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Introduction

When Toronto police Constable Michael Sanguinetti advised an audience convened for a safety forum at York University in January 2011 that in order not to be victimized by sexual assaults, “women should avoid dressing like sluts” (Maronese 2011) his comments sparked immediate outrage, inspiring a global mobilization known as “SlutWalks.” Appalled by his victim-blaming remark and its inference that women hold responsibility for the violence perpetrated against them, a small group of young women organized the first annual Slut Walk Toronto in April 2011. Anticipated to attract between 200–300 participants, the march drew 3,000 protestors, some wearing jeans and others outfitted in lingerie and stiletto heels; together, they rallied at Toronto Police Headquarters to challenge what many feminists term a “rape culture” too frequently focused on blaming the behavior of the victim rather than that of the perpetrator (Stampler 2011; Loriggio 2011). Fuelled by intense media curiosity around what was regarded by many commentators as a deliberately provocative event, women worldwide embraced the walk’s message and by the end of 2011, seventy cities across North America, Europe, Australia, Africa and South America mounted their own SlutWalks.

Although the significance of this global response to feminist anti-violence activism deserves scholarly attention and debate, this paper considers the SlutWalks from a different vantage point, focusing instead on the role of such activism at a critical juncture in Canadian women’s movement history. Much of the recent literature on feminism in Canada highlights the current abandonment of gender equality agendas by neo-liberal governments and the demobilization of many women’s groups within a political environment openly hostile to feminist concerns (Brodie and Bakker 2008; Haussman and Rankin 2009). Since the mid-1990s, the Canadian state at the federal, provincial/territorial and even municipal levels, actively pursued a “technocratic turn” in their approach to gender equality by adopting gender mainstreaming (GM)
policies and practices and fashioning what might be described as a “gender measurement regime.” At the federal level, both Liberal and Conservative governments’ embrace of metric-driven policy development, implementation and evaluation accompanied a retrenchment in government support for feminist movements and the widespread dismantling of women’s state machinery.

The impact on the Canadian women’s movement has been chaotic. In order to meet the government’s new standards of engagement with civil society actors, feminist organizations faced disciplining their organizational practices and programmatic goals in line with the new demands of the new public management. Many other women’s groups, reeling from government funding cuts, reluctantly closed their doors. These developments destabilized the movement significantly; by deploying the rhetoric and practices of gender mainstreaming with its emphasis on rationalizing policymaking and establishing measurable policy outcomes, the historical relationship between women’s movements and the federal state that characterized English-Canadian feminism in earlier decades underwent fundamental restructuring.1

This paper argues that given the current state of the Canadian women’s movement, analysis of activism that pursues a more transgressive politics such as that deployed by Slut Walks is particularly important to the movement’s survival/revival. Certainly the SlutWalks themselves are not without controversy, even within feminist circles; the paper argues, however, that by tapping into both the legacy of feminist activism in Canada and mobilizing the energy of Third Wave feminists, the example of SlutWalks can contribute much to urgent debates over feminist strategic practices in hostile and conservative times. The paper proceeds by surveying the recent history of the Canadian state’s experiences with gender mainstreaming and the disciplining impact such practices leveled on the Canadian women’s movement and then shifts to consider the SlutWalk phenomenon as one example of the kind of transgressive politics potentially useful to women’s movements in an era dominated by governments that manage by measuring, monitoring and standardizing to achieve their desired policy outcomes.

Gender Mainstreaming and the Canadian Women’s Movement

Following the adoption of the Platform for Action at the 1995 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, analysis of the

