary state and strengthened the call for Belgium to withdraw its forces. On 9 August, Security Council Resolution 146 mentioned Katanga for the first time, and explicitly allowed UN forces to enter Katanga whilst forbidding their use to “intervene in or influence the outcome of any internal conflict”.

**UN launches the crackdown of the insurgency**

After one year of quasi-inactivity of the UN presence, was clear that Moise Tshombe, the leader of the self-proclaimed independent Katanga, had no intention to reunite it with the rest of the country. In particular, he had not complied with the UN Security Council resolution demanding the expulsion of foreign mercenaries and, at the contrary, increased the threats on the UN personnel. The FC (Force Commander) of ONUC, the Irish General

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\(^2\) The Special Representatives Of The Secretary-General and head of ONUC were: Ralph J. Bunche (US) July-August 1960; Andrew W. Cordier (US) August-September 1960; Rajeshwar Dayal (India) September 1960-May 1961; Mekki Abbas (Sudan) (Acting) March-May 1961. There were also, as Officers-In-Charge: Sture Linner (Sweden) May 1961-January 1962; Robert K.A. Gardiner (Ghana) February 1962-May 1963; Max H. Dorsinville (Haiti) May 1963-April 1964; Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall (Mexico) April-June 1964.

\(^3\) The bulk of the ONUC was formed of infantry battalions from Ethiopia (2), Ghana, Guinea, India (3), Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria (2), Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, United Arab Republic; from February 1963 to June 1964 a battalion of the Congolese Army was directly incorporated within ONUC. Morocco and UAR dispatched also a company and a battalion of parachutists respectively. The command and support, military police, engineer, signal, medical, movement control, air and ground transport, logistic was provided by Austria, Burma, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Philippines, Ghana, India, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Netherlands, Sweden. There was also a group UN Military Observers dispatched from UNTSO; for the occasion was set up the OG-C (Observer Group – Congo) and small group of police officers from Ghana and Nigeria tasked to train and re-organize the Congolese police. The mission included a civilian support component with 600 international civilian and 2.000 locally-recruited staff. Canada, Switzerland USSR, UK and USA voluntarily provided the airlift of contingents and logistic necessary to launch the operation.
Sean McKeown\(^4\) perceived the situation on the UN troops stationed in that region (mainly Indian and Irish) as dangerous. Facing 10000 Katangan militiamen (called “gendarmes”) and 4-500 mercenaries, ONUC, despite an increasing divide between the HQ in New York and the field in the way to interpret and manage the situation, launched on 28 August the Operation Rumpunch, focused to disarm the Katangan militiamen, capturing key secessionist military assets and arresting the foreign mercenaries who formed the leadership of the Katangan “gendarmerie”. The operation was an apparent success, but only 250 out of 520 of foreign mercenaries were arrested and the potential threat of Katangese insurgency remained substantially untouched.

On 9 September, UN launched Operation Morthor (Hindi word for “smash”). This time the UN troops matched a stiff resistance, but the superior firepower of the UN forces cracked out it in few hours, especially on North Katanga, while in the central Katanga meet mixed results. In addition, the Congolese central government issued the UN with arrest warrants for Tshombe and other key Katangan officials (the UN was able to act on these warrants because the new government of Cyrille Adoula was the internationally recognized authority). Originally intended as an arrest operation, Morthor quickly escalated into open warfare but it went badly from the start. The Katangan militias showed a strong resistance to the UN attempts to gain control of the area. Due to lack of experience on multinational operations in command, control and communication, ONUC was substantially ineffective despite the overwhelming number of troops, firepower and air/ground mobility. At the end of the first day of the operation, was announced by ONUC over Katangan radio that the secession was at an end.

The statement, not coordinated with the UN HQ in New York, was premature and caused controversy because the ONUC was not specifically mandated to end the secession, but only to prevent civil war and expel foreign mercenaries. On 13 September Tshombe fled to Ndola in Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) from where he continued to lead the insurgency. Reports about UN forces indiscriminate attacks involving civilian installations and people on Elizabethville caused anger in Europe and worsened the relationship with the local population. In the midst of Operation Morthor, UN Secretary-General Dag Hamilton decided to intervene personally and negotiate a ceasefire with Tshombe.

