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Tadeusz Zieliński (Poland)

HOMERIC PSYCHOLOGY [1922]

Chapter one

Organs of spiritual life

I

... *That we shall fulfill zealously*, answered Crito, *but how do you wish us to bury you? – The way you wish*, said Socrates, *provided that you can catch me and I do not run away from you*. Then, with a quiet smile he added, beholding us: *I will not manage, my friends, to persuade Crito that I am the same Socrates who is conversing with you today, considering every my position; he thinks, that I am the one whom he will soon see as a corpse, so he asks how he has to bury „me”!* And my recent promise, *that having drunk the poison I will no longer be with you but leave for the blissful dwelling of the reposed, – I should not have apparently said that, if I did, it was but for the sake of quelling both your and my own anguish ...*

In those words of the dying Socrates¹ not for the first time, but especially persistently and without ambiguity, the regrouping of the three concepts: *the soul, the body* and *I* was carried out. Unlike the presented by Crito then popular understanding, according to which the concept *I* continues to reside in *the body* after *the soul* separates from the latter – Socrates identifies his *I* with his immortal, unique and blissful soul, opposing it to the both his impersonal, soulless body as a corpse.

The outlook of Socrates triumphed in the Christianity as well; and it will be not without a smile – the gentle, Socratic one – that a thoughtful Christian reader will read the first lines of *Iliad* about its hero's anger, *that pernicious anger*, which *sent many courageous souls to the Hades abode, and threw themselves as fodder for dogs and various birds*². *Themselves* means their

¹ Plato, *Phaedo* 115 c.

² A 2 sq. I do not see the necessity to dim this clear antithesis, as it was done by Nägelsbach (*Homeric Theologie*, p. 353) to make it agree with other places, where the man himself is discussed, when *he descended into the Hades* (Z 284, A 162 and others). If there is no antithesis – we just have a trivial metonymy; only an antithesis can be proved. I can tell an acquaintance of mine who would hang my portrait in a dark place: *Why have you hung me in such an awkward way?*; this does not mean that I identify my *I* with my portrait but not with my animated body. Much more significant than the places quoted by Nägelsbach, is the antithesis Ψ

bodies, their corpses.

This analogy is not deprived of reliability; it shows us very well the breakthrough, brought about by Socrates and his school of psychology. Still, there is a hidden ambiguity in it. The soul (*psychê*) here, the soul there; that is the matter of fact, Homer's and Socrates' understanding of the soul are two different things. According to Socrates, the soul takes with itself all that the body abandoned by it lacks, all the totality of *spiritual* qualities, forces and discharges. That cannot be told about Homeric *psychê*.

According to Homer, *Achilles is the body of Achilles*; from the first sight this is quite natural, since when Achilles stands, runs, strikes his enemy, shakes his friend's hand – these are all activities of his body. But when he thinks, desires, is happy or miserable, dares and fears, loves and bursts with anger – does he do that with his body or with his soul? It may seem strange, but if we support Homer's point of view, and understand *soul* as *psychê*, we will have to reply: neither. As for the body, the negative answer is implied and will be confirmed by our further discussions; more important is that the described activities are not ascribed to the soul either, the so common for us expressions *to love with all one's heart** *to bare one's soul*, *soul mate*, etc. do not have their parallels in Homer's language. His soul is *psychê*; and never, while a person is alive, any fit of passion (*affect*) can be ascribed to this psyche. It is only described as his life principle: people fight, jeopardizing their psyches (*I322*), the fatal runaway of Hektor being chased by Achilles happens because of his psyche (*X161*), all the treasures of Ilion in the eyes of Achilles are not worthy of his psyche (*I401*). And when the death comes – the psyche leaves the body (*II453*), flying away from its parts (*II856*, *X362*), and it flies out of the body either through the mouth (*I409*), or through a wound (*Ε518*) – apparently, it is seen as poured around, spread out throughout the whole animated by its body. Then, the body that becomes *insensitive soil* (*Ω54*), decays, the soul–psyche stays intact as the body image (*eidôlon*), resembling it in everything; it descends into the Hades and leads there ghostly dozing life – *all the strengths of desiring, feeling, thinking disappeared with the division of a man into his component parts*¹.

One thing follows from the said above: Homer's psyche is not yet the object of what we call today psychology; its sphere is eschatology. When we

165 or the conversation of Agamemnon's *soul* with Achilles' *soul* ω 36 sq. – the latter is also the temporal offspring of Homer's tree – where about the hero's corpse it is told *you were lying, around you*, etc., in complete accordance with the first verses of Iliad. For the same reason, Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 5 is right not to the end either. If we consider the inaccurate character of the colloquial speech, it is possible to prove on the ground of ι 523 *αἰ γὰρ δὴ ψυχῆς τε καὶ αἰῶνός σε δυναίμην εὐνὴν ποιήσας πέμψαι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἶσω*, that the body without the soul was descending into the Hades.

* Russian: *with all one's soul* [N. K.].

¹ Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 4 (see stipulations further). All earlier works – Halbkart, *Psychologia seu de Homericæ circa animam vel cogitatione vel opinione commentario* (1796); Voelcker, *Über die Bedeutung von Ψυχή und Εἶδωλον in der Ilias und Odyssee, ein Beitrag zu der Homerischen Psychologie* (1825); Grote-meyer, *Homers Grundansicht von der Seele* (1854); Gotschlich, *Psychologia Homericæ sive historia notionum psychologiarum apud Homerum* (1864); Daremberg, *La médecine dans Homère* (1865), since they concern the soul–psyche, are abolished by this classical book. The reason for my stipulations is that Rohde does not recognize evolutionary principle for Homer.

speak about the soul as about the substratum for intellectual, emotional and willing phenomena, it is not the soul–psyche that we mean, neither is it the body, but something else, the third. We are going to discuss *the third* in the following chapters.

II

First of all let us certify the following fact: Homer's soul understood as the third element of our essence is not poured around the whole body, but like the psyche it has its defined place in the chest of the man. Right in the chest (stêthos) and only in the chest: the dualism of our popular psychology according to which it is the chest and the heart included into it that are the organs of emotional phenomena, while the head and the brain included into it are intellectual organs, – that is not known to Homeric man yet. It is obvious that in those times when nobody knew about the existence and functions of the nervous system, the connection of passion with the increased or decreased *heart-beat* attracted attention most of all and made one see the real arena of all spiritual life in the space between the ribs and the diaphragm¹. A headache evolved by intense intellectual work could have attracted people's attention towards the brain or at least towards the head, which would have brought about, as it is with us, their competition with the chest; but that is the reason why we can assume that Homeric epoch was not yet acquainted with the excess of such work. The brain interests them only at the moment when it spatters under the directed at it hit², and the head itself can compete with the psyche as the principle of life only as an indispensable for living part of the body³.

So, we shall repeat it that the chest of the man is the abode of his thinking, feeling and willing soul; but namely it is only the abode, but not the soul itself – never were Homer's stêthos or (pl.) stêthea used metaphorically like Russian *chest*⁴: but factually all the three categories of spiritual life take place in this body frame. First of all thinking – this is something that contradicts most of all with our psychology, both scientific and popular: Antinoös hypo-

¹ This conception, which Homeric Greeks shared with ancient Indian, ancient Roman and Ancient German literature, should be considered natural at the first stage of human thought. But discovering the brain as a thinking organ belongs to Greeks; we suppose that Alcmaeon from Croton (~ 500 b. C.) was the first to discover it. Then follow Democritus, Hippocrates, Plato (not Aristotle); Plato influenced Galen, due to whom this knowledge spread around the New Europe. See E. Windisch, *Über den Sitz der denkenden Seele in: Berichte d. Sächs. Gesellsch. d. Wiss., phil.-hist. Klasse 43, 1891, pp. 155 sq.*

² *Ἐγκέφαλος*, cf. Γ300, Θ85, Λ97, Μ185, Π347, Ρ297, Υ399, ι290, 458, ν395 – these are all places, and most of them, obviously, can be found in Iliad.

³ Especially it is expressed in such collocations as Λ55 *πολλὰς ἰφθίμους κεφαλὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν* in comparison with Α3 *πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν* or β237 *σφὰς γὰρ παρθέμενοι κεφαλὰς* in comparison with γ74 *ψυχὰς παρθέμενοι*. A night dream [Russian: *snovideniye* literally means *seeing dreams* – N. K.] appears *over the head* of the sleeping (*ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς* Β20, 59, Ψ68, Ω682, δ803, ζ21, υ32); it can probably be explained by the fact that the sleeping can see it of course with his eyes, although they are closed. Scientific interpretation of the *Schol Ven. A do B20 αἱ πλείονες αἰσθησεις ἀπὸ τῆς βάσεως τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσιν* brings into Homer the later understanding, see above.

⁴ So, Ebeling does it in vain when he gives under B for the word *σῆθος* in his *Lexicon Homericum* II 292 the meaning *animus hominis*; none of the given by him examples can prove that.

critically offers Telemachos to free his chest from all stupid thoughts (epos; β 304); to the same Telemachos; Mentor advises to find out, what kind of thought (mêtis) is hidden by Nestor in his chest (γ 18); about the unrecognized Odysseus, Penelope says that he himself surely does not imagine in his chest (eolpe), that if he pulls the bow correctly, he can get her as his wife (φ 317). Further – feeling: Menelaos at the Patroklos corpse grows sadness (penthos) in his chest (P139); Hera's chest cannot hold her wrath (cholon Δ 24, Θ 461); the king conceals rancorous wrath (koton) in his chest (Α 83); wrath (cholos) like smoke gathers in men's chests (Σ 110); Achilles feels the rush of courage (menos) in his chest (Τ 202); Pallas imbues Diomedes' chest with intrepid fatherly bravery (Ε 125); on the other hand, Apollo also instills bravery (menos) into Aineias' chest (Ε 513); other time Pallas fills Menelaos' chest with courage (tharsos) of the fly, and the bard asks to understand this right comparison without any irony (P570). And finally, the will – although with an intellectual understanding of the ancient will (bulê), the border between this category and the first one leaves much to desire for clarity: some god imbued Automedon's chest with a useless will to fight solitarily with the enemy (P470); Poseidon guessed the will hidden in Zeus' chest (Υ 20). – I believe it is useful to have presented the full list of places where spiritual phenomena are transferred immediately into the chest of the man: I think that it presents interest by itself.

And a question arises more persistently: where is the *soul* that experiences all those thoughts, feelings and movements of the will? Or, do they in fact represent something, and we face an action without an actor, psychology without not only the psyche but also without the soul before future theories can prove that? I will answer: it is not excluded that there is a possibility of previously having been so: since immediately we only have a phenomenon, the subject or the substrate of the phenomenon will always be something derived, the result of our conclusion or a conjecture. That is why it is not surprising that when questioned the subject or the substrate, clarity and accuracy, which were inherent to the phenomenon itself, disappear. That is the reason of the difficulty of the problem which we are now approaching: to the question asked Homer gives not one but several answers, which compete one with another. All of them, nevertheless, lead to two options: acknowledging either the corporal or the incorporeal soul.

According to Wundt's¹ terminology we shall understand *the corporal soul* as a visible part of the human body, represented at the same time as an organ of psychic functions – the chest, as it has already been mentioned, is not such; it only contains the soul in an external way. No, when we talk about the corporal soul of Homer, we imagine the following psychophysical organs: without any doubt *phrên* or *phrenes* (diaphragm) and *kardia* (heart) and less obviously *êtor*² and *prapides*³ of an unclear origin and meaning.

¹ *Völkerpsychologie*, t. 2: *Mythus und Religion* 2, pp. 5 sq. Yet, Homeric psychology is more complex and cannot be fully considered within the scheme elaborated by Wundt.

² Both etymologies of the word *ἦτορ* are presented only as unconvincing hypotheses, from which we should reject at once the one, which (Benfey, Retzlaff) approximates to *ἦπαρ* – as it will be shown later, Homeric soul cannot be located below the diaphragm. The matter is clear with the approximation to *ἦτρον*, from

III

Let us start with *kardia* (Homer usually has *kradiê*, rarely *kardiê*); which is etymologically a kin close to Russian *serdce*, it also corresponds to the latter in its meaning, as well as the related to it *kêr*, which was in fact only once used in its physiological meaning (*Π*481: is wounded in the place where phrenes adjoins *kêr*). Firstly, *kardia* is located in the chest¹. It can beat and throb (*N*282, *X*461), and sometimes it may seem that it is going to leap out of the chest (*K*94), and a spear, thrown by an enemy, can pierce into it like into any other part of the body; and due to this corporality *kardia* differs from other purely spiritual organs which will be discussed later. But again, like Russian *serdce*, this word is much more often used metaphorically, in the meaning of a spiritual life organ – and this metaphoricalness makes it different from the mentioned above *stêthos* chest. And here, however, the following phenomenon can be observed: disregarding the fact that Ancient Greeks tended to place in the chest not only the feeling and the willing but also the thinking soul – *kardia*, *kêr* and *êtor* are only seen by them as the organs of *almost only*

if the general meaning of *cavity* is derived. As for the way Homer uses it, what is important in the first turn, is its localization. *ἦτορ* is located 1) *ἐν στήθεσιν* (*A*188, *X*452, ρ46, υ22) – similar to all spiritual organs; 2) *ἐνὶ φρεσίν* (*Θ*413, *Π*242, *T*169, *P*111, *Υ*310) – which is somewhat generalized as well, and 3) *ἐν κραδίῃ* (*Υ*169). The last localization is the most interesting – if we take into consideration the fact that Hindus believe that the cavity exists outside the heart as the place where the soul is located. (Windisch, *Über den Sitz der denkenden Seele*, p. 165). Although, there was a belief among Homer's interpreters (already starting from Döderlein) that *ἦτορ* – was an exclusively psychological notion, and not physiological; that could only be stated on the basis of 1) *X*452 *ἐν δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ στήθεσι πάλλεται ἦτορ ἀνὰ στόμα* (Andromache), cf. 461 *παλλομένη κραδίην*. the heart is beating so strongly, as if it were ready to spring out through the mouth. A similar approximation *ἦτορ* with *καρδία* we can observe in *K*93 *οὐδέ μοι ἦτορ ἐμπεδον, ἀλλ' ἀλαλύκτῃμαί, κραδίη δέ μοι ἔξω στήθεων ἐκθρόσκει* and υ 18 in the well-known *τέτλαθι δὴ κραδίη* of Odysseus, after whom the poet continues: *ὡς ἔφατ' ἐν στήθεσσι καθαπτόμενος φίλον ἦτορ, τῷ δὲ μάλ' ἐν πείσῃ κραδίη μένε τετληυία*; 2) *O*252 *φίλον ἄϊον ἦτορ* (Hektor) about the dying, no matter how we clarify the obscure word *ἄϊον*; 3) *P*535 *Ἄρητον δὲ κατ' αὐδί λίπον δεδαϊγμένον ἦτορ* (was killed by the hit into the abdomen line 519, but *διὰ ζωστήρος*, means through the diaphragm and the heart, cf. *Π*660 *βεβλαμμένον ἦτορ* about Sarpedon, stroken line 481 *ἐνθ' ἄρα τε φρένες ἔρχεται ἀμφ' ἀδινόν κῆρ*) and especially 4) *B*490: I would not be able to count the soldiers *οὐδ' εἴ μοι δέκα μὲν γλώσσαι, δέκα δὲ στόματ' εἶεν, φωνῆ δ' ἄρρηκτος χάλκεον δέ μοι ἦτορ ἐνεΐη*. It is clear from this that *ἦτορ*, according to the vision of the bard, is the cavity of the body, from which the voice comes out; although for resonance, the voice has the cavity of the head (from there *Λ*462 *Odysseus ἦϋσον ὄσον κεφαλή χάδε φωτός*), but nevertheless, it comes out from the chest cavity (*Γ*221 *ὅπα ἐκ στήθεος εἶη, Ξ*150 *ἐκ στήθεσφιν ὅπα ἦκεν*). It is interesting to contrast here the popular argument of Zenon about the localization of the soul (cf. Windisch, *Über den Sitz der denkenden Seele*, p. 175). *The voice comes through the throat; if it were coming from the brain, it would not be coming through the throat; from where the word comes (λόγος), there from the voice does; and the word comes from the mind (διάνοια); so the mind cannot be located in the brain.* – The general conclusion: *ἦτορ* according to Homer – is the internal heart cavity, which is identified with the heart because of that, the localization of the soul and emission of voice. Moreover, *ἦτορ* is identified with *θυμός* and we shall discuss it later.

