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USA-ASIA RELATIONS IN THE TIME OF TRUMP'S ADMINISTRATION

INTRODUCTION

In this paper¹ we study¹ the consequences of D.J. Trump's announcements of a fundamental change in the US foreign policy after he became the 45th President of the United States on January 20, 2017. President Trump's election campaign slogan "America First" along with the declaration that it will be „the major and overriding theme," underpinned in the inaugural speech, constituted the foundation of his political strategy,² which cannot be treated as coherent, however, as it was undermined very quickly. Thus, the subject of the analysis is the meanders of the strategy and the policy, since they comprise the reality³. The starting point of the analysis are both the President's announcements (always official due to the office held) and the facts, i.e. the decision of the new Administration on the termination

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¹ The paper is a part of a statutory research project carried out in the Collegium of World Economy, Warsaw School of Economics.

² More in: *America First Foreign Policy 2017*, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/america-first-foreign-policy> [access: 24.06.2017].

³ Of course, there are many speculations about Trump's future at the president's office (including removal from the office in the impeachment formula and potential policy changes), however, we consider the status quo as a rational starting point for the study.

(January 23, 2017) of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)⁴. The real significance of the agreement (from the point of view of both the parties and the world) is evidenced by the fact that in 2015 TPP accounted for 24% of world trade⁵, while the political weight of the participants (though not quantifiable) is even higher⁶. However, the weight of both declarations and actions was undermined within less than 11 months since the President's first statements. From this point of view, great importance is attributed to the President's November visit to five Asian countries⁷ and his speech at the APEC summit (10/11/2017). In *Remarks at APEC CEO Summit*, he included the following: „... I've had the honor of sharing our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific – a place where sovereign and independent nations, with diverse cultures and many different dreams, can all prosper side-by-side, and thrive in freedom and in peace. ... Today, I am here to offer a renewed partnership with America to work together to strengthen the bonds of friendship and commerce between all of the nations of the Indo-Pacific, and together, to promote our prosperity and security. At the core of this partnership, we seek robust trade relationships rooted in the principles of fairness and reciprocity. When the United States enters into a trading relationship with other countries or other peoples, we will, from now on, expect that our partners will faithfully follow the rules just like we do. We expect that markets will be open to an equal degree on both sides, and that private industry, not government planners, will direct investment”⁸. This quotation suggests that, concerning the Asian policy, the USA moved from *pivot to Asia*, through neo-isolationism, towards the India-Pacific (Post-Pivot) strategy within a year⁹.

Therefore, the question of what the US policy is / will be answered. Another question arises further as a derivative of the aforementioned one, concerning the impact of various signals sent by the US to its strategic partners in Asia on the foreign policy. The study comprises the importance of voluntary (political decisions) and non-voluntary (economic connections) factors affecting the development-maintenance-change of the interstate and transnational ties.

We verify the hypothesis that the implementation of the foreign policy by the American Administration will not affect the density of US real relations with their allies in the Trans-Pacific area. From this perspective, both the policy of neo-isolationism and the *post-pivot* of Trump's Administration is and (should it be continued) will be counter-targeted. At the same time, the current policy (both

⁴ A plurilateral agreement regulating trade rules, concluded on 5/10/2015 by twelve countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The parties are: Australia, Brunei, Chile, Canada, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, USA and Vietnam.

⁵ The US makes up 60% of the GDP of the group of the “12” original TPP countries, but the total GDP of the “11” is still USD 12.4 trillion.

⁶ For example, France, the United States and the United Kingdom (aside from Brexit), i.e. TTIP entities, belong to the group of five permanent members of the Security Council.

⁷ Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam and Philippines

⁸ White House, *Remarks by President Trump at APEC CEO Summit*, Da Nang, Vietnam, November 10, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/11/10/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nang-vietnam> [access: 29.11.2017].

⁹ P.M. Cronin, *Trump's Post-Pivot Strategy*, *The Diplomat*, Nov. 11, 2017, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/trumps-post-pivot-strategy/> [access: 29.11.2017].

through the program and the measures taken) will significantly downgrade the US position, deepen destabilization and reduce security at regional level (as far as the analysis is concerned, mainly in the South-East Asia), as well as diminish the level of global security.

On one hand, the possibility of a real change in the American foreign policy is questioned, on the other hand, however, great importance is attached to the consequences of the inconsistent and mutually contradictory statements and decisions made by the President and his administration, the influence they have on the level of trust in the US, as well as the values, and methods, and tools for practicing politics they represent. From this point of view, “America First” slogan does not constitute an empty voice of neo-isolationism¹⁰.

An attempt to replace multilateral (WTO) or plurilateral (TPP) cooperation with bilateral agreements – President Trump’s dream and postulate – seems unrealistic due to time. It is difficult to predict how long the negotiations would take and what normative-institutional order should be applied during the transition period (from WTO to bilateral agreements).

