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# Abstracts

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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

## **Abstracts**

### **Susan Haack, The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth**

„Much truth is spoken, that more may be concealed,” wrote Mr. Justice Darling in 1879. Opening with an articulation of the distinction between truth (the concept or phenomenon) and truths (particular true propositions), and of some thoughts about vagueness, this paper is largely devoted to:

(1) developing an account of the dual meaning of „partially true” (true-in-part vs. part-of-the-truth); and

(2) understanding the reasons for, and the dangers of, the very common tendency to mislead by telling only part of the relevant truth.

*Keywords:* truth, partial truth, vagueness, deception, Ramsey, laconicism

### **Susan Haack, Professor Twardowski and the Relativist Menace**

The first part of the argument of this paper is that Prof. Twardowski’s attempt to dispose of relativism once and for all in his short paper does not succeed—for a number of interrelated reasons: (i) Twardowski’s argument that there are no relative truths fails: it is not exhaustive. (ii) Even with respect to the examples on which he focuses, it is inconclusive, relying on an unclear and unexplained concept of judgment, and the unjustified assumption that only judgments are literally true or false. (iii) More fundamentally, Twardowski’s approach relies on a conception of relativism which badly over-simplifies a very complex phenomenon.

*Keywords:* relativism, truth, statement, judgment, epistemology

### **Jan Woleński, Susan Haack on Twardowski’s Refutation of the Relativity of Truth**

This paper comments Susan Haack’s remarks about Twardowski’s criticism of relativism in the theory of truth. The author summarizes Twardowski’s arguments for truth-absolutism and tries to show that their presentation by Haack is incom-

plete. The defense of Twardowski's position in the paper uses ideas developed by Tarski and Kokoszynska.

*Keywords:* absolutism, relativism, epistemology, logic

### **Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska, A Modern Version of Relativism about Truth**

In the paper I describe John MacFarlane's version of relativism about truth. I begin by discussing Twardowski's (1900) and Kokoszynska's (1948; 1951) arguments against relativism. They think — just as Haack does (see 2011) — that sentences may be relatively true, if they are incomplete, but once they are completed they become true (or false) absolutely. MacFarlane distinguishes between nonindexical contextualism (which was anticipated by Kokoszynska (sic!)) and relativism which requires the introduction of the context of assessment. According to him only the view which postulates double-indexed (to contexts of utterance and to contexts of assessments) truth is able to explain disagreement in subjective domains and contradicting intuitions about the truth-value of future-contingents.

*Keywords:* contextualism, nonindexical contextualism, relative truth, relativism

### **Joanna Gęgotek, On Partial Truths in Science. Some Remarks on Susan Haack's *The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth***

The article is a commentary to Susan Haack's *The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth*. It consists of two parts. In the first one some doubts about Haack's conception of partiality of truth are formulated. However, Haack's concept of truth is treated as one of the assumptions and not brought up for discussion. In the second part of the article a simple typology of possible sources of truth's partiality in science is presented. The list includes deliberate and unintentional omissions, misleading, lack of scientific interest, unattainability, and epistemological problems with truth and realism.

*Keywords:* truth, partial truths, Susan Haack

### **Krzysztof Wójtowicz, The Status of the Continuum Hypothesis in the Light of Woodin's Argumentation**

In the article, Woodin's program (for setting up axioms, which decide the continuum hypothesis) is presented, and some philosophical aspects of it are discussed. In particular, the general problem of justifying axioms of set theory is discussed in the context of the relation between set theory and mainstream mathematics.

