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Kantian Friendship : Duty and Idea

Diametros nr 39, 140-153

2014

Artykuł został opracowany do udostępnienia w internecie przez Muzeum Historii Polski w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł jest umieszczony w kolekcji cyfrowej bazhum.muzhp.pl, gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych.

Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

KANTIAN FRIENDSHIP: DUTY AND IDEA

– Victoria S. Wike –

Abstract. Kant commentators have recently begun to pay attention to Kant’s account of friendship. They have asked questions, such as: Is his description of friendship consistent and robust and does it provide an account of friendship that satisfies common intuitions and expectations of friendship? Their answers to these questions have often been negative. At the same time, many of these critics share a common understanding of two basic aspects of Kant’s account of friendship. Kant sees friendship as both a duty and an ideal state. One critic, Patricia Flynn, considers the implications of this dual claim. She argues that the view that friendship is both duty and idea gives rise to a tension in the concept of friendship. This tension makes the duty of friendship different from all other Kantian moral duties and leaves us with a duty that we cannot achieve. My aim is to revisit Flynn’s argument and by reassessing Kant’s claims to show that there is indeed complexity in Kant’s understanding of friendship, but there is no conceptual *problem* that makes friendship a duty *unlike* all other duties or makes it an *impossible* duty.

Keywords: Kant, friendship, highest good, ideas, duty.

I. Introduction

Kant commentators have recently begun to pay attention to Kant’s account of friendship. They have asked questions, such as: Is his description of friendship consistent and robust and does it provide an account of friendship that satisfies common intuitions and expectations of friendship? Their answers to these questions have often been negative. It has been claimed that some of Kant’s views of friendship are false and must be revised,¹ that Kant has a “thin” concept of friendship,² and that he did not pay enough attention to the emotion of love and to emotional warmth as a necessary component of friendship.³ At the same time, many of these critics share a common understanding of two basic aspects of Kant’s account of friendship. They point out that Kant sees friendship as both a duty and

¹ Denis [2001] pp. 1–3.

² Flynn [2007] p. 423.

³ Denis [2001] p. 22.

an ideal state.⁴ Kant says both that friendship is a duty and that friendship is an idea or ideal that in its perfection is beyond human experience.

One critic, Patricia Flynn, considers the implications of this dual claim. She argues that the view that friendship is both duty and idea gives rise to a tension in the concept of friendship. This tension makes the duty of friendship different from all other Kantian moral duties and leaves us with a duty that we cannot achieve.⁵ This paper assesses Flynn's argument and by revisiting Kant's claims it shows that there is indeed complexity in the role Kant assigns friendship, but there is no conceptual *problem* that makes friendship a duty *unlike* all other duties or makes it an *impossible* duty. The paper leaves aside issues concerning Kant's definition and types of friendship and questions about whether his definition of friendship is constant throughout his writings and whether it provides an adequate account for our own lives.

The problem, as Flynn sees it, is that Kant describes friendship in both real and ideal terms. He has a concept of perfect friendship but he also considers the dangers and risks of actual friendships. She states that in Kant's discussion of friendship "there are really two sets of practices—ideal and real. Ideally, friends engage in the mutual sharing of each other's ends and discuss their thoughts openly and candidly. Realistically, friends never let their needs be known and monitor the sharing of judgments with great care and an eye to self-preservation."⁶ Flynn concludes:

The tension between Kant's presentation of the ideal of friendship and the possibility of its realization seems irreconcilable, and Kant is quite resigned to this lack of reconciliation... Friendship is thus a moral duty tantalizingly beyond our reach, in a way that is markedly different from Kant's other moral duties that, despite our natural inclinations to the contrary, can be achieved with sufficient struggle and fortitude.⁷

Flynn's objection is that by treating friendship in both ideal and real terms, Kant's concept of friendship sets up an unbridgeable chasm. Furthermore, she claims, the consequence of this complex view of friendship is that the duty of friendship,

⁴ See Langton [1992] p. 492, Marcucci [1999] pp. 436–439, Van Impe [2011] p. 135, and Denis [2001] p. 8.

⁵ Flynn [2007] p. 423.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 420.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 423.

unlike all of our other moral duties, is beyond our reach, which makes it an impossible duty.