On the night of 17-18 September his plane crashed en route to Ndola, killing him and fifteen others on board. The exact cause of this was never determined. The next day a besieged UN garrison at Jadotville, after holding out for 6 days, surrendered to the insurgents after running out of water and ammunition\(^5\).

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\(^4\) ONUC air component at the beginning included only transport airplanes, 16 C-119 Flying Boxcars provided by Canada, Italy and other countries air forces and around 20 civilian-chartered planes (C-47/53 Skytrain/Skytrooper, C-46 Commando, C-54 Skymaster) and helicopters. This was organized in transport wing led by a Wing Commander of Indian Air Force. Due to the appearance of the so-called “Katangese Air Force”, with few Fouga Magisters and other aircrafts with relatively poor air combat capabilities, the UN organized a multinational combat wing, led by an Air Commodore of the Royal Canadian Air Force with 6 Canberra light bombers India, 4 F-86E fighter from Ethiopia, 5 from Philippines (gift from Italy, from the IAF 4th Wing, Grosseto) and 4 from Imperial Iranian Air Force, 12 Tunnan combat and reconnaissance jets from Sweden.

\(^5\) In Jadotville, 500 Irish and Swedish soldiers, in an epic resistance, confronted a force between 3-5000 armed militiamen (Katangan gendarmes, irregulars and foreign advisers). The blue helmets suffered 7 KIA, but the insurgents suffered losses evaluated around 300 dead and 1.000 wounded. While a consistent part of the
After this reversal, the last of a series, the UN agreed to a ceasefire, giving back public buildings and military posts to Katangan insurgent control. On 20 September Tshombe returned to Elizabethville and on 25 October a POWs swap was agreed. At the end of October, regular Congolese government forces, led an independent operation, not coordinate with the ONUC, attacked Katanga but were repulsed with heavy casualties.

UN Security Council Resolution 169

On 2 November 1961, the UN General Assembly unanimously appointed the former Foreign Minister of Burma U Thant as Secretary-General to replace Dag Hammarsköld while skirmishes involving UN forces continued in Katanga. The new Secretary-General was more open to generalize the use of the force than his predecessor, while on the ground the situation showed signs of continuous degradation. On 17 November the UN signed an agreement with the Congolese government giving the UN troops full freedom of movement throughout Congo. Thus, ONUC was given the operational freedom to conduct its operations. These agreements paved the way to the UN Security Council Resolution 169 (24 November) who mandated ONUC “to take vigorous action, including the use of the requisite measure of force, if necessary”, to remove foreign military and other personnel not under the UN command.

In this light, while was discovered a planned, major attack of the Katangese forces against UN, ONUC launched its major (and preemptive) military operation, Unokat, on 5 December. After heavy fighting and casualties on both sides, strategic objectives were achieved by the UN troops, while Katangan military assets were neutralised. In response, the insurgent leader threatened to blow up the dams and copper mines around Kolwezi, but on December 18 agreed to unity talks which, however run for a year without reaching agreement. Unokat was similar to other UN-led operations in Congo, where the “blue helmets” does implemented sophisticated anti-insurgency tactics, but only search and destroy operation within jungle area and with a constant air support (combat and logistic).

End of Katanga insurgency and termination of ONUC

In August 1962, UN Secretary-General U Thant proposed a plan that Katanga becomes an autonomous region in a federal state as last peace offer. Katangan “government” initially agreed with the proposal, but agreement was never concluded. In December 1962 the UN launched Operation Jacaranda and Operation Grand Slam against Katanga’s core political and military infrastructure with a consistent air support. The operation was carried out with determination, and again with allegations of disproportionate use of force, despite the garrison was withdrawn by helicopter and by road, at the end of the resistance, 150 UN soldiers were captured by the insurgents.

practical non resistance of insurgent forces, and by end of January 1963, Elizabethville was under full UN control, ending the secession of Katanga.