1 The state-centric character of much of English-Canadian feminist history, for example, is documented in Griffiths (1993) and Vickers, Rankin and Appelle (1993).
gendered impact of policies and programs, more commonly known as gender mainstreaming, emerged globally as standard practice in administrative bodies of all kinds, within governments of the global North and South and across international institutions such as the United Nations and the European Union. The rise of gender mainstreaming in the post-Beijing years generated a dizzying proliferation of bureaucratic practices and tools designed to assess systematically the impact of policies on gender equality. Since its advent in the late 1990s, scholars of gender mainstreaming have produced a burgeoning literature that still remains divided between those that stress its transformative possibilities (Rees 1998; Verloo 2005; Walby 2005) and others who acknowledge the potential of gender mainstreaming, but harbour suspicion about its capacity to precipitate any fundamental shift in gender relations (Bacchi and Eveline 2003; Daly 2005). Concerns about the extent to which gender mainstreaming actually meshes seamlessly with neo-liberal agendas are widespread; American scholar Alison Woodward, for example, argues that states can use gender mainstreaming as “an excuse to reduce woman-focused programming” (2001: 4). Others insist that, in fact, it can “serve to silence women and remove gender from the political agenda” (Guerrina 2003: 104 as quoted in Bacchi and Eveline, 2010: 42). In both the Australian and Canadian contexts, feminist scholars point to gender mainstreaming as responsible for the abolition of women’s units, services and policies at various government levels (Bacchi and Eveline 2010: 43; Teghtsoonian 2003).

In her analysis of the European applications of gender mainstreaming, Mary Daly (2005) concludes that it is the very elasticity of gender mainstreaming that allows it in some contexts to be pursued purely to ensure that states can position themselves as adequately “modernized” (the agenda of states pursuing European Union membership comes to mind here) or to target policy objectives (efficiency, productivity, etc.) that may bear little relationship to gender equality or social justice goals (440). Elisabeth Prugl applies Foucauldian understandings of governmentality to gender mainstreaming, reinterpreting it as a “technology of government embedded in an apparatus of gender” (2011: 75). Prugl argues convincingly that GM positions feminist knowledge within various institutional contexts, making it available for deployment by a range of actors engaged in governing gender relations. According to Prugl, gender mainstreaming involves policy interventions focused

on bureaucrats as rule makers, standard setters and conductors of the conduct of populations; [...] to judge whether it has achieved the ends of governing gender, it needs to measure, assess, and evaluate [...]. Thus, the success of gender mainstreaming is judged by how it facilitates the accomplishment of a range of goals, many entailing slim government, entrepreneurial solutions, and standards of efficiency and effectiveness. (2011: 83–84)
Canada’s experiment with gender mainstreaming dates to 1995 when the Liberal government unveiled *Setting the Stage for the Next Century: The Federal Plan on Gender Equality*, a policy document outlining Canada’s vision of gender mainstreaming and introducing a required vetting of all programs and policies from federal departments and agencies to assess their gender impact (Status of Women Canada 1995). Mounting such a strategy was highly significant, as it constituted a more systematic approach to pursuing gender equality through public policymaking than had been attempted previously in Canada. With its promise of generating efficient policy design and measurable outputs, the federal government billed Gender-Based Analysis (the Canadian variant of gender mainstreaming) as an effective tool for realizing commitments to gender equality while ensuring cost effective and efficient public policy tailored to the new Canadian economic realities. *Setting the Stage* committed the federal government to an extensive range of mainstreaming activities including a call for the collection of sex-disaggregated statistics, the development of gender indicators and a certain sequence of rational policymaking steps that, if followed, promised to facilitate the successful integration of gender analysis. Numerous federal government departments, led by Status of Women Canada (the federal government’s lead agency devoted to gender equality) quickly established a web of departmental mechanisms to serve as focal points for conducting gender analysis and adopted training tools and other protocols for the integration of gender into their policymaking processes (Bacchi and Eveline 2010: 38). This period marked one in which gender mainstreaming gained significant visibility and legitimacy across particular quarters within the federal government and in many provincial/territorial and municipal contexts as well.

In 2000, the government renewed its support for gender mainstreaming through its second five-year strategy, the Agenda for Gender Equality (AGE). The AGE promised that the government would engage in “accelerating implementation of GBA in order to strengthen government policy capacity” (as quoted in Report of the Office of Auditor General of Canada, 2009: 6). Less than two years later, however, Canada’s 2002 submitted report on the implementation of the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women prompted a stern recommendation from the United Nations that Canada address its glaring compliance problems, given that there still existed no measures to ensure compliance or implementation of Gender-Based Analysis (Ibid. 7). In fact, between 2000 and 2005, previously active gender policy units gradually began to disappear or face downgrading nearly as quickly as they had appeared originally; noteworthy among them was the Gender-Based Analysis unit in the Department of Justice. At one time, the Department boasted a network of over fifty gender equality specialists and an advisory committee of twenty drawn from all levels of the Department. By 2004, however, the GBA unit was dismantled. Although a departmental policy on gender equality remains in effect to this day, GBA training is no longer offered, the department lacks a GBA champion and gender equality analysis is no longer monitored.