³ Physiological meaning of the word *πραπίδες* was defined in the collocation *ἦπαρ ὑπὸ πραπίδων* (*Λ*579, *N*412, *P*349), on the basis of which already the ancient (*Schol. Ven. A*) concluded that *πρ.* is identical to *φρένες*; like *φρένες* and *πρ.* is more often used in the meaning of intellectual but not emotional strength of the soul.

¹ *Στήθεα* *K*10, 94, δ 548, υ 17; also about *κῆρ* *Ξ*139, α 341, η 309, π 274. *Στέρνα* *N*282. Placing the heart into the diaphragm is also understood due to their vicinity: *τί σφῶν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μαινεται ἦτορ* *Θ*413; *ἄλλα δὲ οἱ κῆρ ὤρμαινε φρεσὶν ἦσιν* σ344; but placing it into *θυμός* (*τὸ δ' ἐμόν κῆρ ἄχνηται ἐν θυμῷ* *Z*523) – baffles the interpreters – one might be expecting quite the opposite. We have doubtlessly to do here with a catachresis, which was most likely brought about by the fact that *τὸ ἐμόν κῆρ* is equal in its meaning to the simple *ἐγώ*.

feelings and will, and only exceptionally the thinking force is ascribed to them as well – but here also we face in most cases examples of thinking which is not pure and impartial but coloured with one or other fit of passion. If Poseidon blames Apollo for having *not a clever heart* (anoos kradiê Φ 441), the accusation is based on the fact that his divine nephew does not remember the evil caused by Trojans who had hurt him; if Zeus is pondering in his *heart* whether he should rescue Sarpedon or not (Π 435), we should not forget that this knight is his son, in the similar way numerous thoughts crowding Menelaos *heart* before the adventure with Proteus (δ 427), and the feeling of approaching death in *the heart* of Odysseus who is fighting with waves (ϵ 389) are seasoned with fear. Conversely, the thoughts in the *heart* (kêr 481) of the same Odysseus in front of the luxurious palace of Alkinoös are inspired by admiration; and the words used by Hera to try and incline *the kind heart* of the quarrelling grandparents Okeanos and Teoiena to peace (Ξ 208), can hardly be of sensible character. Also Achilles, when *the heart* (êtor) in his shaggy chest is pondering (mermêrixen A 188), about how he should respond to Agamemnon's offence, is much more strongly driven by passion than by the mind, and only the unrecognized Odysseus, when telling his wife about the features of the made up Odysseus, as it can *be imagined by his heart* (indalletai êtor τ 224) places that heart really on the ground of pure intellect.

And now, contrary to this scarce and mostly ambiguous evidence of the intellectual character of our three words – how numerous examples proving their¹ emotional meaning are! First of all, *joy* resides in the heart – or rather, it feels joy itself, enjoys itself, admires and even laughs². *Love* nests in the same place: it is *from the heart* (kêri) that the parents love their daughter and the gods – those men and cities that are dear to their heart³. And the man feels

¹ We are comparing them here as well, since there is hardly any difference between them. First of all, *κραδίη* and *κῆρ* mean exactly the same; the difference in their use (e. g. *περὶ κῆρι*, but not *περὶ κραδίη*) is explained by the conditions of the meter. Somewhat different is *ἦτορ*, depending on the developed above p. 18, note 2 its old meaning of the inner part of the heart. It signifies a step in advance towards *ψυχή*: the principle of life is represented only by *ἦτορ* in collocations like: *φίλον ἦτορ ἀλέσσης* (E 250), *ἦτορ ἀπήυρα* (A 115, Φ 201, Ω 50), as well as *λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ* in the meaning of physical weakness (Φ 114 i 425) – neither *καρδία*, nor *κῆρ* are found in this meaning. It is interesting to note that all the mentioned places, as well as those where *ἦτορ* has the meaning of a physical organ, belong to Iliad – till the time of Odysseus a considerable shift towards the metaphorical meaning took place.

² Here we should, however, discern physical luxury in the meaning of quenching hunger, thirst or resting (I 705 *τεταρπόμενοι φίλον ἦτορ σίτου καὶ οἴνοιο*, T 307 *σίτοιο ... μηδὲ ποτήτος ἄσασθαι φίλον ἦτορ*, T 319 *ἐμόν κῆρ ἄκμηνον πόσιος καὶ ἐδητύος*, α 310 *λοεσσάμενός τε τεταρπόμενός τε φίλον κῆρ*, K 575 *ἀνέψυχθεν φίλον ἦτορ* by bathing and N 84 *ἀνέψυχον φίλον ἦτορ*) and moral joy, expressed by collocations *χαίρειν* (δ 259, ν 89 *κῆρ*, Ψ 647 *ἦτορ*), *γηθεῖν*, *γηθόσυνος* (Ξ 140, Δ 272, 326, Σ 557 *κῆρ*, η 269 *ἦτορ*), *ἰανθῆναι* (δ 548 *κραδίη*, χ 58 *κῆρ*, δ 840 *ἦτορ*), *θέλγεσθαι* (ρ 514 *ἦτορ*) and *γελᾶν* (ι 413 *κῆρ*, Φ 389 *ἦτορ*), as well as certain special, in particular A 395 *ὠνησας κραδίην*, ν 327 *ἄδοι κραδίη*, X 504 *θαλέων ἐμπλησάμενος κῆρ* (an infant), ι 459 *ἐμόν κῆρ λωφήσειε κακῶν*, ζ 158 *περὶ κῆρι μακάρτατος* (a fiancée), ψ 52 *εὐφροσύνης ἐπιβήτων ... φίλον ἦτορ*. The common formula of physical weakness expresses admiration (see example 1 above) *λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ* Φ 205 and ω 345. In general there are 28 places about joy, 3 of which are about *καρδία*, 13 about *κῆρ* and 12 about *ἦτορ*. Buchholtz's remark (*Homerschen Realien*, t. 3, 1, p. 55), that *κραδίη* as *ἔδρα* of joy can be found in Homer only once (in reality A 395) – is one of his numerous faults making us treat his book very carefully and distrustfully even as a bank of materials.

³ Always in the collocation *περὶ* (so this is right) *κῆρι φιλεῖν* or *φίλος* etc. Δ 46, N 430, Ω 61, 423, ϵ 36, η 69, \omicron 245, τ 280, ψ 339 and only once just *κῆρι φιλεῖν* I 117. Altogether there are 10 places about love.

courage in his heart, and not only the man but also an animal; although the heart of animals varies; a lion or a boar have a fearless one, but it is a shame for a knight to possess a *heart of a deer*¹. In its extreme tension, courage of the heart can pass into frenzy or even madness²; that leads us from the sphere of positive fits of passion to the negative ones. Here on the foreground, there is *grief* that corresponds to joy; it has a broad scope of meaning. It is often told about the way achos captures the heart, as it *moans, reduces, melts*; there also exists a more picturesque idiom: *you will be devouring my heart*³. A particular kind of grief – *wrath*, which, if lasts relatively long, turns into *hatred*; we can read as the heart *swells* with anger, as similarly to a dog it *barks* in the chest of an indignant man⁴. Another kind of grief – *pity*; and similarly to its negation – *pitilessness*, it finds its abode in the heart⁵. The third basic negative fit of passion is *fear* – contrasted with bravery: its sudden appearance, that is scare, is felt like *a strike* on the heart and it is followed by *one's knees and kind heart quivering*, which is characteristic of physical weakness⁶.

If to this evidence, witnessing for clearly expressed fits of passion, we add also those not numerous ones where certain *surprise*⁷ or *worry*⁸ are meant, and

¹ Here also we can differentiate between the miraculous influx of physical strength, *σθένος* (B452, A12, E152 *κραδίη*) and filling the soul with courage (M247, Π266, Φ547 *κραδίη*, M45, N713, δ270, ε454, π274, ψ167 *κῆρ*, E529, 670, Π209, 242, 264, T169, Φ571 *ἦτορ*). Similarly K244 *πρόφρων κραδίη*. *Κραδίη ἐλάφου* is found A225. Special idioms like iron heart (δ293 *κραδίη*, Ω205, 521 *ἦτορ*), like an axe (Γ60 *κραδίη*) or a stone (ψ103 *κραδίη*), shaggy (B851), where bravery is contiguous to cruelty, refer herewith as well. Altogether, about courage we can find 28 places (11 *καρδία*, 8 *κῆρ*, 9 *ἦτορ*).

² Frenzy: Φ542 *λύσσα δέ οἱ κῆρ αἰὲν ἔχε κρατερῆ*; madness: Θ413 *σφῶν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ μαίνεται ἦτορ*.

³ *Ἄχος* seizes the heart B171, Θ147, O208, Π52, Ψ47, Ω584, σ274, 348, υ286 (*κραδίη*); H428, 431, T57, Ψ165, 284, 443, Ω773, κ67, μ153, 250, 270, χ188, ω420 (*ἀχνύμενος κῆρ*); κ247 (*κῆρ ἀχέει βεβολημένος*); E399 (*κῆρ ἀχέων*); P539 (*κῆρ ἀχεος μεθέηκα*); Z523 (*κῆρ ἄχνυται*); E364, ι62, 105, 565, κ77, 133, 313, ν286, ο481, υ84 (*ἀκαχημένος ἦτορ*); I9 (*ἀχέει βεβολημένος ἦτορ*); T366 (*ἦτορ δὲ ἄχος*). Other terms and collocations: *τετιμημένος ἦτορ* Θ437, Δ556, α114, β298, δ804, η287, θ303, σ153; to grow grief in one's heart (ρ489 *κραδίη*); a burdened heart (Δ274 *κῆρ*); moans with his heart or the heart moans (K10 *κραδίη*, K16, Σ33, φ247 *κῆρ*, Π450, Υ169, X169 *ἦτορ*); the heart diminishes (δ374, 467 *ἦτορ*, A491, κ485 *κῆρ*), is embarrassed (Π509, ρ46 *ἦτορ*), is tortured (α341, τ516 *κῆρ*, π92 *ἦτορ*), breaks (α48, ν320 *ἦτορ*), melts (T136 *ἦτορ*), freezes (P111 *ἦτορ*); *you will be devouring* Φ129 (*κραδίη*). Altogether, there are 70 places about grief (*κραδίη* 12, *κῆρ* 26, *ἦτορ* 32).

⁴ *Χωόμενος* (A44, I555, Ψ37, μ376 *κῆρ*), *χολοῦσθαι* (N206, Π585, η309 *κῆρ*, E367 *ἦτορ*), *ὀρίνεσθαι* (ρ216 *κῆρ*, Ω585 *ἦτορ*), *νεμεισάσθαι* (N119 *κῆρ*) and conversely, to hold one's wrath or keep oneself from it *μεταστρέφασθαι ἐκ χόλου* (K107 *ἦτορ*), *ἐρηθιέσθαι* (I635 *κραδίη*), *τετλάναι* etc. (T220, Ψ591, α353, υ18, 23 *κραδίη*). The heart *οἰδάνεται χόλω* (I646 *κραδίη*); *υλάκει* (υ13 *κραδίη*). Hatred: *ἀπεχθάνεσθαι* (Δ53 *περὶ κῆρι*). Altogether, about wrath there are 21 places (*κραδίη* 8, *κῆρ* 10, *ἦτορ* 3).

⁵ *Νηλέες ἦτορ* I496, *ἀμείλιχον ἦτορ* I572, *οὐκ ἐντρέπεται ἦτορ* α60; only three places, all with *ἦτορ*.

⁶ *Κατεπλήγη*, more often *κατεκλάσθη* (Γ31, δ481, 538, ι256, κ198, 496, 566, μ277, all with *ἦτορ*); *λύτο γούνατα καὶ φίλον ἦτορ* about frightening δ703, ε297, 406, χ68, 147 (see above p. 20, note 1 and 2). A lasting fear: *δθεταί* (O166, 182 *ἦτορ*), *δεῖδοικα* (Ω435 *περὶ κῆρι*). Altogether, about fear there are 16 places, from which 1 with *κῆρ*, the rest 15 places with *ἦτορ*.

⁷ Only ψ93 *τάφος δέ οἱ ἦτορ ἴκανεν*.

⁸ Here, the idiom *πόρφυρε* (Φ551, δ427, 572, κ309 *κραδίη*), borrowed from the image of the disturbed sea can be referred; probably also: *τέτραπτο κραδίη* about the unstable heart of Helen δ260. Altogether, 5 places, all with *κραδίη*.

single out those that can be referred to will acts¹, the common conclusion from the above said will be the following: *the corporal soul, the bearer of which is seen by Homer in the heart (kardia, kêr, êtor), in the overwhelming majority of cases has emotional and not intellectual functions*².

IV

Having stated this fact, let us address now to the other corporal soul – the one that is called *phrên* or *phrenes* by Homer. What strikes here first of all is its complete parallelism with the one he calls *kardia* or *kêr* (and *êtor*).

Both the former and the latter in their proper sense mean a definite part of the physical organism of the man: the former – the heart, and the latter – the diaphragm. Homer mentions about the place where *the diaphragm holds the liver* (ι 301), also the one where it *embraces the solid heart* (II 481); if a man is stabbed into this place and then the spear is taken out – *the diaphragm will follow it* (II 504). We can add to this evidence also those where it is told about how *a diaphragm shivers inside* (K 10) an indignant man; in general the physical meaning is rare – which also approximates our word towards the discussed above ones. Let us remark, however, that Homer never places the diaphragm – as well as the heart – into *stêthos*³: apparently, he considered it the border of the limited in the chest space.

So, both the heart and the diaphragm are presented by Homer as bearers of spiritual functions. That is the mystery of Homer's psychology: the matter is that such a representation cannot be found with any other people⁴. But we shall have to put up with that; we shall give the answer to the question why

¹ Without any doubt, collocations like *ἀνώγει* (ο 395 *κραδίη*, α 316 *ἦτορ*), *ἐθέλει* (δ 593, μ 192 *κῆρ*), *κελεύει* (N 784, θ 204, ξ 517, ο 339, π 81, φ 198, 342 *κραδίη*), *στρύνει* (K 220, 319, 611 *κραδίη*) can be referred here, also A 569 *ἐπιγνάμψασα φίλον κῆρ* and O 52 *μεταστρέψει νόον μετὰ σὸν καὶ ἔμὸν κῆρ*. Altogether, 16 places, from which 11 with *κραδίη*, 4 with *κῆρ* and 1 with *ἦτορ*.

² Really, for expression of fits of passion (not counting will acts) we have altogether 182 places, from which 39 fall on *καρδία*, 68 on *κῆρ* and 75 on *ἦτορ*. To the intellectual functions, as it has been shown on p. 20, belong only few.

³ Later that definiteness disappears; see for example Aeschylus *Cho.* 746 *ἐν στέρνοις φρένα*.

⁴ This phenomenon, as far as I know, was first mentioned by W. Wundt (*Völkerpsychologie*, t. 2: *Mythus und Religion* 2, pp. 10 sq.); having stated the meaning of kidneys as *corporal soul* for the primeval societies and with Semites, he supposes that (p. 14), that *φρένες according to Homer has as the soul's abode even more general meaning, embracing not only the diaphragm, as it normally is interpreted by this word, but also the whole set of organs adjoining the diaphragm, the kidneys with their entourage, and genitalia together with kidneys*. We cannot possibly agree with that. With the strict difference from the Semites, Greeks never presented the kidneys as bearers of spiritual functions; although Wundt refers to Suda *νεφροί: οἱ λογισμοί ἐπειδὴ τῆς υπογαστρίας ὀρέξεις διεγείρουσιν. ἐντεψθεν κινουῦνται τῆς ἐπιθυμίας οἱ λογισμοί*, but the matter is that, as it was ascertained by Küster, Suda's gloss had been borrowed from Theodoret's commentary to the Psalter (VIII 11) that is why it has no relation to Greece. This is where the difference between Semite and Hellenic, especially Homeric psychology lies, that here *στήθος* is exclusively supposed to be the arena of spiritual phenomena, and there – to a considerate extent, the lower part of the body, especially the kidneys. The reason for this preference was also stated by Wundt; it lies in their alleged connection with sexual excitement, this *ἐπιθυμία κατ' ἐξοχήν*. Let us recollect now that Plato places the first organ of his tripartite soul, *τὸ λογιστικόν* in the head, the second, *τὸ θυμοειδές*, in the chest, and the third, *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*, in the lower cavity; and that the same Plato sees especially strongly pronounced *τὸ θυμοειδές* with the Northern peoples, with the Hellenes – *τὸ λογιστικόν*, and with the Southern peoples – Semite and Chamita races – *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν* – and we shall receive a closed, funnily rational circle.

the Homeric Greek attaches such a great value to that apparently imperceptible organ of physical life later, in the connection with the further development of our reasoning.