THE ASIAN OPTION IN US POLICY

Since the end of World War II, the United States, sparing neither effort nor resources, has built up its sphere of influence in the East and South-East Asia and in the Pacific region. In order to assure (to a significant extent) the country’s presence, the USA used to stop communism (initially the USSR along with vassals, then the USSR and China, and the runners-up for regional rule, e.g. Vietnam), as well as replace the retreating allies and displaced those who wanted to remain (the US replaced Great Britain and the Netherlands, and *de facto* displaced France). At the same time, it was not the country’s intention to build a global empire. In its global commitment the United States sought to ensure stability in the world – instability (and unpredictability) was perceived as the main threat to security and justice. Retaining stability, however, was not supposed to prevent fostering desirable values, and freeze the undesirable state in international and internal relations. The USA – a country created on the foundation of striving to provide every citizen with basic human rights and freedoms and the rule of law, while advocating free trade and ensuring justice and peace in international relations – favored the establishment of governments sharing

¹⁰ While using the slogan – even if not being aware of its roots or the consequences in so doing – he refers directly and inextricably to its authors and its first use, when the slogan appeared on the banners of America First Committee (AFC) – an organization of over 800,000 members, based on Nazi ideology and anti-Semitism (More: B. Bennett, “America First”, *a phrase with a loaded anti-Semitic and isolationist history*, Los Angeles Times, January 20, 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-america-first-20170120-story.html> [access: 12.05.2017]). The AFC acted against US accession to World War II. The AFC nationalism decided on its ideological alliance with Nazi Germany. The fact that D.J. Trump referred to AFC does not constitute a retreat from President Obama’s policy, but it is a retreat from Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt’s policies, it is a rejection of the values for which American citizens fought and were killed on the fronts of WW I and WWII, and it is aimed against their victims. See R. Sales, *The story of America First. The Men and Women who opposed U.S. intervention in World War II*, Praeger, London 2003.

these values and the construction of international order based on them, which was manifested in messianism, always markedly present in American politics. At the same time, the US propagated these values with varying intensity, which was determined by both ideological considerations and pragmatism¹¹. On one hand (up until the era of President Carter), the US recognized that temperance should be maintained in fostering human rights abroad, as human rights-based governments should be established by societies that share these values, and not be brought from outside¹². On the other hand – at least since the end of World War II – while confronting the USSR, the US supported the anti-communist governments governed by tactical considerations (which can be compared to Roosevelt reply to Sumner Welles, the Secretary of State, who once said “Somoza’s a bastard!” And Roosevelt replied, “Yes, but he’s our bastard”)¹³. The US in the Asian region strived for stopping communism – replacing the allies, not wanting to take their place or follow their policies, but protecting themselves and their allies from the decolonized territories being taken over by the regimes supported by the USSR or China.

Countries in this sphere of influence were to be the beneficiaries and co-authors of regional and global stability. They were supposed to be countries with a market economy. The US supported them in actions for the benefit of democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human and minority rights.

The scale of the American involvement in the region may be borne out by the personnel costs¹⁴ incurred to gain and maintain the position in the region (more quantifiable and comparable than the material costs). While in World War II¹⁵ a total of 407 316 American soldiers were killed, in the Euro-Atlantic war theater there were as many as 183 588¹⁶, and in the war on the Pacific, the Korean War, 52 516 soldiers were killed and 92 134 were injured, whereas in the Vietnam War¹⁷ 58 152 were killed and 313 000 were wounded.

Regardless of whether the US, in its foreign policy followed the Wilsonian ideology in – based on a deep faith in the “inherent” good of man, and carried out a collective security mission (as a tool to maintain “natural peace” between

¹¹ President Trump’s words sounded even stranger in the Korean Parliament, as he said „...Here, the strength of the nation does not come from the false glory of a tyrant. It comes from the true and powerful glory of a strong and great people – the people of the Republic of Korea – a Korean people who are free to live, to flourish, to worship, to love, to build, and to grow their own destiny. In this Republic, the people have done what no dictator ever could – you took, with the help of the United States, responsibility for yourselves and ownership of your future. You had a dream – a Korean dream – and you built that dream into a great reality”. Remarks by President Trump to the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, November 07, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/11/07/remarks-president-trump-national-assembly-republic-korea-seoul-republic> [access: 1.12.2017].

¹² This point of view was shared with Great Britain.

¹³ https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Talk:Franklin_D._Roosevelt [access: 10.06.2017].

¹⁴ See: Louisiana State University’s statistical summary of major American wars, <https://web.archive.org/web/20070704173545/http://www.cwc.lsu.edu/other/stats/warcost.htm> [access: 12.05.2017].

¹⁵ 53,000 soldiers died and 204 thousand were injured in the battles on the fronts of WWI.

