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Peter New (England)

THE CONCEPT OF UTOPIA IN SIR THOMAS MORE'S *UTOPIA*

Before beginning this lecture* I should like to thank the Polish Academy of Sciences and the British Council very warmly for inviting me to come here from England.

Sir Thomas More would, I am sure, have appreciated your generosity as much as I do. He was a very hospitable man; he was a man who saw learning as an essentially international endeavour, belonging as he did to the circle of European scholars who both dominated the thought of their time and were life-long personal friends; and he was very profoundly a man of peace: he once said to his son-in-law that he would willingly be thrown into the Thames in a weighted sack if universal peace between nations would result. So your choice of subject seems to me very remarkably appropriate. Whether you have been as fortunate in your choice of a lecturer remains to be seen.

I have not read very extensively in Utopian works of the 19th and the 20th centuries, but from what I do know there seems to be a very important difference between on the one hand More's *Utopia* and almost all Utopian thinking to the end of the 18th century, and on the other hand Utopian thought of the 19th and 20th centuries. In the later centuries, I think there is a general assumption that the Utopian visions presented are possible. There is then of course a radical division between those who regard the possibilities they portray as desirable, and those who regard them as undesirable. I think it is a related fact that the later Utopias are usually located in some future time, whereas the earlier Utopias are usually located in some previously unknown geographical place. The later Utopias are thus in effect prophecies of

* "Utopia between Concept and Realisation"—Session in Warsaw, 7 February 1978.

what the future will possibly be like, whether the writer regards that future possibility as desirable or undesirable. The earlier Utopias present not what the writers think might actually happen in the future to us, but what life might be like in some imaginary place where certain aspects of human nature, which are in fact unchangeable, are imagined as having been changed. So the earlier Utopias can represent something which is regarded as impossible, something which can never actually happen in the future, but which may be desirable: an ideal to be aimed at, even though we know it will always elude us. These are generalisations, and More's *Utopia* is more complex than they suggest, but I think they are broadly speaking true. Two important exceptions which come to mind are Bacon's *New Atlantis* which in the 17th century seems to present something regarded as possible; and Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* which in the 19th century presents an impossible society which in some respects (though not all) is desirable.

I have made this distinction between earlier and later Utopias, even though I know there are exceptions, because I think there is serious danger of confusion leading to error if we try to think of Utopian thought as a homogeneous whole. *Utopia*, of course, is a name formed from Greek words which mean "No Place", and More previously used the Latin name *Nusquam* or "Nowhere". The man who describes the island is called Hythloday, which means "Distributor of Nonsense". These names seem to me clear signals that it would be very misleading to read More's book as if it were intended to be prophetic in the way that those of much later Utopian thinkers are. On the other hand, it would be very foolish to regard Hythloday's description of the island of Utopia simply as Nonsense: if it were that, it would obviously have been forgotten more than four centuries ago. So the basic argument I am going to put forward about More's *Utopia* is that it is very radically two-faced. Consequently when we read it we have to respond with a kind of mental alertness which is seldom required in reading either positive or negative Utopian thought of the last two hundred years.

At the very simplest level, we have to know when More is joking and when he is serious. He tells us himself that in his private life he used to wear such a serious expression when he was joking that people often did not know whether he was serious or whether he was joking. Similarly, in *Utopia*, there are seldom any signals to the reader to help him decide whether he should laugh or not. Sometimes the difficulty in deciding is not very great. For example when Hythloday says the Utopians use gold to make chamber pots, we are obviously not expected to think that More is seriously suggesting Europeans should do the same. It is a joke which is part of More's general argument, that, considered

objectively, gold is not really very useful to humanity. Conversely, when he describes the Utopian use of mercenary troops he is clearly not joking at all. But it is very seldom as easy as that; usually it is quite impossible to tell when he is joking and when he is not, unless one has a clear vision of the direction of the book as a whole.