Let us try to look into the numerous psychic references of the diaphragm. However, we need to remark here previously the following: we have already seen that diaphragm psycho-physical *êtor* and will see later that he also locates in it the purely psychic organs *thumos* and *noos*¹; in such cases they, that is: *êtor*, *thumos* and *noos*, are the immediate organs of spiritual functions, and the diaphragm is only presented as their external container. We have to disregard all those cases since they determine the activity and meaning of those more internal organs, but not of the diaphragm.

Adhering to the order we had accepted earlier for the psychology of the heart, we see the diaphragm also first of all as the organ of *joy*, expressed by various, although not so typical collocations². But it can also feel *love* – in the sense of passion *covering* it³. Here also the god puts *courage* into the man⁴. There also resides *grief* – *it hits* the man into the diaphragm, tortures it, grieving, the man *torments* it, the grief *covers the diaphragm which is black on both sides*; an offensive speech *bites* it for him⁵. It happens that both joy and grief fill it at the same time⁶. There also is the abode of *wrath*⁷ and, finally, *fear*⁸. All those fits of passion can be felt by the diaphragm in the way they are by the heart; but if we count all the examples when they are mentioned in reference to the diaphragm, we shall not receive a high number – as many as 72. In order to understand the meaning of this statistics in the right way we should compare this number not only with the sum of fits of passion in the heart – although that coordination (182 : 72) is eloquent enough by itself – by mainly with the sum of all those cases where the diaphragm is presented as the place of *intellect* in the psychic organism of the man. First of all the diaphragm for

¹ About *ἦτορ ἐν φρεσίν* cf. above p. 18, note 2; hereto 5 evidence are referred; we should also add *ΙΙ* 435 *κραδίη φρεσίν* (Ebeling has omitted the line *ΙΙ*447) and *σ* 345 *κῆρ φρεσίν*, altogether 7. More often *θυμός ἐνί* (or *μετὰ*) *φρεσίν*. *Θ* 202, *Ι* 462, *Κ* 232, *Ν* 280, 487, *Τ* 178, *Φ* 386, *Χ* 357, *Ψ* 600, *Ω* 321, *ἐς φρένα θυμός ἀγέρθη* *Χ* 457, *ε* 458, *ω* 349, altogether, 18 places; *νόος μετὰ φρεσίν* only *Σ* 419.

² *Χαίρειν φρένα* or *φρένας* (numbers do not matter anywhere) *Ζ* 481, *Ν* 609; *τέρπεσθαι* *Α* 474, *Ι* 186, *Τ* 19, *Υ* 23, *δ* 102, *ε* 74, *θ* 131, 368; *ρ* 174; *γεγηθῆναι* *Θ* 559, *Δ* 683, *ζ* 106; *γάνυσθαι* *Ν* 493; *ιανθῆναι* *Τ* 174, *ω* 382; *ἤραρεν φρεσί* *δ* 777; *ἄδε* *ω* 465; *φίλον* *Α* 107, *Φ* 101; *ἦδύ* *ω* 435. About physical appetite *σῖτου ἡμερος αἰρεῖ* *Δ* 89. There are altogether 23 places about joy, including the last one.

³ *Ἔρωσ φρένας ἀμφικαλύπτει* *Γ* 442 i *Ξ* 294 – only 2 examples.

⁴ Xanthos to Asteropaios *μένος ἐν φρεσὶ δῆκε* *Φ* 145; Athene to Telemachos *μένος* *α* 89, *θάρος* *γ* 76, to Menelaos *Ρ* 573 and Nausikaa *θάρος* *ζ* 139; Iris to Priam *θάρος* *Ω* 169; with the flavour of physical strength: *ἀλκῆς καὶ σθένεος* *Ρ* 499; *ἀλκῆ* *Δ* 245, *Π* 157, *Υ* 381, *οὐ βίη οὐδὲ ἀλκῆ* *Γ* 45. Altogether, 11 places.

⁵ *Ἄχος* *θ* 541, *ρ* 470 (*κατὰ φρένα τύψε* *Τ* 125); *πόνος* *Ζ* 355; *πένθος* *Α* 362, *Σ* 73, 88, *Ω* 105, *η* 218, 219, *λ* 195, *σ* 324, *ω* 233, 423; *κῆδεα* *Σ* 430, *θ* 154; *τέτληκε* *τ* 347; *ὀδυνῶν αἶμ' ἐρέθουσι* *δ* 813; about physical pain *Ο* 61; *ἀχέων φρένας ἐφθιεν* *Σ* 446; *ἄχος πύκασε φρένας ἀμφιμελαίνας* (about this epithet see below) *Ρ* 83 and (without *ἀμφ.*) *Θ* 124 *δάκε φρένας μῦθος* *Ε* 493. Altogether, 23 examples.

⁶ *Χάρμα καὶ ἄλγος* *τ* 471.

⁷ *Χόλος* and the related: *Β* 241, *Π* 61, *Τ* 127, *ζ* 147. Wrath also means *μένος* *Α* 103, *δ* 661. Altogether, 6 places.

⁸ *Δεῖδοκα* *Α* 555, *Ι* 244, *Κ* 538, *ω* 353, *δέος* *ξ* 88, *τρομέουσι* *Ο* 627. Altogether, 6 places.

Homer is the place where the man comes to awareness of his sensory perceptions, both of the sight and hearing¹. With reference to this, there are two places that are of great interest, where the diaphragm, mentioned as the organ of consciousness, is opposed to *thumos*; Apollo frilled with courage the soul – *thumos* of Glaukos – Glaukos understood that in his diaphragm, and rejoiced; Pallas imbued the soul – *thumos* of Telemachos with courage and gallantry – the latter noticed that in his diaphragm, etc². That is the reason why the diaphragm is also the receptacle for all *ideas*, both for those captured by memory and those that we create ad arbitrium on the basis of its data: *I am going to tell you a word – and you should try to retain it in your diaphragm*, – is used time and again by Homer – and the upset Telemachos imagines how his father would throw out the importunate suitors³. And it is understood that the forces that bring about *mental derangement*, the so called black-out, first of all, mere forgetfulness, wiping off from the diaphragm the impressions retained by it⁴, secondly, sleep, which spreads around in the eyes and the solid diaphragm⁵, thirdly, wine, which can empower and burden the diaphragm⁶ and, finally, the divine vision – *ata*, its intellectual character was clarified by me in one of the previous essays⁷. But most often *intellectual* activity of a person is presented as concentrated in the diaphragm⁸. With that category, the whole array of verbs and nouns expressing thinking, both pure and impartial as well as coloured with the colour of worry, care, hope or striving, are confronted⁹; but

¹ About visual perceptions: *ἴδωμι ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ἠδὲ δαιείω ... Φ 61*; about auditory: *περὶ φρένας ἦλυθ' ἰωῆ κ139* and *φρεσὶ σύνθετ' ἀοιδὴν α 328*.

² Apollo *μένος δέ οἱ ἔμβαλε θυμῷ ... Γλαῦκος δ' ἔγνων ἦσιν ἐνὶ φρεσὶ ... Π530*; Athene *τῷ δ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ θῆκε μένος καὶ θάρσος, ὃ δὲ φρεσὶν ἦσι νοήσας ... α 320*. To these two places we can add as the third also *Λ 88*: lumbermen are cutting the tree: *ἄδος τέ μιν ἴκετο θυμόν σίτου τε γλυκεροῖο περὶ φρένας ἱμερος αἰρεῖ*.

³ *ἔχειν φρεσὶν* about memory: *B33, 70, ο 445*; compare *P260*; the sentence *ἄλλο δέ τοι ἔρέω, σὺ δ' ἐνὶ φρεσὶ βάλλεο σῆσι Α 297, Δ 39, Ε 259, Ι 611, Π 444, 851, Φ 94; λ 454; π 281, 299; ρ 548; τ 236, 495, 570*. Understanding of will: a wonderful place *φρεσὶ πευκαλίμησι νοήσῃ· ἐνθ' εἶην ἢ ἐνθα Ο 81; ὀσσόμενος πατέρα ἐνὶ φρεσὶ α 115*.

⁴ *He forgot in his diaphragm to descend the stairs: ἐκλάθετο φρεσὶν ἦσιν κ 557; φρένα οἰζύος ἐκκλαθέσθαι Ζ 285*.

⁵ *τῷ δ' ὕπνον χεύῃ ἐπὶ βλεφάροισιν ἰδὲ φρεσὶ πευκαλίμησιν Ξ 165*.

⁶ *Περὶ φρένας ἦλυθεν οἶνος ι 362; δαμασσάμενος φρένας οἶνω ι 454; σε οἶνος ἔχει φρένας σ 331, 391; βεβαρηότα με φρένας οἶνω τ 122*; the idiomatic collocation *φρένας ἄασεν οἶνω φ 297* already forms the transfer to the next group.

⁷ About *Ata* and *ate* see my article *Vozniknovieniye grieha [The beginning of the sin]* in: *Russkaya Mysl*, June – August 1917. It is confronted with the diaphragm: *ἄτη φρένας εἶλε Π 805; μοι φρεσὶν ἔμβαλον ἄτην Τ 88; ἄτης τῆν οἰ ἐπὶ φρεσὶ θῆκεν ... Ἐρινύς ο 234; φρεσὶν ἦσιν ἀασθεῖς φ 301* – not counting the quoted in the previous reference place.

⁸ *Πινυτῆ φρένας ἴκει υ 288*, although is a single idiom, on this basis seems to be quite natural; compare below.

⁹ They say *νοεῖν φρεσὶν Ι 600, Γ 310, Χ 235, β 363, γ 26, ο 326; φρονεῖν* and *φράζεσθαι ἐνὶ φρεσὶν* (which is especially interesting because of the doubtless derivation of these verbs from *φρήν*) *ξ 82, Ι 423, Υ 116; γινώσκειν Α 333, 446, Χ 296, Ω 563, α 420, χ 501* (not counting the mentioned above example *Π 530*); *εἰδέναι φρεσὶν Β 213, 301, Θ 366, δ 632, ε 206, η 327, ν 417* and *κατὰ φρένα Ε 406; ἐπίστασθαι Ξ 92, θ 240; μῆδεσθαι Φ 19, Ψ 176, γ 132, λ 474; μῆδεα ἔχειν Ω 282, 674, τ 353; βουλευεῖν and βουλή α 444, ξ 337; βυσοδομεῖν δ 676, θ 273, ρ 66; τιτύσκεσθαι Ν 558, θ 556; μῆτιν ὑφαίνειν δ 739;*

those concepts which are presented by the content of intellectual activity are equally confronted here, whether it is a common idea, like the inspired by god or by your own consciousness *word*, or a more particular one, like income, return, honour, prophecy or, finally, a whole action, expressed by a verb collocation or an idiom, – to encourage the Achaians, to withstand the enemy, to weave a coat, to wake up Penelope, to appear in front of the suitors, to offer them a bow, to think of the possibility of an argument among them¹. In this way the god instills as well the knowledge of the rules of singing and reciting songs into the *diaphragm*². And since Homer – as we have already seen it – regards moral tendencies of a man through the perspective of knowledge³, this knowledge communicates with, informs his diaphragm.

Basing on what has been said, the diaphragm is the real *soul-intellect* of the man; all the attributes of it are ascribed to the diaphragm – it is *kind, noble, just*, then according to the weird but possible to understand collocation *internally uniform, stable, steady, curable, reversible* (towards the way of Good) – or *perishable, insane*, and with young people *careless*, one can revile it, embarrass, deceive and first of all, and mainly – to convince⁴, the man himself can be mad in reference to it⁵. It is a rare case when phrenes is understood directly as human thoughts⁶; it is just a common metonymy, reinforced through analogy, which will be discussed later. But very often we meet the extended meaning of the word, due to which it receives the meaning of basic *intellect*, that is wisdom⁷.

Such is the varied use of our word in the intellectual sphere; in we count

εἶδεται εἶναι Ω 197, ι 11. With the shadow of worry: *μερμηρίζειν φρεσὶ* α 427, κ 438, υ 41, ω 128 and *κατὰ φρένα* Β 3; care: *μέλειν, μέλεισθαι φρεσὶ* Σ 463, Τ 29, 213, 343, Ω 152, 181, α 151, η 208, ν 362, π 436, ω 357 and *φρενί* ζ 65; hope: *ἐολπέναι* Φ 583, ι 419, φ 157; worry: *ὀρμαίνειν φρεσὶ* Κ 4, Π 435, γ 151, δ 843 and *κατὰ φρένα* Κ 507, *μενοινᾶν φρεσὶ* Ε 221, 264, β 34, ζ 180, ο 111, ρ 355; reserve: *φρεσὶν ἔσχετο* ρ 238.

¹ *The word*: *μῦθου τέλος ἐν φρεσὶ θεῶν* Π 83; *ἔπος τι* Τ 121, λ 146; *νόημα* ξ 273; absolutely *Α* 55, ε 427, ζ 227, π 282; to hide *κευθῆναι* Ι 313, *εἰρύσσασθαι* π 459, a separate concept: *κέρδ' ἐνώμας* σ 216, *νόστον βάλλεαι* Ι 434; *ἔργα* λ 428, *θεοπροπῆν ἀλαΐνεις* Λ 794, Π 36, *αἰδῶ ἐν φρεσὶ θέσθε* Ν 121; line *αἰδόμενος σῆσι φρεσὶ* Κ 237; verb collocations with *ἐπὶ φρεσὶ* ἤθε, etc.: *ὀτρύναι Ἀχαιοὺς* Θ 218, *ἐστάμεναι* Ν 55, *φᾶρος ὑφαίνειν* τ 138, *μ' ἀνεγείραι* δ 729, *μνηστήρεσσι φανῆναι* σ 158, *τόξων θέμεν* φ 1, *μῆ πως ἀλλήλους τρώσητε* π 291, τ 10.

² *Θεὸς δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἴμας παντοίας ἐνέφουσεν* χ 347.

³ About this view see above, p. 24. Here the following collocations are referred to: *αἴσιμα φρεσὶν εἶδέειν* β 231, ε 3, ζ 433; *ἄρτια* Ε 326, τ 248, *φίλα μῆδεα* Ρ 325, *εὐ μῆδεα* λ 445.

⁴ *Φρένες ἀγαθαὶ* Θ 360, γ 266, ξ 421, π 398, ω 194; *ἐσθλαί* Ρ 470, β 117, η 111, λ 367; (*ἐν*) *αἴσιμοι* Ω 40, σ 220, ψ 14; *ἐνδον εἶσαι* λ 337, ξ 178, σ 249; *ἐμπεδοί* Ζ 252, σ 215 (but if the late Teiresias *φρένες ἐμπεδοί* κ 493, in this way his exclusive among the shadows – line ψ 104 – consciousness is indicated, about which we shall write later); *πενκάλιμαι* Γ 35; *ἀκεσταί* Ν 115; *στρεπταί* Ο 203; *όλοισαί* Α 342; *μαινόμεναι* Ω 114, 135; *ὀπλοτέρων ἀνδρῶν φρένες ἠερέθονται* Γ 108; *ὠνοσάμην φρένας* Ε 95, Ρ 173; *ἐπτοίηθεν* χ 298, *ἠπεροπεύειν* ν 327, ο 421, *πεῖθειν* Δ 104, Η 120, Ν 788, Ι 184, Π 842, α 48, *τρέπειν* Ζ 61, *βέομαι* Ο 194; *πεῖθειν φρένα* Κ 45; *τρέπεσθαι* Μ 173.

⁵ *Φρένας ἠλέ* ο 128, β 243, *οὐκ ἀρηρῶς φρένας* κ 553.

⁶ About Phaiakian ships: *αὐταὶ ἴσασι νοήματα καὶ φρένας ἀνδρῶν* θ 559 – an isolated collocation.

⁷ Cf. *Α* 115, *Ζ* 234, *Η* 360, *Ι* 377, *Μ* 234, *Ν* 394, 432, 631, *Ε* 141, *Ο* 724, *Π* 403, *Ρ* 171, *Σ* 311, *Τ* 137, *Ω* 201, δ 214, θ 168, 448, ξ 290, ρ 454, σ 327, φ 288. The related κ 46 *ἐπὶ φρένα ἤθε*, where *φρήν* means attention with the shade of affection.

all the places that refer here, we shall obtain the impressive number of 214, that is three times more than those which we could refer to the emotional sphere. This correlation gives us the right to *speak about the diaphragm as about the organ of prevailingly sensible departures of the soul* and to confront it in this quality to the heart, as the exclusive organ for feelings and passion. Another argument in favour of the rightness of such thinking is the word-formation: it is from *phrên* that the verbs *phroneô* and *phrazô*, the adjectives – *phronimos* and *aphrôn*, etc. – belonging if not exclusively then in the prevailing number of cases to the sphere of intellect, are derived¹.