II. Friendship as Duty and Idea

Flynn and other commentators rightly note that Kant's discussion of friendship speaks both of perfect friendship and of human friendship. Kant insists that there is a duty of friendship and that friendship is an idea. These claims are made both in the *Lectures on Ethics* and in the later *Metaphysics of Morals*.⁸ In the Conclusion of the Elements of Ethics in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, he says:

Friendship [Freundschaft] (considered in its perfection) is the union of two persons through equal mutual love and respect—It is easy to see that this is an ideal [*Idea*] of each participating and sharing sympathetically in the other's well-being through the morally good will that unites them... human beings have a duty [*Pflicht*] of friendship. —But it is readily seen that friendship is only an idea [*Idee*] (though a practically necessary one) and unattainable in practice, although striving for friendship (as a maximum of good disposition toward each other) is a duty [*Pflicht*] set by reason...⁹ (MS 6: 469)

In the Collins lecture notes, Kant states:

Friendship is an Idea [*Die Freundschaft ist eine Idee*], because it is not drawn from experience, but has its seat in the understanding; in experience it is very defective, but in morals it is a very necessary Idea... We have need of a measure, by which to estimate degree... In regard to quantities, so far as they are determined *a priori*, what is the specific measure by which we can assess them? Their measure is always the maximum; so far as this maximum is a measure in regard to other, lesser qualities, such a measure is an Idea...The maximum of mutual love is

⁸ Although the *Lectures on Ethics*, as student lecture notes from courses that Kant taught, do not have the same authority as the later *Metaphysics of Morals*, they echo the later in calling friendship both duty and idea and so they are used here.

⁹ I use the following translations and abbreviations of Kant's works, all from the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: standard A/B pagination for the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant [1998a]; KpV: *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant [1996b]; Gr: *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant [1996a]; MS: *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant [1996c]; LE: "Moral philosophy: Collins's lecture notes," Kant [1997a]; "Morality according to Prof. Kant: Mrongovius's second set of lecture notes (selections)," Kant [1997b]; "Notes on the lectures of Mr. Kant on the metaphysics of morals: Vigilantius notes," Kant [1997c]; and Rel: *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Kant [1998b]. Cites provide the abbreviated name of the work and the volume and page numbers from the Prussian Academy edition of Kant's works: *Kants Gesammelte Schriften* (Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin 1900–).

friendship, and this is an Idea, since it serves as a measure by which to determine reciprocal love... This Idea of friendship [*Diese Idee der Freundschaft*] enables us to measure friendship, and see how far it is still deficient. So when Socrates said: 'My friends, there are no friends,' this was as much as to say that no friendship ever matches the Idea of friendship; and he was right about this, for it is not in fact possible. But the Idea is true, nonetheless. (LE 27: 423-424)

In the Collins lectures, friendship is discussed under the section title, "Of Duties Towards Other Persons" (LE 27: 413) and Kant speaks of friendship, and even friendliness and social intercourse generally, as a virtue (LE 27: 419-420). Thus, friendship is both an idea, as such unattainable in practice, and a duty, meaning a morally required action of human beings.

Kant says that there are actual human friendships, even though none of them fully realizes the idea of perfect friendship as such. Lara Denis offers this summary of Kant's conceptions of friendship:

Kant acknowledges at least four notions of friendship. He takes at least three of them from Aristotle: Friendships of taste (aesthetic friendship), need (pragmatic friendship), and disposition and sentiment (moral friendship)... According to Kant, all three of these kinds of friendship are realizable. The fourth notion of friendship that Kant introduces – perfect, ideal, or complete friendship – is not; we can only approximate it.¹⁰

H.J. Paton too claims that Kant distinguishes moral friendship from perfect friendship. The two, he states, are defined differently and the former can be realized, however rarely, while the latter is an ideal.¹¹ Marcia Baron agrees that the two kinds of friendship are different and she focuses on the point that moral friendship "actually exists here and there in its perfection" (MS 6: 472) although perfect friendship is unattainable in practice.¹²

Hence, Kant, contrary to Flynn, does not consider it to be a problem that ideal friendship is distinguishable from types of human friendships. He is not resigned in some negative sense to the difference between perfect friendship that is unattainable and human friendships that are attainable. On the contrary, he believes it is *necessary* to insist on this difference. Put simply, Kant is content with the unbridgeable gap that troubles Flynn. The reason for this is that Kant believes

¹⁰ Denis [2001] p. 3.

