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THE SCHOLAR AND THE ARTIST IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR OWN ETHOS

1. INTRODUCTION

What is an ethos ? What are the reasons that make it so important in our investigations and explorations ? These are the questions which have to be answered when we start our discussion on the problems of ethos. The ethos of a group in the society is the very basis, the stem and the core of this group. The materials, which can be collected when we investigate the problem of ethos, are vast and important, as they cover the most important information about the group whose ethos is being analyzed.

In this paper our examinations of an ethos will refer to the ethos of the scholar and the ethos of the artist of the fine arts in the occidental civilization, originating from the circles of the Mediterranean culture. The reason why such a choice has been made is, first of all, the great significance which both these kinds of ethos have in the formation of the European culture, including also its present state, as well as the relationship which exists between the two kinds of ethos, discussed in terms of the cultural systems. We have to remember that the act of creation refers not only to art but also to science (e.g. the construction of a scientific theory). Both these groups have also one common objective—an effort to reach truth. What makes them different is the perspective in which they can see the whole world.

The concept of ethos is beyond the scope of this work.¹ It has often been the subject of discussions. For the needs of this text (the problems and aspects which are taken into consideration) we shall accept the definition of ethos elaborated by J. Goćkowski:

The ethos of a social group is its general axionormative orientation, i.e. such a concept of the life style of this group which will be observed and respected by this group during its everyday life because

¹ The problem of ethos was comprehensively discussed in a paper by J. Goćkowski, "The Polish Academic Community's Ethos—Continuity and Change," *Organon*, 1984/86, Nos 20/21, pp. 119—135.

the members of the group have assimilated the pertinent values and objectives, the rules and commands.²

This definition will be taken as a basis for further considerations, disclosed in the course of the present work. Yet, they will refer to the development and changes in the code of values and principles valid for an individual ethos only (i.e. for the, so-called, ethos of long duration). In view of the complex, detailed and vast nature of the problem, a full analysis of the codes of values would certainly go far beyond the scope of the present work.

The formation and crystallization of an ethos is a process which depends on various factors. Basically speaking, these factors can be divided into the conditions which promote the formation of an ethos, and into the effects which back up and accelerate the nucleation and crystallization of this ethos.

There are two conditions most essential for the formation of an ethos :

- the group creating an ethos must acquire its own structural individuality ;
- the group creating an ethos must become conscious of its own cultural individuality.

The existence of these parameters forms a basis for the initiation of the process of formation of an ethos, since only in the case when the above-mentioned requirements are fulfilled, a group will be able to form the axionormative orientation which will be typical of this particular group and which will be consciously accepted by its members. Apart from the above-mentioned conditions, some other effects which promote the formation of an ethos could be enumerated but, being of no major importance for the problems investigated in this work, they will be disregarded.³

Ethos can be analyzed in its four main aspects, namely:

- basic personality,
- social structure,
- forms of culture,
- civilizing function.

Now, the characteristics of an ethos will depend on which of the above-mentioned aspects of this ethos will be regarded as a most important one. In the present work we shall take into consideration only one aspect, namely the form of culture, i.e. the specific character of standards, rules of behaviour and human attitudes. This approach will be completed with the aspect of a social structure, i.e. the place which a given community occupies in the wider complexes of groups.

— ² J. Goćkowski, "Sytuacje testujące wierność uczonych wobec ich etosu" ["Situations Testing Faithfulness of the Scholars to Their Ethos"], *Etyka*, 1984, vol. 21, p. 106.

³ This problem was discussed in a more detailed way in a paper by J. Goćkowski and L. Hołowiecka, "Etos profesjonalny uczonych" ["The Scholars' Professional Ethos"], *Etyka*, 1981, vol. 19, pp. 162—163.

2. THE SCHOLAR AND THE ARTIST—THE SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN THEIR ETHOS

A comparative analysis of these two kinds of ethos should be carried out, as far as possible, on various planes. Obviously, the mere fact that we are going to analyze an ethos forces us to accept a historical formulation of the problem, which imposes a dynamic approach to the question of the creation and changes in the ethos. Yet, we cannot stop here; the other forms of the existence of the subjects of our analysis have also to be taken into consideration. Therefore the analysis of the ethos of the scholar and of the ethos of the artist will be carried out on the three, in my opinion, most important levels. At the very beginning we are going to deal with the problem of crystallization of both these kinds of ethos and with the crystallization of the forms of science and art—this is a level of the genesis of an ethos. Then the subject of our analysis will cover the problems related to the similarities and differences in both kinds of ethos; the similarities and differences which result from an analysis carried out in terms of the forms of culture and the social structure—this is the level of historical transformations in the forms of an ethos. Next, our attention will be focussed on the problem of crisis suffered by both kinds of ethos—this is the level of the modern forms of an ethos. The comparative analysis will end in a quick glance at the scholar and the artist looking for truth in their activities.

When we compare a relative time of the crystallization of the ethos of the scholar and that of the artist (i.e. related to the appearance of science and art), we can note that in this plane both kinds of ethos reveal certain variations. The sources of science taken as a reflection usually go back to ancient Greece (Popper, Crombie). In that period the first forms of the ethos of the scholar appeared. So, we can risk the statement that the crystallization of the ethos of the scholar was a relatively quick process, since it was comprised in the span of one epoch only (the Greco-Latin civilization). This fact proves that, compared with other groups, the scholars did not need much time to acquire their individuality as a group and the self-consciousness of their autonomy. The problem was quite different in the case of artists. The beginnings of art are to be sought as early as in the palaeolithic period, but the ethos of the artist appears much later. It is still absent in the culture of ancient Egypt where they did have a code of values which had to be respected by the artist-craftsman, although it cannot be called ethos, since it referred not only to the artists but to the craftsmen as well. The situation is more or less the same in ancient Greece in the archaic and classical period. Only in the Hellenistic period artists became conscious of their cultural individualism, they acquired the structural separateness, and due to this fact the conditions necessary for the creation of an ethos became finally fulfilled. Nevertheless, the social changes, which took place on the turn of the Greco-Latin world and the Middle Ages, made the ethos of the artist disappear again. The artists lost the consciousness of their cultural individualism and of the structural separateness. This consciousness was regained as late as in the Renaissance, thus contributing

to the recreation of the ethos of the artists, which continued its existence till modern times. Since that time, including additionally the Hellenistic period, we have full right to use the word ethos.

When the process of the formation of the ethos of the scholar and of the artist is compared, we can wonder what are the reasons that make them so different, although in both cases this is the ethos of a creator. Most probably the reasons of this difference are to be sought in the very nature of science and art.

Science is mainly a conceptual activity, while art combines in itself the conceptual and executive function (revealed through physical actions). As long as the artist was merely an executor of a concept, he was included into the group of craftsmen, but as soon as he started thinking about an implementation of his own concepts, he was no longer considered to be a craftsman and he discovered his own individuality. Yet, to give a full answer to the question why both these kinds of ethos are different, it will be necessary to carry out a detailed analysis of the reference materials.