In February 1963, after Katanga had been reintegrated into the national territory of the Congo, a phasing out of the Force was begun, aimed at its termination by the end of that year. At the request of the Congolese Government, however, the General Assembly authorized the stay of a reduced number of troops for a further six months. The Force was completely withdrawn by 30 June 1964. Although the military phase of ONUC was completed, civilian aid continued in the largest programme of assistance undertaken until then by the UN system, with some 2,000 experts at work in the nation at the peak of it, in 1963-1964.

Comment

ONUC marked a milestone in the history of UN peacekeeping in terms of the responsibilities it had to assume, the size of its area of operation, manpower involved and financial cost. Originally mandated to provide the Congolese Government with the military and technical assistance required following the collapse of many essential services, ONUC became embroiled by the force of circumstances in a chaotic internal situation of extreme complexity and assumed obligations well beyond normal peacekeeping duties and was the first case where the UN troops were mandate to use the force to implement the Security Council Resolutions. It should be mentioned that, aside to the insurgency/secession of Katanga, the UN troops faced deadly attacks of independent armed Congolese militiamen and the massacre of the crews of Italian Air Force planes, assigned to ONUC, kidnapped and killed by mistake by regular elements of Congolese forces showed how was difficult the situation on the ground. As mentioned, the operation was a military controversial success.

Despite a theoretical overwhelming superiority in number, fire power and air/ground mobility and protection, in reality the UN troops lacked in C3 (Command, Control, Communication) capabilities, interoperability experience and suffered some serious setbacks. The insurgents, thanks to a better knowledge of the terrain and an effective leadership, provided by the mercenaries, obtained some unexpected victories and forced the UN to humiliating agreements with repositioning of forces and POWs swaps. The cost of it was high, both human and financial (250 soldiers and US$400 million), together with a deeper and bitter divide between Member States (East-West and North South crossed confrontations) and between the Member States and the organization.

Somalia

Following the downfall of President Siad Barre in 1991, a civil war broke out in Somalia between the faction supporting Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and that supporting General Mohamed Farah Aidid. UN, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other international, regional organizations and Member States, sought
to resolve the conflict, dispatched an envoy to whom all faction leaders expressed a verbal support for a UN-led peace role. The UN also provided humanitarian aid, in cooperation with relief organizations, to nearly 1 million refugees and almost 5 million people threatened by hunger and diseases. Giving the ongoing civil war, the Security Council in January 1992 imposed an arms embargo against Somalia, while the Secretary-General organized talks between the parties, who agreed on a ceasefire, to be monitored by UN observers, and on the protection of humanitarian convoys by UN troops.

In April, the UNSC with the Resolution 751 established the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), tasked to provide, facilitate, and secure humanitarian relief in Somalia, as well as to monitor the (first) UN-brokered ceasefire of the Somali Civil War.

The operation was established in April 1992, but in reality the UN military presence was a small force de facto under siege of the local factions in the area of the port of Mogadishu and the humanitarian relief activity was seriously affected and hampered by continued fighting and insecurity.

The Security Council in August decided to deploy additional troops to protect humanitarian aid, but the situation continued to worsen, with aid workers under attack as famine threatened 1.5 million people. However, also these troops remained trenched in the port of Mogadishu, avoiding fights with the local militias. The US, pressed by mounting pressure of the domestic and international polls and media reports on this issue, in November 1992 offered to organize and lead an operation to ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance asking that the US troops were not put under direct UN command.

UNITAF, the “quasi blue” deterrence

In the face of mounting public pressure and frustration, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali presented several options to the Security Council. Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN allows for “action by air, sea or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” and Boutros-Ghali believed the time had come for employing this clause and moving on from peacekeeping. Significantly, this invocation of Chapter VII waived the need for consent on the part of the state of Somalia; effectively the first time the UN Secretariat had endorsed such an act. However, Boutros-Ghali felt that such action would be difficult to apply under the mandate for a UN force, giving that the organization did not have the skills to command and control it. Accordingly, he recommended that a large intervention force be constituted under the command of member states but authorised by the Security Council to carry out operations in Somalia.