¹¹ Paton [1956] p. 142.

¹² Baron [2013] p. 374.

that practical ideas serve an important function. Hence, any reply to Flynn's critique must first show why practical ideas are crucial.

III. Practical Ideas

Kant is both clear and insistent on the need for practical ideas. He states: "an idea [*Idee*] of practical reason... is the indispensable condition of every practical use of reason... The practical idea is always fruitful in the highest degree and unavoidably necessary in respect of actual actions" (A328/B385). Lacking practical ideas, there cannot be a practical use of reason. In a footnote in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, he confirms:

If I understand by an *idea* [*Idee*] a perfection to which nothing adequate can be given in experience, the moral ideas are not, on that account, something transcendent, that is, something of which we cannot even determine the concept sufficiently or of which it is uncertain whether there is any object corresponding to it at all, as is the case with the ideas of speculative reason; instead, the moral ideas, as archetypes of practical perfection, serve as the indispensable rule of moral conduct and also as the *standard of comparison*. (KpV 5: 127n)

In the arena of practical reason, ideas are indispensable and necessary because they serve as archetypes, as the rule against which all practical objects and actions are judged. Without ideas, practical objects or states cannot be measured or evaluated. More specifically, he says that the task of a practical idea is to provide a standard or a maximum.

In the Mrongovius lectures on ethics, he states:

A practical Idea [*Eine Practische Idee*] is a moral perfection whose object can never be adequately given in experience... Such Ideas are not chimeras, for they constitute the guideline to which we must constantly approach. They make up the law of approximation. We have to possess a yardstick by which to estimate our moral worth, and to know the degree to which we are faulty and deficient; and here I have to conceive of a maximum, so that I know how far away I am, or how near I come to it. (LE 29: 604–605)

Thus, Kant repeatedly states the need for practical ideas. The practical use of reason requires archetypes as standards for human actions. As we are engaged in making better choices, choices more in keeping with and done for the sake of the moral law, we need to see the standard to which we aspire. We must be able to measure ourselves and our progress in virtue against an idea of perfection.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant links his use of practical ideas to Plato's. Like Plato, Kant says, it is wrong to derive concepts of virtue from experience. The Platonic Republic, even if it never comes to pass, is valuable as an archetype and as the idea of a maximum towards which legislation and government should draw ever nearer (A316–317/B372–374). Similarly, the idea of virtue acts as an archetype and standard.

That no human being will ever act adequately to what the pure idea of virtue [*die reine Idee der Tugend*] contains does not prove in the least that there is something chimerical in this thought. For it is only by means of this idea that any judgment of moral worth or unworth is possible; and so it necessarily lies at the ground of every approach to moral perfection... (A315/B372).

The ideas of theoretical reason have a regulative or heuristic purpose (A671/B699) and can be described as “only” ideas because the ideas cannot be projected in an image. But the ideas of practical reason do more. Without them, there would not be practical action and moral evaluation. Kant says: “an idea [*Idee*] of practical reason... is the indispensable condition of every practical use of reason” and, hence, “the practical idea is always fruitful in the highest degree and unavoidably necessary in respect of actual actions” (A328/B385).

As we have seen, one of these practical ideas of perfection is friendship. Additional evidence comes from the Vigilantius lectures where Kant speaks of friendship as an idea [*Idee*], as something unattainable (LE 27: 675). He says that people “assuredly see friendship as a need, but since nothing in experience corresponds to the idea of it, the thing was to be considered as intellectual, merely, as a concept whose perfection is never attained by men” (LE 27: 680). Van Impe makes a strong claim about the importance of Kant's idea of friendship. This idea, he says, in spite of its supersensible quality has “an important propaedeutic function for becoming a moral agent, a picture which contradicts the often but wrongly acclaimed individualism, coldness and moroseness of Kant's ethics.”¹³ The idea of friendship is not only a measuring stick for actual friendships but also a condition for moral agency. Thus, Van Impe concludes, the idea of friendship not only facilitates the assessing of human friendships but the acting of moral agents.

¹³ Van Impe [2011] p. 132.