The problem how the scholar's ethos and that of the artist crystallized is directly related with the problem of the crystallization of certain forms of science and art. Science is in search of an accurate and exact self-definition ; the main goal of science is to give an answer to the question what is its scope, subject and methods. This is an attempt which has as its main aim to enable full crystallization of science as a form. The situation is different in the case of art. Art is striving after the indefiniteness ; it tries to blur the outlines of its subject, introducing into its scope really everything that is possible. Art does not define its methods either, due to which the artist has unlimited possibilities in manifesting his artistic expressions. So, art is not interested in its own crystallization, on the contrary, it rejects the process of this crystallization.

Let us now make a step towards an analysis which would be more related with the history of both these kinds of ethos. At first we are going to deal with the similarities which occur in the aspect of the forms of culture.

In this approach an analysis of the scholar's ethos will go back to the ancient times since (as it has been mentioned previously) in that period the beginnings of scientific reflection are thought to come into existence.

In ancient Greece the appearance of scientific reflection was accompanied by an emergence from the Greek society of a group of scholars. At the very beginning the group was rather small, but already in the year 285 B. C. the first Academy of Sciences was established in Alexandria, and the most eminent erudites were invited to join it. In this way a separate group—the group of scholars, was formed which, certainly, was at least a nucleus of the later ethos, the more so that its isolation was not of a structural character only but was additionally supported by the feeling of one's own difference, individuality and cultural separateness. The other towns like Antioch, Pergamum, Miletus and Ephesus followed Alexandria, establishing also their own institutions of the scientific life.

Among the principal standards included into the ethos of the scholar the first

place was occupied by truth, understood as the main goal in the whole activity of the scholar. To achieve that goal was possible only through autotelic cognition and explanation of reality. That criterion was changed in Roman times when science was treated in a much more utilitarian way. After all, the practical outlook upon life was a tendency prevailing over the whole Hellenistic epoch, although in that particular period it became most prominent. The autotelic principles of science were related with another rule which covered only the sphere of motivations of the scholar. According to this principle, science should be cultivated only as some means to achieve the inner improvement and self-education, not as a way for gaining material welfare. The code of values of the ancient scholar included one more principle, very important for the scientific activities as such. According to that principle the scholar was granted freedom and independence in his work.

On the turn of ancient times and the Middle Ages the scientific activities disappeared almost completely. The reason was both mysticism, reigning at that time, and the invasions of barbarians. On that basis a conviction was formed that the ancients reached a limit in the possibilities of scientific cognition, leaving no field in the investigations for further generations. The confidence in the perfection of the scientific achievements of the Greco-Latin civilization was the very reason why scholars devoted their efforts to the preservation of the conquests of the ancient knowledge rather, than to the establishment of their own programme of researches. Therefore, at that time to possess the skill of transferring knowledge in a proper way was considered to be much more important than to enlarge the scope of this knowledge in a creative way. All these factors resulted in the fact that in the code of rules and principles, which was binding for the contemporary scholar, the main emphasis was placed on teaching and cultivation of knowledge. It has to be remembered, however, that science cultivated in the Middle Ages till the beginning of the 12th century was, in most part, governed by theology.

The beginning of the 12th century is a period in which the ethos of the scholar undergoes very important transformations. The attitude of the scholar becomes much more active which, combined with reanimation of the Greco-Arabic traditions, initiates various technical inventions. On this basis the empirical science was born, and it created new prospects for the cognition of reality. At first, the renaissance of the Greco-Arabic traditions took place in the society of goliards, assisted in their activities by the translators, but already in the 13th century the scientific life became an institution, and proper conditions were created which enabled the society of goliards to be transformed into the society of academics. The change in the concept of the scholar caused also some changes in the code of values included into his ethos. The most important objective in the activities of the scholar became once again the cognition understood in terms of an attempt to know the truth about the world, to disseminate this truth and to teach it. In return for his activities the scholar was becoming famous, and he could gain some means of subsistence. The ethos of the scholar also determined

the methods which could be used in the scientific research. Here a growing popularity was gained by the empirical and logical methods (induction and deduction), although they started to be applied on a wide scale only towards the end of the Middle Ages.

The code of values of the mediaeval ethos formulated in this way was nothing else but a developed and expanded form of the code of values valid in the ancient ethos, and this trend followed the ethos of the scholar till modern times. The early modern epoch did not change the ethos of the scholar but extended its range, introducing some new forms. At the very beginning of the early modern epoch, i.e. in the Renaissance, the cult of knowledge, of science and of the humanistic studies of the world appeared, and this trend lasted till the end of the 19th century. It is true that during this long-lasting period both science and the scientific methods of studies suffered various crises (e.g. Romanticism considered the scientific methods of learning to be insufficient), but it is equally true that over the whole period the attitude of the scholar towards science remained much the same and so did his ethos. What changed was the perspective of cultivating science.

In the period from the 16th to the 17th century science was still a value in itself.

To see the truth is something much more worthy and noble than any possible usefulness of the work.⁴

In the 18th century science was discussed in quite different terms. The practical advantages were mainly taken into consideration, the social usefulness of science was more and more emphasized as well as its didactic functions. Yet, in those times :

[...] it is difficult [...] to separate the interest shown in the cause of pure scientific truth from the curiosity in respect of useful inventions....⁵

In the code of values of the scholar attention was also paid to the methods which he could apply in his research. The experimental method was considered to be the best one.

In the course of the modern epoch one of the changes in the principles of ethos was related with the attitude of the scholar towards teaching and the transfer of knowledge. At the end of the Middle Ages scholars were thinking that teaching was an element inherent in their profession, as it was one of the most important sources of maintenance. The Renaissance changed the situation of the scholar, introducing on a wide scale the institutions of patronage.

⁴ S. Kamiński, *Pojęcie nauki i klasyfikacja nauk [The Notion of Science and Classification of Science]*, Lublin: KUL, 1970, p. 83.

⁵ Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science 1300—1800*, G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1950, p. 169.

In this way the humanists abandon one of the main tasks of the intellectual—the contact with the masses, the bond which exists between the knowledge and teaching.⁶

In the later periods of the modern epoch that situation was changing step by step. The main reason was understanding the fact that only teaching can be a stimulus to the scientific activities and ensure their continuation. Therefore, in quite a short lapse of time the law, which required from the scholar to share his own knowledge with the others, became one of the principal rules governing his ethos.

The 19th century certainly became a culminant period in the creation of the scholar's ethos. At that time, finally, the fully crystallized and formulated ethos came into existence. It was known under the name of the traditional ethos and was used as a reference standard to make comparisons with the previously and subsequently formulated kinds of ethos. It was characterized by a well-developed code of rules and values, the observation of which was necessary in the society of scholars.