¹⁶ M. Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts – A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1500–2000*, McFarland, 2002, s. 584-591.

¹⁷ G. Emerson, *Winners and Losers: Battles, Retreats, Gains, Losses and Ruins from Long War*, New York, Random House 1976.

countries), or tried – following the realists – to protect peace and balance (in a world where the state is not inherent), cooperating with allies and moderating conflicts with antagonists, it was the US own strength that constituted the instrument of desirable stability in the world. The dispute between the idealists and the supporters of the national interest was significant for the States, but, paradoxically, it did not cause turbulence in the world. The similarities can be noticed while comparing the values and objectives of two US Presidents: Wilson and Nixon¹⁸. At the same time, the United States has never sought to build a monopolar order (an empire) or maintain a bi-polar one. What constituted one of important steps into attempting to change the bi-polar order was, apart from the policy of strengthening European integration, opening (from 1969) to China – triangulation of relations with the Soviet Union (USSR).

It can be assumed that the US, in the post-World War II period, managed its resources reasonably, as far as the activities on the international front are concerned, distinguishing states and circumstances in which their direct participation was necessary from those in which it was (only) helpful. In the long term, the country proved to be relatively effective in avoiding antagonizing protagonists (allies) and the antagonists evolving into enemies. Owing to that, in the ongoing strategic game, the US increased the number of „fields” (countries / actors / issues) where it was possible for the country to take actions, reducing the „fields” which its antagonists had the access to¹⁹.

The US strategy in such a game was cautious, but its effect was to „force” other players (especially the antagonists and enemies) to act with restraint. Despite the lack of security and stability, the world in the years 1945-2017 avoided a global conflict, thanks to, among others, the United States making international commitments and both the allies and the strategic interests areas staying under the umbrella of the US²⁰. Such policy, however, did not release neither the US nor the world from dilemmas. Maintaining peace by „holding the umbrella” over the allies is based on their taking responsibility for themselves – therefore they bear security costs along with the US. The „umbrella” over areas of strategic importance for the USA is „kept for free”. As a consequence, as part of political realism, the allies paid for what the non-allies got for free, which strengthened the temptations and encouraged free-riding.

Obviously, the above-mentioned comparison was not made to prove that, from the American point of view, Asia was more favored than Europe, but it shows that in Europe the US has used multilateral instruments, whereas in Asia both the intention and the possibility of conducting policies other than unilateral are significantly smaller. The US, in the face of existential threat to the allies in Europe, did not spare strength and resources to defend them against the threats

¹⁸ H. Kissinger, *Dyplomacja*, Philip Wilson, Warszawa 1996, p. 775-778.

¹⁹ Therefore, the chess strategy was used, although the US avoided the “zero-one” game in the strategic perspective, preferring the benefits of the “win-win” game.

²⁰ Any attempt to roll up the umbrella only raised the costs of restoring the *status quo ante*, as it was in the case of defending South Korea against aggression on the part of North Korea, or defending Kuwait after the annexation by Iraq.

posed by the USSR. However, after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, when regional security in Europe reached the desired level, and the allies, consuming their security dividend, did not show willingness to participate in global security actions, the USA was forced to respond to threats to both its own and global security at its source. If the sources of nuclear threats to the US and their allies after 1989 are located in North Korea and Iran, i.e. countries that both reject the nonproliferation regime and acknowledge armed aggression (including international terrorism), if this is a region of significant instability, radiating on closer and further surroundings, it would have been necessary for it to be taken special care of by the USA.

In this situation, the *pivot to Asia*, proclaimed by the Administration of President Obama, could not come as a surprise. This was how the regional and global policy of the USA in relation to the Asian region was defined for the purposes of the language of propaganda²¹. The term allowed to conceal the military-defensive nature of the reactivity of the US presence in the region – and to emphasize the positive nature of motivation in the form of recognizing the growing importance of the region.

In the USA, a policy of attributing a higher (as compared with the past) weight to the relations with Asian countries was developed and announced. There was to be a shift in priorities, which, while maintaining a constant sum of weights, reduced the importance of Europe²². This policy, planned for more than 60 years, was supposed to mean the relocation of resources – leaving behind in the (entire) region of Asia the resources used in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. For in this region, countries with significant military capabilities (including the nuclear ones) are neighbors and refuse to accept the *status quo*. From the point of view of their participants, conflicts and situations threatening the international security used to remain within the borders of the bloc (USSR versus (communist) China, (communist) Vietnam versus (communist) Cambodia) and these regional specifications, according to which what separates is more important than what unites, remain²³.

What lies at the source of the American striving for economic, military and social presence in the Asian region is the belief in the potentially negative consequences of the lack of presence in any part of the world. The global dimension of the US position requires an *ipso facto* global presence. At the same time, a constant presence is a more effective way of pursuing a policy than being present in response to the challenges of a regional or global pretender aiming to undermine the position of the US and to build an empire.