It makes no wonder for us, – and not only for us. Already Hellenes, as soon as their physiology received a rational ground, found such understanding of the diaphragm strange. *Diaphragm*, says Hippocrates *had absolutely no ground to receive its name* (that is the name *phrenes*, which is understood by the author as *intellect*), *it could only have happened as a consequence of a chance and tradition (nomos), but not due to its nature and essence; I am not acquainted with such properties of the diaphragm as becoming aware or thinking*². So, it would make sense to question what made Homeric Greeks, unlike other peoples, see in the diaphragm the centre of the intellectual activity of the man: it seems to me that a satisfactory answer can be given. But we shall discuss that later.

Returning to our parallelization of the diaphragm with the heart, begun from the first lines of our chapter, we can say: both these concepts are parallel; firstly, because they both mean organs of physical life of a man; secondly, because they are seen as carriers of his psychic functions as well; if we consider these circumstances together they both are his corporal soul. The difference, however, is that the function of the heart has almost exclusively emotional character, while the function of the diaphragm is mainly intellectual.

To this difference we can add another one: the heart in all its three names is presented by Homer as an *active* organ of spiritual life in all its volume; it can itself, like a heart: rejoice, laugh, grieve, moan, weep, get embarrassed, *bark*, care, worry, suffer, strive and inspire, drive, encourage, reason, imagine,

¹ The first statistic data about the use of the word *φρήν* and *φρένες* are presented by Jansen (*Über die beiden homerischen Cardinaltugenden*, p. 32); being somewhat different from my observations in details, it coincides with them in the main frame. He refers

to intellect	197 places	or 70%
to feelings and passion	69 places	or 24%
to will acts	13 places	or 5%

But I do not dare to establish the last category, although it would not have been difficult to outline it among the mentioned above places; in order to speak about *φρένες* as the organ of will, we would have had to find collocations of the kind *αἱ φρένες με κελεύουσιν, ἀνώγασιν* and the like, analogous to the mentioned on p. 21, note 8 for the heart. Compare below for this topic. I will remark incidentally that Rohde was most probably not aware of the prevailingly intellectual character of the diaphragm, where he says, *Psyche*, p. 41, that die homerischen Gedichte benennen mit dem Namen des Zwerchfells geradezu die Mehrzahl der Willens- und Gemütsregungen, auch wohl die Verstandestätigkeit.

² Hippocrates *περὶ ἰερῆς νόσου* (II, 343 Lind.). We do not think either with the help of the diaphragm or the heart, but exclusively with our brain; both organs shiver and shrink under the influence of strong fits of passion, *τῆς μέντοι φρονήσιος οὐδετέρω μέτεστιν* – an apparent polemic, if not with Homer, then with Homeric psychology.

guide¹. So, as the counterweight to this common and so varied initiative of the heart we can not find a single place where the diaphragm would be presented as the active principle of the emotional life. The man can only produce or experience psychic acts with it, in it, or, even more generally, in reference to it; the diaphragm itself, even if called somewhere the subject of a corresponding verb, is always presented as a passive principle, but never as an active one². This limits strongly the meaning of the diaphragm as the corporal soul in comparison with the heart. Having such numerous examples confirming this observation, we should not doubt its trustworthiness; we should only state a question about the reason, which will be done eventually, when the analysis of the incorporeal Homeric soul will present us the necessary material for the answer. That is what we are going to do now.

V

Following Wundt's terminology we have identified the heart and the diaphragm as two varieties of *the corporal soul* because these two objects are at the same time both the organs of the physical organism of the man and carriers of his psychic–emotional activities. Correspondingly to this, the incorporeal soul according to Homeric psychology, will be the one which will appear as *the exclusive carrier of psychic departures*, without occupying any place in the physical organism; that is, simply speaking, it is not a part of the human body. That incorporeal soul is given to us again in two variants; the name of the first is thumos, the name of the second – noos³. We cannot give a Russian name to either of them, which is the consequence of the fact that they, unlike kardia and phrenes, are not adjoined to certain definite organs of the human body, for which we have in Russian a definite, not ambiguous name.

Let us start with the thumos. It has in our body its definite location, which is either in the chest (stêthesin Δ 152 etc.), or in the diaphragm (phrenes Θ 202 etc.), that is, either in a physical or in a psycho–physical organ of the man – but not a single time, as it is clear enough, the diaphragm is presented as finding its place in the thumos. In a similar way, the thumos has never been shown as corporal; although, sometimes it can *beat* in one's chest, when a

¹ Χαίρει ψ 647, δ 259 and others, γηθεῖ η 269, ἐγέλασε Φ 389, ι 413, ἄχνηται Ζ 523; στένει Υ 169, ὀλοφύρεται Χ 169, ταρβεῖ Μ 45, ὑλακτεῖ υ 13, ὀδεται Ο 160, 182, πόρφυρε Φ 551, τέτλαθι υ 18, μίμνε Ν 713, μαιμησε Ε 610; μέμονε ΙΙ 435, ὠρμαινε φ 82 etc., ὠρσε ΙΙ 554, κελεύει Ν 748 etc., ἀνώγει ο 395, ὀτρύνει Κ 220 etc., προτιόσσετο ε 389, μερμηήριξεν Α 188, ἐνδᾶλλεται τ 224, ἠγεῖτο Β 851.

² In other words: we can encounter ἦτορ χαίρει, but we can never find φρένες χαίρουσι etc., but only such as χαίρει φρεσῖοι κατὰ φρένα or merely φρένα. This observation, we should mention, allows us to finally solve the old argument about Ζ 285 φαῖην κε φρέν' ἀτέρπου οἰζύος ἐκλελαθέσθαι. How to understand the accusative φρένα – as the accusative of the subject in accusativus cum infinitivo or as acc. respectivus? In the first case the structure of the direct speech would have been: ἡ φρήν ἐκλέλησται; in the second case ἐκλέλησμαι φρένα. Consequently, according to our observation the first should be treated as impossible.

³ Nägelsbach (*Homeric Theologie*, p. 362) is not right to add to the first two incorporeal souls the third, in the form of μένος; see about it in the chapter about positive passions. Here lies the main drawback of his interpretation of Homeric psychology.

man has a fear attack, it can *shiver*, and even *falls to his feet*¹, but these metaphorical expressions do not prove anything; a good proof would have been something of the kind: *he was wounded in his thumos* or in general using the word *thumos* for a definite part of the human body – but that is something we have not found. This is where the difference lies between the *thumos* on the one hand, and *kardia* (*kêr*, *êtor*) and *phrenes* on the other.

However, the *thumos* is quite often presented as *the principle of life*. The one who is dying *is being abandoned by his thumos, which is evaporating from his body parts, he is losing* or, more figuratively, *is breathing it out*²; the one who has died is deprived of it³; the one who kills another man, deprives him from his *thumos*, takes it away from him⁴. The one who is on his way to death, has little left, if any, *thumos*, he *is suffocating in it his thumos, is withering in it*, in him *his thumos is being pressed upon by a rod*⁵ and conversely, the one who recovers after a stroke – *his thumos is gathering in the breast or in the diaphragm again*⁶. If we consider attentively the expressions that belong here, we shall clearly see that the *thumos*, as the principle of life, is the closest to *breathing*; which approximates it to the *psyche*, to which it is confronted exactly on that reason⁷. Altogether, *thumos* in the analysed here meaning was registered 85 times.

It is a definitely more frequent case, however, that it is registered as *the incorporeal organ of various fits of passion*. On the border, between the two meanings, there are those places where it is told about *physical satisfaction and dissatisfaction* felt by the *thumos*. The one who is satisfied – increases his life strength: that is why Hektor reminds his allies that he *is growing their thumos*, feeding them on the cost of the citizens, in the same way, Circe invites Odysseus' peers *to eat until they return themselves their former thumos*⁸. The

¹ *Θυμός ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πάτασεν* H216; about common anxiety *πάτασσε δὲ θυμός ἐκάστου* Ψ 370. Compare about the heart *κραδίη στέρονοισι πατάσσει* N282; this approximation can explain the close kinship of the *thumos* with the heart. Helbig (*Dissertation de vi et usu vocabulorum φρένες, θυμός similitumque apud Homerum*, p. 18) was embarrassed by it; he is trying to show that *πατάσσειν* is used here de strepitu, quia vehementiore respiratione percipitur. I do not comprehend why it could possibly be better: if *θυμός* is an incorporeal instrument, it cannot give out any strepitus. *Τρομοείατο θυμῶ* (horses) K492. – *Παραὶ ποσὶ κάππεσε θυμός* O280.

² *Ὀλέσαι θυμόν* A205, Θ90, 270, 358, K452, Λ342, 433, M250, Π861, P616, Σ92, γ412, Ω638, μ350; *θυμόν ἀποπνεῖων* Δ524, N654, ἄϊσθε Υ403, Π468 (a horse); *τὸν λίπε θυμός* Δ470, M386, Π410, 743, λ221, μ414, Υ406; *λίπεν ὅστέα θυμός* Γ455 (animals) with *ἐκ μελέων θυμός πτάτο* Ψ880, Π469, κ163, τ454 (all about animals); other expressions with *ἐκ(ἀπὸ) μελέων. δύναι* H131, ῶχετο N671, Π606, φθίσθαι ο354.

³ *Θυμοῦ δευόμενον* Υ472, Γ294 (animals).

⁴ *Ἐκ δ' αἶνυτο θυμόν* Δ531, E155, 848, Υ459; *ἐξελέσθαι* E317, 346, 673, 691, 852, K506, Λ381, M150, O460, Π655, P17, Υ436, Φ112, X68, λ201, ξ405, ρ236, υ62, χ462, in this way also about animals M150, P678, χ388; *θυμόν ἀπηύρα* Z17, K495, Π828, P236, Υ290, Φ179, 296, λ203, ν270; *κεκαδεῖν θυμοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς* Λ334, φ154, 171.

⁵ *Ὀλίγος δ' ἔτι θυμός ἐνήεν* A593 (according to Hephaistos!); *θυμόν ἀποφθινύθουσι* Π540; *κακῶς κεκαφηότα θυμόν* E698, ε468; *βέλος δ' ἔτι θυμόν ἐδάμνα* E439.

⁶ *Ἐσαγεῖρετο θυμόν* O240, Φ417; *θυμός ἐνὶ στήθεσσι ἀγέρθη* Δ152; *ἐς φρένα θυμός ἀγέρθη* X475, ε458, ω349.

⁷ Compare the last examples in the note 3.

⁸ *Θυμόν ἀέξω* P226; *ἐσθίετε ... εἰσόκεν αὐτίς θυμόν λάβητε* κ461.

thumos needs food, being fed, indulged – the Latin genius in the expression *genium placare*, etc. at once comes to one's mind – for the dog also – fodder will be *indulgence to his thumos*¹. Correspondingly, tiredness, brought about by the soldiers' toil, chopping trees or rowing; or a wound *dispirits their thumos*².

From here, there is only one step towards purely *spiritual satisfaction*. The thumos rejoices or we rejoice in our thumos, what pleases us is *dear to our thumos*; also, one can *become sated with tears in one's thumos*³. The rank of *bitter feelings* is manifold as well. Our thumos is upset or we are upset in it; the pain in it or it is in pain; it is weeping, tortured by bitterness and grief, or we do all that in it, also, in powerless dismay *we are devouring our thumos*⁴.

To the spiritual satisfaction adjoined are the feelings of friendship and love⁵, more seldom – hope⁶, courage⁷ and dissatisfaction, the feeling of wrath⁸

¹ Θυμός ἐδέυετο δαιτός A 468, 602, B 431, H 320, Ψ 56, π 479, τ 425; πλησάμενος θυμόν ἐδῆ-
τύος ρ 603, τ 198; κεκορήμεθα θυμόν θ 98, ξ 28, 46; ἤραρε θυμόν ἐδωδῆ ε 95, ξ 111; μειλίγματα
θυμοῦ κ 217.

² Θυμός τείρεθο καμάτῳ P 744; ἄδος τέ μιν ἵκετο θυμόν Λ 88; τείρετο θυμός ὑπ' εἰρεσίης κ
78; κῆδε δὲ θυμόν (a wound) Ε 400, Λ 458. – Altogether, about physical satisfaction and dissatisfaction – 21
places.

³ With θυμός it is possible to collocate the verbs: χαίρειν A 256, H 292, Ε 156, O 98, Φ 423, X 224, Ω
491, α 311, θ 395, 483, ξ 113, ψ 266, ω 515; γηθεῖν H 189, N 416, 494; τέρπεσθαι T 312, Φ 45, π 25, φ
105; τερπεῖν I 189, α 107, ἰαίνεσθαι Ψ 597, 600, Ω 119, 147, 176, 196, 321, δ 548, ξ 155, ο 165, 379, ψ
47; the related expressions: ἤρα φέρειν Ε 132, ἐπιήρανα τ 343, ἄρσαντες A 136; ὀνήσεται H 173, κν-
δαίνειν ξ 438, ἀνδάνειν A 248, 518, O 674, κ 373, π 28, ἀσπασίος θ 450; θυμός ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ κ 465, ρ
531, φίλον θυμῷ H 31, K 531, Λ 520, Ε 337, θ 571, ν 145, ξ 397, σ 113; ἀθύρματα θυμῷ σ 323; κλα-
ίουσα κορέσσατο ὄν κατὰ θυμόν υ 59. Altogether, there are 57 places about joy.

⁴ With θυμός the verbs: ἄχνυσθαι Z 524, Ε 39, ξ 169, ἀχεύειν E 869, Σ 461, ψ 566, φ 318; ἀκαχί-
ζεσθαι Z 486, M 179, Σ 29; ὀδύρεσθαι Ω 549, θ 577, ν 379, σ 203; ὀλοφύρεσθαι Θ 202, λ 418;
στεναγίζεσθαι 495; collocations with ἄχος Ε 475, Γ 412, Ω 9, N 86, B 171, Θ 147, O 208, Π 52, σ 274;
ἀσχάλλειν β 192; κατήφησαν π 342; τετιήσθαι κ 555, P 664, Ω 283; collocations with ἄλγεα I 321, N
670, Π 55, 198, X 53, Σ 397, Ω 523, α 4, ν 90, 263, μ 427, ξ 310, ο 487, ρ 13, ε 83, 157, φ 88; with κῆδεα θ
149, Σ 8, 53, ξ 197, τ 377; with κακά Ω 518; with μελεδήματα Ψ 62, δ 650, ο 7, υ 56, χ 343; with ὀδύνη O
25, β 79, τ 117; θυμός ἐτείρετο πένθει X 242, πολυπενθής Ψ 15, νεοπενθής λ 39; θυμόν δαμάσαν-
τες Σ 113, T 66; θυμόν ἀνιάζειν Φ 270, X 87; ὀρίνειν N 418, Ε 459, 487, φ 87 (in the sense of bitterness),
τήκειν τ 263; ἀτέμβειν β 90; θυμόν ἀμύσσειν A 243; ἐσεμάσσατο θυμός P 564, ν 425; (ὄν) θυμόν
(κατ) ἔδων Z 202, ι 75, κ 143, 379. Altogether, 73 places.

⁵ About sensual love ἴμερον ἔμβαλε θυμῷ Γ 139, ἔρω θυμόν ἐδελεχθεν σ 212, 282; about friendship
and affection φιλεῖν θυμῷ A 196, 209, ἐκ θυμοῦ I 343, 486; φίλα φρονεῖν ζ 313, η 42, 75, κ 317; φίλος
Ψ 548, Ω 748, 762; κεχαρισμένος E 243, 826, K 234, Λ 608, T 287, Δ 71; κῆδεσθαι γ 223, ξ 146; θυμός
ἦπια δῆνεα οἶδεν Δ 360; ἴλαος θυμός I 639; T 178. Altogether, 25 places.

⁶ Ἐλπεσθαι κατὰ θυμόν K 355, Ε 67, P 404, 603, γ 275, 319, φ 126, ψ 345; θυμός ἐλπεται M 407,
N 813, ο 288, 701, P 234, 395, 495, T 328, υ 328, φ 96, ω 313. Altogether, 19 places.

⁷ Θυμός by itself can mean courage at times: Δ 309, N 485, Π 266, π 99, ω 511; namely θυμόν ἐγεί-
ρειν E 510, ἀεξέειν β 315; the verbs (ἐπι)τομᾶν K 232, P 68, α 353; τετληκέναι A 228; the adjectives
τλήμων, τλητός E 670, Ω 49, δ 447, 459, ε 435, λ 181, π 37, σ 135, ψ 100, 168, ω 163, τολμητής K 205, ρ
284, ταλαπενθής ε 22, καρτερός E 806; ἄτρομος Π 163 (about a wolf); in θυμός is located μένος Π 529,
P 451 (about horses), X 312, Ψ 468 (about horses), μένος καὶ θάρσος α 320; χάρμην N 82; θυμός βλεμε-
αίνει (about a boar) P 22. Altogether, 35 places.