The most important and most highly praised value was an autotelic study of the world ; the radices of this principle go back to the ancient ethos. Truth and knowledge became most important objectives in the activities of the scholar, and to confer to these activities a scientific character, he had to use scientific methods. A lot of emphasis was placed on the character of the work. On one hand, the work had to be creative, disclosing the mysteries of this world, on the other, it was expected to give self-realization. To meet this requirement, the scholar should have an autonomy, i.e. he had to be free in his scientific investigations and explorations as well as in the choice of the field of knowledge which would be most suitable for his scientific activities. It was also important that the scholar had no restrictions in the exchange of his opinions and in the publication of the results of his explorations. Such conditions created proper atmosphere for the scientific disputes which seemed to be of the same importance as the collection of research materials. The model of an ethos based on that system obliged the scholar to resist any ambitions, to see in quest for truth the main objective of his activities and to abandon the thought of any advantages which he might get in exchange for his work.

The first half of the 20th century did not introduce many changes in the traditional ethos. All the main principles of the traditional ethos were left. We can still find the autotelic model of studies and the rule to carry out the scientific activities by means of the scientific methods. Truth and knowledge continue to be the main values which should guide the scholar in his work.

On the other hand, in the 20th century the ethos extends the duties of the scholar. Apart from the requirements imposed by the traditional ethos, such as a creative character of the scientific activities, publication of the scientific achievements, freedom in scientific research and studies, moral rules are

⁶ J. Le Goff, *Les intellectuels au Moyen Age. Le temps qui court*, Editon de Seuil, 1957, p. 187.

becoming more and more obligatory. This results from the development of science and from the reflection of the scholars that, apart from the advantages, science—when used in the wrong way—can also bring some serious losses. After R. K. Merton :

The mores of science possess a methodologic rationale, but they are binding, not only because they are procedurally efficient, but because they are believed right and good. They are moral as well as technical prescriptions. Four sets of institutional imperatives—universalism, communism, disinterestedness, organized scepticism—comprise the ethos of modern science.⁷

The imperatives suggested by J. Goćkowski are quite closely related with the above-mentioned four sets of institutional imperatives ; J. Goćkowski has additionally enriched them with the principle of responsibility, understood in terms of a dictate to feel responsible for the results of one's own scientific activities.⁸

It has to be remembered, however, that the above-mentioned imperatives are not new. Their radices go back not only to the rules of the traditional ethos of the 19th century, but they can be traced even in the rules of the mediaeval and ancient ethos. Previously they did not bear such a great significance. In early ages science did not interfere so much in the ethical problems. Nowadays, when science can bring either salvation or extermination to the world, the problem of responsibility has become a matter of utmost importance.

The second half of the 20th century brings certain changes in the concept of ethos. The increasing institutionalization of science, the state control exerted over the scientific life, high degree of professionalism and specialization of the scientific studies—all these factors cause the disappearance of the scholar's ethos in favour of the worker's ethics. The reason of such changes is the fact that :

There are changes in the concept of science, in the concept of its status and functions in the society, as well as in its relations with the state [...]. Grave and significant transformations occur in the structure of the society taken as a whole : the category of a highly skilled staff of the workers with the "white collars" mentality is expanding, and it becomes a typical segment. As a result of these changes the scientist carries on his profession as a worker hired by a given institution ; the state interferes in the essence of the scientific activities and integrates science, making it a tool and a source of the political and economic power [...], while the institutions take over and control a number of the matters which were previously in gestion of the scientific societies only. And although scientists still have the power to take numerous decisions, quite often—in view of other functions performed in the society—they are forced to resort to the non-scientific means which are of no service to science.⁹

⁷ R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, Glencoe, Illinois : The Free Press, 1957, pp. 552—553.

⁸ This concept was disclosed by J. Goćkowski during a scientific symposium on : *Badacze i wychowawcy—Etos ludzi nauki* [*Researchers and Teachers—Ethos of the Scholars*], Cracow, May 27—29, 1985.

⁹ J. Goćkowski, L. Hołowiecka, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

So, we face a crisis in the scholar's ethos. The crisis which refers to the values but goes much deeper ; it becomes a crisis of the existence of the ethos. At present the scientists are standing at the cross-roads. The total disappearance of ethos may depend on whether they are able to either overcome the lack of its adaptive power to the social processes which occur in the circles of the scientific societies, or to accept the worker's ethics which will mean a slow decay of the society of erudites in favour of the in-plant societies, worker's societies and the branch societies.

To end our discussion on the problem of the scholar's ethos related to the various forms of culture, let us try to recapitulate the information disclosed so far, referring it to the ethos of long duration. When the history of the scholar's ethos is analyzed, we can note that it is subjected to continuous and quiet changes, where every next "step in the development" is a modification and an expansion of the previous one. Therefore the ancient ethos is so important, and therefore its elements are encountered in all the subsequent periods. Another reason which makes the Antiquity important is the fact that it created the conditions appropriate for the formation of ethos and defined the main elements in the code of values.

These elements can be traced in every next phase of the development of ethos, although they are enriched all the time with additional rules. The formation of the scholar's ethos can be described in a pictorial way comparing it with a sphere (the core or the basis for the code of values) which is being "coated" around with new group principles. So, here we are speaking about one period in the long duration of ethos. Some doubts may occur only when we take into consideration the mediaeval ethos (till the beginnings of the 12th century), but that period may be regarded as a crisis during which the scholars treated their activities in a less active (more passive) way than their predecessors did although, appreciating duly the value of knowledge, they tried to impart it to other people. To support this thesis, we can use as an argument the fact that in that period the principal concept of science, treated as a form of human aspirations to reach truth, did not, as a matter of fact, undergo any changes. Therefore it was a period during which the shape of science was moulded not by a "scholar-explorer" but by a "scholar-teacher."

Out analysis of the ethos of the artist, discussed in terms of the various forms of culture, will begin with the code of values of an artist in ancient Egypt. It is true that art had appeared as early as in the Palaeolithic, but the lack of reliable data makes the description of an artist in that period of culture impossible.

At the very beginning it has to be stated that in ancient Egypt both artists and craftsmen used the same code of values. The lack of cultural and structural division between those two societies accounted for the fact that they were treated as one group. The most important and fundamental rules in the code of values of the artist in Egypt were those which referred to the objectives of art. And the most important objective of the Egyptian art was to accept and support the existing social situation.