In December 2005, the Expert Panel on Accountability Mechanisms for Gender Equality struck by then-Prime Minister Paul Martin, argued in *Equality for Women: Beyond the Illusion* that Gender-Based Analysis needed “to be more than a purely technocratic exercise internal to government” (12) and noted that the Panel’s research confirmed that within departments and central agencies, “human and financial resources are inadequate to conduct analyses, define outcomes and assess results” (22). The following year, the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women, newly reconstituted in 2004 (also by Prime Minister Martin under pressure from the New Democratic Party) turned its attention to Gender-Based Analysis and held hearings on its implementation. The Standing Committee report, *Gender-Based Analysis: Building Blocks for Success*, similarly cited an ongoing lack of sufficient mechanisms for accountability and sustainability (2006).

In 2005–6, Status of Women Canada’s budgetary allocation for gender-based policy analysis stood at $6.2 million (Status of Women 2006). The 2006–7 estimates, however, show that SWC’s Gender-Based Analysis and Accountability Directorate was downgraded significantly as the budgetary commitment to gender-based policy analysis dropped precipitously to $1.1 million with the emphasis now placed squarely on departments to manage gender analysis themselves (Ibid 9). Outside SWC, however, the decreased activity around GBA at the departmental level, coupled with the Harper government’s refusal to craft a new coordinating framework for gender equality following the end of the previous Agenda for Gender Equality (2000–2005) appeared to sound the proverbial death knell for gender mainstreaming in Canada.

These developments continued the dramatic restructuring of the women’s movement in relationship to the Canadian federal state that dates back to the government of Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney (1984–1993). During that period, equality-seeking organizations increasingly
were excluded from the policy process as women’s movements began to lose their status as a legitimate policy actor. Women’s movements in particular were slowly squeezed financially through successive budget reductions beginning as early as 1986 (Bashevkin 1998). In 1989, the budget of the Women’s Program (the grants and contribution fund that had provided funding for women’s organizations and equality-seeking groups since 1973) suffered a 15% funding reduction followed the next year by even deeper cuts of an additional 20% (Bonnet 1996, 70 as quoted in Bush, 2001). These cuts occurred in tandem with an emerging neo-liberal climate that narrowed Canadian women’s access to the democratic process and undermined national women’s groups as accepted sources of knowledge for the development of Canadian public policy.

In 1995, Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government closed the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, a longstanding body responsible for research and advice on women’s equality offered at arm’s length from government. Other changes to women’s policy machinery, including the demotion of the Cabinet portfolio for the status of women to a junior Cabinet position represented by a Secretary of State represented not simply a contraction of women’s state machinery but were actions regarded by many feminists as symbolic of a widespread reduction in state support for women’s equality demands. As federally-focused women’s movements coped with their new diminished status, the trauma of the funding withdrawal was felt acutely both at the institutionalized as well as the grassroots level (Morris 1999: 31) and drastically thwarted the capacity of movements to pursue their usual range of lobbying activities. By 1998, deep cuts in public funding slashed government monies to 30% of the budget of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC), Canada’s largest umbrella organization of over 600 feminist groups, forcing the layoff of all but one of its remaining paid staff members. NAC leaders watched in shock while the Liberal government publically trumpeted its commitment to “a reorientation to civil society” yet simultaneously ended core funding to the group later that same year, leaving NAC reliant on fund-raising activities to support individual projects (Phillips 1999: 387).

