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## Disintegration tendencies in the contemporary international order : separatism, secession, revolution

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# **DISINTEGRATION TENDENCIES IN THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ORDER. SEPARATISM, SECESSION, REVOLUTION**

## **ABSTRACT**

The processes of separation and unification of states and state systems are permanent elements in international relations. Alongside national development, the ethnic factor became another cause for both integration, as well as fragmentation of states. Nowadays, in Europe and in the world both tendencies appear. We are dealing with aspirations to unify, to focus on shared values, and parallel – to emphasise separateness and separate identity in external relations and inside multinational states. This article concentrates on the disintegration tendencies in the contemporary international order: separatisms, secessions and revolutions.

## **Key words**

international order, globalisation, revolution, secession, separatism

## **1. Introduction**

“People rebel not when there the system is the most repressive, but when the situation improves. It is the moment when a question arises: If the situation may be somewhat better, why can’t it be a lot better?”<sup>1</sup> – this thought, expressed by Edward Wnuk-Lipiński in a conversation devoted to the issue of revolution, may constitute a cause for deliberations on the nature, causes, and diverse aspects of contemporary processes and events, which affect the shape of the contemporary international order. On the one hand, in spite of frequent conflicts scattered

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<sup>1</sup> K. Janowska, P. Mucharski, *Rozmowy na koniec wieku III* [Discussions at the End of Century III], Cracow 1999.

across the entire world, we are in the habit of saying, in Europe at least, that we live in the age of peace – in the world of the UN and the EU, during a period of stability, durable international solutions that uphold it, and peaceful cooperation between nations, in the age, when essential human rights, including minority rights, are the standard. However, since things are so well, then why in the recent years successive regions of the world are shaken by more and more violent riots, why are analysts sounding the alarm, announcing further threats and forecasting new disruptions of the world order, and why does the feeling of social unrest and continuous uncertainty, which has been announced by Anthony Giddens as one of main indicators of the age of “late modernity”<sup>2</sup>, affect the residents of larger and larger number of countries? After all, equally true is the statement that the contemporary times bring about not only the economic crisis, but also an increase in instability on the international arena, and the “clash of civilizations”, long ago heralded by Huntington, takes much more extensive and multifaceted dimensions.

In what way then do various conditions and events affect the development of the international order, the international political arena, and the global economic world order? To what extent does the continuous tendency to “rebel” in societies arise from an aspiration to “better things,” and to what extent is it a fight for the bare minimum, necessary for survival? What triggers more or less peaceful public demonstrations that crop up around the world? What character do they take? And, most of all, what are the occurrences that disturb the international order in this context and how can we characterise them? Generally speaking, what are we dealing with? These are the questions that we will try to address in this study by presenting different theoretical positions and views.

As a starting point for analysis, we shall characterise the notion of the international order, its understanding in the past and today, the factors that influence it, as well as the shape it assumes in the political science discourse. Thus we shall establish the main framework to describe the international order, historical events that shaped it, and the laws that guarantee it. We will also discuss the threats which may cause a destabilisation of the international order.

Next, we will proceed to discuss particular kinds of threats, which are connected with popular riots against the existing order, and which may result in the disruption of the social order, not only in a given region, but also worldwide. We will concentrate on the two main directions – firstly, on separatist and

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<sup>2</sup> A. Giddens, *Nowoczesność i tożsamość* [*Modernity and Self-identity*, Stanford 1991], Warsaw 2010.

secessionist aspirations, which are present among nations and ethnic groups, and secondly, on the issues of revolution.

In the course of the study, we shall devote some thought to the nature of secessionism and separatism, making a distinction between these two notions and describing their most important features. We will determine what place separatism and secessionism occupies in the contemporary international law and in state policies. Finally, we shall discuss different causes of separatist and secessionist aspirations, trying to find those which dominate in the contemporary separatisms.

A polar opposite to separatist and secessionist movements, in terms of intensity of the social movement, are revolutions. We will consider the nature of this type of popular riots, its essence, diverse causes, kinds and possible courses. We will present various definitions of a revolution and the theoretical views on the analysis of this phenomenon. Finally, we shall ponder whether revolutions cause only disintegration in the world order, or whether perhaps they can also have some positive aspects.

It is worthwhile to consider (although it is a topic for a different study) to what extent the transformations and phenomena which we observe presently cause disintegration in the contemporary world order. This is because, in many cases, it seems that this kind of sine wave is also a permanent element of the geopolitical reality. Because of that, we will try to consider to what extent can these processes distort the shape of the international political arena, and to what extent they are permanently set in the social reality. Although it sounds like a paradox, one thing is certain – the contemporary international order is more and more characterised by instability, liquidity, and unpredictability. However, in this context it is all the more worthwhile to seek frameworks and grounds to create basic notional and definitional outlines for this changeable social reality.

## **2. The Issue of the International Order**

The notion of “order” was introduced when man started to seek the meaning of the world history. For centuries, numerous thinkers and philosophers substantiated human dreams and longing for the ideals of goodness, beauty, and truth. While creating their philosophical systems, they sought confirmation in the existing order, in social life on a smaller or larger scale.

Confucius stated that only proceeding in accordance with the divine right may ensure eternal peace in the country. Thus, one was obliged to learn about the world in order to improve himself, his family, and his state. In the 13<sup>th</sup> century,

St Thomas of Aquin explained the need for living in harmony with nature by achieving individual prosperity through aspiring for the prosperity of a community. In times of the Enlightenment, English philosopher John Locke explained that the social order and all laws are based on reason and a social contract<sup>3</sup>.

Immanuel Kant in his work *Perpetual Peace* based the universal order on a moral imperative called the “categorical imperative”. According to this theory, man is a being that thinks in practical categories and it is possible to achieve the state of “perpetual peace” only by awakening conscience both in single individuals, as well as in entire nations and state leaders. According to this moral law, one should avoid, or straight-out eliminate, contradictions in words and actions. However, the condition of accomplishing this goal was to apply a specific code of moral and legal norms in relation to state actions. Among these norms Kant included: rejecting secret clauses in peace treaties, non-disturbance of the existence of “any independent state”, a ban on borrowing money for waging wars with other states, unlawfulness of imposing political systems on states, and, finally, following the “conditions of universal hospitality”<sup>4</sup>.

Apart from the abovementioned ideas, there were many other philosophers and thinkers, who considered various aspects of the social order. Most generally, they defined “order” mostly as the opposite of chaos, anarchy, disorder, egoism, violence, and destruction. In the positive sense, they identified order with internal cohesion and balance between particular parts of a given system<sup>5</sup>.