Yet if we try to form a clear vision of the whole, we immediately come up against a much more formidable difficulty, which results from the form in which the book is written. The most famous part of it, of course, is Book II, the description of Utopia by Hythloday. But the context of that description is a dialogue. The dialogue is dominated by Hythloday and by another character who has very different opinions and who is given the name of More. Now if More were a simple-minded writer and we were given differing opinions, one set of opinions attributed to a character called More, and another set to a character called Hythloday, or "Distributor of Nonsense", we should not be in any doubt as to which set of opinions the writer wished us to adopt. But More was not a simple-minded writer. He might well, for a joke, have given the sensible opinions to the Distributor of Nonsense and the foolish ones to himself. After all, he enjoyed the joke in the title of his friend Erasmus's book, *The Praise of Folly—Encomium Moriae*, where Moria, the Latin for Folly is a pun on More's name. On the other hand he may be playing a double joke, just as international spies in bad modern American fiction play their idiotic games of agent, double-agent, double-double-agent and so on until no-one knows who is on which side. One fact we do know is that Book II was written before Book I was planned. Some critics argue from this that Book II, the description of Utopia, must have been regarded by More at first as self-sufficient and therefore can be taken to express his own opinions. But against that it can be replied firstly that a common literary form of his time was the rhetorical defence of an indefensible thesis. (Thus in *The Praise of Folly* Erasmus makes a character argue that a foolish man is more prudent than a wise man). Secondly it could be replied that he added Book I to indicate to the reader how to approach the enigmatic Book II. There is not in fact any easy clue: there is no substitute for continuously alert reading. (From now on I am going to refer to three different Mores to make clearer what I am saying. There is the man More; secondly there is the writer More; and thirdly there is the character More inside the book).

The main argument in Book I between Hythloday and the character More is about whether the truly wise man should become involved in practical politics or not. Hythloday argues that the world of politics is hopelessly corrupt and that therefore the truly wise man should stay

out of it. If he tries to interfere, says Hythloday, the wise man will lose his head—he will either quite literally have it chopped off, or he will become as corrupt as the kings he meddles with. Against this the character More argues that the truly wise man has a responsibility to do what he can, that to hide from the problems of practical politics is to desert the common people who are in desperate need of wise leadership. I think myself that the character More wins this argument, but there are some very eminent critics who think that Hythloday wins it. But the main point to emphasise is that whoever one thinks the winner, it is undeniable that both argue extremely powerfully. More does not give us an easy answer: he presents us with a radical dilemma. Book II clearly does not have the same structure—apart from three short paragraphs at the end, it is not a dialogue, but a monologue by Hythloday—but as I am now going to try to show, it does have the same effect. We are not told what to think: we are made to think.

In those final three paragraphs of Book II More gives us some important, though very vague clues about suitable responses to Hythloday's description of Utopia, and I shall refer to them shortly. But I want to consider first the reaction of the character More at the end of Book I to Hythloday's first general remarks about Utopia. When Hythloday refers to the abolition of private property, the character More raises two objections. Firstly he says that if one abolishes private property one removes the motive for work: ordinary people will not work unless they can keep the rewards for their work. Secondly he says that if one abolishes the social distinctions which result from unequal distribution of wealth, there will be no respect for magistrates, and therefore social chaos. As always we must be on our guard here; and as usual we are pulled in opposite directions. The second objection is stupid: a proper respect for magistrates is based on their integrity, not on their wealth. But the first objection is not at all stupid. Wise men ought to know that it is their responsibility to work for the good of the community for no personal reward (though by one of More's characteristically silent strokes of wit, Hythloday, who admires Utopia, actually argues against this); but ordinary men tend to think more about their own good than about the good of the community. Why should they work if no personal gain will come of it?

This is in fact a special case of a problem which can be stated in more general terms. What man is like is unfortunately not what he ought to be like in an ideal society. Or to put the same problem in different words, we use the phrase "human nature" in two quite different ways. Sometimes we use it to describe what men actually do—and we all know enough history to acknowledge that men are seldom good

and frequently commit atrocities; sometimes we mean by "human nature" only those aspects of man which we think desirable or admirable. Thus we say that it is against human nature to be cruel, even though we know perfectly well that actual men are often brutally cruel. Indeed we are so arrogant about our species that when we condemn an action we sometimes call it inhuman or bestial, even though we know perfectly well that the beasts are very seldom as bestial as men and human beings are often inhuman. More, of course, was a Christian, and the Christian view of man takes very full account of this problem. Man as he is, is fallen man, a creature who is by nature corrupt; man as he ought to be can be seen in the life of Christ and in the lives of those who through God's Grace have been able in some respect temporarily to imitate Him. The Utopians were not Christian when Hythloday first visited them (their partial conversion is a topic I have no time to discuss now). Consequently they have to find some other means of bridging the unfortunate gap between what man is like and what man ought to be like. When the character More asks what motive men could have for work if there were no private property, the man More, who was a Christian, could have answered with Christ's second commandment, "Love thy neighbour as thyself", though with the qualification that very few men in fact adequately obey that commandment. But the non-Christian Utopians could not give this answer.