Indeed, the impact of this “technocratic turn” undertaken by governments pursuing a neo-liberal agenda supports the analyses of Woodward (2001) and Bacchi and Eveline (2010). The Canadian women’s movement found itself increasingly marginalized from the policy process as gender mainstreaming practices sought to develop gender expertise ‘in house’ with less room for consultative relationships with movement actors. As well, women’s groups faced new pressure to align their lobbying efforts with government expectations of quantitative evidence and indicators that often proved impossible for organizations with limited resources. Escalating rhetoric by, in particular, the Reform Party of Canada, about how ‘special interests’ such as the women’s
movement were derailing Canadian democracy also increasingly marginalized progressive social actors.

Following the election of Stephen Harper’s Conservative government in 2006, an attack on women’s movements and gender equality initiatives began that was accompanied by the Harper government’s successful deploying of a discourse stressing how gender equality already existed in Canada and, therefore, required no further state attention. On September 25, 2006 new Conservative government announced “efficiency savings” of $5 million to Status of Women Canada (Status of Women Canada 2007), constituting a devastating 38.5% reduction to the agency’s budget and effectively handcuffing the agency for future effectiveness. The government explained these cuts as an extension of the $2 billion in spending cuts announced in their first budget, thus squarely situating the decision as one motivated by fiscal responsibility rather than as evidence of a socially-conservative driven rollback on women’s rights. In a dramatic move one week later, however, Minister Responsible for the Status of Women, Bev Oda, announced that the Women’s Program no longer would fund women’s groups that engaged in advocacy, lobbying or general research. In fact, as the Minister explained, the Women’s Program would focus not on ensuring equality, but rather on “supporting the full participation of all Canadian women in the economic, social and cultural life of Canada,” (House of Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women, 5 October 2006) a subtle but critically important discursive shift in the government’s definition of gender equality. The government also terminated the SWC’s Policy Research Fund that since 1993 had generated independent research studies on a diverse range of equality-related topics. When Minister Oda appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Status of Women two days after this second announcement, she defended the government’s actions, assuring citizens that “Canada’s new Government fundamentally believes that women are equal” (Ibid.) By affirming the government’s belief that equality was achieved, the government signaled its intention to further relinquish responsibility for pursuing programming targeted to address gender inequality.

SWC’s 2008–9 Report on Plans and Priorities outlined a further drift away from the agency’s previous focus on creating gender equality towards a focus on: building strategic partnerships; developing accountability mechanisms to monitor and measure progress; and strengthening the organizational structure of the Department to ensure it meshed with overall Government of Canada accountabilities (6). But the absence of any meaningful progress on actual accountability mechanisms coupled with the overarching chilly climate of the Canadian federal government towards gender equality, left little hope that

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4 For fuller accounts of these developments, see Brodie and Bakker (2008) and Haussman and Rankin (2009).
further substantive progress on Gender-Based Analysis might be possible. In fact, by 2008 it appeared that the conditions necessary for institutional leadership in gender mainstreaming by SWC had evaporated. Outside government, the casualties of the Harper government’s approach to gender equality grew to include defunded feminist organizations such as the National Association of Women and the Law, the Canadian Research Institute for the Advancement of Women, the Alberta Network of Immigrant Women, the New Brunswick Pay Equity Coalition and the Ontario Association of Interval and Transition Houses.

The unexpected intervention of the Auditor General of Canada into the arena of GBA precipitated a revival of activity around GBA with the decision of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) in 2008 to undertake an audit of the federal government’s implementation of GBA. The findings revealed, at best, a patchwork commitment to GBA and, at worst, the complete absence of any serious attention to GBA. In only 30 of the 68 initiatives scrutinized by the OAG had gender impacts of policies and programs received any analysis; neither was there any evidence that when such analysis was available, it had been incorporated in developing public policy options. Only 4 cases revealed evidence that GBA had been integrated in the policy development process (Office of the Auditor General of Canada 2009: 2). The OAG study noted also that even though central agencies such as the Treasury Board of Canada demonstrated that improvements in GBA training had occurred and GBA champions were appointed, “they could not demonstrate that their analysts had reviewed and, when appropriate, challenged gender impacts of spending initiatives or policy proposals submitted by departments for approval” (3).