In the service of the great national propaganda, art confirmed in the masses the image of stability of the existing state of affairs. The art had to express this image in a clear and explicit way ; above all art should be understandable. Therefore it did not show a subjective picture in foreshortening, depending on a given point of view, but it was presenting an objective picture of the reality—not the reality as I can see it at a given moment or in a given situation but the reality such as I know that it really is.¹⁰

That kind of knowledge referred not only to the form of the presented objects but also to their symbolic meaning. Basing on this knowledge, the Egyptians formulated their own concept of art and of the proper relations which served as a basis for the establishment of their own canons which, on the other hand, were determined not by art but by the liturgical and social factors. The way in which these canons were elaborated expressed another objective of art, namely the dissemination of religious ideas. The canons were expected to exert a double effect on the artist. On one hand, the artistic canon impeded the development of art, preventing the artist from expressing his ideas in a free and unrestrained manner while, on the other, it ensured a high artistic level of the contemporary art, making it clear and easily understood by everybody.

Apart from the determination of the main objectives which art was expected to satisfy, in the code of values recommended for artists a great emphasis was put on the workmanship of a piece of art. The accuracy and perfection were highly esteemed, since they spoke well of the artist himself. The fundamental rules in the code of values of the Egyptian artist were definitely of a very stable nature. Changes in the canons and attempts to make the rules less strict occurred only in the field of art, and their influence on the binding code of values was of no major significance. Some important changes in the code of values appeared in the ancient Greek culture. At the very beginning, in an archaic period, the code of values of the Greek artist was not clearly formulated. Like in Egypt, he was included into the group of craftsmen, and he was evaluated in the same way. The reason was the still lacking cultural individuality of an artist as well as the fact that art was thought to be :

[...]every piece of the human work if it was creative, if it used skills and if it was consciously based on the general rules.¹¹

The main aim of art was to imitate and reproduce reality, and to give pleasure to the onlooker. The classical period developed the existing code of values. The art continued to be regarded as an activity ruled by principles. The most important objective of art was to represent reality, but to represent it in an idealistic way.

¹⁰ K. Michałowski, *Kanon w architekturze egipskiej* [*The Canon in Egyptian Architecture*], Warsaw, 1956, pp. 8—9.

¹¹ W. Tatarkiewicz, *Historia estetyki* [*History of Aesthetics*], vol. 1, Ossolineum, 1962, p. 37.

Even if it be impossible that people like those painted by Zeuxis really existed, it is preferable to present them in this way because the ideal should have a priority (over the real).¹²

The main aim of the artist was to look for ideal proportions, i.e. to seek absolute beauty. To facilitate the achievement of this goal, various canons were recommended for use, that is, the rules which should be observed by the artist and which, according to the Greeks, could make the art perfect. The canons were justified from the artistic point of view (contrary to the Egyptian ones), they were elaborated gradually, they were changed and corrected, they resulted from the observations of nature and were formulated basing on the laws of nature. The canons were regarded as objective truths, not invented but discovered.

The classical period also maintained the rule according to which art should serve the pleasure, including also its additional function, i.e. recording of the historical and mythological events. The code of values recommended for the classical artist imposed upon art one more objective. Being of an imitative and reproducing character, art should tend towards truth.

Truth, understood as a conformity with the reality was considered to be an important feature of art.¹³

Towards the close of the Classical period and at the beginning of the Hellenistic epoch, great changes took place in the code of the artist's values. They were caused by the alterations which occurred in the field of art. A transformation of the Hellenic art into the Hellenistic one resulted in the fact that :

[...] in the creative activities of an artist the relationship between art and beauty became most prominent ; in the theory of art the centre of gravity shifted from the intellect to imagination, from the impression to an idea, from the rules of art to the personal skills of an artist, from the passive understanding of art to an active comprehension ; due to these changes the artist was finally considered to be less of a craftsman and more of a prophet and legislator of art.¹⁴

In the field of the artist's ethos, in the Hellenistic period the most important change consisted in the gradual emergence of the group of artists, in the split in the consciousness of artists and craftsmen, and in the creation of the separate code of values. These changes were followed by a growing importance of the artist as a creator of art. The main principles in the code of values were also undergoing some significant changes. The objectives of art had changed as well as the forms of their realization. Beauty was gradually becoming the main and direct goal of art, and that was the very reason why the artist was respected much

¹² J. Białostocki, *Myśliciele, kronikarze i artyści o sztuce. Od starożytności do 1500* [Thinkers, Chroniclers and Artists on Art. From Antiquity to 1500], Warsaw : PWN, 1978, p.43.

¹³ W. Tatarkiewicz, *Dzieje sześciu pojęć* [The History of Six Notions], Warsaw : PWN, 1975, p. 351.

¹⁴ W. Tatarkiewicz, "Hellenistyczna teoria sztuki i poezji" ["Hellenistic Theory of Art and Poetry"], *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, 1957, vol. 1, No. 4, p. 4.

more than the craftsman. The faithful representation and imitation of reality was no longer the rule to be strictly followed. Hence, in the code of values new requirements were imposed upon the artist, and apart from the knowledge he was also expected to possess inspiration, originality, boldness of ideas, and technical skill—the latter factor enabled the creation of a piece of art. On the other hand, the canon, understood as a set of the strict rules, disappeared almost completely. During the Hellenistic period only the tasks of art were not changed. Art was still expected to give pleasure and to record the important events.

The decline of ancient culture and the development of Christianity caused some important changes in the character of the mediaeval art. The cultural individuality of artists disappeared again, and they were included once more into the group of craftsmen. This social degradation combined with a change in the tasks and objectives of art contributed to a change in the code of values binding for the artists. The rules were changing not only on the turn of Antiquity and the Middle Ages but also in the course of the Middle Ages. The rules, which had to be observed by the artist in the epoch of early Christianity, were different from those which existed in Gothic times, and the changes assumed more or less the same course as in Antiquity.

In the Middle Ages the definition of art did not stray very much from the classical one—art is a methodical activity based on certain rules. If, however, these rules were strictly observed in the early Middle Ages, the late mediaeval period permitted a deviation in favour of the artist's own invention.

The objectives of art, on the contrary, changed in a very definite way. In ancient times art represented nature and the world; it served beauty and “had to feast one's eyes;” in the Middle Ages art was expected to represent God's ideas and religious truths. Art also changed its character—it started to use symbols since it was representing the temporal world regarded as a symbol of the transcendent being and as a symbol of the eternal world. So, in a way, art belonged to the second world—the world of God; it was God's image created for people. Therefore, in the rules prescribed for artists particular emphasis was placed on the social nature of the artist's activities and on the religious functions of art. This trend was predominant in the early Christian epoch when art was entirely subjected to the religious and moral problems of the Christian faith. It symbolized and illustrated the religious values, and its main task was to teach and disseminate the truth of the faith.