IV. Is friendship a unique or impossible duty?

Thus far, we have seen that there is a duty of friendship, meaning we are commanded by practical reason to pursue friendship but friendship is an unattainable idea of perfection. In a Platonic vein, friendship can be both a perfect idea and a human state of affairs that resembles or reflects more or less the perfect idea. Kant does not recognize a problem with this account of friendship. Flynn, on the other hand, objects that this view of friendship makes the duty of friendship unlike other Kantian duties. It does so, she argues, by making friendship (perfect friendship) unreachable. Her point seems to be that a duty to friendship would be impossible or nonsensical if perfect friendship is in fact beyond our reach.

Consider first whether friendship is really so different from other Kantian duties. To be sure, there are many kinds of Kantian duties and no comprehensive account of duty can be provided here. For example, the *Groundwork* lays out four duties classified as duties to self or others and as perfect or imperfect duties (Gr 4: 421). The *Metaphysics of Morals* uses these classifications but also identifies wide, not narrow, duties as the subject matter of ethics (MS 6: 411). In addition, there are indirect duties, as in the indirect duty to assure one's own happiness (Gr 4: 399) and to show gratitude to an old horse or dog because of one's duty with regard to these animals (MS 6: 443).

But there is one specific duty that can be explored and compared to the duty of friendship in fruitful ways. The duty at issue is the duty to promote the highest good (*das höchste Gut*) (KpV 5: 113). It must be noted that the duty to further the highest good has itself been subject to intense criticism. Among other claims, it has been argued that the concept of the highest good is ambiguous, in that the highest good seems to be posited in both this world and a future intelligible world, and that the duty to promote it introduces an element of heteronomy into Kant's ethics as well as a duty that is impossible to attain.¹⁴ But our task is not to defend the duty to promote the highest good, but only, by using this duty as a point of comparison for the duty of friendship, to show that the latter is neither a unique or impossible duty.

The highest good, like friendship, is described in both ideal and real terms, as both idea and duty. Kant posits the highest good as the unconditioned final end of pure practical reason. This whole and complete end for human beings involves

¹⁴ These views are expressed by, among others: Reath [1988] pp. 593–619; Silber [1959] pp. 469–492; Beck [1960] p. 243; and Murphy [1965] pp. 102–110. They continue to be discussed today. See, for example, O'Connell [2012] pp. 257–279; and Guyer [2011] pp. 88–120.

the combination of virtue and happiness. Kant refers to the “rational idea of the totality of conditions (and so of the unconditioned)” (KpV 5: 107) and calls the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason “the highest good (*des höchsten Guts*)” (KpV 5: 108). The doctrine of wisdom is aimed at determining “this idea [*Idee*] practically” (KpV 5: 108). The highest good is an idea of pure practical reason, the idea of a rational moral world, and this idea is the object and necessary end of practical reason. As such, we have a duty to actively promote the highest good. Kant says that it is “(morally) necessary to *produce the highest good through the freedom of the will* [*das höchste Gut durch Freiheit des Willens hervorzubringen*]” and that the highest good is to be “made real through our will” (KpV 5: 113). Practical reason commands that we further the highest good. As Kant puts it: “the moral law commands me to make the highest good possible in a world [*das höchste mögliche Gut in einer Welt*] the final object of all my conduct” (KpV 5: 129). Thus, it is “a duty for us to promote the highest good [*war es Pflicht für uns, das höchste Gut zu befördern*]” (KpV 5: 125). This passage identifies the highest good as both idea and duty:

... the *highest good* [*das höchste Gut*] [is] the whole object of pure practical reason, which must necessarily represent it as possible since it commands us to contribute everything possible to its production [*zu dessen Hervorbringung alles mögliche*]...the possibility of such a connection of the conditioned with its condition belongs wholly to the supersensible relation of things...although the practical results of this idea [*Idee*]—namely actions that aim at realizing the highest good [*die Handlungen die darauf abzielen, das höchste Gut wirklich zu machen*]—belong to the sensible world... (KpV 5: 119).

We are commanded by reason to produce the highest good although the highest good is an idea.