Hythloday, we must remember, is advocating the Utopian way of life, trying to persuade the character More and, through him, us readers that Utopia is virtually perfect. So sometimes he cheats and tries to pretend that the Utopians are by nature good. The writer More of course knows what he is doing: making Hythloday cheat is one way of signalling to the fully alert reader that More is not presenting the Utopian way of life as a possible model for Europe. But although the Utopians are for example impossibly rational at times, they are not so impossibly rational as to be completely super-human as are the horse-like creatures in Book IV of Swift's *Gulliver's Travels*, the Houyhnhnms. They have in fact three means of controlling the fallible parts of themselves, three ways of bridging the gap between what man is and what they think man ought to be. The first bridge is education: "They take," says Hythloday, "the greatest pains from the very first to instill into children's minds, while still tender and pliable, good opinions, which are also useful for the preservation of their commonwealth." Controlled education has of course often proved a very powerful means of influencing adult behaviour. But the Utopians evidently do not find it sufficient, for they have to add to it a second bridge, an extremely rigid legal system. To make sure that no-one becomes possessive about

his house, everyone has to move every ten years. If a family becomes too big to suit the arrangements, some adult members are arbitrarily transferred to another family which is smaller. In order to ensure that there no private possessions they have no privacy: any door can be opened by anyone. If the citizens keep to such rules they are quite safe; but if they break them the penalties are extreme. A Utopian who is twice caught outside his city boundaries without a permit is sentenced to slavery. If a man has possessions it is in his personal interest to keep the peace: if he causes public strife he may lose his possessions. A man who has no possessions has to be controlled by stricter regulations. But in fact the Utopians find this second bridge also insufficient. Ultimately they find it necessary to believe in immortality and punishment or reward after death. A Utopian who does not believe in these things is not punished, but he is regarded as subhuman. "Who can doubt," asks Hythloday, "that he will strive either to evade by craft the public laws of his country or break them by violence, in order to serve his own private desires, when he has nothing to fear but laws and no hope beyond the body?" This is a very ironic conclusion for the Utopians to reach. The particular part of the gap between what man is and what he ought to be which they most want to close concerns motive for work. Having abolished the incentive of personal gain in possessions, they try first education and secondly rigid laws. Finding both insufficient they fall back finally on a different sort of personal gain: the good citizen will not be rewarded with personal wealth on earth, but he will be rewarded with personal benefit in heaven. In other words, they have failed ultimately to find a reason why the individual should care more about the community than about himself. I take this to be a signal from the writer More that it is not possible to find an alternative bridge to the Christian one.

But in discussing this question so far, although I have tried to get behind what Hythloday says to what the writer More means, by following vague clues dropped by the character More, I have not been sufficiently radically critical. I have not raised the question whether what the Utopians think man ought to be like resembles what the writer and the man More thought they ought to be like. I have discussed the bridges but I have not discussed what lies at the end of the bridges. Here we again have clues from the character More, but again they are very vague clues. In those final three paragraphs of Book II I have already mentioned, the character More says two important things: firstly he says he doesn't like some aspects of Utopian civilisation; and secondly, right at the end, he says that he finds it easier to wish for other aspects to be adopted in Europe than to hope they could be. He is

not specific, so as always we are not told what to think; but what he is doing in effect is to raise in the reader's mind two distinct series of questions. That is, firstly, are Utopian institutions and modes of conduct desirable? Secondly, are they in Europe possible?