*Keywords:* continuum hypothesis, Woodin's axioms, philosophy of mathematics

### **Wojciech Krysztofiak, Mathematical Facts in Light of Nonfregean Logic**

The paper presents a new argument supporting the ontological standpoint according to which there are no mathematical facts in any set theoretic model (world) constructed on the grounds of second order arithmetical theories founded upon set theory. Slingshot arguments directed against facts, situations and other propositional

entities are usually blocked by rejecting one of the main inference rules used in various versions of this argument. Authors distinguish two types of main inference rules used in these variants: (i) for non-propositional expressions: iota-conversion rules ( $\iota$ -conv), iota-substitution rules ( $\iota$ -subs), lambda-conversion principle ( $\lambda$ -conv); and (ii) for propositional expressions: the principle of substitutivity for logical equivalents (PSLE). Even if strategies for defending facts by the rejection of one of the mentioned rules are accepted, it may be shown that the acceptance of the requirement that mathematical facts (situations or truth-makers) differing with regard to their constituents are different facts, leads to the contradiction in meta-theories of set theoretic models for first order arithmetical theories. In the paper, a new type of slingshot argument is presented, which may be called *hyper-slingshot*. The difference between meta-theoretical hyper-slingshots and conventional slingshots consists in the fact that the former are formulated in the semantic meta-language of mathematical theories without the use of the iota-operator or the name-forming lambda-operator, whereas the latter require for their expression at least one of these non-standard term-operators. Furthermore, in hyper-slingshots PSLE is not used, whereas in conventional slingshots, PSLE plays a crucial inferential role. Hyper-slingshots implement simpler language tools in comparison with those used in conventional slingshots.

*Keywords:* mathematical facts, slingshot arguments, nonfregean logic, truth-makers, situations, lambda conversion rule

### **Wojciech Rostworowski, Rigid Designation and Definite Descriptions**

The aim of this paper is to discuss an idea that referentially used definite descriptions are rigid designators or, at least, „weakly” rigid designators in some sense of this term. In the first part, the views of Nathan Salmon, Howard Wettstein and Michael Devitt are presented. The author observes that none of these positions provides a conclusive argument in the discussion on the issue in question. In the second part, it is argued that referentially used descriptions are in some sense rigid. The main argument appeals to some observations concerning the scope ambiguity of modal constructions in which definite descriptions are embedded, and applies in an essential way Kripke’s possible worlds-semantics. In particular, the author attempts to demonstrate that in a „de dicto” modal construction, a referential description is rigid in a sense that it designates the same object in all „accessible” worlds. Moreover, he observes that his conclusion can be accepted by someone who is a proponent of a unified semantic analysis of definite descriptions, since his whole argumentation is based on the unified quantificational treatment of descriptions.

*Keywords:* definite descriptions, attributive use, referential use, rigid designation, weakly rigid designation, de re, de dicto

**Barbara Tuchańska, Do We Really Need an Opposition between A Priori and A Posteriori?**

I present modifications of the notion of the *a priori* knowledge (beliefs) or justification executed in the recent epistemological conceptions, and discuss difficulties raised in their empiricist criticisms. Next, I discuss a naturalist and a metaphysical extreme approaches to the *a priori*, and give arguments against the need for the acceptance of the *a priori* versus *a posteriori* opposition. My arguments refer to contemporary philosophical processes: the abandonment of the abstract concept of the cognizing subject, the rejection of the concept of language as a logical representational structure, and the demise of the ideal of *episteme*.

*Keywords:* *a priori* knowledge, *a priori* justification, *a priori* insights, naturalism, rationalism, socio-historical conception of knowledge, the ideal of episteme

**Joanna Komorowska-Mach, Where do Concepts Come From?**

The review discusses the book *The Origin of Concepts* by Susan Carey, in which she presents three main theses — the innateness of some kind of conceptual representations, the presence of a qualitative change during conceptual development and the existence of a special learning mechanism that achieves that discontinuity called bootstrapping. The general reception of the work is positive. Minor doubts are presented regarding two claims: first, the speculation about the iconic format of core cognition representations, which seems to be underdeveloped and slightly unclear, second, the claim that core cognition representations are innate, which seems to be insufficiently supported by empirical data presented.

*Keywords:* concepts, core cognition, bootstrapping, cognitive development