⁸ Θυμός independently only ν 148 – θυμόν ὀπίσσομαι – means *wrath*; with a difference regarding the
later use; in Homer's language we cannot find θυμοῦσθαι *be angry with*. There is χολοῦσθαι A 217, 429, Δ
494, N 660, Γ 29, collocations with χόλος Z 326, I 436, 675, Ε 50, 207, 306, Π 206, A 192, ω 248, κοτεῖν and
κότος Φ 456, ι 501, τ 71, χ 477, ν 342; νεμεσᾶσθαι ἰ νεμεσίζεσθαι B 223, Ε 191, ο 155, Π 544, 616, P
254, α 119, δ 158, β 138; ἀγάσσασθαι δ 658, ἐπισκύζεσθαι η 306; θυμόν ὀρίνειν (in the meaning of
wrath) Γ 395, T 271, Ω 568, θ 178, υ 9. Altogether, 36 places.

and hatred¹, fear and cowardice²; on the edge appears pride³, pity and pitilessness⁴, surprise⁵, and also undefined anxiety⁶, all of them have the thumos as their arena. To anxiety, again, adjoined is anxious pondering⁷; with serves as the connecting sign between the emotional and *intellectual* sphere.

Let us turn now to the thumos as an organ of *intellectual functions*, that are singled out by us first of all as impressions – incidentally only visual ones are mentioned⁸, then as images either of the past in one's memory, or of the future in one's dreams⁹. Later – as thinking together with its results, while this thinking appears sometimes as a conversation of the thumos with a man, and once, – however, only one time – as a conversation of two different thymoi, suggesting two contradictory decisions¹⁰. And finally – it is the one, already

¹ Only Ξ 158 *στυγερός θυμῶ*.

² In the noble sense *σεβάσατο θυμῶ* \Z 167, 417; even more *αἰδῶ θέσθ' ἐνὶ θυμῶ* O 561, 661; with *δεῖσαι* Θ 138, N 163, 623, σ 299, Ω 672, 778, π 306, 331; with *δέος* P 625, *ταρβεῖν* Φ 574, η 50, σ 330, 390; *τρομεῖσθαι* K 492 (about horses); *ἐρριγένοι* ψ 251; *δαίζεσθαι* I 8, σ 629; *ὀρίνεσθαι* E 29, Π 280, Σ 229 (*κακῶς*), 675; *συγγεῖν θυμόν* N 808, I 612; *θέλγειν* σ 321, 594; *πτήσσειν* Ξ 40; *ἀμχανῆν ἔχε θυμόν* ι 295; *κακός θυμός* E 643; *ἀναλκας* Π 656, 355 (about sheep); *θυμός ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πάτασεν* (in the sense of fear) H 216; *παραὶ ποσὶ κάππεσε θυμός* O 280. Altogether, 36 places.

³ *Θυμός μέγας* B 196; *ἄγριος* I 629 (with tendency towards intransigence); *ἄλληκτος* I 636 (also); *ὑπερφίαλος* σ 94, ψ 611; *ὑπέρβιος* Σ 262, σ 212; *μεγαλίζεσθαι* K 69; *εἶκειν θυμῶ* I 109, 598, δ 242 (about a lion); *θυμόν ἴσχειν* I 255, *δαμάζειν* I 496, λ 562. Altogether, 14 places.

⁴ *Ἐλεεῖν θυμῶ* λ 55, 87, 395; *θυμόν ὀρίνειν* (in the sense of pity) Ω 467, δ 366, ξ 361, Λ 792, σ 403, σ 486, ω 318; *θυμός νηλής* T 229, ι 272, 287, 308; *ἀπηνής* ψ 97, 230; *σιδήρεος* X 357, ϵ 191, ψ 172. Altogether, 19 places.

⁵ *Θαμβεῖν κατὰ θυμόν* α 323, δ 638, ζ 166, θ 265, κ 63; *θυμός τέθηπεν* ψ 105. Altogether, 6 places.

⁶ *Θυμόν ὀρίνειν* I 595, ρ 150; *θυμός πάτασσε νίκης ἰεμένων* ψ 370. Altogether, 3 places.

⁷ *Ὀρμαίνειν* A 193, Λ 411, P 106, Σ 15, Φ 137, Ω 680, β 156, δ 120, ϵ 365, 424, ζ 118; *μερμηρίζειν* E 671, Θ 169, δ 117, κ 151, π 73, ν 10, 38, ω 235; *θυμός ἐπιδινεῖται* ν 217, *διχα ὀρώρεται* T 524; *δαίξόμενος* Ξ 20; *ἐρέθουσι* δ 813; *φραζέσθω* O 163, α 294; *οὐδ' ἐνόησε* Υ 264, also *οἶδα* in the sense of places Δ 163, Z 447, σ 211. Altogether, 29 places.

⁸ We need to refer to it also a series of cases that do not fall into the mentioned above rubrics. Firstly, with the help of the word *θυμῶ* sometimes internal passion is opposed to its external expression. Odysseus *θυμῶ μὲν ... ἔην ἐλέαιρε γυναικᾶ, ὀφθαλμοὶ δέ...* τ 210, *ἐν θυμῶ, γρηῦ, χαίρε καὶ ἴσχεο μηδ' ὀλόλυξε* χ 411; here might also refer *μεῖδισηε θυμῶ Σαρδάνιον* ν 301, *ἀπειλήσω θυμῶ* σ 212 and *εὐχετο ὄν κατὰ θυμόν* Ψ 769 (quietly ?), ϵ 444 (imitation of the previous place or in both cases *from the soul* ?). As a single case is *θυμός πρόφρων* K 244 (*ἐν πόνοις*, mysteriously) and Θ 39, X 183, Ω 140, π 257 (seriously). Sometimes *θυμός* means *character*: *τοῖος* Δ 289, *ὡς* Δ 313, *τὸν ἐμόν* π 309 (in those three cases *courageous-ly*); *ὑμέτερος* δ 694 (*not noble*); *οἶος θυμός γυναικός* σ 20; *πετάσειε θυμόν μνηστῆραν* σ 161; *θεουδέα θυμόν* τ 364. From here is identical θ . = agreement: *ἕνα (ἴσον) θυμόν ἔχοντες* N 487, 704 (about bulls), O 710, Π 219, P 267, 720, Υ 32, γ 128; *οὐχ ὁμόφρονα θυμόν ἔχουσι* X 263 (wolves and sheep), *διχα θυμός ἄητο* Φ 386. From here come collocations *ἀπὸ θυμοῦ ἔσαι* A 562 (*opposed*), *ἐκ θυμοῦ πεσέειν* Ψ 565 (to bore), *κατὰ θυμόν μυθήσασθαι* I 645 (*in my soul*), also such where *my θυμός* simply = *I*: (*εἶπε*) *πρὸς ὄν θυμόν* Λ 403, P 90, 200, 447, Σ 5, Υ 343, Φ 53, 552, X 98, ϵ 285, 298, 355, 376, 407, 464; *μή με θυμόν ἐνίπτε* Γ 438, Ξ 104; *οὐκέτι κεῦθετε θυμῶ ποτῆτα* σ 406; *τοι κέρδιον ἔπλετο θυμῶ* ν 304; *μηδέ τι θυμῶ δευέσθω* Ψ 121. Lonely in madness *ἀλύσσοιτες περὶ θυμῶ* X 70 (dogs). Altogether, 52 places are mentioned here.

⁹ *Θηήσατο θυμῶ* ϵ 76, η 134, σ 132, ω 90. Altogether, 4 times.

¹⁰ *Μνήσατο κατὰ θυμόν* α 29, δ 187, ν 93; *μῦθον ἐνθετο θυμῶ* α 361, ϕ 355; *οἶεται θυμός* δ 452, ι 213, κ 248, 374, σ 154, τ 312, 390, ν 349; (*προτιόσσατο* ξ 219, σ 154, Σ 224 (about horses), *βάλλειν θυμῶ* K 447, O 566, Υ 195, Ψ 313, α 200, μ 217, 266, σ 172, τ 485, ω 459; *ἔπλετο ὄν κατὰ θυμόν* N 8, ψ 345; *ἐνὶ θυμῶ μέμβλετο* χ 11; *ἐνὶ θυμῶ θῆκε φάτιν* I 459. Altogether, 30 places.

known to us, force which blacks out intellectual considerations of the man – ate¹.

And for the end – the *thumos* as an organ of *willing acts*. Sometimes the word itself can be translated into Russian with the word – *ohota* (inclination, desire)²; more often our *thumos* wants something³; or we want something by it, or in it⁴; that is why it is inclined⁵, and it can be held⁶.

Such was the material; having presented it completely, we can draw conclusions. Altogether, the word *thumos* is used by Homer 754 times; according to the categories, the examples are divided in the following way:

as the principle of life	85 places	or 11 %
as an organ of passion	416 places	or 56 %
as an organ of intellect	81 places	or 11 %
as an organ of will	162 places	or 21 %

As our reader can see from this confrontation⁷, we should *acknowledge*

¹⁰ With *δοκεῖν* κ415, ν154; *φαίνεσθαι* B5, K17, E161, ι318, 424, λ230; *εἶσατο* τ283; *φρονεῖν* B36, Σ4, Θ430, K491, Π646, β116, ο202, ρ595, ω391, υ5; *μῆδεσθαι* Z157, E253; *εἰδέναι* β409, M228, β112, ν339, σ228; *ἐπίστασθαι* δ730; *γνώναι* Π119, χ373; *βουλευεῖν* ι299, κ50, μ58, π237; *συντίθεσθαι* H44, ο27, *νόον σχεθε* ξ490; *πιστωθῆτον* φ218; *μοι διελέξατο θυμός* A407, P97, Φ562, X122, 385; *ἕτερος δέ με θυμός ἐρκεν* ι302. Altogether, 43 places.

¹ *Ἄασατο θυμῷ* I537, Λ340; *ἄτην ὀχεῶν θυμῷ* φ302; *ἄτην ἐγκάτθετο θυμῷ* ψ223. Altogether, 4 places.

² *Θυμός τοι αἰτιάσθαι* N775; *πειρηθῆναι* Υ349; *ὄ θυμῷ εἶξασα* ε126. Altogether, 3 places.

³ *Θυμός ἐθέλει* I177, P702, γ342, 395, η184, 228, κ497, λ566, ν40, σ427, φ273; *βούλεται* M174, O596; *ἀνώγει* Δ263, Z439, 444, H74, Θ189, 322, I101, 703, K534, E195, O43, Π382, Σ90, 176, 426, T102, 187, Υ77, 179, X142, Ω198, ε89, θ70, λ206, ξ246, ο395, π141, 466, σ409, φ194; *ἀνίησι* B276, Z256, H25, 152, K389, M307, Φ395, E252, 346; *εἶ* Σ282; *ἐφορμᾶται* N73, α275, δ713; *ἐπέσσυται* A173, Z361, I42, 398, κ484, *ἐέλδεται* ο66, σ164; *ἐπιμαίεται* K401; *ἴεται* Θ301, 310; *κέλεται* M300 (about animals) σ140, ρ554; *κελεύει* H68, 349, 369, Θ6, N784, η187, θ27, 204, σ278, ξ517, ο339, π81, δ469, σ352, φ198, 276, 342; *ἐπετρέπετο* ι12; *στρύνει* K220, 319; Υ174, Ω288, θ45, ι139, σ161. Altogether, 94 places.

⁴ *Ἐθέλειν θυμῷ* Π255, P488, Φ65, 177, ψ894, Ω236, ξ445, ψ257, *ἴεσθαι* θυμῷ B589, N386; *ἐν θυμῷ μεμῶε* Γ9, E135, H2, N537, T164, β248. Altogether, 16 places.

⁵ *Ἐστρύνει θυμόν* E470, 792, Z72, Δ291, N155, O500, 514, 667, Π210, 275, θ15; *ὀρίνειν* B142, Δ208, Z51, Λ792, 804, N468, O403, P123; *ἀνιέναι* Π691; *τρέπειν* E676; *πείθειν* I386, 587, χ78, 91, β103, η258, ι33, 500, κ406, 466, 475, 550, μ28, 324, τ148, φ337, ω138; *θυμός ἀπιστος* ξ150, 391, ψ72. Altogether, 41 places.

⁶ *Ἐρητύειν θυμόν* A192, I462, 635, N280; *ἐρυκακείν* λ105; *ἐπίσχετε* υ266; *ἐδάμασοε* E316; *ἐκῶν ἀέκοντι θυμῷ* Δ43 (intellect and will are opposed well). Altogether, 8 places.

⁷ The statistics of the frequency of *thumos* appearance in Homer was first presented by Jansen (compare p. 26, note 1); he collected 715 places and divided them in the following way: feelings and sensations – 254 (35%), willing and will – 172 (24%), thinking – 111 (16%), life strength – 93 (13%), *spirit* in general – 85 (12%). The order of degrees is more or less the same; but my statistics is, first of all, more complete (754 places as compared to 715), and secondly, I dare hope, it is considered psychologically, and as a consequence of that – the results received are more expressive. The first advantage is due to the fact that I could use the article about the *thumos* by Hizeke in a special dictionary by Ebeling and check it according to Gehring (*Index Homericus* 1891); he counted altogether 759 places, and this result, in view of inevitable fluctuations of the text, we consider to be quite successful. But that is the only aspect that I find to be the merit of that article; regarding the rest – I can only caution against it. From the psychological point of view it is as inconsiderate as the remaining articles in that dictionary, causing all kinds of perplexion and insecurity (collocations that are absolutely analogous by their structure and meaning were dispersed around different rubrics; in the same rubric one could find completely different collocations, in the rubric *χαίρειν θυμῷ* there are references to the places where there is *κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ*; and since the author of this too short article limits himself to bare references only, those who are using it have to check all of them). I had to make corrections to all of them.

that the *thumos* is mostly the organ of passion, consequently, the organ of the related to it willing acts and only at the last position – the organ of intellect. Comparing these results with the ones, obtained by us earlier, regarding the corporal souls, we become convinced that the *thumos* is as closely related to the heart (the organs of passion in 182, of will – in 16 and thinking – in 8 places), as strongly it differs from the diaphragm, in reference to which we can observe a reverse grouping of the functions (214 places for intellect, 72 for emotions). The second analogy here is that similar to the heart: the *thumos* is also very often mentioned as an active organ of spiritual life, cheering, feeling sad, desiring, etc.¹, while the diaphragm never plays such an active role. The reader will find many other analogies without applying any special efforts to it, counting in the rubrics all the materials given as reference about the heart and *thumos*; they will only reinforce the conclusion which is clear enough and needs no further proofs, that *the heart and thumos refer to each other as the corporal soul to the incorporeal one, and are absolutely uniform in their functions.*

However, the *thumos* was only one of the two indicated incorporeal souls; the second was the *noos*. We shall pass now to it.

VI

Similar to the *thumos*, *noos* is perceived as an unconditionally incorporeal organ of our nature – and that is even to a higher degree: in reference to it we cannot find even such few catachresis like *a beating thumos*, which we have already discussed. Similar to the latter, the *noos* also is located in the chest or in the diaphragm², but never in the heart – and it is understood that we cannot encounter the opposite case, that is, locating the diaphragm in the *noos*. The conviction about higher spirituality of the *noos* in comparison with the psychophysical diaphragm never abandons Homer.

Here, however, the analogies come to end; when it comes to the question about *specific* meanings of *noos*, differences appear.

Its the most general meaning is the one, according to which it as *consciousness* is opposed to unconscious and subconscious state of the man. There are not so many places demonstrating this but this is the reason why they are so interesting. The *noos* remains untouched and unchanged with the Odysseus' peers who were turned into pigs, it exists as before; the servants made by Hephaistos from metal also have a *noos* in their *diaphragm*. Persephone granted a *noos* to Teiresias even after his death; the *noos* of the injured Eurypylos, disregarding the enormous loss of blood, is unchanged. The god of

¹ Compare the examples on the p. 31, notes 1–3 about will manifestation; in other rubrics we do not separate collocations like *χαίρει θυμός* from the ones like *χαίρειν κατὰ θυμόν*, in order not to complicate even more the statistics which are complicated enough by themselves.