The revelations of the OAG propelled the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Accounts to join the chorus calling for increased implementation of Gender-Based Analysis, arguing that central agencies should “use their challenge role to impose a more rigorous review of departmental GBA, and that Status of Women Canada have sufficient resources to assess and promote GBA throughout the government” (“Gender Based Analysis Not Integrated into Decision-Making” 2010). Although it is too early to judge the effectiveness of this latest plan, intervention from the Auditor General and the deployment of a different discursive strategy to support gender equality around the need for government accountability on this issue appears to have breathed some much needed oxygen into a nearly-asphyxiated GBA mandate. But regardless of the long-term viability of GBA within government, however, the impact of the technocratic approach to women’s equality within the state only served to marginalize women as actors in the policy process. When the most recent government scaled back gender mainstreaming efforts and adopted a largely negative attitude towards progressive social movements more generally, the result was a seriously demobilized women’s movement.
From the Technocratic to the Transgressive

Recently migrated from literary analysis and gender studies, the language of transgression now informs social movement analyses (Spalding 2007). In their work on contentious politics, noted social movement scholars McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly conceptualize transgressive politics as that which “consists of episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims” in which “at least some of the parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors” and “at least some parties employ innovative collective action” (2001: 7–8). Transgressive politics entails “opposition to prevailing normative expectations about what is proper or correct behavior and indeed, in the extreme, about what is morally or ethically ‘right’” (Spalding 2007: 87–88).

Although SlutWalks do not constitute a social movement per se, the strategic practice of the SlutWalks, their decision to eschew a formal structure and the capacity of SlutWalks to mobilize women previously uninvolved in political activism would appear to qualify them as transgressive according to McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s definition. Although the SlutWalk Toronto organizers do not identify their activism as necessarily feminist, the specific nature of their interventions in the broader movement to end violence against women and the spontaneous replication of the marches globally confirm that their actions tap into the palpable anger and frustration of women across borders with cultural stereotypes that deem a women’s physical appearance to be a factor in their vulnerability to sexual violence.

Certainly, SlutWalks fulfill McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly’s definition with respect to opposing normative expectations about what is “proper or correct behavior.” Indeed, the organizers themselves are fully cognizant that much of the attention generated by the SlutWalks inevitably derives from the deliberately provocative name and related assessments by many commentators of the inappropriateness of the march in general. As one of the original co-organizers, Sonya Barnett explains, however, “We wanted to take back the word and sling it right back.” Barnett, herself an admitted political neophyte, admits: “If you are going to be heard, you have to rise above the noise [...] without such an audacious attitude, we wouldn’t be where we are” (Church 2011). Calling herself a “self-proclaimed slut,” co-organizer Heather Jarvis agrees: “Slut is a pejorative term, and is thrown at us regardless of our behaviour and dress, so we’re taking it back” (Wheeler 2011).

The decision by walk organizers to reclaim the word “slut” garnered widespread critique from non-feminists and feminists alike. The Toronto-based Globe and Mail columnist, Margaret Wente, well-known in Canada for anti-feminist sentiments, dismisses the SlutWalks as “what you get when

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5 Although SlutWalk Toronto mounted the original march and offers information and advice to potential SlutWalk organizers, the group does not function as a secretariat for marches elsewhere.
graduate students in feminist studies run out of things to do.” For Wente, those participating in the SlutWalks suffer from “narcissistic self-indulgence” if they believe that the media coverage elicited by the Slut Walks is inspired by anything other than a desire to attract audiences through “images of nubile young women in thigh-high cutoffs and tube tops” (2011). More substantive critiques of the SlutWalk mobilization come from within the women’s movement itself. In the pages of The Guardian, U.S. feminists Gail Dines and Wendy Murphy outline their argument as to the misguided efforts of SlutWalk organizers to reclaim the misogynist term:

The term slut is so deeply rooted in the patriarchal “madonna/whore” view of women’s sexuality that it is beyond redemption. The word is so saturated with the ideology that female sexual energy deserves punishment that trying to change its meaning is a waste of precious feminist resources. (Dines and Murphy 2011)

”Take Back the Night” organizers who mount annual nighttime marches and vigils in many countries to protest violence against women, also express concern about the SlutWalk phenomenon. Katherine Koestner, U.S executive director of the Take Back the Night campaign, insists: “Using the word ‘slut’ as an adjective to describe women in any way, shape or form just reinforces that pigeonholing of women and tying our value to our worth as sexual beings” (as quoted in Grasgreen 2011).