²¹ K. Lieberthal, *The American Pivot to Asia*, Foreign Policy, December 21, 2011 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/21/the_american_pivot_to_asia [access: 6.06.2017].

²² We always consider the sum of US assets in foreign policy to be equal to one, taking into account the changes of the values of components assigned to the respected players that make up the sum.

²³ More: E. Czarny, J. Menkes, *Różnice modeli integracji i wyników ekonomicznych głównych ugrupowań regionalnych w Europie, Azji i Ameryce*, [in:] K. Rybiński, *Azja w gospodarce światowej*. Wyd. Uczelni Vistula, Warszawa 2012, p. 169-191.

Such a policy was rejected by President Trump. The new US strategy in the Asian-Pacific region was to protect the interests of the USA – primarily the economic ones, and lead to a parity of security expenditures between the US and the allies. According to Trump, the policy of his predecessors (not only Obama's Administration) has resulted in the growth of power of other states at the expense of the USA. The *pivot to Asia* policy was to be replaced with the policy of protecting and supporting US economic and political interests. President Trump's message, his assessment of the US's links with its strategic partners in Asia (and not only) was unambiguous and negative. The US opened its market for goods from these countries, which was not reciprocated by the access to the other party's markets, and US expenditures in human and material resources were disproportionately high as compared to the expenditures of allies. The US wanted to change this situation radically. However, a strategic challenge arose, which the country had to face soon. The challenge was the North Korean nuclear potential being increased with the hydrogen bombs (the explosion in the test of September 3, 2017 had a power of 60-80 kilotons TNT)²⁴ and North Korea obtaining the ability to attack the US territory with the use of unconventional weapons (strategic missiles and technological potential allowing for placing a nuclear weapons on the head – the miniaturization of the charge). Then, North Korea announced deliberately the fact of being in possession of such military potential. Undoubtedly, many factors decided on the North Korean authorities' political decision to demonstrate the potential and to be exposed to an increase in UN sanctions, to criticize their allies (China and Russia) and to worsen relations with the USA, South Korea, and Japan. However, what was undoubtedly important in this case was the rejection of the agreement with Iran by Trump's Administration and their proclamation of neo-isolationism, as well as the overthrow of the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world. North Korea wanted to send a message that in defense of the regime it is able to attack the „sanctuary” – i.e. US territory. In this situation, the US, as quickly as it announced the retreat from Asia, began to return to Asia, to the strategic alliance with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

However, what could be noticed was a change in the terminology with regard to the region mentioned above, “Asian-Pacific” was replaced by “Indo-Pacific,”²⁵ which, of course, may well express an aversion to the terminology of Obama's Administration, but such perception of the change is only superficial. During his Asian trip, however, President Trump also recalled an even stranger and older institution – namely the strategic quadrilateral alliance of the USA, Japan,

²⁴ Norsar, 2017.09.12, *The nuclear explosion in North Korea on 3 September: A revised magnitude assessment*, <https://www.norsar.no/press/latest-press-release/archive/the-nuclear-explosion-in-north-korea-on-3-september-2017-a-revised-magnitude-assessment-article1548-984.html> [access: 10.11.2017].

²⁵ The author of the term was Gurpreet S. Khurana, a naval officer, but the author himself stated that: „The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ refers to the maritime space comprising the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. Littoral to it are the states of Asia (including West Asia/ Middle East) and eastern Africa.” (see. S. Khurana, *Security of sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation*, Strategic Analysis Jan-Feb 2007, Vol. 31, No. 1, s. 139). In the context of Trump's strategy, this definition indicates that the President either does not know the denotation of the name, or decided to change it, remaining with the name.

Australia and India²⁶; an institution that has been in hibernation for many years. What appears surprising is not the idea itself²⁷, but the shift in emphasis, namely displaying the tasks of the alliance in opposition to China²⁸, which the US expects to cooperate on the North Korean issues²⁹.

What President Trump directly referred to by using the term “Indo-Pacific” was the Japanese Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe’s idea describing Japan and its regional partners as „Asia’s democratic security diamond”. In this new institutional cooperation, India is going to be an important participant³⁰. In this case, however, President Trump either did not notice or decided to disregard some important factors covered by Abe’s initiative. For what constitutes an important proof of change in the policy of America’s Asian allies is Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Taro Kono’s invitation of France and the United Kingdom to cooperate within the proposed institution³¹. It is a political signal to strengthen the cooperation which exists in American, Japanese, French and British vessels patrolling the waters of the Pacific Ocean to protect the freedom of navigation in international waters since May 2017³². The proposal was accepted by the UK, announcing its readiness to *back east of Suez*, and so did France³³.