Painting means the same to people as alphabet to those who can read, because those who cannot read can see and in the picture they are shown a model to follow. Therefore paintings exist mainly for the instruction of people.¹⁵

Striving after beauty was also recommended, but it was regarded as a means for expressing the spiritual truth, the truth revealed and divine. Later on, in the

¹⁵ J. Białostocki, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

Romanesque and the Gothic periods, the theological concept of art, prevailing until then, became only a background for the artistic activities. Due to this change, the main objective in the artist's activities was more and more often an attempt to reach beauty and, what is even more important, to reach the aesthetic and not metaphysical beauty. Yet, even that attitude was partly justified from the religious point of view. The aesthetic sensations were regarded as a means to experience the spiritual beauty and to come nearer to God.

The code of values also determined the character of the artistic activities. Art was expected to be of a reproductive nature, yet it should reproduce not the visible world but the invisible one, which is eternal and more perfect than the real one. The last rule in the code of the artist's principles of behaviour concerned the problem of a relationship between the artist, his art and truth. Since art was representing not the mundane reality but it symbolized the world of God, artists were released from the duty to be strictly subordinated to art. It was discovered that art is beyond truth and falseness. On the other hand, it was required from art to give a representation consistent with the religious truth. Comparing in a general way the tasks which were given to the artist in those periods, a very important difference can be observed :

The Egyptians had largely drawn what they knew to exist, the Greeks what they saw ; in the Middle Ages the artist also learned to express in his picture what he felt.¹⁶

The decline of the Gothic and the beginnings of the Renaissance brought the next series of changes in the artist's code of values. The changes, which had already begun in the times of the Gothic, referred directly to the "newly discovered" ancient tradition. However, the separation between the artists, taken as a cultural group, and the craftsmen had the greatest direct impact on the changes in the existing code of rules. The restoration in art of the ancient traditions was the very reason why the code of values also acquired the ancient character. It is true that at the very beginning, similarly as in the Middle Ages, art was regarded as an activity dominated by certain rules, but for the sources of this attitude we have to look back into Antiquity. On the contrary, in the later periods that definition was gradually abandoned in favour of the definition of art understood as an activity following certain predetermined rules, but it did not disregard entirely an effect of the artist's talent, imagination and inspiration. The most important rule, which governed the activities of the Renaissance artist, was sticking to the laws of perspective. This caused a "mathematization" of art, and put artists into one group with the scholars. The Mannerism and Baroque opposed the tendency of making art a branch of science. The result was a rejection of the rules and subjecting art to the artist's psyche. Similarly, in the Classicism the scientific aspirations of art were not cultivated, although strict artistic rules were introduced once again. The most important duty of the

¹⁶ E. H. Gombrich, *The Story of Art*, New York, 1958, p. 115.

Renaissance artist was to imitate nature. The imitation was understood in two different ways : to imitate nature and to imitate the laws which ruled nature, that is, to perform functions similar to those of nature itself.

At that time another important and obligatory principle was to strive in art after beauty. Like in the ancient times, the goal was to be reached through proportion and harmony. To this end it was not enough to imitate reality and nature, but it was also necessary to create its ideal image. The idealization consisted in selecting the most beautiful fragments of reality and in using them as a basis for the creation of ideal beauty.

The artist not only imitated the nature but he also embellished it according to the rules of art. Beauty was a sign of the artist's intervention into the order of nature.¹⁷

So we can see that in the epoch of the Renaissance the artist was not only an imitator of art but he was slowly becoming also a creator of art, since both the reproduction of reality and striving after beauty were not merely mechanical actions. The creative element was gaining importance. An increase in the importance of the creative power of the artist became most visible in the Mannerism and Baroque. In the code of values binding in those periods it was clearly emphasized that art is a result of the creative power of the artist.

In those two epochs the attitude of the artist towards reality also changed. Art was no longer expected to represent nature ; its main task was to become an illusion of nature, and therefore it should deceive the spectator. The attitude of artists in the epoch of Mannerism and Baroque towards the problem of beauty was also different. In the Renaissance it was thought that beauty was inherent, first of all, in nature and then in art, especially the classical one. In the period of Mannerism and Baroque the artists considered nature to be weak and frail. They could see real beauty only in their own illusive art. They considered their own art to be not only superior to the previous one but also better and closer to beauty than nature itself.

That opinion of the artists remained unchanged until the period of Academism which reached its culminating point during the Classicism. Introducing into art certain determined principles, it reduced the significance of a creative factor but did not eliminate it totally. Art became once again a copy of nature, and not of an arbitrary nature but of the chosen nature, free from imperfections. Such an ideal model of ideal nature became the ancient art, and it was regarded as an example to be followed. The Renaissance works were also considered to be worthy of imitation. Since, apart from the aesthetic pleasure, teaching became another objective of art, the invention of the artists was restricted to the ancient subjects and to those which represented some scenes from the *Holy Writ*. The reasons, which would explain these changes in the

¹⁷ Z. Ważbiński, *Dzielo i twórca w koncepcji renesansu [The Work and the Creator in the Renaissance Concept]*, Ossolineum, 1975, p. 8.

artist's code of values, are to be sought in an attempt of the artist to reach ideal art and in his conviction that there is only one truth existing in art. To achieve this truth was possible only due to the observance of some strict rules, determined on the basis of the rational criteria. So, it was believed that art could be even more beautiful and more truthful than nature itself, since nature has some imperfections, while art can be released from these imperfections if the artist observes the right rules.

The 19th century and the 20th century are the periods when many different concepts of art are coexisting. The pluralism of concepts has resulted in a pluralism in the artist's code of values. In spite of this, the separate systems had some features in common which enabled them to be regarded as a set of the rules typical of the artists in this period—the artists creating modern art.

Compared with the code of values recognized by the academic artists, the most important change consisted in renouncing the idea of objectiveness. The artist's duty was still to reflect reality but the image of this reality was a subjective vision of the world, the world seen through a prism of the artist's own personality.

The work of art should reflect the impression received. Therefore to the artist nature means nothing but a state of his own personality.¹⁸

Since art became a subjective experience of the artist, and it was no longer bound by an attempt to reach beauty, the aesthetic criterion was replaced with the criterion of expression, sensation and feeling, which accompanied the contact with art. The artist, who could rouse with his art some emotions, was a good artist, capable of transmitting to the others his internal feelings and ideas. In the realization of this goal the artist was not bound by any rules. Of course, he was free to observe some rules, but he could also choose other means of expression.

The artist is relieved from all the rules and conventions, his art has practically no boundaries ; it does not bother about any justifications, and no such justifications are needed because art is not necessary as a symbol of culture.¹⁹

Only one requirement is now imposed upon the artist : to convey with what he creates some important pieces of information. There is also another criterion which becomes important—the creative power. The question is whether the art presented by a given artist is sufficiently creative and original, whether it is a result of the artist's independent work on a given subject or whether it is a plagiarism. Previously, the notion of plagiarism was alien to art, since copying was not regarded as something censurable. Modern art, on the contrary,

¹⁸ E. Grabska, H. Morawska, *Artyści o sztuce. Od Van Gogha do Picassa* [Artists on Art. From Van Gogh to Picasso], Warsaw : PWN, 1962, p. 85.