The history of international relations provides many examples of order and chaos. From time immemorial, an aspiration to overcome chaos is a natural aspiration of the international community, which strives to establish international order in the form of a political order. Building order based on the authority, power, and prestige was attempted by combing ideas with legal norms and codes of conduct, and by creating institutions and frameworks for political activity.

As a result of World War II and the escalation of threats connected with weapons of mass destruction, the concept of the right to peace was developed in the field of law and politics. In this respect, the Charter of the United Nations and numerous other resolutions and declarations of the UN were quoted.

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<sup>3</sup> J. Kukułka, *Wstęp do nauki o stosunkach międzynarodowych* [Introduction to the Study of International Relations], Warsaw 2003, pp. 225–226.

<sup>4</sup> I. Kant, *O wiecznym pokoju* [*Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, 1795], Wrocław 1995.

<sup>5</sup> *Ład międzynarodowy* [International Order], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, <http://stosunki-miedzynarodowe.pl/sloownik/59-2011-01-28-16-50-11/592-lad-miedzynarodowy> [Access date: 30.06.2013].

Theoreticians also started to talk and write about different types of international order – political, legal, economic, cultural, ecological, informational, and others. One should emphasize that in the UNESCO, which has been the entity most interested in that topic, international order is mainly understood as the “organised system of international relations” or also as “a system of set relations between the participants of the international life”. Additionally, international order is seen as a “specific system of values accepted by the community of states”<sup>6</sup>.

According to Józef Kukułka, “international order is based on the international law and the international system. In turn, political order means the balance of certain relations on the global scale, balancing and concurrence of positions of states, as well as a state of organisation of the international co-existence”<sup>7</sup>.

At the basis of comprehending international order there was a belief that the contemporary international order includes diverse realities, interests, and aspirations, which are mutually interdependent in influencing the changeability and dynamics of a given order. Hence one may conclude that all types of international order that are possible to distinguish are interdependent and are mutually conditioning themselves in their existence and functioning.

The Westphalian order was regarded as the first document on international order in the modern times. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 which ended the Thirty Years’ War, initiated new order in Europe, based on principles of political equilibrium and was confirmed in all treaties until the Great French Revolution. A subsequent new order, stabilising international relations in Europe, was established in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna. A trio of powers, “the Holy Alliance”, safeguarded that order. A distinctive feature of that period were the alternating periods of stability and turbulence. International cooperation was disturbed by contradictory interests, crises, and armed conflicts<sup>8</sup>.

At the Versailles Conference after World War I, global powers formulated the principles of the new international order by sanctioning the *status quo*. They created a system of collective security that restricted the right to engage in war,

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<sup>6</sup> W. Malendowski, *Nowy ład międzynarodowy* [New International Order] [in:] *Stosunki międzynarodowe* [International Relations], W. Malendowski, Cz. Mojsiewicz (eds.), Wrocław 2004, p. 230.

<sup>7</sup> J. Kukułka, *Historia współczesna stosunków międzynarodowych 1945–2000* [The Modern History of International Relations 1945–2000], Warsaw 2001, p. 35.

<sup>8</sup> R. Fontaine, D.M. Kliman, *International Order and Global Swing States*, Center for Strategic & International Studies, [http://csis.org/files/publication/TWQ\\_13Winter\\_FontaineKliman.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/TWQ_13Winter_FontaineKliman.pdf) [Access date: 15.06.2013].

compelled to peacefully solve international disputes, and applied sanctions against states that commit acts of aggression. The League of Nations, established in 1919, was supposed to oversee the undisturbed functioning of the new order. However, the system proved to be ineffective, which was one of the reasons for its collapse<sup>9</sup>.

After World War II, the international order was a consequence of the binary division into two systems: socialism (the East) and capitalism (the West). In spite of significant differences between the East and the West, both sub-systems were built and functioned in a similar manner. Both the East, as well as the West, were “constructed” around one superpower with a group of satellite states interconnected politically, economically, and militarily. A fundament of this order was the dominance and rivalry between the two powers: the United States and the Soviet Union. An additional component securing the balance of power between the two blocs was a huge disproportion in military and economic strength between the superpowers and their allies. This difference was the reason why any changes or shifts in the sub-systems did not exert any significant impact on the balance of forces in the global scale.

Apart from intra-bloc structures (the NATO, the COMECON, the Warsaw Pact) the superpowers created institutions that governed relations between individual subsystems. In this context, the United Nations established in 1945 was particularly important. It became one of the most important platforms for political settling and resolving conflicts between the East and the West, and, in a later period, also between the North and the South. Parallel to actions taken within the framework of the UN, both powers supplemented the Yalta order with additional elements that reduced the risk of global confrontation. Most of all, they strived to reduce the threat of using nuclear weapons. The USSR and the USA, as well as other countries possessing such weaponry, signed a series of agreements and treaties for that purpose including: Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968), Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water (1963), and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973). Admittedly, the international order created after World War II saved mankind from a global confrontation with the use of

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<sup>9</sup> S. Lechner, *Equality, Authority, and the Locus of International Order*, Webpapers on Constitutionalism & Governance beyond the State, [https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/governance/ConWeb\\_Papers/conweb1-2007.pdf](https://www.wiso.uni-hamburg.de/fileadmin/sowi/politik/governance/ConWeb_Papers/conweb1-2007.pdf) [Access date: 15.06.2013].

nuclear weapons, however, it did not resolve mutual antagonisms and rivalry between the East and the West<sup>10</sup>.

This multilevel rivalry went down in history as the Cold War. It was defined “as the state of permanent hostility and mistrust and a struggle predominantly characterised by tension and confrontation between the two political and economic systems”<sup>11</sup>. The Cold War ended with the breakdown of the bipolar system, which was preceded by the crisis and destruction of worldwide communism. It triggered a chain reaction, which resulted in the disintegration of the structures of the real socialism, the Autumn of Nations, and the German reunification. COMECON and the Warsaw Pact were disbanded (on May 23, 1991 and July 1, 1991, respectively). The progressing disintegration of state structures of the Soviet Union in the years 1990–1991 caused its formal collapse (December 26, 1991). One of the two poles of the bipolar system ceased to function. The end of the Cold War was simultaneously the end of a certain period in history of international relations connected with the Yalta order.