In “An Open Letter from Black Women to the SlutWalk” (2011), African-American women commend the mobilization but express their unwillingness to join, arguing that “we do not have the privilege or the space to call ourselves ‘slut’ without validating the already historically entrenched ideology and recurring messages about what and who the Black woman is.” Instead, the Open Letter calls on SlutWalk Toronto organizers to re-brand the walks in ways that will offer a more “critical, a more strategic and sustainable plan for bringing women together” across histories, language, context and cultures. From within Canada, feminist activist and organizer Harsha Walia (2011) writes eloquently about her own discomfort with the SlutWalks. Walia roots her critique in both the anti-racist arguments outlined in the Open Letter in that she sees the term “slut” as one that “disproportionately impacts women of colour and poor women to reinforce their status as inherently dirty and second-class, and hence more rape-able” but also on the basis of its liberal framing around questions of choice, what Walia dubs “the palatable ‘I can wear what I want’ feminism that is intentionally devoid of an analysis of power dynamics” and that fails to advance an analysis of the systems of capitalism and patriarchy at work in the commodification of women’s sexuality. Despite her insightful and powerful critiques, however, Walia admits that she too marched in the Vancouver SlutWalk and registers her surprise at
the participation level of young women as well as women of colour, despite the controversy over the racialization embedded in the work “slut”.

To appreciate the relevance of the SlutWalks in a moment dominated by a “gender measurement regime,” it is important to recall that turning to transgressive acts to fight women’s oppression is a familiar political strategy for Canadian feminists. Suffragists of the 19th and early 20th century relied on a range of acts dismissed as inappropriate and radical at the time, for example, staging mock parliaments in their struggles to gain political citizenship (Prentice et. al. 1988). In the 1960s and 1970s, women undertook transgressive acts such as the 1970 Abortion Caravan during which women travelled over 3000 miles from Vancouver to Ottawa to demand reproductive rights and thirty-five women chained themselves to the gallery of the House of Commons, closing Parliament for the first time in Canadian history (Pierson et al. 1993). Beginning in the 1990s, “third wave” feminists in Canada sought to reclaim “girl/grrl culture” through, for example, the use of “zines” as creative self-publishing venues within which to explore expanded definitions of feminism and issues such as femininity, youth culture and the body (Newman and White 2006: 90). In the first decade of this century, the Fédération des Femmes du Québec, a coalition of women’s groups, launched the World March of Women 2000 Against Poverty and Violence Against Women, an action that presaged SlutWalks in that it mobilized women in 157 countries who united to stage their own marches and press for immediate action on poverty and violence by their respective states (Dufour and Giraud 2007).

What distinguishes SlutWalks as transgressive in this particular historical moment, however, is not only SlutWalks’ bold “in-your-face” rejection of dangerous stereotypes about violence against women. In an era in which many governments, including Canada’s, seek to contain and curtail women’s equality struggles, the manner in which SlutWalks pursue a spontaneous and provocative politics that inspires countless women to march in the streets is noteworthy. Certainly, the definition of what many states now consider “transgressive” political acts has expanded in neo-liberal times; in the post-9/11 era in particular, resistance politics often elicits coercive state responses rationalized by securitization discourses. Given how gender mainstreaming practices marginalize women’s movements and the Canadian state now threatens to erase gender altogether from public policy debates, the spontaneity and drama associated with SlutWalks with their capacity to engage new contingents of women, draw attention to a central feminist issue and potentially re-energize feminist activism, are of critical significance.

Whether SlutWalks continue in Canada as impromptu mobilizations that can build long-term momentum remains highly uncertain. Their viability will depend most importantly on whether SlutWalk organizers address substantively the very salient critiques of racialized women and the serious concerns voiced by others in the anti-violence movement. Regardless of their
mobilization lifespan, however, in a period marked by efforts to measure gender equality in ways that often do little to end women’s oppression, SlutWalks serve as a cogent reminder to women’s movements of the power of transgressive politics as a viable route to political change.

Works Cited:


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