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8 UNOSOM was authorized to be formed by 50 unarmed military observers 3,500 security personnel (formed military units), up to 719 military logistic support personnel, and approximately 200 international civilian staff. 8 UN troops were killed.

9 UN Security Council authorized to increase UNOSOM troop strength to 4,219 troops and further 50 military observers. 1992. In reality, the peak of UN forces in Mogadishu, before of the landing of UNITAF, was of 54 military observers and 893 troops and military support personnel, supported by a limited number of international civilian and locally recruited staff. The leadership of the mission was: Special Representatives of the Secretary-General Mohamed Sahnoun (Algeria) April 1992-November 1992; Ismat Kittani (Iraq) November 1992-March 1993; Jonathan T. Howe (US) March 1993-April 1994 (with UNOSOM II). Chief Military Observer (subsequently FC) Brig-Gen Imtiaz Shaheen (Pakistan) June 1992-March 1993.
The goal of this deployment was “to prepare the way for a return to peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building”.

The Security Council left it to “the discretion of the Secretary General” as to what should be done with the abortive mission (UNOSOM) and accepted the offer and authorized the use of “all necessary means” to establish a secure environment for the relief effort on 3 December 1992 with the unanimously adopted Resolution 794. The Security Council also urged the Secretary-General and Member States to make arrangements for “the unified command and control” of the military forces that would be involved.

Prior to Resolution 794, the US had approached the UN and offered a significant troop contribution to Somalia, with the caveat that these personnel would not be commanded by the UN. Resolution 794 did not specifically identify the US as being responsible for the future task force, but mentioned “the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General’s letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment of an operation to create such a secure environment”. The advanced parties of Unified Task Force (UNITAF), made up of contingents from 24 countries led by the US, landed on Mogadishu on 5 December 1992, then the force quickly secured all major relief centers, and by year’s end humanitarian aid was again flowing, while the international troops, with an heavy deterrence potential, discourage the militias to attacks the convoys and the area of Mogadishu was practically secured. UNOSOM continued to operate in parallel and coordination with UNITAF. As UNITAF’s mandate was to protect the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid and the use the force if necessary, the operation was regarded as a success and it was approved the concept to enlarge the operational framework and mandate of the international troops and work for the stabilization of the country.

At a meeting convened by the Secretary-General in early 1993 on Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), 14 Somali political movements agreed on a ceasefire and pledged to hand over all weapons to UNITAF and UNOSOM. This conference was followed in March by international donors conference and Somali-focused conference on reconciliation. Following these successes, the UNSC in March decided on a transition from UNITAF to a new UN peacekeeping operation – UNOSOM II (also on the Chapter VII) tasked to secure a stable environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and to assist in the reconstruction of economic, social and political life. But, while UNITAF had patrolled less than half of the country with 37,000 well-equipped troops, the 22,000 UN troops, with the substantial reduction of the firepower and mobility, mainly provided of US component, were given the mandate to cover all of Somalia.

In reality, UNOSOM-II does not enlarged the AOR (Area Of Responsibility) of UNITAF, while the backbone of the US forces was re-collocated the QRF (Quick Reaction Force), separated by the UN command

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10 The bulk of UNITAF’s was provided by the US (25,000 out of a total of 37,000 personnel); other contingents were provided by Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, India, Ireland, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE, UK, Zimbabwe. They were co-ordinated by US Central Command. There were 44 killed (43 US, 1 Australia) and 156 wounded (153 US, 3 Australia).