“With the end of the Cold War, the elegant simplicity of a bipolar world disappeared. A disarray of nations surfaced from the Yalta order. The rules and regularities disappeared. International institutions faced a crisis and were forced to adapt their role to a new situation. The new world order disappeared even before any real action was taken in order to establish it. Globalization and interdependence faced fragmentation of states and the Balkanization of the world. (...) International politics appears to be dominated by a conviction that old demons will once again start dancing on their graves”<sup>12</sup> – this quote from Carlo Jean very well describes the reality after the Cold War. Entering the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we stand before a world with a very complex system of relations between various regions, societies, organizations, and movements, which guard their interests both through rivalry and cooperation. In addition, a characteristic feature of our times is the extremely fast pace of events that imposes the need for exceptional flexibility in accommodating oneself to new developments. It is necessary, if one wants to exert at least some degree of control over the course of events. At this point a question emerges: how to describe the contemporary international order

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<sup>10</sup> A. Nowak, *Międzynarodowy ład pokojowy po II wojnie światowej* [International Peacetime Order after World War II] [in:] *Współczesne stosunki międzynarodowe* [Modern International Relations], T. Łoś-Nowak (ed.), Wrocław 1993, pp. 157–162.

<sup>11</sup> *International Order and the Future of World Politics*, T. Paul, J. Hall (eds.), Cambridge 1999, p. 101.

<sup>12</sup> C. Jean, *Geopolityka* [Geopolitics], Wrocław 2003, p. 24.



and whether the possibility of building an alternative model actually exists. Of course, in such uncontrollably changing international environment, “creating models” may be considered only hypothetically – they are only theoretical structures.

Initially, the disintegration of the Eastern bloc created a situation that seemed like a monopole of the United States. Therefore, the first of the considered models is the hegemonic system. It was connected with perceiving the US as the only superpower which survived and is able to establish a world order. Until now, in history, we did not deal with a full monopoly that would encompass the entire world, although such a role was played by the Roman empire and China in their respective parts of the world. While constructing this model, it was assumed that in the surrounding of the United States some states would be awarded a special status and their role and relations with the hegemonic leader would have a different, privileged character. The European Union, Russia, Japan, and China would belong to that group<sup>13</sup>. However, due to a constant evolution of the international order, monopolistic aspirations met resistance around the world. Numerous politicians accused and are accusing the United States of hegemonism and not respecting the rules of democracy and partnership in international relations. After commencing the invasion on Iraq without the UN approval (called a “preventive war” by the Washington), many analysts and politicians accuse the USA of unilateralism and impiety towards multilateral international commitments, which were, after all, established due to American initiatives. It is possible to notice the American unilateralism also in its abandonments, e.g. in the withdrawal from the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court. This makes it impossible to call to account and punish the American soldiers who participate in missions outside the borders of the United States. Another example is the withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol. The American industry does not need to incur the costs of industry modernization, even though it is one of the biggest producers of greenhouse gasses in the world. The United States still remain a global leader, but their dominance is not as absolute as it may have seemed just a few years ago.

Contemporary world divided itself. Every now and then we hear about the outbreaks of new conflicts, and new players have entered the scene of international relations – transnational corporations, which are able to significantly alter

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<sup>13</sup> E. Stadtmüller, *Międzynarodowy ład polityczny* [International Political Order] [in:] *Problemy polityczne współczesnego świata* [Political Problems of the Contemporary World], Z. Cesarz, E. Stadtmüller (eds.), Wrocław 2000, p. 37.

the shape of reality. The contemporary international order became multipolar, that is, full of disquiet and uncertainty. The United States must take into account other states aspiring for the role of a superpower – Brazil, Russia, India, and China (unofficially called the BRIC countries). These states already play the role of economic centres of the world, but they want to improve their political potential. The current reality is manifold and changeable. On the international arena it is hard to find the balance between competition and maintaining national cohesion. The world faces new challenges and numerous threats – new, or previously existing. They include:

1. Threats of the destruction of mankind in the event of a nuclear war;
2. Inadequate protection of the natural environment;
3. Fast population growth on the global scale;
4. Problem with feeding mankind;
5. Growing differences between the economically developed countries and developing countries;
6. Increase in the pace of depleting of finite resources;
7. International terrorism<sup>14</sup>.

These are the global problems. In terms of globalisation processes, one may speak of the “butterfly effect”, according to which, even slight modifications of economic processes or the state of environment, comparable to a movement of butterfly wings, may bring global consequences. Moreover, the everyday life of local communities is more and more conditioned by global events. Globalisation appeared gradually, but with extreme impact, especially in such fields, as economics, politics, religion, art, architecture, and sociology<sup>15</sup>. At present, attention is paid mostly to the interest of particular states; there is no place for idealistic thinking. The states do not engage into actions that may in any way harm their national interests.

Nowadays, the competition between states has an economic, rather than military, character. The rich “North” does not want to help the poor “South” anymore, stating that development in those regions is obstructed with political instability, corruption, baby boom, and bureaucratic ineptitude. Yet, the poor “South” continues to ask for help in the sake of solidarity (“the white man’s

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<sup>14</sup> Cz. Mojsiewicz, *Problemy globalne ludzkości* [Global Problems of Humanity] [in:] *Stosunki międzynarodowe* [International relations], W. Malendowski, Cz. Mojsiewicz (eds.), Wrocław 2004, p. 228.

<sup>15</sup> A. Zieliński, *O globalizacji sceptycznie* [Sceptically on Globalisation], “Przegląd Europejski” [European Review] 2001, No. 2, p. 151.

burden”)<sup>16</sup>. However, the assistance from the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank deepens the dependence of those states on the highly industrialised donors. Poor and backward states are subject to disintegration. The states that are rich and integrated with the world economy seek maximum independence and do not wish to be burdened with the weight of national solidarity.

It appears that we are still in the middle of a certain transitional phase. The international order continues to evolve, it is unusually dynamic, and it is hard to predict what will happen next. George Friedman in his book *The Next 100 Years. A Forecast for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* thinks, that “The twenty-first century will be like all other centuries. There will be wars, there will be poverty, there will be triumphs and defeats. There will be tragedy and good luck. People will go to work, make money, have children, fall in love, and come to hate. That is the one thing that is not cyclical. It is the permanent human condition. But the twenty-first century will be extraordinary in two senses: it will be the beginning of a new age, and it will see a new global power astride the world. That doesn’t happen very often”<sup>17</sup>. According to this forecast, we have an unusually difficult, but nevertheless interesting period before us. However, it is only a forecast and it does not necessarily have to be reflected in the future events.