² *Νόος ἐν στήθεσσι* Γ63, β125, κ329, ν255, υ366; *μετὰ φρεσίν* Σ419. It should not embarrass the reader, *νόον σκέθε τόνδ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ* ξ490 (above, p. 30, note 7), here *νόος* means *τὸ νοούμενον*, *νόημα*, the result of thinking, not its organ; we shall be writing later about such meanings. Nägelsbach did not take that into account either, *Homerische Theologie*, p. 362, where he states that *μένος* and *νόος* are equally located in *θυμός*.

sleep makes the noos of Zeus sleep; dust weakens the noos of the Achaian; Priam's noos was troubled when he saw a strange warrior on his way to Achilles; also what will happen to his noos when he encounters a genuine enemy¹?

From that general meaning of consciousness which makes the difference between an alive person and a dead one or a sleeping one, that is, unconscious matter, the second meaning of the word *noos* develops – *turn of mind*, the intellectual stamp of a man, due to which one person is different from another. This concept is of quality kind; and it should not be surprising for us, since, due to the instability of the border between the intellectual and the emotional character of the man, the noos sometimes is located in the places where the thumos is normally located and vice versa². So, while travelling, Odysseus and Menelaos study the noos of people; it can be different by people depending on the circumstances, but the noos of gods does not alter easily. More accurately, the noos is described with the help of different epithets borrowed from the intellectual, sometimes from the emotional sphere. It is crafty by Odysseus, cautious by Priam, clever by Telemachos and (in metamorphosis) by Hermes, smart by Eurykleia and Odysseus, fair by Kalypso, miserable at times by Hektor and others, not yielding to any spells by Odysseus, noble by Arete, sincere by Odysseus' shepherds, god fearing by other people and *solid* by Zeus; it is unwise and insidious by the suitors, improvident by Epikaste, inconsiderate at times by Menelaos, impetuous by youth, short-sighted by a solitary man³. However, when *wrath bursts opens the noos in the chest of even*

¹ *Νοῦς ἦν ἔμπεδος ὡς τὸ πάρος περ κ240; τῆς ἐν μὲν νόος ἐστὶ μετὰ φρεσίν Σ419; τῶ καὶ τεθνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνεια κ494; αἶμα μέλαν κελάρυζε, νόος γε μὲν ἔμπεδος ἦεν Λ813; ἔλεξ' Ἀιδὸς νόον Ξ252; (κονίη) Ἀχαιῶν θέλεγε νόον Μ255; σὺν δὲ γέροντι νόος χυτο Ω358; τίς ἂν δῆ τοι νόος εἶη Ω367. Altogether, in the meaning of consciousness – 8.*

² There is no and there cannot be complete consistency: we are dealing with a poet but not with a philosopher. *Θεουδῆς νόος* refers to piety ξ121, θ576, ι176, ν202, but *θεουδέα θυμόν* in the same meaning τ364; *γυναϊκὸς νόος* Odysseus wants to learn, asking about his wife λ177, but in the same meaning Telemachos ο20 is pondering about *γυναϊκὸς θυμός*: ἐν θυμῷ, γρηῷ, χαίρει, Odysseus says to Eurykleia χ411 like *to himself*, but Agamemnon in this meaning *χαίρει νόω θ78*. However, the confrontation Δ309 *τόνδε νόον καὶ θυμόν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔχοντες* rather indicates differentiation: line 303 allows to refer *θυμός* to courage (*ἡγορέη*), and *νόος* to the knowledge about horse husbandry (*ἰπποσύνη*). It is more complicated to draw differentiation γ128 *ἔνα θυμόν ἔχοντε νόω καὶ ἐπίφρονι βουλή* (about Nestor and Odysseus).

³ *Πολλῶν δ' ἀνδράπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω* Odysseus α3, *πολλῶν ἐδάην βουλήν τε νόον τε ἀνδρῶν* (Menelaos) δ267; *τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἀνδράπων, οἶον ἐπ' ἡμᾶρ ἄγησι* Zeus σ136; *οὐ αἶψα θεῶν τρέπεται νόος γ147*, still *νόος ἐτρέπετο* of Zeus P546 and Kalypso η263, and Poseidon *αἰψὰ κε μεταστρέψειε νόον μετὰ σὸν καὶ ἐμόν κῆρ* (of Zeus and Hera) Ο52; whereas Pallas easily *νόον ἐτραπε* (almost attention) of Penelope τ479; compare *δοσις ἐτ' ἀθανάτοισι νόον* (attention) *καὶ μήτην ἐνίψει* Η447. It is not known, *οἶος νόος Ἀτρείωνος* Β192; Nestor blames him for acting *οὐ καθ' ἡμέτερον γε νόον* Ι108; *be assisting to the hostile sides ὅπη νόος ἐστὶν ἐκάστου*, says Zeus to gods Υ25, that is who sympathizes to whom and *ἔρξον ὅπη τοι νόος ἐπλετο* Pallas Χ185; according to her νόος the Phaiakians honoured Odysseus ν305; *ἀνήρ δέ κεν οὔτι Διὸς νόον εἰρύσσαίτο* Θ143; since *Διὸς κρείσσων νόος ἠέπερ ἀνδρῶν* Π688, P516, but Hera can think of it, *ὅπως ἐξαπάφοιτο Διὸς νόον Ξ160* – she alone, since *οὕπως ἐστὶ Διὸς νόον...* *παρεξελθεῖν ἄλλον θεόν ε103, 157*. Both Hektor Ο242, and Odysseus ω164 *ἔγειρε Διὸς νόος*, and Aiant conversely Π103 *δάμνα Διὸς νόος*. Removal of suitors is not possible until Penelope *τούτον ἔχη νόον β124*. The bard is presented with *τέρπειν ὅπη οἱ νόος ὄρνυται α347*; Odysseus craves to learn *βουλήν τε νόον τε* of his wife λ177; honours bend *νόος* of the good Ι513. Designating the soul in this way it is sometimes opposed to words as overt expression of its thoughts; *ἐξαύδα, μὴ κεῦθε νόω* says Thetis to Achilles Α313 and Achilles to Patroklos ΙΙ19; *εἶ τοι νόος ἐνδοθι κεῦθει*, Athene asks Zeus ω474; *σίγα καὶ κατὰ σὸν νόον ἴσχανε* (Odysseus to Telemachos) τ42; Agamemnon *χαίρει νόω θ78* (see above note 2); says one thing, *νόος δέ οἱ ἄλλα μενοινᾶ β92, ν381, σ283*. The coloration *νόος πολυκερδῆς* of Odysseus ν255, *πολυδρεῖσι νόοιο* of Odysseus ψ77 and Eu-

very wise people¹, this is a rarely appearing phenomenon.

From this neutral or quality concept of the turn of mind of the man which can be good or evil, due to the force of common shrinking (*pregnancy*), the positive quantitative concept of *the mind*, in the meaning of the good mind, wisdom, is developed. Perythetos prevails over many Mykenaians due to his noos, Penelope – over other women, and Odysseus – over all mortals; Theoklymenos is also satisfied with his. Thanks to the noos of Odysseus his people were rescued from the Cyclops, although his transformation was not the act of the human noos; the wounded leader can only assist his people with the help of his noos; a charioteer also needs it to drive the horses. It perished together with dignity by Ares; and by Hera it is only temporarily obscured by wrath, by Antiochos – it is youth, by Dolon – *ata* of greed, by others – love².

And finally, due to its meaning's shrinking in an other direction, the noos from the thinking mind is transformed into the content of its thinking, into the thought – into *thoughts*: the noos is identified with *noëma*. In this meaning – if there also exists the thumos as a thinking organ – the noos can also be the content even for it, which is the reason for the odd localization of *the noos in the thumos*; however, this use is unique. Proteus warns Melenaos: do not attempt to cognize my noos, namely, how many Achaians perished; nobody, says Nestor, will make up a noos better than this; we have no, says Aiantes to his people, better noos than to fight. Were not it you?, asks Zeus Athene, who made up this noos. Odysseus told Helen the whole noos of the Achaians; the fighting sides had the following noos: the Achaians were afraid of perishing; the Trojans intended to burn their ships. Achilles proposes to learn about the noos of the Trojans, whether they are going to continue the war after Hektor's death; the suitors are hoping that their noos comes true; Spercheios did not fulfill the noos of Peleus; the noos of a man can be simultaneously carried into different places³.

rykleia β 346; line μη κλέπτε νόω A 132; ένα θυμόν έχοντε νόω και επίφρονι βουλή Odysseus and Nestor γ 128; φραδής υ of Priam Σ 354; επισήμων βουλή τε νόω τε Telemachos π 374; τόνδε νόον (the knowledge of horses) και θυμόν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν έχοντες ancient people Δ 309; you are also kind by your body, πέπνυσαι τε νόω Ω 377, Hermes presented as an adolescent; έναίσιμος by Kalypso ε 190; ἀτάρ-βητος by Hektor Γ 63, ἀπηνής by Achilles Π 35, by Aias Oileus' son Ψ 484, by Eurymachos σ 831; ἀκήλητος by Odysseus κ 329 ἐσθλός by Aretha η 73, by other people Ν 732; νημερτής by the shepherds φ 205; θεουδής by people ξ 121, θ 576, ι 176, ν 202; πυκινός by Zeus O 461; μνηστήρων βουλήν τε νόον τε ἀφραδέων β 281; κακοραφίησι νόοιο β 236; αἰδρεῖησι νόοιο Epikaste λ 272; ἀφραδίησι νόοιο Menelaos Κ 122; τοιοῦτος (in order to μεταμώνια βάσειν) σ 332, 392; κραιπνότερος by youths Ψ 590; ἀποφώλιος by Euryalos θ 177; βράσσων by the lonesome Κ 226; κακῶ νόω ν 229. In the quality meaning there are altogether 68 places.

¹ Χόλος ... οιδάνει ἐν στήθεσσι νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντων I 554.

² Perythetos νόον ἐν πρώτοις Μυκηναίων O 643; Penelope: εἴ τι γυναικῶν ἀλλῶν περιέμι νόον και επίφρονα μήτην τ 326; Odysseus περὶ νόον ἐστὶ βρωτῶν α 66; Theoklymenos: (ἐστὶ) μοι ... νόος ἐν στήθεσσι τετυγμένοσ υ 366; Odysseus ἐνθεν (from the Cyclops) ἐμῇ ἀρετῇ βουλή τε νόω τε ἐκφύγομεν μ 211; mortals' transformation will not make real ᾧ αὐτοῦ γε νόω π 197; let us take a council εἴ τι νόος ῥέξει, and we need not fight Ξ 62; Nausikaa νόω δ' ἐπέβαλλεν ἰμάσθλην ζ 320; Athene to Ares: you have only ears, νόος δ' ἀπόλωλε και αἰδώσ O 129; Ἥρη, μη χαλέπαινε παρέκ νόον Γ 133, νόον νίκησε νεοίη Ψ 604; Dolon: πολλήσιν μ' ἄτησι παρέκ νόον ἤγαγεν Ἔκτωρ Κ 391; πάρφασις ἦτ' ἐκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονέοντων Σ 217. Altogether, there are 13 places referring to mind-wisdom.

³ Odysseus νόον σχέθε τόνδ' ἐνὶ θυμῶ ξ 490 (compare above p. 32, note 2); οὐδέ τί σε χρῆ ... ἐμόν νόον δ 493; οὐ γάρ τις νόον ἄλλος ἀμείνονα τούδε νοήσει I 104; ἡμῖν δ' οὔτις τούδε νόος και μήτις ἀμείνων O 509; τούτον μὲν ἐβούλευσας νόον αὐτῆ ε 23, ω 479; μοι πάντα νόον κατέλεξεν

Altogether, *noos* is encountered 102 times in Homer¹ – and, as the reader could have already convinced himself from the presented material, almost exclusively in the intellectual, not emotional meaning; accurately speaking, only one place could be referred to the latter category, the particularity of which I have highlighted earlier².

So, comparing the *noos* to the *thumos*, we are approaching the conclusion that the former was understood by Homer as almost exclusively the thinking, and the latter – as the feeling and overwhelmed by passion soul. All inconsistency and fluctuations regarding this are to be assigned to the lack of logical education of the bard or poets in general, that is, to the fact that they were poets, not philosophers.

Nevertheless, the same difference has been stated above, regarding the problems of Homeric corporal soul: the heart was described almost exclusively as an emotional organ of the man, while the diaphragm was prevalingly his intellectual organ of psychophysical nature. From here comes a conclusion: *the thumos is immediately related to the heart, whereas the noos – to the diaphragm*³. And had Homer been consistent to the end, the *thumos* would have been located exclusively in the heart, whereas the *noos* – exclusively in the diaphragm, neither would he have allowed himself to speak about *the thumos in the diaphragm*. But, according to what has been said, we will not be too demanding.

The poet is following the impetuses, the meanings of which we cannot always solve; their functions can sometimes be discovered due to statistics. Among the corporal souls, the heart (all the three synonyms) is encountered 206 times, the diaphragm (only as *phrên*, *phrenes*) – 286 times; should we, basing on this preference given to the thinking organ, make a statement about

'Αχαιῶν δ 256; τοῖσι δὲ μαρναμένοισιν δδ' ἦν νόος O699; γνῶμεν Τρώων νόον X382; ἡμέτερόν γε νόον τελέεσθαι οἶα χ215; σὺ δέ οἱ νόον οὐκ ἐτέλεσσας Ψ149; ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἂν αἶξῃ νόος ἀνέρος... O80. Altogether, in the meaning of *νόημα* there are 12 places. Although, we must acknowledge that it is sometimes difficult to define a clear border between *νόος* as the thinking element and the thought element; in some of the mentioned above, p. 33, note 3 places *νόος* can have also the meaning of *νόημα*, e. g. Θ143, ε103, 137, and also O242, Π103, 688, P516, ω164. And vice versa, *νόημα* is sometimes used in the meaning of the turn of mind of the man, e. g. Nausikaa does not *ἡμβροτε νοήματος ἐσθλοῦ η 292*, the spouses *ὄμοφρονέοντε νοήμασιν ζ183*, Penelope does not wish *χείρονος ἀνδρὸς εὐφραίνειν νοήμα* etc.

¹ This number, being checked according to Gehring's *Index Homericus*, can be considered absolutely accurate; Mutzbauer's article in Ebeling's dictionary, apart from its confusion, is also incomplete. Janzen's revision (see above, p. 31, note 7) is also incomplete – p. 31, moreover, it is psychologically inconsiderate; he sees *νόος* more often as *the thought* rather than *the thinking*.

² P. 33: *χόλος ... οἰδάνει ἐν στήθεσσι νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων I554*. Comparing this verse with *Ε217 πάρφασις, ἦτ' ἐκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων* we can be convinced that the collocation which is used in *Ε* correctly, here was used catachrestically; and obviously weakens its argumentative force. We more than seldom have to deal with such a catachrestic use of collocations; hence, they should be faced with a certain deal of caution.

³ That kinship by pairs can be proved by numerous examples. The epithet *ἐσθλός* can be found together only with *φρένες* (P470, β117, η117, λ367) and *νόος* (N733, η73, compare *νόημα η 292*), never with *καρδίη* or *θυμός*, and conversely *φίλος* very often with *θυμός*, *κῆρ* or *ἦτορ*, never with *φρένες* or *νόος*. *Ἄνωγει, κελεύει* etc. Only heart and *θυμός*, not diaphragm and *νόος*, also *πατάσσει*. The explanation O 81: *ὅτ' ἂν αἶξῃ νόος ἀνέρος, ὅς ... φρεσὶ νοήσῃ, κ493* about Teiresias *τοῦ τε φρένες ἐμπεδοί εἰσιν, τῷ καὶ τε θνηῶτι νόον πῶρε Περσεφόνεια*. Only *φρήν* (Φρόνιος, Φρόντις, Ἐχέφρων, Λυκόφρων) and *νόος* (Νοήμων, Ἀλκίνοος, Ἀντίνοος etc. serve for creating proper names; β386 *υἶος Φρονοῖο Νοήμων*) is interesting, never *θυμός* (Θυμοίτης Γ146 with the short *υ*) and *καρδίη* with synonyms.

prevailing rationality of Homeric poetry? Let us take the incorporeal souls; the emotional thumos is encountered 754 times, the sensible noos – only 102 times; the relation being opposite. Moreover, the heart is almost exclusively the organ of emotions, while the diaphragm, being prevalingly the organ of intellect, is connected with it mainly due to the emotional functions. In the incorporeal souls we can observe the opposite phenomenon: the noos is almost exclusively rational, the thumos – prevalingly emotional, however, it holds at the same time intellectual functions. Here it is a diaphragm, there it is a thumos, that extend their sphere of use at the expense of the rival, proving of the tendency towards universalism¹ – the heart and noos withdraw. Now we understand *a thumos in a diaphragm*. The result of this development was defined in the following way earlier: a thumos is a universal soul that has its corporal organ in the diaphragm. How come and whether this result was achieved – is the question reaching beyond the intentions of our study.