11 UNOSOM II authorized strength authorized, March 1993 – 4 February 1994: 28,000 military and civilian police personnel; approximately 2,800 international and locally recruited civilian staff; authorized strength 4 February- 25 August 1994: 22,000 all ranks, supported by international and local civilian staff; UNOSOM
The summer insurgency and the blue helmets

The factions, however, did not observe the ceasefires and did not send their weapons to the international forces. On 5 June, a UNOSOM unit (Pakistani troops) was sent to investigate an arms depot belonging to a Somali warlord vying for the Presidency, Mohamed Farrah Aidid, the most hostile to the UN. The militiamen attacked them and, according to what it seemed a previously organized plan, several UN compounds. The day ended with dozens of UN troops and hundreds of Somali insurgents killed. The UN escalated the answer; between 12 and 16 June 1993 UN troops launched a massive operation attacking targets in Mogadishu related to Aidid. On 17 June, a $25,000 warrant was issued by the UN for information leading to the arrest of Aidid, but he was never captured. The hunt for Aidid characterized much of the UNOSOM II interventions. The operations carried out in Mogadishu caused heavy civilian casualties and greatly affected the relationship between the foreign troops and the Somali people; since then the situation degraded military and became almost unmanageable politically.

Again, like in Congo, was recorded a lack of political and military coordination between the UN in New York and Mogadishu, between the organization and Member States and among the Member States regarding the management and strategic approach of the whole mission. The UN troops were easily portrayed as evil foreign interlopers by the militia leaders, particularly after incidents of civilian casualties caused by wholesale firing into crowds, like on July 12, when a compound where clan leaders were meeting was indiscriminately attacked by UN forces.

The spectre of Islamic fundamentalism also began to rise, as militia leaders sought to use religion as a rallying point for anti-UN sentiment. As the international forces became more insular, the warlords began to reassert control of many Mogadishu districts. With each failure to apprehend Aidid, the militias grew bolder while, as mentioned, rifts between nations contributing to UNOSOM II also began to be very serious, in the meantime Somali insurgents increased targeting peacekeepers, causing casualties and as for consequences, mounting problems with the domestic public opinions of the troops contributing countries.

The hunt for Aidid his lieutenants and allied (Aidid became a point of reference for the various militias, now re-united against the UN troops) led the battles of Mogadishu, resulting in heavy losses, especially among Somali civilians while in other locations of Somalia, the international troops were constantly attacked witnessing the worsening of the security situation. The US, especially a failed attack on 3-4 October 1993 (which cost them 18 KIA and 73 WIA) reinforced its military presence, but later announced that it would withdraw by early 1994, quickly followed by other Western states.

On 4 November 1994, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to withdraw all forces in Resolution 954. UNOSOM II's mandate ended in March 1995 when a joint combined task force protects the withdrawn from Mogadishu of the last international contingents.

Comment

During the three-year effort, 199 international personnel had died, but till now Somalia is considered a “failed state”. The UN never stops the humanitarian aid operations but these efforts faced lack of commitment to peace by the Somali factions and insufficient political will by Member States. However, under military point of view the UN operations in Somalia had a positive impact. Despite an apparent negative one, due the reluctance of Western States to dispatch forces under the UN flag; the follow up of Somalia operations “forced” the organization to improve her performances and led Member States, especially African, to reinforce their military apparatus with the financial aid and training advice of EU/NATO countries and allowing the “africanization” of the peacekeeping.

ONZ przeciwko nieregularnym działania zbrojnym

Streszczenie

W artykule omówiono doświadczenia i wnioski wynikające z zaangażowania sił zbrojnych tworzonych pod auspicjami ONZ w rozmaitego rodzaju działania, począwszy od operacji w Kongo na początku lat sześćdziesiątych XX wieku. Uwaga autora koncentruje się przede wszystkim na zagadnieniu konfrontacji między siłami międzynarodowymi a nieregularnymi siłami miejscowymi. Podejmuje on również zagadnienie politycznych uwarunkowań kreowania mandatu sił międzynarodowych, zwłaszcza w zakresie podejmowania przez nie działań przy użyciu siły. Za przykład skutecznego posłużenia się przez ONZ siłą militarną, co było przede wszystkim następcem adekwatności mandatu do warunków miejscowych autor uznaje stłumienie rebelii Katangi i te unifikację tej prowincji z Demokratyczną Republiką Konga. Z kolei misja ONZ w Somalii, rozpoczęta w 1992 roku, potraktowana została jako przykład operacji przeprowadzonej nieudolnie i niekonsekwentni, co finalnie doprowadziło do jej całkowitej klęski.