There is further evidence of this dual role for the highest good in the *Religion*. Kant considers in the Preface “the idea of a highest good in the world [*die Idee eines höchsten Guts in der Welt*]” (Rel 6: 5). This idea, which he calls the “moral idea of the highest good [*moralische Idee vom höchsten Gut*],” arises out of morality but is not the basis of morality (Rel 6: 5). Furthermore, the pursuit of the highest good is a moral duty. He states: “the moral law wills that the highest good possible through us be actualized [*das moralische Gesetz will, dass das höchste durch uns mögliche Gut bewirkt werde*]” (Rel 6: 5) and “the proposition: ‘Make the highest possible good in this world your own ultimate end [*mache das höchste in der Welt mögliche Gut zu deinem Endzweck*],’ is a synthetic proposition *a priori* which is introduced by the moral law itself” (Rel 6: 7n). In the

following passage, Kant links his claim that we have a duty to further the highest good to the status of the highest good as an idea.

... by himself the human being cannot realize the idea of the supreme good [*Idee das höchsten Guts*] inseparably bound up with the pure moral disposition, either with respect to the happiness which is part of that good or with respect to the union of the human beings necessary to the fulfillment of the end, and yet there is also in him the duty [*Pflicht*] to promote the idea... (Rel 6: 139)

The highest good is a rational idea of perfection that is by definition supersensible and beyond our human abilities to achieve. But the idea is not useless or unrelated to human moral experience. It posits the practical end of reason and thereby directs human choice and commands actions that promote the highest good. The highest good is both idea and duty and, in these two capacities, it is identical to friendship. Therefore, contrary to Flynn's claim, the duty of friendship is not unlike all other Kantian duties; it in fact resembles the duty to further the highest good.

Consider next whether, given Kant's description of friendship, the duty of friendship is in reality an impossible duty. That is, given the characterization of friendship as an idea of perfection, does it follow that imperfect human beings cannot have a duty of friendship or that friendship is impossible? It is important to note that several other Kantian duties have also been subjected to the charge of impossibility. The most discussed example is Kant's claim that we have a duty to promote the highest good, understood as happiness in proportion to worth (KpV 5: 114).¹⁵ Hence, again, the duty to promote the highest good can be usefully compared to the duty of friendship. Given that the highest good and friendship are both characterized as ideas and duties and are both critiqued as impossible duties, a reply to the "impossible duty" charge against the highest good will likely supply a reply to the similar charge against friendship.

With regard to the highest good, commentators have argued that it is impossible for us to do the kind of apportioning that the highest good requires. L.W. Beck claims that there is nothing human beings can do to distribute

¹⁵ Another duty that some have argued may be effectively impossible to achieve is the duty to develop one's talents. Johnson [2011] considers that there are circumstances under which a person sincerely aiming to improve herself may find no opportunities to do so. The person may be constrained by more pressing duties or extreme poverty (pp. 21–22). Villarán [2013] claims that the duty to cultivate oneself is not within one's complete control, since a person may will self-improvement but fail to achieve such improvement due to conditions of illness or scarce resources (p. 14).

happiness in proportion to virtue. That, he says, is a task for the Supreme Being (in the *Critique of Practical Reason* this is the reason for introducing the postulate of God's existence).¹⁶ Jeffrie Murphy states that, given what Kant says about the inscrutability of moral motives, it is impossible for any human being to assess the virtuousness or worthiness of any action.¹⁷ If we cannot judge worthiness, then we assuredly cannot apportion happiness in accord with worth. Sharon Anderson-Gold agrees that our "epistemological limitations" make us incapable of evaluating worthiness. She concludes that: "Our obligation to 'promote' this type of world cannot mean that individuals should attempt to become the distributing agents."¹⁸ For these commentators, the argument is that the duty to promote the highest good is impossible for us.

But, if the duty is truly impossible, then Kant must have made a mistake in calling it a duty. Recently, Alonso Villarán has proposed a solution to the so-called impossibility problem of the highest good. He introduces the notion of "fallible" duties. A fallible duty is "one whose perfect accomplishment is not in the moral agent's complete control."¹⁹ The moral agent is fully capable of willing the action, but not necessarily of accomplishing the action. Since Kant's ethic is an ethic of intentions, Villarán argues that it is enough to satisfy the stated duty, in this case, to promote the highest good, that we try as best we can to apportion happiness in accordance to worth. The duty is to will such a moral world insofar as we can, that is, to make well-intended attempts. Kant himself uses this language when he says that our duty as human beings is to "realize the highest good to the utmost of our capacity" (KpV 5: 143n) and "with all my [our] powers" (KpV 5: 142).