I call these questions distinct because they are so in the mind of the character More at the end there, and also because it's theoretically quite easy for us to think of them separately. But what actually happens in the book resembles what usually happens in practical experience—that is the two sets of questions get tangled up together in various kinds of mixture. One thing can be literally impossible but desirable; another possible but undesirable; another both impossible and undesirable, and so on. Putting it like this one runs the risk, of course, of making the book seem like a mere game or a mere intellectual puzzle. But for one thing there is no alternative if we really want to understand it: this is how it works. And for a second thing, More is almost continuously very serious indeed at some level or other beneath his jokes and his puzzles. More and the great Renaissance scholars who were his friends carried on a long series of jokes in their private letters about people who read *Utopia* so literally that they wanted to know the exact length of the bridge in its capital city or the exact location of the island so they could lead missionary expeditions to it. If we took Utopia to be literally the man More's own ideals we should make ourselves equally ridiculous and can be sure that More would have found us very comic. On the other hand if we respond to More's wit and play his games, we shall find firstly that he has some very powerful criticisms to make about European man, and secondly (again ironically) we shall have a personal gain: we shall enjoy a literary masterpiece and we shall have our critical intelligence exercised to a degree that should permanently sharpen it. We shall have been made to think very critically about very important moral, social and political matters; and that is a gain both to ourselves and, as the Utopians put it, it is "also useful for the preservation of the commonwealth."

The first example I shall take is a relatively simple topic. In one of the funniest passages in the book the ambassadors of a foreign country are made to seem very absurd when they dress themselves up in gold chains to impress their Utopian hosts. The Utopians use gold to make chains for their criminals, so a Utopian child can hardly be blamed for laughing at the chains which seem impressively thick to the ambassadors but are not strong enough to hold any prisoner. About the same time as he was writing *Utopia* More was acting as a junior ambassador himself, so he knew from personal experience that ambassadors had in 16th-century Europe to dress up in rich clothes and gold chains as part of

the unavoidable ritual of aggressive diplomacy. But obviously what an ambassador says and does should be infinitely more important than what he wears. And in fact in 20th-century Europe ambassadors no longer dress up in as much gold as they can carry and their countries can afford. What we have here, then, is an example of a Utopian attitude which was impossible in 16th-century Europe, but which is desirable, and as history has shown is morally possible. There is nothing in the nature of man which necessarily makes him cover ambassadors with gold: it is morally possible to be more sensible. We have here something which was impossible in 16th-century Europe, but which is desirable and is also morally possible.

I don't think there is likely to be any disagreement about this case; but my second example is a much more debatable one—indeed it is the matter which has provoked more controversy about what More meant than any other. That is, the Utopians' abolition of private property. My opinion on this matter is that More regarded it as literally impossible in 16th-century Europe, as morally impossible given the actual nature of man, and yet as desirable if man were what he ought to be as opposed to what he is. In the first place, it seems to me very important to understand absolutely clearly what the Utopians have done and why they have done it. They have not re-distributed property so that each man has an equal share. They have abolished private property altogether: no man in Utopia possesses anything. And they have not abolished *only* private property: they have altogether abolished money. This alone makes Utopia quite unlike any advanced civilisation in recorded history. This is what they have done. Why have they done it? The motives of later European thinkers and politicians who have attempted something similar have usually been firstly to ensure that all men do a fair amount of work, to prevent those who have much property from living on the income from their property instead of working like everyone else, and secondly to enrich the country as a whole. The Utopians share the first motive: they think every man should work six hours a day, no less and, unless the individual wants to work more, no more. But their second motive is nothing like an attempt to raise their Gross National Production or their export/import ratio above that of neighbouring countries. They do achieve that, but only accidentally: it is not their direct intention. Their second direct intention, the most basic of all their intentions, is to eliminate human pride. Hythloday makes this very clear at the end when he describes the Utopian conception of pride as the root cause of all human evil. If there are no possessions, no man can feel pride in possessing more than his neighbour. This is to say that the fundamental motive behind the Utopian abolition of private property is not a political

motive, but a moral motive. Parts of More's *Utopia* are obviously very deeply concerned with political questions, but it seems to me a very serious mistake to regard this as one of them. The fundamental motive in the Utopian abolition of private property is an attempt to eradicate human pride. And it is a moral motive which the man More, I think, fairly obviously would have admired. For it is not only the Utopians who regard Pride as the root cause of human evil: it is of course the first in the classical Christian list of Seven Deadly Sins. This, then, is what I meant when I said that More should be taken to regard this aspect of Utopia as desirable. No man possessing anything is one aspect of the monastic ideal we know the man More admired. Fundamentally it is a religious ideal, not a political one.