¹⁹ J. Białostocki, *Refleksja i syntezy ze świata sztuki* [Reflections and Syntheses from the World of Art], Warsaw : PWN, 1968, p. 237.

repudiates copying and does not recognize it as an artistic activity. The work of art has to be creative, original and independent. The artist is expected not only to master the technique but to have something to say and to be able to do it in his own words. So, the requirements imposed upon the artist have changed completely.

Nowadays art has changed again, and it is a result of the crisis which has taken possession of the values of art accepted until now. They have become obsolete and useless. Modern art tries to occupy a different place in the society from the one it has been holding until now. And this attitude is backed by the resignation of art from its previous informative and substantial role, by the process of automatization of art as well as by the disintegration and destruction of artistic forms. It can be stated that art is subjected to deep and revolutionary transformations and that :

[...] this revolution means not only breaking with the whole European past and with the whole cultural tradition held until now, but also with the whole past of the art existing until now.²⁰

Some basic changes also occur in the principal elements of the code of the artist's values. It can be observed that a new ethos is being formed ; the ethos which is a result of the activities of the artistic vanguard of the 60s.

The ethos of the individualized truth is dominated by the ethos of individual activities, while the criterion of a faithful representation of the world has to give place to another criterion—that of being faithful to one's own self, that is, to the criterion of an adequacy between a given act and the deep internal structures of an individual.²¹

The artist has to face quite a new task. He is no longer expected to reflect the world in his art, he is no longer interested in the cognition of the world, but he is acting through his art, he exists due to his art. So, the artist becomes "full" creator, and he is creating not only art itself, like in the post-ancient times, but also reality, all that surrounds him. The new art gives him new tasks, he has to create his own world, environment and existence. E. Souriau, the creator of the moral system on which modern art has been based, is of the opinion that the only moral principle of the artist is his duty to create art. This duty has become so important that artists have degraded their professional skill, preferring the creative idea itself to the skill. It can be noted that the objectives of art as well as the objectives of the artistic activities have changed completely. Now the main objective is not an aesthetic experience but an active attitude towards one's own existence. Among the different criteria used in the evaluation of art, the greatest emphasis is put on the sublimity of art. The new ethos imposes quite new requirements upon the artist. The artist is expected to create both the world and

²⁰ P. Krakowski, *O sztuce nowej i najnowszej* [*On the New and the Newest Art*], Warsaw : PWN, 1984, p. 171.

²¹ J. Brach-Czaina, *Etos nowej sztuki* [*Ethos of the New Art*], Warsaw : PWN, 1984, pp. 18—19.

the reality. Yet, this act of creation must be sublime, it must be constructive, it must give new values and new ideas ; it must release emotions, it must be an artistic activity. Therefore the artist is burdened with a great responsibility, although he is not the only one to bear it. The responsibility is equally shared by all people, since all people are supposed to be creators of the new art. So, everybody creates something, every activity, every object can be introduced into the field of art, and everybody is responsible for the existence and the reality which he creates.

Let us now try to recapitulate the above-given information in the aspect of the ethos of long duration.

When we investigate the code of values of the artist in particular historical periods, we cannot find one leading value which would be common to all the codes of values. Therefore our analysis will be made on the basis of the two main characteristics determining art, namely : the objective of art and the attitude of art towards reality.

An Analysis of the Objectives of Art

When we analyze the above-given information, we can distinguish four main objectives of art : political, religious, aesthetic (beauty) and emotional (affection). The political objectives were fulfilled by art in Ancient Egypt, where art was a tool of power; the religious objectives can be attributed to art in the Middle Ages, and to some—though smaller—degree in the Egyptian art. The aesthetic objectives, revealed in an attempt to find beauty, appeared in a visible way in ancient and early modern times and also, though to a smaller degree, at the end of the Middle Ages. The emotional objectives, often related with the aesthetic ones (they might be, after all, combined into one common group), most often expressed in affection or other emotional reactions, have been and are still observed in modern art.

An Analysis of the Attitude of Art towards Reality

Basically speaking, two types of the attitudes of art towards reality can be distinguished : art creates reality and art reflects reality. In the scope of the latter attitude, however, we can distinguish : a creative representation of reality and an imitative representation of reality. In this way we have, as a matter of fact, three types of the attitudes. The imitative representation of reality occurs in the Egyptian art, in the archaic and classical Greek art and in the mediaeval art. The creative representation of reality is typical of the Hellenistic, early modern and modern art. The creation of reality through art occurs only in the modern art.

Relating now these remarks with an analysis of the ethos of long duration, it can be stated that in the history of ethos the following four periods can be distinguished :

First period—the Egyptian art representing in an imitative way reality and performing political and religious functions.

Second period—the Middle Ages—art also represents in an imitative way reality but it must also perform a religious and aesthetic functions.

Third period—includes the Greek, early modern and modern art, which had to represent reality and was focussed on the fulfilment of aesthetic objectives.

The last period in the ethos of long duration covers the art contemporary to our times, which also aims at a fulfilment of the aesthetic objectives but assumes a most active (creative) attitude towards reality.

From the short historical review presented above we can see that in the aspect of the forms of culture, both of the above discussed kinds of ethos reveal great differences. Looking for similarities gives rather poor results. The similarities are most visible in the Renaissance. At that time art and science were treated in a similar way, and the main goal was an objective scientific cognition. In science it was an autotelic value, in art it served as a means to achieve the principal aim, i.e. an objective representation of the world. These common features observed in some of the values are revealed in both kinds of ethos through the existence of some common rules and activities. Yet, in the aspect of the forms of culture, the similarity between the ethos of the artist and the ethos of the scientist is rather superficial. The reason is the fact that art does not allow, or maybe it needs not allow us to penetrate into the nature of some phenomena which occur in reality, as it is necessary in the case of science. For the artist the cognition of reality is a much more superficial act ; to describe reality is enough for him. For the scholar the description is not sufficient ; apart from the description, he tries to understand and explain the phenomena which he finds interesting. So, in spite of the apparent similarities, there is an obvious difference between these aspects of the ethos. The difference results from a different attitude which is assumed by the artists and by the scholars.