### **3. Separatism, Secession – Definition**

Because they influence the specific parameters of the geopolitical arena and the limits of movement of its players, separatist and secessionist aspirations are among the most characteristic transformations in the international order. Due to their character and consequences, among which the most important one is – whether or not particular aims are regarded as justified – the violation of a state’s territorial integrity, which, naturally, causes conflict. Those aspirations are a tinderbox both in the history of international relations and in the current relations between states and societies. Although it would seem that in the contemporary world – with disappearing political, economic, and cultural borders, with a stabilized political and legal situation on the international arena, normalised by numerous legal documents under the aegis of the UN (not exclusively), which are signed by a majority of states – the threat associated with separatist aims was weakened, this impression is, in fact, incorrect. European

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<sup>16</sup> C. Jean, *op.cit.*, p. 247.

<sup>17</sup> G. Friedman, *Następne 100 lat. Prognoza na XXI wiek [The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century]*, New York 2007] Warsaw 2009, p. 28.

separatisms – most of which, at least, do not use terrorist methods anymore, are therefore less noticeable – presently go through rapid development of their ideas, as it is the case, with the Catalan separatism or the Flemish-Walloon relations in Belgium, for example. Next, whereas African or Asian separatisms, which often go unnoticed, being in the shadow of other problems of states on these continents, are a dozing volcano – several dozen of African states encompass hundreds of ethnic groups, and an attempt at secession by any of them, or an impression of dominance of particular groups may end as tragically as it was the case of the conflict in Rwanda almost twenty years ago.

In the paragraph above, we interchangeably used the concept of separatism and secession when referring to disintegration tendencies and actions aimed at assuring self-determination for dependent nations as a whole. However, at this point it is necessary to introduce a distinction between these two notions. Even though both notions have similar origins, there is a difference between them that is seemingly slight, but with far-reaching consequences when these aims are realised.

Separatism (from Latin *separatio* – dividing) denotes an aspiration to emerge from the whole, to highlight the separatness of one group from the others. Separatism may have cultural, religious, or any other character; however, it is most often identified with ethnic or national separatism. Thus, we shall define national separatism as an aspiration of a given national or ethnic group to independently decide their fate<sup>18</sup>. Very often separatism is defined in similar terms to secession – as an “aspiration of a given territory to separate from the state and create a separate state structure or join a neighbouring country”<sup>19</sup>. This aspiration, however, does not necessarily have to entail creating a separate state – for less radical separatists, achieving an appropriately vast autonomy is enough. This is exactly the main difference between separatism and secession. The second difference is the fact that even in a situation, in which separatists aspire to detach themselves from an existing state, they may at the same time aspire to join another, already existing state.

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<sup>18</sup> K. Czubocho, *Separatyzm etniczny w dobie praw człowieka – nowe wyzwanie dla państwa narodowego i społeczności międzynarodowej* [Ethnic Separatism in the Age of Human Rights – New Challenges for the National State and the International Community], Toruń 2012, p. 18.

<sup>19</sup> T. Jerzak, *Separatyzm i terroryzm o podłożu etnicznym w Europie Zachodniej* [Ethnically-Based Separatism and Terrorism in the Western Europe], Portal Spraw Zagranicznych, <http://www.psz.pl/tekst-1132/Tadeusz-Jerzak-Separatyzm-i-terroryzm-o-podlozu-etnicznym-w-Europie-Zachodniej> [Access date: 3.07.2013].

Simultaneously, as it shows in the very name, ethnic/national separatism should be strongly connected with a social foundation, which bases aspirations of separateness on an existing population that we may describe as an ethnic group or a nation. This is the reason why separatism will be strongly connected with nationalism and its premises. Ethnic/national separatism should arise from an aspiration of the population to respect and maintain their tongue, culture (also political culture), tradition, and historical achievements. It will be significant when we shall later on discuss political and legal premises for justifying separatist aims.

Conversely, secession (from Latin *secessio* – withdrawal), according to James Crawford, will denote a process, in which a specific group is trying to separate from a state to which they belong and to create a new state<sup>20</sup>. The author emphasises that it usually takes place as a result of the use of violence (or threats thereof), without consent of the state that previously owned that territory or governed that particular group. However, A. Pavković, emphasizing that secession may also occur peacefully, defines it as creating a new state by isolating a specific territory and its population, both of which were previously part of an existing state<sup>21</sup>. In every case, secession means the creation of a new, independent state, which goes beyond autonomy or connecting a territory to another state.

Moreover, secession, which, in general at least, is connected with pro-independence aims, in theory does not have to be connected with any nationalist move or an ethnic group. Causes of secession may be also economic or purely pragmatic. These aspects of the phenomenon will be discussed later.

#### **4. Separatism and Secession in the Contemporary International Law**

Separatist and secessionist aspirations usually meet with concern and negative attitude on the part of the players of the global political arena, as destabilizing the international order and disturbing the territorial integrity of existing states, and, quite often, peace. Newly established states must prepare for a long fight for gaining recognition from (even *de facto*) other states and international organizations. An exception to this is a situation, where the division takes place

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<sup>20</sup> J. Crawford, *State Practice and International Law in Relations to Secession*, “British Yearbook of International Law” 1998, No. 1, pp. 85–117.

<sup>21</sup> *Creating New States: Theory and Practice of Secession*, A. Pavković (ed.), Aldershot 2007, p. 5.

with the approval of the parent state or on the basis of treaties; however, this is remarkably rare. The abovementioned premises show that separatist and secessionist aims are viewed as a negative phenomenon in the international political and legal order.

Meanwhile, the contemporary international law does not forbid secession directly, and all the more, it does not formulate accusations towards separatist aspirations. On the contrary, it would seem – international acts emphasise the principle of the self-determination of nations as one of the fundamental rules that shape the contemporary world order. The Charter of the United Nations, as one of the aims of the UN, stipulates: “To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”<sup>22</sup>. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights goes even further by saying in the very first article that “all peoples have the right of self-determination” and that “by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”<sup>23</sup>.

This last regulation allows to state that all national groups are entitled not only to self-determination, understood as deciding their fate, ensuring potential for development potential and shaping political and social reality, but also to choose the form this reality is to assume in the formal and legal meaning. The widely understood “self-determination” can be considered in terms of autonomy and its scope within the framework of an already existing state. However, the last regulation on the freedom of determination of political status could point to the option of choosing a political and legal form, thus also enabling secession in the purpose of creating an independent state.