But I said earlier that I think More regarded it as simultaneously desirable and impossible. Impossible because I do not think More believed one could change human nature so radically as to eliminate the most basic human vice by simply changing social and political organisations. What kind of evidence is there for thinking this? Three kinds. Firstly there is the kind of deliberate cheating I referred to earlier. Because they are so much more equitably employed, the Utopians need only work six hours a day. What do they do with the rest of their waking hours? Most of them, says Hythloday, spend them listening to lectures. I don't think our professional pride is going to blind even us academics to the improbability of this. The rest, says Hythloday, fill in the time by voluntarily doing more of the work they have been trained to do in the compulsory six hours. A politician's dream: workers actually wanting to do more than they have to, for no personal gain! But that of course is the point: this could only happen in a dream world. Actual men are very seldom like that. What we are being given in fact is a circular argument. We want to make men better than they actually are by eliminating pride, so we set up a social system abolishing private property; but the details of that system require men who are already better than men as they actually are. The system depends on the prior achievement of what it is designed to achieve.

The second piece of evidence for taking More to be describing an impossibility is the little passage about gardening. We know that More was like the Utopians in being fond of gardens, but when he describes Utopian gardens, Hythloday foolishly lets out the crucial information that they take pleasure not merely in gardening as such but also in "the keen competition between blocks (of houses) as to which will have the best kept garden." At what point does pleasure in gardening shade into pleasure in possessing the best garden? And what is the moral difference between possessing the best garden and possessing the biggest

house? It's a small point, not given much prominence. But as I have stressed, reading More requires great alertness of mind. The third piece of evidence is given even less prominence. In fact it's not even mentioned. Several critics have noticed that although each Utopian city has a governor, there is no reference to an overall ruler of the country except the original king Utopus who must have been dead for 17 centuries. Those who have noticed this have thought that More must have just forgotten to say anything about it. I think that improbable given More's prodigious memory and the prominence he rightly attributes to the king in the political discussions in Book I. Academic arguments are very often based on evidence which is actually absent, but I try to avoid them if I notice that is what I'm doing. My positive evidence here is a letter More wrote to Erasmus near the end of 1516, the year *Utopia* was published. "You cannot imagine", he writes, "how I leap for joy, how tall I have grown, how I hold up my head when a vision comes before me of my Utopians making me their perpetual sovereign." He indulges the fantasy at some length and then concludes, "I was proceeding further with this most beguiling dream, when the break of day dissolved the vision, deposing poor me from my sovereignty." More was a wise man, who knew that he was not exempt from human pride, and he had the wit to ridicule himself for it in a letter to his best friend. But More was also a man of quite abnormal integrity. If he ruled Utopia the pride would take very harmless forms. But what if a man like Henry VIII got elected? (In his youth Henry was a very promising man and could possibly have been elected even if he were not heir to the throne by birth). In Utopia the governor of a city can be deposed if he tries to become a tyrant. That could be done through cooperation between the 53 other cities. But what if the supreme ruler of the country became a tyrant? Given the history of European kings in More's time, the question is extraordinarily conspicuous by its absence. Hythloday himself admits that "Pride is too deeply fixed in men to be easily plucked out." In fact it's so deeply fixed that by Utopian methods it's quite impossible to pluck it out. One cannot destroy Pride by abolishing private property.

That, then, is an example of something in Utopia which is desirable but impossible; and it is not immediately obvious what More means. But even when we have worked this bit out, we do not have a key which will open all the locks in the book. I shall try to demonstrate this by moving on now to an exactly opposite example: something in Utopia which is not "desirable but impossible", but quite the reverse: something which is undesirable and possible. We get this particular mixture in the Utopian approach to war. Hythloday starts this section of his

description with a pun on the Latin words *bellum* meaning war and *belua* meaning beast. The Utopians regard war as bestial, inhuman. So we are completely unprepared for the gradual shift of emphasis as Hythloday describes the kinds of reasons which induce the Utopians to fight despite their contempt for war. The first reason is completely justifiable: they will fight to defend their own land. The second seems little different: they will help drive an invader from the land of a nation which is their friend. But the emphasis shifts almost imperceptibly from rescue to revenge, from expelling an invader to interfering in the internal affairs of another country if they think justice is being abused. And eventually there is reference to a specific war in which the Utopians engaged very fiercely to support a people who claimed an injustice had been done to them, but without stopping to discover whether the claim was "right or wrong." This is clearly undesirable, but also wholly possible: Utopia is not the only country to have waged a fierce war in the name of justice without troubling to find out exactly where the justice lies.

