

Sulowski, J.

[Professor Suchodolski in his report...]

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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.



J. Sulowski

Professor Suchodolski in his report so much appreciated by everybody of us said: "If to the science belong science of man and society, the latter must belong, too, in the same degree to the history of science". Now I am not interested in the obvious sense of this sentence. I would like to call your attention to another meaning of these words. What must be the relation between the history of philosophy and the history of science?

It is a general truism that philosophy is interested in everything. Till the moment when the development of the history of science has started, its field had been covered by the history of philosophy. The history of philosophy was interested not only in the ideological development of human concepts, but also in everything concerning the intellectual activity of man.

Many of the studies on the history of philosophy belong rather to the history of science in its today's meaning. For instance, one of my articles on the history of philosophy¹ concerns one of the mediaeval scientists and even evolutionists from the School of Chartres that had started a naturalistic treatment of natural phenomena not only before Francis Bacon, but also before Roger Bacon just at the beginning of the XIIth century, namely William de Conches († 1154).

So we can imagine that the history of philosophy is full of data which deal with the history of science. Now the question arises: what must be the relation between the history of science and the history of philosophy which in the Middle Ages was "a queen" of human sciences after theology? If the position of philosophical "imperialism" is not acceptable nor possible to put in practice, there are some other possibilities to realize. One may suppose:

1) that the history of philosophy is one thing and the history of science another one; we might study the latter as having nothing to do with the former;

2) that all previous accomplishments of the historians of philosophy belong to the history of science if they concern the area of particular sciences; so we appropriate them without saying even "thank you";

3) that all the investigations of the historians of philosophy are worthless for the history of science and as such should be brought together and put into the dust of libraries;

4) if no one of the above possibilities is real, we suggest to consider the history of philosophy an older sister of the history of science that can help greatly the latter in different subjects, in logic and general

¹ J. Sulowski, *Filozofia Wilhelma z Conches i pierwociny metody przyrodniczej*. "Studia Filozoficzne", N. 4/1962.

methodology of science; to consider the history of philosophy a mistress and a guide in the jungle of meanings of ideas and a source of different data concerning the development of sciences in their historical aspects. The last point, of course, could not be accepted without detailed analysis nor criticism.

Professor Voisé discussed the notion of "science". Such an occupation is philosophical *par excellence*. In 1964, for instance, there will be held in Italy an International Congress of Mediaeval Philosophy devoted to the meaning of the term "nature" (*natura*). My own standpoint is that we need philosophy in all we do. Reverting to our subject we must say that the relation between the history of science and the history of philosophy must be friendly as that between two branches of the same tree — the human activity. They never must divorce from each other.

L. Nový

Le professeur Suchodolski nous a esquissé un tableau bien large des thèmes que l'histoire des sciences devrait étudier. Sa conception accuse certains traits qui diffèrent de la conception habituelle. D'après mon opinion le plus important de ces traits c'est la tendance de créer un domaine unique et homogène des recherches destiné à étudier le développement de toutes les sciences, c'est-à-dire des sciences appelées par tradition naturelles en commun avec les sciences appelées sociales.

Avant d'aborder cette tendance importante je voudrais souligner que je ne considère nullement les sciences sociales comme inférieures aux sciences naturelles du point de vue scientifique. En langue tchèque, on emploie la même expression pour désigner tous ces domaines: le mot "věda" aussi bien pour l'histoire que pour la physique.

L'exposé du professeur Suchodolski nous a apporté de nombreux arguments pour soutenir ladite conception de l'histoire des sciences. Ils sont basés sur le fait qu'à notre époque les points de contact entre les sciences classées parmi les sciences naturelles d'une part et les sciences sociales de l'autre deviennent de plus en plus nombreux. On pourrait déployer encore davantage cette argumentation. Cependant, si on veut soutenir une conception, on doit consacrer son attention en premier lieu aux arguments contraires, aux arguments opposés à la conception soutenue.

Dans le cadre de la science moderne, et, avant tout, dans le cadre de la science contemporaine deux tendances opposées se manifestent: une d'elles aboutit à une spécialisation toujours plus étroite, à la création des domaines de plus en plus limités et restreints; la deuxième force la naissance des points de vue plus larges ou d'un usage inattendu des