In practice, the interpretation of regulations of the international law does not go that far. The rights of nations of self-determination were created after World War II and in the age of decolonization; the contemporary political discourse influenced their ultimate meaning. Therefore, it became customary to interpret the regulations concerning self-determination of nations exclusively

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<sup>22</sup> Karta Narodów Zjednoczonych z dn. 25.06.1945 r., art. 2 [The Charter of the United Nations of June 25, 1945] Art. 2, UN Information Centre in Warsaw, [http://www.unic.un.org.pl/dokumenty/karta\\_onz.php](http://www.unic.un.org.pl/dokumenty/karta_onz.php) [Access date: 3.07.2013].

<sup>23</sup> Międzynarodowy Pakt Praw Obywatelskich i Politycznych z dn. 16.12.1966 r. [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of December 16, 1966], Art. 1, Internetowy System Aktów Prawnych, <http://isap.sejm.gov.pl/DetailsServlet?id=WDU19770380167> [Access date: 5.07.2013].

in the context of the post-colonial peoples – particularly since decolonization already became a fact, and since limiting this principle only to that instance was and is in the interest of many states, often multiethnic, including the chief actors of the international political arena. Another limitation on that regulation was the assumption that entitled to secession are only these nations, who in the existing state suffer from violation of human rights, including the rights of national minorities, and in cases when a given community cannot carry out in basic manner the right of self-determination<sup>24</sup>. In practice, this is the main ground for justifying separatist aspirations (in this case, the abovementioned ethnic and nationalist separatism).

Formally, however, there are no restrictions in this respect, and the principle of self-determination of nations refers to all national groups without exception. All the more so, international law does not have any directly formulated prohibition of secession. Only infringing territorial integrity of one state by another state is prohibited – including the principle of self-determination of nations<sup>25</sup>. Continuing this thought, from the formal and legal point of view, a secession of territory, which is inhabited by a national group that do not have their own state, is legal; however, there is no possibility of incorporating a given territory into an another state without consent of the state which the territory in question belonged to up to that point (such incorporation would require support from the state which a given community wants to join – as simple as, for instance, through giving consent to incorporation – and this practice may be recognised as an action infringing upon the territorial integrity of another country). Additionally, on the other hand, the majority of the constitutions of contemporary states treats the principle of territorial integrity as one of the major ones, and actions infringing it as one of the most frequent crimes against the state. These constitutional regulations are not regarded as contrary to the international law, but rather as referring to different situations and conditions (since, as we mentioned, the principle of self-determination was usually considered in a rather limited scope). Thus, although separatist and secessionist aspirations are not formally rejected

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<sup>24</sup> M. Missala, *Geneza i współczesne dylematy samostanowienia narodów* [Genesis and Contemporary Dilemmas of Self-Determination of Nations] [in:] *Dylematy państwowości* [Statehood Dilemmas], K. Trzcziński (ed.), p. 45.

<sup>25</sup> Deklaracja Zasad Prawa Międzynarodowego z dn. 24.10.1970 r. [Declaration On Principles of International Law of October 24, 1970], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, [http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info/dokument,8,Deklaracja\\_zasad\\_prawa\\_miedzynarodowego\\_24\\_X\\_1970.html](http://www.stosunkimiedzynarodowe.info/dokument,8,Deklaracja_zasad_prawa_miedzynarodowego_24_X_1970.html) [Access date: 27.06.2013].

by the international law, they may be difficult to fulfil in practice and individual domestic and international legal acts are plainly contradictory in this respect.

Similarly to legal documents, we may notice a division in the views on legality of secession amongst theoreticians of international relations and international law; however, in most cases they are in favour of limiting admissibility of secession only to exceptional cases. W. Multan and J. Symonides argue that the principle of self-determination should be narrowed only to nations subjected to external violence and exploitation, because otherwise it might lead to excessive dividing of state organisms<sup>26</sup>. Simultaneously, however, the majority of analysts and law theoreticians calls for admissibility of secession if human rights are violated, the possibility to realise the rights is threatened, or when there is a threat of annihilation of a given national community. However, this point of view eliminates chances for self-determination of the majority of contemporary separatisms – at least European ones – even in the form of a widened autonomy beyond the will of a given state.

Not being able to support our thesis on the international law alone, we need to turn to the international political and legal practice with the question of admissibility of separatist and secessionist aspirations. For a state to function in the geopolitical reality it is not enough that it is able to separate itself from the existing state – it still must be recognised on the international arena. In the political doctrine we may find two theories of recognition: constitutive and declarative. The first, coming from the classical positivist school of international law, says that we can speak about functioning on the international arena only when a state is recognized by other states and international organizations. However, in accordance with the declarative theory, the state comes into existence in the moment it meets the criteria of statehood – it has its own territory, permanent population, state bodies able to govern effectively, and it is able to cooperate with other states<sup>27</sup>. If this is the case, recognition has an exclusively declarative character, that is to say, it confirms the state's actual functioning. Nowadays, in the

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<sup>26</sup> See K. Czubochoa, *Pojęcie państwa i procesy państwowotwórcze we współczesnym prawie międzynarodowym* [The Notion of State and State-Building Processes in the Contemporary International Law], Toruń 2012, p. 172.

<sup>27</sup> C. Ryngaert, S. Sobrie, *Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik? The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia*, "Leiden Journal of International Law" 2011, No. 24, pp. 467–490, <http://igitur-archive.library.uu.nl/law/2012-0601-200500/Ryngaert%20-%20Recognition%20of%20states2011.pdf> [Access date: 27.06.2013].



discourse on statehood the latter theory is dominant. However, when analysing separatisms, which in recent times led to the emergence of new state organisms, we may notice that these elements are interpenetrating and the issue of a formal recognition by the actors on the international stage is equally valid to the practical aspects of functioning of a given state. As an example we may give the case of Kosovo, which, in spite of a factual separation from Serbia, a confirmation on the lack of illegality of this secession by the International Court of Justice in Hague, and a gradually growing recognition in the majority states of world, is formally still not recognised as a state by the international civil service of the UN.