Trump’s project, which can be referred to as the „Indo-Pacific Dream” is essentially a reaction to „China Dream” – One Belt One Road Initiative³⁴. It is to change the rules of trade between the US and third countries so they are more favorable for the US and induce the allies to make higher expenditures on implementing the US strategic objectives.

²⁶ It was an initiative launched by the Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in 2007, in response to China’s policy.

²⁷ B. Jaipragas, *Why is the US calling Asia-Pacific the Indo-Pacific? Donald Trump to ‘Clarify’*, 2017.11.07, <http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2118806/why-us-calling-asia-pacific-indo-pacific-trump-clarify> [access: 1.12.2017].

²⁸ This context was noticed at the beginning of the concept. More: R. Medcalf, *The Indo-Pacific: What’s in a Name?* Brookings October 2013, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-indo-pacific-whats-in-a-name/> [access: 1.12.2017].

²⁹ The US Secretary of State R. Tillerson accused China of what follows: „China’s provocative actions in the South China Sea directly challenge the international law and norms that the United States and India both stand for, ...we will not shrink from China’s challenges to the rules-based order, and where China subverts the sovereignty of neighboring countries and disadvantages the US and our friends.”; More: N. Gaouette, *Tillerson raps China as ‘predatory’ rule breaker*, CNN Politics Oct. 19, 2017, <http://edition.cnn.com/2017/10/18/politics/tillerson-china-rebuke-speech/index.html> (data accessu 1.12.2017); P. L. Viray, *US: We will not ignore China’s challenge to rules-based order*, The Philippine Star Oct. 19, 2017, <http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/10/19/1750399/us-we-will-not-ignore-chinas-challenge-rules-based-order>, [access: 1.12.2017].

³⁰ More on India’s position, see J. Eyal, *Japan-India: An Alliance with a difference*, The Straits Time Nov. 7, 2016, <http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/japan-india-an-alliance-with-a-difference> [access: 1.12.2017].

³¹ S. Hayashi, Y. Onchi, *Japan to propose dialogue with US*, India and Australia, Nikkei Asian Review 2017.10.25 <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-to-propose-dialogue-with-US-India-and-Australia> [access: 1.12.2017].

³² D. Hutt, *The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Vision: Room For Britain And France?* Forbes Nov. 14, 2017, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhutt/2017/11/14/the-indo-pacific-vision-room-for-britain-and-france/#a6eeff843827> [access: 1.12.2017].

³³ D. Scott, *French maritime Strategic thought on the Indo-Pacific*, Center for International Maritime Security 2017.03.31 <http://cimsec.org/french-maritime-strategic-thought-on-the-indo-pacific/31742> [access: 1.12.2017].

³⁴ P.M. Cronin, *Trump’s Post-Pivot Strategy*, The Diplomat Nov. 11, 2017 <https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/trumps-post-pivot-strategy/> [access: 29.11.2017].

To sum up, the new order and the new region are to end the era of trade imbalance (which Trump deems to be unacceptable) and begin competing *on fair and equal basis*. As far as the economic sphere is concerned, the US will take measures against the infringement of the competition rules through dumping and subsidies, it is also the country's intention to protect intellectual property³⁵.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

The basic premise of the analysis is that enterprises (each separately), while making the decision to complete outside (in relation to the domestic market), start from heading towards a market similar to one they are currently operating in³⁶. One of the factors affecting convergence (apart from the civilizational circle) are similarities in the level of socio-economic development verifiable on the basis of HDI (the index of socio-economic development with a high level of aggregation) and the index of freedom – indicating the condition of civil society and the social policy development prospects³⁷.

We are convinced that the readiness to maintain current rules of trade will determine the maintenance of bonds (outweighing the readiness to create new ones). The relationship between the similarity of the standard of living and the intensity of trade links between regions was demonstrated by Markusen³⁸, who took (as well as Linder did) the income per capita as a determinant of the standard of living. Our conclusions are in line with Markusen's results. We believe that, in our case, however, the data used as a basis for making comparison of the level of life are with a higher significance than those used for formulating the model (and thus departing from the intuitiveness of the theory towards reinforcing its verification). The complementarity of the economies of the indicated countries is deepened with the evolution of their features – as indicated by the volume of trade in knowledge products among them³⁹.

³⁵ „In the process of your economic development, you've sought commerce and trade with other nations, and forged partnerships based on mutual respect and directed toward mutual gain. ...At the core of this partnership, we seek robust trade relationships rooted in the principles of fairness and reciprocity. When the United States enters into a trading relationship with other countries or other peoples, we will, from now on, expect that our partners will faithfully follow the rules just like we do. We expect that markets will be open to an equal degree on both sides, and that private industry, not government planners, will direct investment. Unfortunately, for too long and in too many places, the opposite has happened. For many years, the United States systematically opened our economy with few conditions. We lowered or ended tariffs, reduced trade barriers, and allowed foreign goods to flow freely into our country. But while we lowered market barriers, other countries didn't open their markets to us. ... We can no longer tolerate these chronic trade abuses, and we will not tolerate them.” White House... op. cit.