What Villarán is really drawing attention to here is the moral command to will or to strive for practical reason's end. A so-called fallible duty is not one we might be wrong about or one that is mistaken. It is rather the claim that what the duty is requiring is the willing or promoting or pursuing of some end that is not completely within our power. The so-called fallibility point is not that duties are fallible but that human moral willing is limited and constrained and cannot always achieve its end.

For the highest good, one way this limitation is evident is in Kant's statement that the "highest moral good will not be brought about solely through the striving of one individual person" (Rel 6: 97). Kant says the highest good is

¹⁶ Beck [1960] pp. 244–245.

¹⁷ Murphy [1965] pp. 107–108.

¹⁸ Anderson-Gold [2001] p. 31.

¹⁹ Villarán [2013] p. 33.

a social good and it requires a union of individuals working together. Insofar as the highest good is a practical idea it contains a kind of perfection that puts it out of reach. Hence, when Kant talks about the duty to the highest good, he says it is a duty to promote [*Beförderung*] (Rel 6: 97)/[*hinzuwirken*] (Rel 6: 139), contribute everything possible to its production [*zu dessen Hervorbringung alles mögliche*] (KpV 5: 119), and produce [*hervorzubringen*] the highest good (KpV 5: 113). Finally, our duty is not to realize the highest good but to actively pursue and do everything we can to promote the highest good. The duty to strive for the highest good is not impossible even if the highest good itself is an idea and any so-called duty to attain the highest good would be impossible.

Returning to the duty of friendship, the same point applies. We can respond to the charge that the duty of friendship is impossible by recalling that the duty is to strive for friendship, not to achieve it (MS 6: 469).²⁰ As moral agents, we may try to develop friendships but be hindered by geography or the unwillingness of others to reciprocate. Since friendship requires two persons in union sharing equal mutual love and respect (MS 6: 469), there are many factors outside of any one person's control. Kant notes how difficult it is to determine whether friends are loving one another equally or whether friends feel equal love and respect for their friends. Success in accomplishing the duty of friendship cannot be attained by a single person. Furthermore, since friendship is a practical idea, it posits a kind of perfection that is out of reach for human beings. But we can still achieve the willing of the duty, namely, the effort to engage in friendships. There is thus a way of understanding the duty of friendship that avoids the charge of impossibility based on human limitations. Although human beings cannot achieve perfect friendship because it is a practical idea and even progress towards perfect friendship is limited by human and situational factors, nevertheless, we can still strive to pursue and promote friendships. Efforts can be undertaken to advance friendships and that is all that the duty of friendship requires. Hence, contrary to Flynn's claim, we ought not abandon the duty of friendship on the mistaken grounds that it is an impossible duty.

V. Conclusion

Therefore, there is no reason to summarily reject Kant's account of friendship as both a duty and an idea. It is not unintelligible to view friendship in its perfection as an unreachable idea although friendship remains the object of human duty. Human friendships are possible and are evaluated in light of the

²⁰ This point is made by Paton [1956] p. 140, and Baron [2013] p. 367.

archetype that is perfect friendship. Flynn's concern with the unbridgeable gap between ideal and real friendship is a necessary unbridgeable gap, according to Kant. Practical ideas, unattainable in themselves, play an important role in enabling us to act morally and to measure human efforts at morality. Friendship is one such practical idea and the highest good is another. Hence, the duty of friendship is not unlike other Kantian duties in setting what is for human beings an impossible-to-reach end but requiring human progress towards that end. Furthermore, the duty of friendship is not an impossible duty simply because the idea of friendship is unattainable by human beings. The duties to promote friendship and the highest good are duties to strive towards perfect moral ends. They require us to work to the best of our abilities to achieve these ends, that is, to fully will these ends, even though the ends are ideals. Inevitably, human limitations and contingencies of the sensible world work against our ability to realize these ends. Kant's view of friendship as both a duty and an idea does not result in irreconcilable tension or set friendship apart from other duties. It is instead a view that is remarkably consistent with Kant's broader discussion of practical ideas and moral duties.²¹

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²¹ I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their comments and assistance.

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