Therefore, we can see that the issue of recognition (in the event of secession), or the opinion of chief actors of the international political landscape (in the event of separatist aspirations) is exceptionally significant. On this basis we may state that, in principle, secession and separatism are not recognised on the geopolitical arena. Separatism is often connected with terrorism in the public discourse – even though, actually, only a small percentage of separatists resorts to terrorist practices, all actions of this type are treated as attempts at violating the territorial, social, or cultural integrity of states, “spreading anxieties,” and building divisions. Moreover, in the popular view, secessionist aspirations bring a threat of destabilization of the international order, since, in creating new state entities, they quite naturally cause a shift of the geopolitical balance in the region or in the world. Because of that, the international community, and also the United Nations Organization, have a negative approach towards secession, or a neutral one at best. A secession has chances for surviving and confirming its legality, if it proves to be effective, and, in addition, when it does not drastically infringe upon any rights of groups inhabiting a given territory<sup>28</sup>. A certain premise for acknowledging either a secession or separatist aspirations (to create an autonomy, for instance) as justified or legal, may be caused by the infringement (especially a drastic infringement) of the rights of a given population, related not only to maintaining separate identity, but to basic human rights in general, on the account of membership of a given nationalist group. This element in the political and legal discourse is indicated as the main factor that is the practical condition for the right of self-determination of nations. However, as the case of the Kurdish minority shows, that is not a factor sufficient to provide the aspirations of a given group with explicit, although perhaps declarative, support on the part of the international community.

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<sup>28</sup> K. Czubocha, *Pojęcie państwa...*, op.cit., pp. 181–182.

## 5. Causes of Separatist and Secessionist Aspirations

In the above part we discussed the nature of separatism and secession and the place of separatist and secessionist aspirations in the international political and legal order. However, while considering to what extent these aspirations may lead to disintegration of the international order, it is worthwhile to consider what the causes of these phenomena are, and, therefore, what they may lead to in the contemporary global political and social conditions.

Looking from the theoretical perspective, we may distinguish a few main motives substantiating the right to secession. Aleksandar Pavković distinguishes five primary sources, on which we may base our belief on the legality of secessionist actions<sup>29</sup>:

1. Anarcho-capitalist approach – assumes that the right to secession results from the freedom of an individual, which leads to the right to create political associations and secession in order to create a political order with other people sharing similar views;
2. Democratic secessionism – derives the right to secession from the right of self-determination, which allows a given territorial community to aspire to leave an existing state and separate the territory with the consent of the majority;
3. Communitarian secessionism – assumes that a given group with strong feelings of identity, concentrated on a specific territory, aspires to strengthen the political position of its members, in order to create a *prima facie* impression of the right to succession;
4. Cultural secessionism – maintains that every group, which was previously in the minority, has the right to be protected and to develop their identity, also by separating themselves and creating their own state;
5. Secessionism of endangered cultures – according to this approach, if a minority culture is endangered by a state that has its own, dominating culture, this minority needs the right to create their own state in order to protect their own culture.

Therefore, as we can see above, we may seek justifications for separatism and secession in self-identification and the identity of individuals, groups, cultures,

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<sup>29</sup> A. Pavković, *Secession, Majority Rule And Equal Rights: A Few Questions*, “Macquarie University Law Journal” 2003, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MqLJ/2003/5.html> [Access date: 4.07.2013].

or in the feeling of endangerment. Now let us see how these theoretical assumptions fit into the actual contemporary separatist and secessionist aspirations.

“Protests are the language of the unheard,” said Martin Luther King. Following this train of thought, one should say that at the basis of separatist aspirations, especially those which assume the most radical forms, lies negligence – mostly on the part of the governing authorities and the entire central state apparatus, which are unable to provide the minorities with modes of functioning within the state and with the living conditions suitable to their expectations. However, it seems that such a statement would be a huge oversimplification, even more so, if we analyse the current conditions of the autonomies functioning in Europe, for instance, in the Spanish state – it would be impossible to talk about negligence. However, separatisms are far more complex phenomena, which are the outcome of various factors – historical, political, economic, and cultural. Only through examining this mosaic of causes, it is possible to make an attempt to comprehend the separatist aims of particular groups and nations.

As a rule, separatists aspirations are accompanied by a conglomeration of the factors indicated above – a feeling of separateness is rooted in history, but it is visible in the cultural context, and the economic factors are not negligible. However, what causes this feeling of separateness to make ethnic groups and nations take concrete actions in order to separate themselves from the current state, often in a violent manner? What are the factors that constitute the border beyond which an autonomy (which is often quite vast) is not enough, and having a state of their own becomes the main goal? Certainly, a high level of national awareness is of considerable importance. In a well-educated society, cultivating their own tongue, tradition, and culture, as well as being aware of the history of their nation and caring about extensive and regular education in this respect, the aspiration to recover the possibility of deciding about themselves no longer seems to be only a “tradition” (which remains the domain of traditions that are “from times immemorial”, rooted in the community and folk culture), but rather a logical next step, a natural right, and even an entitlement. Hence, as we can see on the example of Catalonia and the Basque Country, in modern societies (but not only) there is a correlation between actions of popularising national traditions and tongue, and the revival of national identity with the support and lobbying for the independence by wider and wider (and more and more educated) circles of the society. However, it is rare that the level of national awareness and identity is high enough to be an exclusive and sufficient factor. At the foundation of many separatisms lie many other causes. One of the characteristic stimulus for

an increase in separatist aspirations of nations and ethnic groups is the feeling of endangerment<sup>30</sup> – be that political, economic, or cultural. It is not without reason that a considerable increase of separatist aspirations of Catalonia and Basque Country grew noticeably in the times, when General Francisco Franco exercised authority in Spain. Franco's attempts to make Spain ethnically homogenous had to meet with the protest of the Catalonians and the Basque, particularly when bans and repressions were imposed on cultivating their own culture and using their native tongues. In attempt to maintain political and cultural identity, the response to these years-long actions bearing the hallmarks of terror, was an increase of separatist tendencies, which in the case of the Basque Country led all the way to the creation of ETA. A similar development (although repressions were on a much smaller scale) is taking place in the case of the Kurds or the Chechens.

Economic factors also have a significant influence on the growth of independence aspirations<sup>31</sup>. The abovementioned Catalonia and the Basque Country are among the most affluent regions of Spain. And although the Basque Country managed in advance to gain and maintain economic and fiscal independence, so that financial factor is not the main determinant of the Basque actions, in the case of the Catalonians economic arguments are very often put forward – the rich Catalonia simply does not want “to support” the poorer (and, in the view of the Catalonians, lazier) regions of Spain. A similar situation is taking place in Italy. Activists of the North League argue that a secession from the rest of the state would allow a rapid development of the region (a country by then?), which would not be encumbered with economic problems of the poor South.

To sum up, we may distinguish three main factors that influence the growth of separatist aspirations in contemporary ethnic groups and nations deprived of their own state<sup>32</sup>. A fundamental condition is an appropriately advanced national awareness of a given group, a sense of identity, and inhabiting a possibly compact territory. Another factor is an insufficient reaction of the central authorities to the aspirations to self-reliance of a given group. Both those factors combined bond the group and increase their feeling of endangerment.