³⁶ S.B. Linder, *An Essay on Trade and Transformation*, Almqvist&Wiksell's Boktryckeri AB, Uppsala 1961.

³⁷ G.S. Becker, G. N. Becker, *Ekonomia życia. Od baseballu do akcji afirmatywnej i imigracji, czyli w jaki sposób sprawy realnego świata wpływają na nasze codzienne życie*, Helion, Gliwice 2006, p. 313.

³⁸ J.R. Markusen, *Explaining the Volume of Trade: An Eclectic Approach*, The American Economic Review, 1986, Vol. 76, No. 5, December, p. 1002-1011.

³⁹ A. Kuźnar, *Międzynarodowy handel produktami wiedzy*, Oficyna Wydawnicza SGH, Warszawa 2017.

THE ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE

What is analyzed is the indicators depicting the standard of living and differences in this regard between the selected highly developed countries of the Pacific area (Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand), China and the USA.

The first of the indicators – the *Freedom Index*, according to Freedom House, the American NGO – ranks countries depending on their obeying and protecting political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). A maximum number of points that a state can get in both categories is 100 (points are awarded in 25 areas, from 0 to 4 in each of them). Moreover, in both categories (PR and CL), the countries receive from 1 to 7 points, and the average of both values is called the freedom index and it constitutes the basis for the classification of countries into free (1.0-2.5), partly free (3, 0-5.0) and free (5.5-7.0). In the group of analyzed countries, China is rated very poorly as it comes to the category of civil liberties and – even lower – in the category of political rights. As a result, it is classified as a not free country, whereas all the remaining ones are classified as free (Table 1).

Table 1. The degree of observance and protection of political rights and civil liberties in selected countries in 2016.


Country	Political rights indicator	Civil liberties indicator	The country's classification
Australia	1	1	free
China	7	6	not free
Japan	1	1	free
South Korea	2	2	free
New Zealand	1	1	free
The USA	1	1	free

Note: The indicators assume values from 1 (the best score) to 7 (the worst score).

Source: Own study based on *Freedom in the World 2017*, Freedom House, <https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world> (access: 10.06.2017).

The total number of points obtained in 2016 by the countries selected for the study is presented in Figure 1. The results achieved by China are apparently different – the country received 16 points out of 100, while the remaining Pacific countries scored from 83 (South Korea) to 98 (Australia, New Zealand). Similarly, a high score was recorded by the USA (90).

Fig. 1. The Freedom Index in selected countries in 2016 according to Freedom House.



Source: As in Table 1.

Another indicator of freedom, developed by the Cato Institute from the USA, the Fraser Institute from Canada and the Liberales Institute from Germany, apart from personal freedom (such as protection and observance of the law, freedom of movement, religion, association, speech, relationship), includes also economic freedom (government expenditure, tax burden, property rights, monetary policy, freedom of international trade and economic activity, freedom of foreign investment, labor market regulations), which together make up the Human Freedom Index (HFI). According to the authors of the HFI index, it constitutes a measure of human well-being. The values of HFI range from 0 to 10, where 10 stands for more freedom. China, with a score of 5.63, proved to differ from the rest of the examined countries significantly. The country's level of personal freedom appears particularly low (Table 2).

Table 2. Cato Institute Freedom Indicator in selected countries in 2014.

Country	Personal freedom	Economic freedom	Human Freedom Index (HFI)	HFI rank
Australia	9,29	7,93	8,61	6
China	4,81	6,45	5,63	141
Japan	8,67	7,42	8,04	32
New Zealand	9,00	8,35	8,67	3
South Korea	8,57	7,40	7,98	35
The USA	8,79	7,75	8,27	23


Note: The latest data is available is for 2014.

Source: Own study based on The Human Freedom Index, A Global Measurement of Personal, Civil and Economic Freedom, 2016, Cato Institute, the Fraser Institute, and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom.

Similarly, China differs from the other countries in terms of the value of the Human Development Index (HDI). It allows a more comprehensive assessment of the level of development than just GDP per capita, as it also takes into account such areas as health and education. HDI is used, among others, to make comparisons

of distance between the poorest and the richest countries. In the 2015 ranking, China occupied a rather distant 90th position. Australia is at the very forefront, occupying the second place, the USA is the tenth, and the other above-mentioned Pacific countries are in the top twenty of the ranking. The value of the indicator (on a scale from 0 to 1), for China was 0.738 in 2015, which determines that the country belongs to the group of medium-developed countries. The remaining ones, all with results above 0.9, are rank among the highly developed countries (Figure 2).