More similarities can be found when we analyze the aspect of a social structure, that is, the status of the scholar and that of the artist. Artists appear as a group with a very low status, while the social position of scholars places them, from the very beginning, in the group of the “middle class.” In ancient Greece the status of the scholar, and hence also his authority, was much higher than that of the artist. In the Hellenistic period the position of the artist gained a lot of importance, while that of the scholar remained at the same level. Due to this fact, at that time both scholars and artists acquired a very similar status. It is true that in the Middle Ages the position of the scholar suffered a decline, but the position of the artist decreased even more. The end of the Middle Ages strengthened the influence of the artist, his social position raised, but the same tendency was observed also in the case of the scholar ; the humanistic ideas increased the authority of science as well. In the modern epoch the status of the artist was raising all the time, while that of the scholar was gaining importance to a very small degree only. Due to this fact, both the scholar and the artist acquired a relatively high social status, although the 19th century brought in some

changes. The position of the scholar became definitely stronger, he was included in the élite of the society, he gained a very high authority as well as a social status. On the other hand, the artist, owing to the social alienation and disintegration caused by the feeling of his own exceptionality, reduced his own authority. Hence, at that the position of the artist was definitely much lower from that of the scholar. However, in the course of time the situation was gradually changing. The growing approval of modern art made the social status of the artist raise again. Nowadays both artists and scientists are again placed at the same social level.

In an analysis of this aspect our attention should be drawn to one very important fact. The status of the scholar and the status of the artist were formed in different ways, but certain common tendencies can be observed here, namely :

— a definite decrease in the social status of both artists and scholars was observed on the turn of the ancient epoch and the Middle Ages, the theocratic mediaeval system was certainly responsible for that state of affairs ;

— the early modern epoch brought in a definite increase in the social position of both groups ;

— modern times give artists and scientists a very high social status and a great authority.

A more comprehensive and detailed analysis of the ethos of the scholar and the ethos of the artist reveals some similarities, although there are differences as well. To explain this fact is not a simple task, and therefore it will be necessary to make a less detailed analysis which would enable us to grasp the development tendencies in both kinds of ethos.

As it has already been mentioned, in modern times the scientists and the artists suffer a crisis of their ethos, but if the artists are passing through this crisis in a relatively mild way, the scientists face certain difficulties. The common feature are here similar development tendencies (i.e. the occurrence of a crisis), which are a reaction to the actual social situation. To know, however, whether this is a characteristic of only these two kinds of ethos, would require an analysis of other modern forms of ethos. Then we would be able to see if this is, by any chance, the peculiarity of our times which induces various crises. It is quite possible that the social conditions under which we are living nowadays cause the same crisis in other groups, too. It is generally supposed that the technical progress and economic development have contributed to the crisis of values in numerous social groups.

The problem of crisis in the ethos is directly related with the problem of a reaction to this crisis, that is, with the problem of looking for some solutions. In this field, the situation is quite different in the ethos of the scientist and in the ethos of the artist which consequently brings some variations in the results of this crisis. The artists reacted to the crisis in a very active way ; they formulated a new code of values, they created a new ethos. On one hand, the new system, based on a very "elevated" ideology conferred to art an important place in the social code of values; on the other, it enabled the artist to enter into friendly relations with

the society, breaking the border which existed between him and the society. Such a formulation of the concept of art was a logical step in the visible tendency of making the artistic activities more sublime. In the Hellenistic period as well as in early modern ages the artist was representing in an objective way reality. So, art was an image of reality, it was something secondary in relation to nature. In the present art the artist is transforming the objective reality through a prism of his personality, and due to this art becomes a new value, though it is still related, to some degree, with nature. Modern art is a result of the creative activities of the artist. The process of creation makes the artist's work independent of nature, it becomes equal to the works of the Creator. The creation as such is included into the sphere of sacrum, since it transcends the aesthetic values, tending towards higher values. So, in the creative process of the artist we observe a constant idealization of this process, transferring it gradually into the sphere of sacrum, which means a "sacralization" of the artististic activities. On the other hand, the new ethos expresses quite opposite tendencies. The value of the work itself is gradually disappearing in favour of an intention and a creative idea. The character of the ethos also changes. First of all, it becomes available to everybody, since everybody can be a creator. The borderline between art and reality is blurred ; life is art and art is life. This is the motto which reveals the tendencies of the artists to oppose the system of élite, the tendencies which might be denoted as a process of the "desacralization" of the artist and his work.

The reaction of the scholars to the crisis was quite different. It was of a more passive nature ; they did not create a new ethos, they were not able to present new leading values. The social status of the scholar did not change, either. In the epoch of the traditional ethos the scholar had a very high social position. The cult of knowledge and science, which reigned in the contemporary society, contributed to a great extent to this situation. At that time, science was the field of human activities which was believed to be omnipotent and to be able to solve every problem. Due to this, the scholars gained a very high authority. The situation started to change when it was noted that science can be only one of the cognitive perspectives of man, that its possibilities are limited and that its role is not always of a positive nature. At that time, however, the authority of science did not suffer a decrease, although it seemed that the crisis in the scholar's ethos and the popularization of science would unavoidably cause that state of affairs. Science was only deprived of its halo of the loftiness and irrationality (the decisive factor here was a growing consciousness of the limited possibilities of science), which had previously caused an unjustified cult and fascination resulting from the failure to understand the essence of science as a social phenomenon. Science had finally reached the state in which the rationalism and logics, that is, the main criteria of the scientific character of knowledge, became its most important force. The process, which is now described, might be called "desacralization" of science and of the scientist. One fact has to be emphasized here, however, namely that owing to this process science can fully accomplish its objectives, using its own scientific means. The process in question liberated the

scholar from the ballast which may be the irrationally motivated cult of science.

An interesting phenomenon can be noted here. Apart from its disfunctional characteristics (the disappearance of ethos in favour of the worker's ethics and other related processes), the crisis of the scholar's ethos is also characterized by some functional properties (the "desacralization" of science and of the scientist), related with science as such and with the possibilities of its development.

The difference in the ethos of the scholar and the ethos of the artist, discussed in the aspect of various forms of culture, is also the very cause of differences in the opinions to what extent science and art have deviated from truth. In science the criterion of truth is much simpler than in art, since it is based on Aristotle's definition of truth. Truth is conformity with what is real. In this situation, in science the deviation from truth will mean a proclamation of the statements inconsistent with reality and with the facts. Now, when we speak about the deviation from truth in terms of the ethos of the scholar, we have to think additionally which rules and principles of this ethos are violated when we face this situation. Assuming that this is not a deliberate activity aiming at the development of a "false science," it can be ascertained that breaking of the principles of autotelism, objectivism and criticism is the very cause of deviation from the scientific truth.

In art truth is understood in a slightly different way. One fact has to be emphasized here, namely that, according to Aristotle's definition, art is beyond truth and falseness. In art the notion of truth has quite different criteria, while the term "truth" is confined in its meaning and should be understood as a conformity with the accepted concept of art.