Simultaneously, it is worthwhile to emphasise that in the contemporary times this feeling of endangerment may have not only a political or cultural character, but also a more and more economic background. Particularly, we may observe

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<sup>30</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>31</sup> J. Stefanowicz, *Bunt mniejszości* [Minority Rebellion], Warsaw 1977.

<sup>32</sup> T. Jerzak, op.cit.

this regularity on the example of European separatisms. In the Western Europe, where democratic canons and fundamental human rights, including the protection of the rights of minorities, long ago became an indisputable standard of political life, it is hard to talk about violating the rights of national or ethnic minorities to cultivate their identity, culture, or even to maintain political autonomy. In these conditions, nations without their own state have proper conditions for development – thus, the theory on the feeling of endangerment has little application as an element enhancing separatist aspirations. What is more, contrary to what we would expect in regards to that theory, in contemporary Europe pro-national movements propagating separatist aspirations are blooming, and, in the process, they are gradually expanding their expectations.

Simultaneously, a shift in the geopolitical order, which, on the one hand, was caused by integration (mostly European), and on the other hand, by globalisation, as well as the current conditions of the global political scene cause both separatist and secessionist aspirations, as well as the results that they exert on the international community, to undergo change in the course of years. For many years, secession was rejected in the discourse because it caused destabilization and a shift of power balance on the international arena. Meanwhile, in the times of disappearing borders, it seems that those shifts of balance are less meaningful, and in the times of promoting multiculturalism and regionalism, supporting a growing autonomy of individual regions is nothing controversial. Separatist and secessionist movements, instead of disturbing the international order, strive to fit into it. This is shown on the example of Catalonia, which aspires to make the Catalan language one of the official languages of the European Union – that is, to officially enter into the structures of European Community. As a result, at present, we are dealing with certain changes of the discourse on the definition and the role of the state and the issues of autonomy and self-determination. In the age of increasing stress put upon respecting human rights and extending their catalogue, separatist aspirations of national minorities are starting to be more and more appreciated, and this does not need to necessarily have a destabilizing character – at least up to a point, in which separatism starts to turn into a secession, and other factors come into the picture.

Thus, factors other than political and cultural are the ones which are more capable to threaten political stability in Europe and in the world. As it was mentioned earlier, one of the main factors which influence the growth of separatist aspirations in the societies of such regions as North Italy, Catalonia, or the Basque Country, are the anxiety that in the times of an economic crisis the inhabitants of these regions will be marginalised and their economic development

will be impaired by less developed regions. At present, we can see this clearly in Catalonia, which for years (and even centuries) has been the richest region of Spain, and currently contends with an economic collapse; the residents of that region blame the Spanish state for that situation, which strengthens the demands for separating from the Spanish state. Moreover, also the riots in Africa and the Middle East are more and more influenced by economic factors, which shape the attitudes of the population to a greater extent than the pre-existing political reasons. Even though they have different sources, those demonstrations take a more and more radical character. As a result, these new movements, even though they not always have separatist aspirations at their foundations, end up reaching for them, and, recently, revolutions are becoming one of the main elements destabilising the international order.

## 6. The Nature of Revolution

When we hear the word “revolution”, we associate it with the Great French Revolution of 1789, with violence, terror, and chaos. In the popular understanding, it is mostly similar to war, or civil war. However, in our deliberations we may not rely on popular associations.

The word “revolution” comes from Latin *revolutio* and means a “coup”, “return”, or “rolling backwards”. In 1390, it appeared in English and originally was used in connection with the heavenly bodies. This word obtained a new meaning in reference to the work of Nicolaus Copernicus *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* (*On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*) from 1543. At the time, this publication transformed scholarship and the contemporary world view, hence the term revolution gained new, subversive, and political connotations. For the first time this word was used in the political sense in 1660 after the fall of Oliver Cromwell’s governments and the restoration of monarchy in England. In the same meaning it was used in 1688, when the Stuart dynasty was overthrown and the crown was passed to William III of Orange. However, that event, known as the “Glorious Revolution,” was not aimed at introducing a new order, but rather at restoring the monarchy in its former shape and glory<sup>33</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> W. Wrzosek, *Losy jednej metafory: “rewolucja”* [The Fate of One Metaphor: ‘Revolution’] [in:] *Historia. Kultura. Metafora. Narodziny nieklasycznej historiografii* [History. Culture. Metaphor. The Birth of the Non-Classical Historiography], W. Wrzosek (ed.), Wrocław 1995, pp. 13–45. “The Glorious Revolution” is called also the bloodless revolution. In 1688 the English Parliament decided to deal with King James II of England.

As Hannah Arendt writes “The revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which to us appear to show all evidence of a new spirit, the spirit of the modern age, were intended to be restorations”<sup>34</sup> and thus they were not aimed at introducing a new quality. The modern understanding of the term “revolution” appeared in the last years of the eighteenth century, that is along with the French Revolution and the American Revolution. It was the first time when the participants of the revolution realized that returning to the old times was impossible, and that, quoting Arendt, “a new beginning could be... the result of what men had done and what they could consciously set out to do. From then on... novelty was no longer the proud and, at the same time, frightening possession of the few. When newness had reached the market-place, it became the beginning of a new story”<sup>35</sup>.

Jeff Goodwin gives two definitions of “revolution”:

- According to a broader definition, it “refers to any and all instances in which a state or a political regime is overthrown and thereby transformed by a popular movement in an irregular, extraconstitutional, and/or violent fashion”;
- According to a narrower definition, “revolutions entail not only mass mobilization and regime change, but also more or less rapid and fundamental social, economic, and/or cultural change during or soon after the struggle for state power”<sup>36</sup>.

However, Jan Baszkiewicz points to the following uses of the word “revolution”:

- As a political shake-up connected with the use of violence;
- As a global transformation of the society in all of its parameters;
- As a crisis of a political entity<sup>37</sup>.

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It was related to the manner of ruling of James II, who was in favour of absolutism and was trying to introduce it to England. The English, attached to their parliamentary traditions, would not have it. The goal of the revolution were met in 1689, when William III announced the Bill of Rights that for good banished the specter of absolutism from England.

<sup>34</sup> H. Arendt, *O rewolucji* [*On Revolution*, London 1964], Warsaw 1991, p. 42.

<sup>35</sup> Ibidem, pp. 45–46.

<sup>36</sup> J. Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements 1945–1991*, Cambridge 2001, p. 5.