Fig. 2. Human Development Index according to UNDP in selected countries in 2010-2015.



Source: Own study based on Human Development Index 2016, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trends> [access: 10.06.2016].

CIVILIZATIONAL CONDITIONS

It is impossible to question the statistically verifiable changes in the social behavior of individuals that indicate the culture of violence being displaced by the culture of respect for such values as life, health, and human dignity. The number of acts related to the use of violence in the human-to-human relations, as well as the community (as a social group)-to-community relations decreases systematically⁴⁰. Undoubtedly, one of the sources of change in behavior is the internalization of values manifested in the prohibition of such behavior⁴¹. What proves to be contributing to the elimination of aggressive behavior is also the reduction in distance as far as the sphere of social communication is concerned. The analysis of the causes of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War already indicates that its source was Spartans' fear of the Athenian power – the attack resulted from fear⁴². This lack of trust in the unknown contributes to what is known as the „Hobbesian trap,” which is believed to be the cause of the beginning of most conflicts. The above mentioned changes in the internalized system of values along with lowering the barriers in social communication (cultural exchange

⁴⁰ S. Pinker, *Zmierzch przemocy. Lepsza strona naszej natury*, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2015.

⁴¹ More on the human nature see: *Tabula rasa. Spory o naturę ludzką*, GWP, Gdańsk 25, p. 432 and next.

⁴² Tukidydes, *Wojna peloponeska*, Ossolineum, Wrocław 2006.

of individuals in the transatlantic and transpacific space) create such a level of convergence which, on one hand, facilitates the maintenance of cooperation with the similar, on the other, however, hinders the cooperation among the different. Paradoxically, the phenomenon might be confirmed by the differences in the “capitalist cultures”⁴³ the realization of which has become a way of creating tools and methods for transcultural communication. Different capitalist cultures do not preclude cooperation based on trust: the lack of cooperation, however, does not allow for building trust in relations with cultures other than the “capitalist” ones.

SUMMARY

The decades of the Cold War – characterized by a state of insecurity, which, however, had never transformed into an open east-west armed conflict - created an illusion that a clock that indicates 5 minutes to the doom can stand still. Nevertheless, the experience was possible because the international order was characterized by stability. After the collapse of the USSR and the disintegration of the “Eastern Bloc”, the place of threat posed by the confrontation between the blocs was taken over by the challenges of the countries that acquired nuclear weapons and developed means to deliver them, violating the non-proliferation regime, as well as by non-state actors (terrorist groups).

At the same time, some of these countries, namely Iran and North Korea, reject the rules of international law and threaten to use force (including unconventional weapons) against the territorial integrity and the political independence of third countries. International terrorism constitutes a constant threat to peace. The global economic order, just after the 2008 crisis, is confronted with the challenge posed by the power of China and the necessity to define its new role and rank in this order. These factors (and they are not the only ones) make the international order sensitive to events and processes that reduce stability under the conditions of high level security threats. A number of the indicated elements are geographically located in the South and South-East Asia, which determines the increase in the significance of the region and the relations with countries located therein terms of the international order. The international community requires North Korea’s acceptance of the principles and norms of the United Nations Charter, or at least the abandonment of aggression as a policy tool. The international community needs China, cooperating in the economic sphere to implement sustainable development and counteract crises.

It was the importance of the region that decided on the US *pivot to Asia*, and it has also decided on the intensification and reinforcement of the EU cooperation with the countries of the region. Thus the US policy in the transpacific space has been monitored and analyzed with greater interest. It raises concern when it

⁴³ Ch. Hampden-Turner, A. Trompenaars, *Siedem kultur kapitalizmu. USA, Japonia, Niemcy, Francja, Wielka Brytania, Szwecja, Holandia, Oficyna Ekonomiczna*; Kraków 2003; J. E. Stiglitz, *Globalizacja*, PWN, Warszawa 2004, p. 127-152.

deteriorates stability in the region and in the world. The reluctance to multilateral cooperation, along with the deterioration of the ability to conduct unilateral policies effectively both constitute a negative contribution of Trump's Administration to the international order. President Trump began his term of office with the US withdrawing from TPP, rejecting the *pivot to Asia* policy, undermining the US security commitments to allies, and challenging agreements related to nuclear control (the agreement with Iran). Confronted with the consequences, such as a challenge from North Korea, he attempts to develop a new policy, strengthen old alliances and build new ones. Regardless of the evaluation of the projects, their implementation will prove to be more difficult due to the brutality of the reset and, resulting from that fact, lowering confidence in the US and the ability of the Administration to operate in both the international and domestic area. What the region of transpacific, and consequently the rest of the world, needs is stabilization.