Still, the question arises, how to explain the basic emotional character of the heart and thumos and the basic intellectual character of the diaphragm and noos?

As for the heart, the answer is clear: it precipitates or beats slower depending on the fits of passion that worry it. And if that is the fact, what is then a thumos, what is its primary, pre-Homeric physiological meaning? Can we, if not identify, then at least contrast it with *blood*, which fills and empties the heart? Internally, it is very verisimilar, but we should admit that no signs of this kinship can be found in Homer's works, neither the psychophysical meaning of blood in general is preserved².

We find ourselves in a much better position concerning the diaphragm and the noos: the explanation for the thumos that we have to arrive at ourselves, making conjectures, for the noos is given by Homer himself. It is – *inspiration, spirit, air*³, penetrating through the lungs into the human body and bringing life into it.

From this point of departure the mysterious role of the diaphragm, I sup-

¹ It would be tempting to follow this development in the order of evolution, basing on the chronological sequence of Homeric poems; but the obstacle to the received results is caused by another phenomenon, even more interesting from the psychological point of view – great intellectuality of Odysseus in comparison with Iliad. Both *φρένες*, and *θυμός* are encountered in the poems approximately equal quantity of times; but for the both terms, the intellectual meaning use grows, while the emotional meaning use decreases.

² If not to take into the account the already mentioned blood drinking of incorporeal souls in the nether world in *λ*, thanks to which they regain consciousness, so they seem to receive again that *θυμός*, of which they were deprived. Still, the mystery is not solved so easily: first of all, it is rather *θυμός*, not *νόος*, which they regain together with blood, which they need much more in order to answer Odysseus' questions, and secondly, that blood-drinking is accompanied by so many difficulties that we had better not refer to it at all. See below.

³ The deciding place – κ 493 about Teiresias, *τοῦ τε φρένες ἔμπεδοί εἰσιν, τῷ καὶ τε θνηῶτι νόον πόρε Περσεφόνηα οἴω πεπνύσθαι, τοὶ δὲ σκίαὶ ἀτίσσοουσιν*. Hence, *νόος* appears from *πεπνύσθαι*, such a form is derived from *πνέω*, *νόος* in a similar way as *πνεῦμα* (or, according to Homeric style, *πνοίη*). From here comes *ὦ πέπνυσαι νόω*, σ 230 *πεπνυμένα πάντα νοῆσαι*. From *πνέω* is derived *πινυτός*, compare 45 *λίην γῆρ πινυτή τε καὶ εὐ φρεσὶ μῆδεα οἶδε*. And further – the noun *πινυτή*, compare υ 228 *τοὶ πινυτῆ φρένας ἔκει*. And further – the verb *ἀνιπύσσω*, appearing in its immediate meaning of *breathlessness* Ο 10 *ὁ δ' ἀργαλέω ἔχετ' ἄσθματι κῆρ ἀπινύσσω* (where *κῆρ* is mysterious), = *ἄπνευστος* ε 456, metaphorically *lack of wisdom*, ε 342 and ζ 258 *δοκέεις δέ μοι οὐκ ἀπινύσσειν*. And all those words in their spiritual meaning are collocated with *φρένες* and *νόος*, and never with the heart and *θυμός*.

pose, also becomes clear: its anatomic vicinity to the lungs made the people, unfamiliar with physiology, see in it the regulator of this organ, performing its breathing movements by stretching and contracting it.

I consciously avoid the unstable etymological ground in this case. Even if we had managed to establish the origin of the words *thumos* and *noos* (in reality nobody does or will do it), it would have proved nothing about the perception of the Homeric epoch, either of its representatives – the bards. So, we have to be satisfied with what we have got so far. Homeric soul – leaving aside the helpless ghost of the psyche – is dual, as the substrate both emotional and intellectual functions of our consciousness: the *thumos* and the *noos*. The first must be identical with blood, penetrating through the heart; the second – surely with the spirit, causing movement of the lungs–diaphragm.

Still, the difference exists. The *thumos*' kinship with blood is forgotten already by Homer and even more it is forgotten in the following epochs. But the *noos*–*pneuma* stayed in the consciousness of Homer and – a great future awaited it.

VII

Until now we have been dealing with the activity of the soul in the *life* of the man. It appeared for us in a threefold perspective: as the psyche, spreaded around the whole body, it keeps the body alive but does not participate in its life; as the *thumos*, abiding, according to the strict understanding, in the heart, it functions as the organ of our passion; finally as the *noos*, which is enclosed in the diaphragm, it represents an intellectual factor of our consciousness.

This is the way, I am repeating it, things look during the life of the man; but what happens at the moment of death?

The answer is clear and unambiguous only for the *psychê*: it leaves the body – this refers to all living creatures, both people and animals; and since this is a human soul, it departs into the Hades' abode¹. There are no exceptions from this rule.

Already with the reference to the corporal souls – the heart and the diaphragm, the clarity is not unconditional to the end. As a matter of fact, they should (due to their corporality) have been staying with the body – and as far as the heart is concerned, we have no contradictory places to that, although we have no confirming places either². The matter looks quite different with the diaphragm.

¹ Τὸν δ' ἔλιπε ψυχή is told ξ426 about a wild boar; I do not see any necessity to look for a catachresis here, it is similar to saying in Russian about that animal that *gave away its soul to God*. But it is clear, that it should not be concluded from here that animals' souls descended into the Hades: we have hardly any right to ask how the animals, that had been hunted by Orion on the asphodel meadow, λ573, τοὺς αὐτὸς κατέπεφνεν ἐν οἰοπόλοισιν ὄρεσσιν happened to be there. They are only used by the poet in order to characterize Orion as an eternal hunter. Why did Achilles have to slaughter animals on the Patroklos' fire ψ166 sq.; the answer to this question cannot have been known to himself; compare Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 14. Initially, surely, the souls of the dead were believed to be using the souls of their horses, dogs and servants in the other world.

² Also the mentioned on p. 18 note 2 particularities of the use of the word ἦτορ are not exceptional: ἦτορ ὀλέσσης, ἦτορ ἀπῆύρα can be said in the meaning of *lose or deprive of life*, not even thinking about physical distancing of this organ from the body.

On the one hand, the idea of its corporality is manifested even more consistently than of the heart: expressions like *lose* or *take away one's diaphragm* in the meaning of losing or taking away one's life are not found at all. On the other hand, there is an exception, the well-known exception: the soul of the prophet Teiresias in the nether world, that has – I will give here a literal translation – *the diaphragm in its right place: to him, even dead the noos was granted by Persephone, as to the only one to be wise; the rest are hovering like shadows* (κ 493–495). The exception has been marked as an exception; still we are bewildered and ask ourselves: how was it possible for *the diaphragm to stay in its place* in the Teiresias' soul if it had left his body, committed to the flames? And the answer, it seems to me, should be given in the sense of rejecting the last statement¹. In any case, that is an exception; the rule can be heard from Achilles' lips in an even more illustrious place Ψ 103–104 *oh, apparently even in the Hades' abode there is the soul (psychê) and resemblance (of the man), but there is no diaphragm here at all*².

So, both corporeal souls stay in the body and become destroyed together with it. That is true, but what about the incorporeal souls, the emotional thumos and the intellectual noos: what is their destiny?

Let us simplify the question: it concerns only the thumos. As for the noos, Homeric eschatology is silent³: here it even more than during the lifetime passes its functions to the thumos, and we are facing now a realized boundary of the development⁴: the thumos in the diaphragm. Hence, our question, in its tangible form sounds: *what is the destiny of the thumos when the psyche–soul abandons the body?*

Does it stay in the body? Of course, no – after all it is not a physical organ like the diaphragm. It is pleasant to certify here consistency of Homer's poetry. Homer does not allow here for such expressions about death of a man as *he lost his diaphragm* or *they took his diaphragm away*. On the contrary, quite normal are expressions like: *his thumos abandoned him; his thumos flew away, to lose one's thumos*. As we can see it, at this moment the thumos is completely analogous to the psyche: similarly to it, the thumos leaves the body at the moment of death.

¹ I absolutely agree here with Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 110, note 1, contrasting the same Teiresias with Amphiaro, who, according to a legend, was swallowed alive by the earth.

² Those who interpret here (*φρένες* in the meaning of *mind*, take Aristarchus' point of view, who because of that athetised verse 104 (*Schol. Ven. A: ἐμφρόνως καὶ συνετῶς διείκεται πάντα ὁ Πάτροκλος ἐνσέσεισται οὖν ἐκ τῆς Ὀδυσσεΐας ὁ στίχος, ἐκεῖ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδωλα σκιῶδη, φρονήσεως ἀμέτοχα ὑπέθετο*. Lehrs must have rightly assigned to him the athetesis, *De Arist. stud. Hom.* 329). A different view is held by Aristophanes Byz. (*ibid.* ἡ φρένας λέγει οὐ τὸ διανοητικόν, ἀλλὰ μέρος τι τῶν ἐντὸς σώματος, ὡς καὶ Ἀλλαχοῦ [cites ι 301 i Π 481]: ἐστὶν οὖν ἀπὸ μέρους τὸ ὅλον σώμα· οὕτως Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς. Aristophanes' share was rightly limited by Nauck *Arist. Byz. fragm.* 227, still athetising in vain ἐστὶν οὖν – σώμα. I do not comprehend Ludwich's critics of *Aristarchs Hom. Textkr.* I 483, who assigns athetising, even admittedly, to Aristophanes). Without any doubt, Aristophanes was on the right side in that argument. The train of Achilles' thoughts is as follows: he was trying to embrace the soul – but he could not: *What is the matter? Does that mean that the soul is incorporeal? Hence, there is no diaphragm in it? But how could she tell me that so well?* This is – ἀπόρημα, about λύσις see later.

³ If not to take into the account the exception of Teiresias, which we discussed earlier, p. 36, note 3.

⁴ See above, p. 35.

Till that moment everything has been clear and consistent, but what happens further? Does the thumos stay in the soul–psyche like the diaphragm stays in the body? Or is it destroyed as well? And, finally, whether it continues its independent existence, being separated from the soul?

The last possibility I added only for the sake of logical completeness: Homer does not give almost any indications of that, further development of Greek eschatology did not preserve any remains of it, psychology of other peoples does not have any analogies. The choice lies only between the first two.

Does thumos stay in the soul–psyche after its leaving the body? Let us listen first to Homer, as the creator of the eschatological dogma; he put it into the lips of the late mother of Odysseus, Antikleia, at a very solemn and pathetic moment (λ 204 sq.):

So she spoke, but I, pondering if my heart, yet wished
 To take the soul of my dead mother in my arms. Three times
 I started toward her, and my heart was urgent to hold her,
 And three times she fluttered out of my hands like a shadow
 Or a dream, and the sorrow sharpened at the heart within me,
 And so I spoke to her and addressed her in winged words, saying:
 „Mother, why will you not wait for me, when I am trying
 to hold you, so that even Hades' with our arms embracing
 we can both take the satisfaction of dismal mourning?
 Or are you nothing but an image that proud Persephone
 Sent my way, to make me grieve all the more for sorrow?”

So I spoke, and my queenly mother answered me quickly:

„Oh my child, ill–fated beyond all other mortals,
 this is not Persephone, daughter of Zeus, beguiling you,
 but ...

The following I translate, for the sake of literal accuracy, by prose: *But such is the rule for the mortals when they die. After all, sinews cannot hold muscles and bones anymore, no, they are destroyed by the powerful force of ardent fire as soon as the thumos has left the white bones, and the soul (psyche) having flown away, hovers like a night dream*¹.

... Therefore

¹ λ 218: ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε κέν τε θάνασιν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἴνες ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τε πυρὸς κρατερόν μένος αἰθομένοιο δαμνᾷ, ἐπεὶ κε πρῶτα λίπη λεύκ' ὀστέα θυμὸς, ψυχὴ δ' ἢ ἤϊτ' ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπόδηται. The real meaning of those words was established by Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 10, in the polemic with Nauck, who (*Mél. Grécorum*, IV, p. 718) in his correction regarding frg. 229 of Aeschylus assigns to souls ἴνες, but without σάρκες and ὀστέα; but nobody, as it seems to be, noticed that the same Aeschylus *Cho.* 324 polemizes exactly with that place of Homer: τέκνον, φρόνημα (= θυμόν) τοῦ θανόντος οὐ δαμάζει (δαμνᾷ) πυρὸς μαλερῆ γνάθος (= κρατερόν μένος), φαίνει δ' ὕστερον ὀργᾶς (= θυμόν). This thought will be developed later.

You must strive back toward the light again with all speed; but remember These things to your wife, so you may tell her hereafter*.¹

I have written out the whole place so that the reader could be convinced about its significance for the bard: he sets a high value on his theory and at the same time is aware of its novelty for people; Antikleia wants Odysseus to remember it and pass it to his wife – why? Because the woman is the guardian for family traditions.

The analogy with the mentioned above words of Achilles is obvious. Both the first and the second revelations are brought about by the futile efforts of the character to embrace the soul of the dear human being. It appears to be impossible, because the soul is incorporeal, it has no *flesh and bones, held by sinews*, it has no diaphragm either, since it is the part of flesh; neither has it a thumos because it abides in the diaphragm. It alone, having abandoned the body, hovers – *like a night dream* – says Antikleia, *who herself is a night dream*, as Achilles finds out. However, the thumos also abandons the body, it also flies away – but where to?

Probably – nowhere. To this conclusion we are driven by two other places in Homer, consequently describing *faint* and its cessation. The first – is the pathetic scene with Andromache, seeing from the tower of the Skaian gates, how Achilles is driving away the body of her husband: *a dark night covered her eyes; she fell flat on her back and began to breathe out her soul* (psychê) ... when she regained her spirit (that is breath, ampnyto) and *the thumos gathered in her diaphragm, she started lamenting* ... The second is a description of a purely physiological syncope of Odysseus who has finally reached Phaiakian coast after a long swim. *He was lying, breathless and speechless, hardly alive, awful exhaustion empowered him; but when he regained his breath, the thumos gathered in his diaphragm too* ...². The underlined phrase is especially significant here; everybody can conclude from it that if syncope led to death, the thumos would not *have gathered* in its corporal organ but finally would have dispersed in the surrounding air. And this means that the thumos itself is air-like – though other expressions in both places drive to this conclusion as well. We should not be surprised by this: we have already seen that the thumos often takes over the functions of the noos, that is why it appears as being located in the diaphragm. Hence, Homer is being consistent; but this consistency is counterweighed by other incongruity. The

* This extract is taken from *The Iliad and the Odyssey of Homer*, transl. by R. Lattimore, Encyclopedia Britannica, inc. 1996.

¹ In passing I will mention about how this place was treated by one of its first conscious readers in the New Europe, Muret (*Variae lectiones*, cap. XLIII): Homer, according to his point of view, wanted in the last verse to make us understand that his eschatological idea talia esse, qualia interdum mulierculis et puerulis ad focum seditibus aut fallendi aut conciliandi somni gratia narrari solerent.

² X 466: *τὴν δὲ κατ' ὀφθαλμῶν ἐρεβεννὴ νύξ ἐκάλυψεν, ἤριπε δ' ἐξοπίσω, ἀπὸ δὲ ψυχὴν ἐκάπυσσεν ... ἡ δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν ἄμπνυτο καὶ ἐς φρένα θυμὸς ἀγέρθη ἀμβλήθην γοῶσα ...* ε 456: *ὁ δ' ἄρ' ἄπνευστος καὶ ἄναυδος κεῖτ' ὀλιγηπελέων, κάματος δὲ μιν αἰνὸς ἴκανεν. ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ῥ' ἄμπνυτο καὶ ἐς φρένα θυμὸς ἀγέρθη ...* cf. A 593 (Hephaistos): *κάππεσον ἐν λήμνῳ, ὀλίγος δ' ἔτι θυμὸς ἐνήεν.*

matter is that the etymology of the soul–psyche (cf. psychô–blow ὤψω) especially *a whiff*, is not completely forgotten since Andromache *breathes it out*. Where is then the material difference between the thumos and the psychê? Why is it that the former disperses and the latter stays?