<sup>37</sup> J. Baszkiewicz, *Państwo, rewolucja, kultura polityczna* [State, Revolution, Political Culture], Poznań 2009, p. 799.

Nevertheless, neither of these definitions managed to present the full meaning of the term. It is a fact that “revolution” means change, but it does not always need be sudden. The goal of a revolution is to introduce a new order in various aspects of political, economic, or social life. However, most of all, revolution is connected with regaining freedom. Freedom may be understood in a lot of ways: freedom from oppression, freedom from poverty, freedom of speech, etc. This struggle may be fought with weapons and violence, or on the intellectual plain, by staging a revolution in the way individuals think. That goal of reaching freedom is exactly what distinguishes revolutions from wars. Both may be violent, and, moreover, both may entail the use of armed forces. Wars feed on violence and, as a rule, it stops there, wreaking havoc and corrupting societies. Truth be told, countless wars were started in the name of regaining independence, but it was often a mask, a regular propaganda gimmick, aimed at hiding the actual interests of the fighting sides. Furthermore, wars are deliberate expressions of the human will. Warfare is carefully planned and carried out, because every mistake may result in defeat. It is often hard to see its internal logic, or sequences of well-thought acts. We may, however, notice a few stages of the birth of a revolution.

Firstly, there needs to be a certain change which creates a new situation, and, thus, a chance for the birth of a revolution (e.g. imposing new taxes, or a war). As a rule, this change causes the worsening of the public feeling and an increase in dissatisfaction. It may be an entire sequence of such changes, extended over the course of many years and achieving the climax at some point. Secondly, there occurs an event that has not been in the past a hotbed of revolution (e.g. a public scuffle, suicide, or riot). If the authorities are conscious of the threat, they may prevent the revolution (e.g. by carrying out reforms, or applying repressions).

In social science, as well as in literature, there are many typologies of revolution. Alexis de Tocqueville distinguishes:

- Political revolutions, aimed at changing the government and political institutions;
- Revolutions as shake-ups, e.g. The french revolution of 1789, the results of which are not limited to government change, but also include social changes. (Tocqueville pays particular attention to the brutality of methods and to terror.) Revolutions of this type are bottom-up, that is they begin in the lowest social classes;
- Long lasting revolutions, which may result in replacing the aristocratic principle with the democratic principle, but also in the transformations of the fundamental spheres of the social life: religion, educational system,



economy, and the status of women. As an example of a revolution of this kind, Tocqueville mentions the American Revolution<sup>38</sup>.

Charles Tilly in his typology lists: coup d'état, top-down takeover, civil war, revolutions and the so-called "great revolutions" (those, which result in a transformation of the social, economic, and political structures, such as the French Revolution)<sup>39</sup>.

Of course the term "revolution" is also used to describe changes outside the political sphere. This may mean changes in technology, culture, or philosophy. Revolutions of this type may have a global character, or may appear only within the borders of a given country. As an example we may mention:

- The Neolithic Revolution (about 10 thousand years ago) which provided the foundations for the development of civilization;
- The Industrial Revolution (at the turn of the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century), which started on the British Isles and spread to the entire world;
- The Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), which took place in China and revolved around a power struggle within the Communist Party of China;
- The Digital Revolution, connected with the development of communication technologies and computerisation; it continues from the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century until today.

It is possible to list many such "revolutions," however, they are not the objective of this study.

Since the dawn of time, states were characterised by transformations, systemic changes, and shifts in the way their citizens thought. States have always been involved in conflicts, both internal and external. However, not every change had a revolutionary character. Revolution, is not an "ordinary" change, it is not "slow," but at the same time it does not have to be "rapid." One should remember that the main purpose of a revolution is to introduce a new order, a new quality that encompasses political, social, and economic spheres. In addition, revolution is always connected with a desire for freedom. In the course of revolutionary fights, main goals may often degenerate, break into a number of indirect goals serving the interests of one man or one social group. Finally, a revolution may lose its ideals, weaken, die down, and fall. However, as history demonstrates, some aspects of revolutions may bring long-lasting and desired changes.

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<sup>38</sup> R. Boeshe, *Tocqueville's Road Map: Methodology, Liberalism, Revolution, and Despotism*, Plymouth 2006, p. 86.

<sup>39</sup> C. Tilly, *European Revolutions 1492–1992*, York 1995, p. 16.

## 7. Summary

The values of a given nation influence the internal policy of their state, and hence – since it is a participant of international relations – also the international reality. Integrating elements, such as, for example, national and cultural awareness must be taken into consideration in political relations. Participants of international relations strive to satisfy their needs of living, surviving, equalling others, recognition, and prestige. Therefore, various state aspirations meet and cooperate, compete, or fight one another, in the last case causing head-on confrontation and international conflicts. A lack or a limitation of prospects of realisation of those aspirational needs causes that the participants of international relations reach for more radical measures of influencing the international environment, causing its destabilization.

The disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and the end of the Cold War changed the attitudes of regional leaders. A threat of a global armed conflict was reduced, and the economic and environmental issues became more important. Problems connected with them surpass the abilities of individual states; however, on the other hand, social problems are more effectively solved by regional authorities than by the central bureaucracy. Such regularities cause fragmentation of democratic societies, particularly of the ones divided politically and ethnically.

At present, we observe as the fight with the economic crisis turns into a fight for internal stability. The crisis stimulates separatisms, which are often illusory dreams, because secession from their states could bring the regions subsequent challenges and much graver financial problems than the ones with which they are struggling at present. The only feasible way for those regions seems to be redefining their relation with their states and extending their autonomy, while maintaining national unity to their benefit.

Social and economic problems are also a catalyst for revolutionary moods. For the last two years we have been witnessing how incensed and dissatisfied societies of the Arab countries fought for better life conditions. Social transformations disturbed the political order that functioned for several dozen years and made the Arab countries seem very stable internally (in spite of a difficult geopolitical situation of the region). Almost in every state (perhaps with the exception of Lebanon) it was known who will be ruling and what will be the political line. In many states, societies have seen the rule of one and same family or person. The Arab Spring broke that rule and thus shook the regional geopolitical order.

As the French proverb says “in demanding vast independence and freedoms, one goes into an even greater captivity.” It appears that this opinion accurately refers both to secession and separatist aspirations, as well as to revolution. Nations and ethnic groups sometimes become engrossed in their own goals so much that they do not give due consideration to the effects and costs of their actions. In case of revolutions, their effects are difficult to predict, therefore evolutions seems to be a much safer option. As for the multinational states, perhaps it is worthwhile to build unity in multitude, instead of centralism and separatism?