Summing up, in the perception of institutions and institutionalization of the US ties with their strategic partners, and these partners among themselves, it should be remembered that it is not the *security community* that has resulted in civilizational convergence, but it was civilizational similarities that enabled the establishment and functioning of this community⁴⁴. These similarities are immune to immediate impulses and are subject to changes in „long cycles” (if at all)⁴⁵. This means that the American and European alliance with (belonging to the Western civilization) East and South-East Asia will survive the turbulence in the US policy. The real foundations of this alliance are stronger than the will to undermine it. In the face of many challenges, democratic, liberal and pro-human-rights European (integrated in the EU), North American and South and South-East Asian countries need one another – hence their cooperation in the transatlantic-transpacific formula proves to be a necessary one⁴⁶. It is anticipated that neo-isolationism in relation to the US strategic partners is only an incident, that the US will go back to cooperation with these countries, and that it is possible neither to withdraw from the cooperation nor to replace any of them. Regardless of China's willingness to take over the USA's place in each of these relations – especially TTP – the country does not appear a competitive partner⁴⁷.

In our opinion, what will change in the short and medium term will be the cost of conducting the US foreign policy. The US will “pay more for less”. The US will bear the costs of necessary actions on its own to a greater extent, the costs which the allies and strategic partners have contributed to up until now. As long as the US presented its own foreign policy as value-oriented, it could

⁴⁴ J. Menkes, A. Wasilkowski, *Organizacje międzynarodowe. Prawo instytucjonalne*, PWN, Warszawa 20017, p. 52-53.

⁴⁵ F. Braudel, *Histoire et Sciences sociales: La longue durée*, Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 1958, No. 4, p. 725-753.

⁴⁶ R. Kagan, *Powrót historii i koniec marzeń*, Rebis, Poznań 2009.

⁴⁷ For the opposite view, see R. Mukherjee, *Commentary: The Indo Pacific, a security diamond, a 10-year Quad?*, Channel News Asia Nov. 10, 2017, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asiapacific/commentary-the-indo-pacific-a-security-diamond-a-10-year-quad-9391268> [access: 29.11.2017].

request that the countries and institutions representing the community of values cooperate, also in terms of financial issues. On the US declaring that it conducts a policy aimed exclusively at the pursuit of its own interests, it cannot expect anyone to participate in the costs – and the US security (in all its dimensions) depends, among others, on the military, economic and social stability.

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Summary: We analyse the possibilities and consequences of changing the US foreign policy in terms of cooperation with Asian allies since Trump became the US President. The goal of the paper is to answer the question of what the political strategy of President Trump is and whether he will manage to implement it, and what the reaction of the allies will be in response to it. Institutional and functional considerations are settled in the economic reality, analyzing the economic indicators of the USA and selected countries of the Pacific region and China (the latter declaring the will to take over the USA's place in the region and in the world). The hypothesis that the way of conducting US foreign policy will not affect the density of the real US relations with their allies in the transpacific space is positively verified. What will change in the short and medium term will be the increase in US foreign policy costs. In a broader sense, the American alliance with the countries of East and South-East Asia will survive the turbulence in the US policy. Regardless of China's willingness to take the place of the US in international relations, it does not constitute a competitive partner, able to replace the USA.

Keywords: China, the USA, neo-isolationism, pivot, Indo-Pacific

STOSUNKI USA-AZJA W DOBIE ADMINISTRACJI TRUMPA

Streszczenie: Analizujemy możliwości i konsekwencje zmiany polityki zagranicznej USA dla współpracy z azjatyckimi sojusznikami po objęciu przez Trumpa urzędu Prezydenta USA. Celem jest odpowiedź na pytanie, jaka jest strategia polityczna Prezydenta Trumpa i czy ją zrealizuje oraz jak na tą strategię zareagują sojusznicy. Rozważania o charakterze instytucjonalno-funkcjonalnym osadzamy w rzeczywistości gospodarczej, analizując wskaźniki gospodarcze USA i wybranych państw regionu Pacyfiku oraz Chin (deklarujących wolę zastąpienia USA w regionie i w świecie). Pozytywnie weryfikujemy hipotezę, że sposób prowadzenia polityki zagranicznej przez USA nie wpłynie na gęstość realnych związków USA z ich aliantami w przestrzeni transpacyficznej. Tym, co się zmieni w krótkim i średnim okresie będzie wzrost kosztów prowadzenia polityki zagranicznej przez USA. W podmiotowo szerszym wymiarze sojusz amerykański z państwami Azji Wsch. i Pd.-Wsch przetrwa turbulencje w polityce USA. Niezależnie od gotowości Chin zajęcia miejsca USA w tych relacjach, nie są one partnerem konkurencyjnym, zdolnym zastąpić USA.

Słowa kluczowe: Chiny, USA, neoizolacjonizm, pivot, Indie-Pacyfik