We will not be too demanding – it is impossible to stay away from incongruity in eschatology. In any case it is clear that according to Homer's theory, the thumos, accepting the noos into itself, is a universal organ of spiritual life for a man after his death, it does not stay in the body and does not follow the soul–psyche, but disperses in the air. A consistent development of this theory must make Homer acknowledge that *the departed from the body soul is deprived of the thumos*. This is what happens, and more than once. That is why the situation of Teiresias, who preserved both the diaphragm and the noos (and consequently the thumos as well), is striking by its exceptionality – *the rest of them hover like shadows* but without a thumos. When Odysseus at the entrance into their kingdom makes his sacrifice to them, they all fly, we should believe, to the smell of blood. One does not need a thumos for such low reflexes and feelings. His mother is sitting among the others, she does not look at her son, does not speak to him. *What should I do to make her recognize me*, – he asks Teiresias¹. Definitely, she has no thumos – the consistency is maintained.

But is it maintained always? Elpenor not only recognizes Odysseus – he answers with *a moan* to his words, which means that he is subjected to a fit of passion, that is, he has a thumos. Correspondingly to this phenomenon, the souls of the killed warriors, leaving for the all–receiving abode, *complain about their lot, that they have left the life of men and their youth*. And, vice versa, the soul, that is accompanied immediately by the soul of its body's murderer into the abode of Hades thanks to a zealous avenger, rejoices. Also the soul of Patroklos, when it appears in front of Achilles, complains at the parting, remembers about the past, – surely it is allotted something like a thumos; Achilles did not manage to solve the incongruity between its incorporeity and its consciousness².

The solution may be such that everywhere in all those cases we are dealing with *the souls of the unburied yet people*? In fact, burial plays the decisive role for a soul: after the burial the soul of Patroklos does not appear to Achilles any more – is it because it and its friend will be already separated by the gates of the nether world, or because it, having lost its thumos, loses also its anguish for the earth life. The memorial expression *to find solace in flames*³ also brings to that understanding. And if we consider more intently the mentioned above theory of Antikleia – *as soon as the thumos leaves the white bones* – it is more natural to think in connection with *white bones* about a de-

¹ About Teiresias see above, p. 36, note 3. About Antikleia λ 144 sq.

² Elpenor: λ 59 ὁ δὲ μ' οἰμώξας ἡμείβετο μύθῳ. – The souls of the warriors: ψυχῆ δ' ἐκ ρεθέων παμένη Ἄιδου δὲ βεβήκει, ὃν πόντον γούωσα, λιπούσ' ἀνδροτήτα καὶ ἥβην Π 856 (Patroklos), X 362 (Hektor). – The friend: οὐ μὴν αὐτ' ἄτιτος κεῖτ' Ἄσιος, ἀλλὰ ἔφημι εἰς Ἄϊδός περ ἰόντα ... γηθήσειν κατὰ θυμόν (sic!), ἐπεὶ ρά οἱ ὅπασα πομπόν N 414.

³ Πυρὸς μελισσόμεν H 410.

ceased being burned than about a deceasing man.

Thus, we acknowledge the existence of an interim state for the soul of a man between his death and burial, if Homer himself demands that. We shall also assume that in this state the soul–psyche is in a mysterious communication with its thumos. Have these contradictions and incongruities been removed? After all, even in this state the soul–psyche is still separated from its body and is located somewhere far away, near the gates of the nether world. We come to this conclusion basing on the words about Aias' soul, that it *will rejoice in its thumos*. It is not congruent to the end with another understanding, the one that we derive from the description of a faint, as well as with the theory of Antikleia, according to which the soul–psyche flies away alone. But we shall not be over–scrupulous here; anyway a concept existed, according to which the thumos follows the soul to the gates of the Hades, until the destruction of the body by flames does not open for the soul the promised gates, where it parts also from the thumos, dooming the latter to extermination. It is highly possible that from that dogma, another one developed later – about the water of Leto, which the souls finding their solace in the nether world had to drink.

In fact, all the just mentioned difficulties, concerning the status of the souls of the unburied, find their solution in a different plane; let us proceed. The body is burned; the thumos under the magic influence of this rite leaves the soul–psyche and disperses completely. From now on, we must believe, the soul abides in the nether world as an empty ghost, impartial and unconscious; this is how it looks basing on the Homeric theory. But is it the same in practice?

Sinners' tortures – Titytus, Tantal, Sisyphus – without any doubt presume consciousness; but they have a special status¹. The souls with which Odysseus converses express various feelings; yes, but about some of them it is told that they have received consciousness after having drunk victims' blood, about others we can assume the same². Let us assume this about all of them, wherever it is possible in the given situation; but here is the soul of Aias. It was clearly said about it that it *was standing in a distance* – which means that it did not approach and could not drink the blood – *being furious because of my victory* – in court regarding the armors of Achilles. Trying to please it, Odysseus addresses it with a gentle speech: *even after death you do not want to forget about your wrath towards me?* We shall not insist on judicial activity of Minos among the shadows (λ 568); of course, unless there had been a thumos – there would have been no lawsuit; and had not there been a noos – there

¹ This is proved already by the lying in the ground of the story about them idea of an afterlife revenge, alien to Homer at all. The question of *Orphic interpolation*, which is described by Wilamowitz, *Homer. Unterters.*, pp. 199 sq., we can leave aside; as for the interpolation, although not Orphic, his antagonist E. Rohde, *Kleine Schriften*, t. 2, pp. 280 sq. agrees with him too. Personally, I would not even speak of interpolation but insist only on a *special status*.

² I completely agree in this respect with Rohde, *Kleine Schriften*, t. 2, p. 264, as well as in the fact that blood feeling is based on the practiced in historical times, in reference to *heroes* rite, the so called *αίμακουρία* (*Psyche*, p. 53, cf. p. 139, note 6). It is not by chance that it is connected first of all with the figure of Teiresias, that *hero* among the shadows, and, apparently, only from him it was projected on others. In the *αίμακουρία* itself, I believe, a rudiment of original connection of the thumos with blood is preserved. A *hero* has *θυμός*, but it needs support, food, and becomes brighter when new blood is poured into it.

would not have been a trial; but let it be a conclusion which did not happen to come to the poet's mind. But the appearance of Herakles' soul is quite illustrious (λ 601): if one can hear around him *moaning of the deceased, like birds rushing about*, if he himself, holding a bow in his hand *is looking around ferociously*, this means that for the both sides passion, as well as the thumos (its condition) has been registered. And when the poet proceeds: *he recognized me immediately, as soon as he saw me with his eyes and told me, crying ...* One should not think about regaining consciousness due to blood drinking, since Herakles' soul possesses it anyway.

But what in *the first nekyia*, that is, in λ could be interpreted as an exception, in the second, that is at the beginning of ω, appears to be a rule. The poet somewhat unchronologically presents us the moment when the souls of Agamemnon and those killed together with him meet in the nether world Achilles' soul. The spells of blood are excluded here by the situation itself; and, nevertheless, the souls of the both heroes recognize each other, tell about the past, and Agamemnon's soul is *upset* (line 21), and by the end, both are *surprised* (line 101) seeing the souls of suitors.

This contradiction is not to be solved with the help of common interpretation; we have *two parallel theories*. According to the first, the soul–psyche is deprived of the thumos and unconscious; according to the other, it preserves the thumos, and, due to this, is subjected to all fits of passion of a living man.

Basing on the second theory, other two places that aroused critics bewilderment both in ancient and new times have received their justification as well. Seeing indecisiveness of Achaian warriors, Nestor exclaims that the old Peleus, having learned about it, will want *his thumos to abandon his members and descend to the abode of Hades*¹. Around Odysseus, near the entrance to the nether world gathered are among others also *tender girls with the fresh yet grief in their thumos*². Those places prove one another and, thus, our second theory.

But how to explain the co–existence of the both outlooks in Homeric epoch? I am leaving aside as being of no use the recently suggested but having by now become considerably sensational theory of complete poetical arbi-

¹ H131 θυμὸν ἀπὸ μελέων δύναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἶσω. This verse – centon – (ο 354 θυμὸν ἀπὸ μελέων φθίσθαι οἷς ἐν μεγάροισιν – Γ'322 τὸν δὲ ἀποφθίμενον δύναι δόμον Ἄϊδος εἶσω), says Nägelsbach, *cannot disprove the rule, that is, the ruling consciousness in the rest of Homer's works, Homerische Theologie*, p. 363; but that is the matter – it does not stand alone. Of course, the thumos stands here instead of psyche; it is also seen from the fact that it is presented as poured around the whole body (see above p. 16), as it was observed yet by *Schol. Ven. B: δηλοῖ ὅτι παρέσπαρται ἡ ψυχὴ παντὶ τῷ σώματι*. But exactly this particularity we have in ο 354.

² λ 39 παρθενικαὶ τ' ἀταλαὶ νεοπενθέα θυμὸν ἔχουσαι. This verse, together with the surrounding ones 38–43, according to the witness of schol. Θ had been athetised by Zenodotus and Aristophanes even before it was done by Aristarchus (Ludwich, *Aristarchus I*, p. 586; II, p. 135 note), and many of the present critics agree with them; as well as Kirchhoff, *die hom. Odyssee*, p. 227 and, apparently, Wilamowitz, *Hom. Unters.*, p. 142, defend them. Personally, I will add that they act absolutely according to my *rule of preliminary concluding*; about that see my article *Staryye i novyye puti v gomerovskom voprosie [The old and new ways in Homeric question]* in Ж. М. Н. Пр. 5/1900, chapter 2, pp. 181 sq. – cf. scholia vulgata *πρὸς ἀνακεφαλαίωσιν πεποιήται τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα ῥηθέντων*.

trariness¹. I prefer to join the strongly justified results of Rohde about pre-Homeric rudiments and Homeric eschatology.

Homer on principle does not acknowledge *the cult of souls* – it is senseless since through the way of burning a corpse any connection between the soul and the world of living is destroyed. But that was acknowledged by the pre-Homeric culture that did not know corpse burning. According to it, the soul of the deceased lives with him, at him in his tomb, staying in a mysterious connection with the body; it has preserved its needs but cannot use the organs of the stiffened and rotting body to satisfy them – that is why it needs care from the side of the alive. It has also preserved its feelings of love and enmity, especially the enmity towards somebody who was guilty of its death; and demands revenge from the descendant of its blood, taking revenge even by itself, special conditions given – for that it possesses enormous, although mysterious strength. It is obvious that such a soul has preserved its thumos. There should not arise even any doubts about that.

And here a tradition of burning corpses is introduced; its consequence – according to Rohde (p. 29), seeming to be quite verisimilar, as well as its goal – is to tear the connection between the soul and the world of the living, departing it, like unconscious resemblance, into the distant abode of Hades. Hence, in any case, before the body is burned, the soul remains in its former state – this fully explains the said above about the exceptional conditions for the souls of the unburied. Homer is quite consistent assuming that they preserve their thumos after separating from the body; we can rather find inconsistency in those places that make us suspect that that thumos is dispersed at the moment of death².

But after burning there cannot be taking care either of the soul, or its thumos and consciousness – this is how it looks according to the new theory. Rohde himself marked the two places where the poet, despite his principle, deviates to the former, of course not completely having disappeared, concepts about the necessity of making sacrifice for the souls of the deceased³. Should it be surprising then that, in reference to their thumos, already old and rejected, but not forgotten, and, we should believe, very enduring ones, convictions still slip at times into his works? So tenacious of life they are, yes; we shall meet them again in the post-Homeric epoch.

The new theory – who was its carrier? The role of pagan priests, no matter how prominent it was claimed to be, is fairly rejected by the present science; still, an organ for such religious reforms was indispensable, and that organ had to be at the head of the Greek society of those times. Do we know

¹ I mean here numerous articles and books by Mülder with their unbearable self-confidence and self-admiration that must have been meant to compensate for the lack of proofs. I ignore them on purpose.

² See above, p. 40 note 1.

³ Odysseus λ 29 sq. (cf. κ 521 sq.) promises to make sacrifice for *all the deceased*, especially for Teiresias after returning to Ithaka; Achilles Ω 592 already after burning Patroklos' corpse promises him to give him the share of the ransom brought by Priam for the corpse of Hektor. Cf. Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 54. It is difficult, however, to get rid of the thought that, even receiving a ransom for refusing from blood revenge, the relations of the killed shared it with him, although we have no evidence of that.

an organ other than *the class of the poets*? I cannot accept persistency with which Rohde (p. 37) rejects any thought about personal impact of Homer (that is the school of poets – Homerides) on the public opinion of their epoch. *Homer*, says Rohde, *is as distanced from polemic as he is from dogmatism*. But it would be difficult not to admit the polemic character of, say, Zeus' speech at the first meeting of gods, in *Odyssey*¹; it is also difficult not to feel dogmatic preaching in the words both of Achilles (Ψ 103–104), and Antikleia (λ 218 sq.) about the nature of the separated from the body souls.

I suppose that speculations of an a priori character should lead us to the same result. We cannot admit that the so-called folklore, people creation, is the act of the whole people with equal shares of its every individual: it is always a small group of prominent personalities that will be active directly. Who were those personalities in Homeric epoch, i. e. in the epoch of heroic epos flourishing? The ruling role of pagan priests, of which Creuzer used to dream, is fairly rejected by Rohde², as well as all other researchers and experts on Ancient Greek religion; and if we need to assume the ruling role of the prominent personalities – where can we find such, unless among the poets themselves?³

In fact, poets' profession by itself presumed the existence of a corporate structure, which is manifested even by the name of Homerides, with the inheriting within separate clans, as it was in the manner of the Greek craft, *technê*⁴. A corporation preserved conventional epic language, that *language of gods* with its sophisticated rules of versification and song tunes, traditions of the tales and customs of the ancient times – who but not them should take care of the familiar, even if it is very extensive, orthodoxy in depicting the religious background of the described deeds of the gods and heroes? History of the Ancient Israel left for us only vague facts about *schools of prophets* – we rarely think of them, but such powerful personalities as Isaiah, or Ezekiel could only appear being distinguished among the general milieu of those schools⁵. And we, I believe, shall hardly move away from the truth when we assign to the schools of Aedes of the Ancient Greece a special role – the role of not only guardians, but also the creators of religious dogmas, as far as we can talk about them regarding the consciousness of the heroic epos epoch.

transl. by Natalia Kotsyba

¹ α 32: *people incorrectly think that the evil comes from the gods*. Cf. my article *Vozniknoveniye grieha [The beginning of the sin]* in: *Russkaya Mysl*, June – August 1917, p. 38.

² *Kleine Schriften*, t. 2, p. 315.

³ Compare the striking evidence about the poet, whom Agamemnon, when departing, leaves to Klytaimnestra, as her director de conscience γ 267 sq. More significant is the later antagonism of the Homerides and the Delphi priests collegium; cf. about that in my essay *Sophocles II* 21 sq.

⁴ Poets also belong to *δημιουργοί*, cf. ρ 383 sq.

⁵ About those *beni ha-nebiim* cf. Robertson, *Alte Religion Israels* (1896) 59 sq. The parallelization is acceptable even because sacral music both here and there would have been in the centre of attention and care; the name itself – Homerides, *the sons of prophets* – presents a certain analogy.

The basis of translation: T. Zielinski, *Gomerovskaya psihologiya* in: *Iz Trudov Razriada Iziashchnoy Sloviesnosti Rossiyskoy Akademii Nauk*, Petersburg 1922, pp. 1–39. English transliterations of Greek proper names correspond to: *The Iliad and the Odyssey of Homer*, transl. by R. Lattimore, Encyclopedia Britannica, inc. 1996.

As it has recently been remarked *this article became entirely forgotten* (...) Zielinski's article is mentioned by only one author. Victor Jarcho on the first page of his article *Zum Menschenbild der Nachhomerischen Dichtung* [in: *Philologus* 112, 1968, pp. 147–172] mentions in the note Zielinski's article (...). Jarcho includes a commentary as follows: außerhalb der Sowjetunion blieb diese Arbeit leider völlig unbekannt, obwohl sie in vielem Schlußfolgerungen späterer Veröffentlichungen vorwegnahm [outside the Soviet Union remained this work unfortunately completely unknown, although it anticipated the conclusions of many subsequent works]. Nowadays one may say that Jarcho's remark referred not only to the years 1922–1968, which he was writing about, but also to the period after 1968, for, despite this comment, Zielinski's article still remained forgotten. (...) The second puzzle concerns the structure of the article. The 30–page article was given the subtitle: Chapter one: Organs of spiritual life. The question arises: where is chapter two? In note 3 on p. 15 [in this translation n. 2 on p. 27] Zielinski writes: see about it [μένοϛ] in the chapter about positive passions. Indeed, in the following part of the article there is no development of menos. Has the part about positive passions thus ever been published? Perhaps it still remains in manuscript? R. Zaborowski, *Tadeusz Zieliński and the Homeric Psychology* in: *Eos* 90, 2/2003 (under print).