In ancient Egypt art was a reflection of the existing knowledge about the world. Hence, the deviation from truth consisted in presenting reality in a way inconsistent with the knowledge and ideas the Egyptians formed about this reality. In ancient Greece truth in art meant conformity with the reality, although idealization was also admissible. The deviation from truth occurred when art was inconsistent with the reality, and when it was not a result of the idealization. The Middle Ages introduced their own criterion of truth. According to that criterion art was true when it was presenting reality in conformity with the religious feelings and principles. So, in that case the deviation from truth meant an inconsistency with the principles of the Christian faith. The Renaissance restored the ancient meaning of truth and along with this meaning also the ancient criterion of the deviation from truth. The Mannerism, Baroque and Classicism introduced their own meaning of truth. The deviation from truth consisted in the presentation of false and artificial poses, gestures and situations as well as in breaking of the accepted rules (Classicism). At the same time a definite distinction between the falseness and fiction was introduced, accepting the latter one as consistent with the criterion of truth. Modern art assumes that the work of art is true when the artist expresses in this work what he thinks and what he feels. The deviation from truth consists in the lack of expression and feeling in a work of art. As a main criterion of truth the modern art has accepted creation ; if the

work of art is a result of the creative activity of an artist, then it is true, if not—it is an example of the deviation from truth.

Let us now proceed to the last problem which I would like to discuss in this paper. It will concern only the ethos of the artist and the history of art. A detailed analysis of the aspect of the form of culture in the artist's ethos enables us to observe (the suggestion has appeared earlier in this work) that the ethos of the artist seems to be composed of four separate components. These four components represent quite different codes of values ; each of them is characterized by its own criterion and principles, and therefore each of them expresses an individual concept of art. The only explanation of this interesting phenomenon is the existence of not one but four kinds of fine arts, coexisting or following each other. Each of them, having its own concept of the work of art, having its own ethos (or a code of values when the requirements indispensable for the existence of an ethos are not satisfied), its own criteria of evaluation and its own rules forms, in practice, a separate and individual system. This statement is additionally confirmed by the fact that the history of art has not one principal criterion which would define whether a piece of work can be regarded as a work of art or not. In the past the evaluation of some works of art was based on the criteria quite different from those applied nowadays, in spite of the fact that it was the same object (e.g. the evaluation of academic or impressionistic works now and before).

So, what is art in the present meaning of this word, when it has been proved that there are practically four different kinds of art ? We might risk the statement that right now this term is a collective one, i.e. it qualifies all works of art which are regarded as such according to the present criterion, irrespective of the evaluation which they might get at the time when they were created. This is the criterion which was observed in all the epochs, but it was formulated in different ways and its different aspects were emphasized. This criterion is an artistic value of the work of art. It is this value, which in spite of everything, enables us to use in our discussions on this subject one common word "art," while its creator is called "artist."

3. RECAPITULATION

At the end we shall try to make a recapitulation and, of course, to answer the question put at the beginning of this paper, since our main objective is to determine the similarities which exist between science and art discussed in terms of their ethos.

The above-given analysis of both kinds of ethos, the analysis which takes into account not only the formation, changes and duration of particular kinds of ethos but also some analogies which exist between them, enables us to see the similarities as well as differences. In this way we can ascertain that the forms of an ethos accepted by these groups are neither totally different nor totally similar.

They have certain features in common, which account for the similarities, but they have also some different features which make the identification of both kinds of ethos impossible. Each of the similarities and differences has its own justification, and in these similarities and differences we have to look for an answer to the question what is a relationship between science and art, between the ethos of the scholar and that of the artist. Therefore, let us now make an attempt and look for a justification of the differences and similarities which have been discussed in this work.

In the aspect of the form of culture the differences in both kinds of the ethos prove in the best way that we are dealing with two separate societies. In this respect a similarity might suggest that both these groups are identical, that is, that the members in each of the groups form, as a matter of fact, one common social circle. The different course in the process of the crystallization of ethos and in the process of the crystallization of the formal science and art confirms not only the different development tendencies in the group of scholars and artists, but it makes an identification of both these groups practically impossible. The different formulation of the criterion of truth is only a consequence of the proved difference in the concept of science and in the concept of art. A similar situation of both these groups, i.e. their crisis, is of no major importance since, perhaps, this is a peculiar feature typical of our modern times which promote a crisis of the group values. Yet, the problem itself requires a more profound study. On the other hand, different reactions to the situation of crisis prove that there are differences in the character of both these groups. While artists have been able to formulate their own concept of art, resulting from the fact that art aims mainly at the satisfaction of some needs typical of a given period, the scholars must constantly defend their own concept of science and its main objective—the scientific cognition and explanation of the world, as otherwise science would cease to be science.

All these similarities and differences prove that some kind of community exists between the scholar and the artist. To explain this fact seems to be the task most important in the whole analysis of both kinds of ethos, since at this stage we can answer the question what sort of a relationship exists between the scholar and the artist. To explain this problem in a proper way, we have now to take into consideration the following question: what is art and what is science ?

We can distinguish three main fields in the creative and cognitive activities of man ; they are : science (including philosophy), art and religion. Speaking in other words, science, art and religion are the three forms of a cognitive and creative approach towards the world. Each of these fields is a functional element for every individual. It maintains in this individual the feeling of safety, it gives the feeling of confidence and mental comfort. Science performs this functions satisfying the “desire to know the truth” about the world. In this way, an individual can have the feeling that he is ruling over the world, and due to this, the feeling of his own security is also strengthened. Art performs its function creating some aesthetic feelings accompanying its perception. The individual, who

experiences these feelings, is able to increase his own mental comfort. Religion performs this function through metaphysical sensations, which also contribute to the feeling of safety and mental comfort, resulting from the confidence that the Almighty Being (God) takes care of the individual.

The three fields of the creative and cognitive activities of an individual, acting in different planes (logical, aesthetic, religious) complete each other. So, they are not competitive to each other but complementary.

The fact that both groups, i.e. the group of artists and the group of scholars, belong to a community of those who are seeking truth may be regarded as a logical justification of the similarities which can be noted between these groups. An exact analysis of these similarities confirms further this suggestion. In this way, it can be stated that the similarities which occur between the ethos of the scholar and the ethos of the artist result from the fact that these groups belong to one community, characterized by the cognitive and creative attitude towards reality. However, to make this suggestion a statement of the cognitive power, it is necessary to carry out a similar comparative analysis which would take into account, apart from science and art, also a third form of the creative and cognitive activity of man—religion. Only then it will be possible to prove that the suggestion formulated here is correct. Coming back to our analysis of the ethos of the artist and the ethos of the scholar, we have to pay due attention to the fact that each of these groups has different perspective in the realization of its objectives. The artist wants to know both truth and reality, as this is the condition necessary for the creation of art, while the scholar creates his works to be able to fulfil his own objective which is going in search after truth. Both of them are creators, yet the processes of creation have quite a different character. The work of the artist, when finished, assumes its final shape, the work of the scholar is never finished, it never assumes its final form, it is modified and complemented all the time. Therefore, while the artist can be a creator who “has done” his work, the scholar is a creator who “is doing” his work.