When we consider their means of conducting wars, the picture is even blacker. One thing they do is to offer huge sums of money to anyone in the enemy country who will accept a bribe to kill his king. There are at least two aspects of this which are plainly undesirable. Firstly they are using money to corrupt other people; this conflicts directly with the basic aim of their whole social structure which is to remove temptation by abolishing money. Secondly by such means they are creating a state of disloyalty and mistrust which conflicts with their conception of human nature in the sense of what man ought to be. In other words, both the means and the end are exactly opposite to their own ideals. Another thing they do when they wage war is to employ mercenaries. The general excuse they give for this is that the mercenaries are so evil that the world is well rid of them when they are killed in battle. And a particular excuse is that since mercenaries from one nation are frequently employed by two opposing other nations, mercenaries who are connected by blood often fight each other. This, say the Utopians, is unnatural. But of course it is what they themselves cause by their policy of offering bribes to enemy traitors. They condemn the mercenaries for something they do themselves. The general excuse is of course open to the more general criticism that they are using an evil means to achieve what they think is a good. Whether it is really good is a matter of opinion, and as we have seen their opinions in matters of foreign policy are easily corrupted. But even if the end were really good, a good end does not justify an evil means. The use of mercenary troops was of course common in 16th-century Europe. More and

Erasmus both thought that the use of them was a major cause of the continual wars of the time. Any king who had enough money to pay mercenaries could start a war even if his subjects did not support him. So this aspect of Utopia too is both undesirable and possible. It is not an ideal we are being presented with at all in this section of the book, but a direct satirical image of what was happening in 16th-century Europe.

Despite the modern sense of the word Utopia, the aspects of More's *Utopia* which can be regarded as ideal in the sense of both possible and desirable are in fact very few. Though it is an essential part of the complexity of the book that although there are few, there are some. But here again we must make a distinction between what was desirable to the man More and what we are likely to find desirable 5 centuries later. The Utopians begin every meal with a "reading which is conducive to morality" and the subsequent conversation is carefully led by the most senior people present. This would clearly be desirable sometimes, but I doubt if we should like all our meals to be like that. Yet all meals were like that in More's own household—he obviously regarded this aspect of Utopia as both possible and wholly desirable, as he did it himself. Other things, of course, we would all agree to be wholly desirable: for example, the education of women and equality of educational opportunity to whatever level the individual could attain. Women in the 16th century could seldom read; More taught his daughters so much that Margaret More's Latin amazed the great scholar Erasmus. Education is available to every Utopian without discrimination on any ground whatsoever, and at every stage of their lives the possibility of further education remains open to them, to whatever level they have the intellectual ability to absorb it. The Utopian hospitals too are in an obvious way ideal: they are outside the walls of the cities to prevent the spread of infectious diseases as far as that was possible in More's time, and they are spacious, so that there is no overcrowding as there was in the hospitals of 16th-century England. But of course the conspicuously absent thing in the Utopian hospitals is advanced medical science. More was describing what could be done in his own time: he was not interested in a vision of future scientific advance. In fact in no respect at all are the Utopians scientifically more advanced than 16th-century Europeans. This of course contrasts completely with most Utopian fictions of the last two centuries. In almost all the later Utopias the societies described are scientifically more advanced, whether the writer is happy about it or frightened about it.

This brings me to the final thing I want to say about More's *Utopia*. It seems to me remarkably significant that the Utopians have most

respect for the elders among them. This is carried right through to detail about the serving of food at mealtimes. The best bits of food are always given to the eldest citizens as a mark of respect and distinction. This seems to me significant because it is so precisely opposite to the tendency of 20th-century man to idealize the young. The young are in an obvious way the symbol of the future, and we have become so disillusioned with our past that a natural reaction is to look for hope in the young who might do better. And in the West (I don't know about the East) this has taken what seems to me the idiotic form of worshipping youth as such, of paying more respect to the young than to the old. More was not prophesying a glorious future to be achieved in a new world. He was looking at his own present society and criticising it by standards he found essentially in the past, in Greek philosophers to a minor extent and in the teaching of Christ to a very great extent. He paid respect to old men, not to young ones. He did not want to destroy and to rebuild; he wanted to remind people of what had been forgotten. And when I contemplate what has been offered by those who have taken the opposite path, those who have wanted to destroy and to build us something new which they think superior, my own firm belief is that More was infinitely wiser.