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The Russo-Japanese war and its impact on Polish–Japanese relations in the first half of the twentieth century

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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.
ARTICLES
The Russo-Japanese War and its effects undoubtedly influenced the international situation and directly affected Poland as well as Polish-Japanese relations, in the short as well as the long run. In the short run – that is, during the war itself – various political forces in Poland (e.g. Polish Socialist Party, National League) sought to exploit it for their own ends (including the restoration of an independent Polish state), establishing direct contacts with representatives of the Japanese government. At the same time, Poles exhibited much greater interest in Japan as a country which, less than 40 years after it ended its isolation and began to modernize, had the courage to launch a war against mighty imperial Russia, Poland’s primary enemy at the time. This interest was reflected in numerous (for the era) Polish publications about Japan, including indirect translations of Japanese literature (Okakura Kakuzō 岡倉覚三, Nitobe Inazō 新渡戸稲造, Tokutomi Roka 徳富蘆花, translations of works by Westerners who had visited Japan (Wilhelm Deppeing, Henry Dumolard, Rudyard Kipling, Georges Weulerse) and works by Poles, including books and articles in the press.

The impact of the war in the short run: 1904–1905

Genesis: Poland and Japan prior to 1904

Due to unfavorable historical circumstances – i.e. Japan’s isolationist policy begun in 1639 and Poland’s loss of independence following the third partition in 1795 – there were no official Polish-Japanese relations until 1919. For this reason, very little news about Japan reached Poland and vice-versa until the end of the

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1 The text was partly presented during the conference on Nichiro sensō-to sekai – 100 nengo-no shiten kara (The Russo-Japanese War and the World: A Centennial Perspective), Tokyo 2004; it was published in Japanese as Pałasz-Rutkowska 2005: 143–68. All quotations in the text have been translated by Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska unless otherwise indicated.
The situation improved somewhat after Japan opened its borders and began the process of modernization. During this time, the Japanese sought to gain knowledge about the rest of the world as quickly as possible, and foreigners – including Poles – were able to visit the distant chain of islands in the Pacific and learn the culture of Japan at first hand. The first Polish researchers and travelers to visit Japan at that time were the zoologist Szymon Syrski (1829–1882), the oceanographer Jan Kubary (1846–1896) and the world’s leading researcher into the language and folklore of the Ainus, the ethnologist Bronisław Piłsudski (1866–1918; the older brother of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, who also figures in this paper), and a writer who later popularized the image of Japan in Poland, the ethnographer Waclaw Sieroszewski (1858–1945). The outstanding Polish travelers who visited Japan at the time were Count Karol Lanckoroński (1848–1933) and Prince Paweł Sapieha (1860–1934), and the Czarist general Bronisław Grąbczewski (1855–1925), whose travel memoirs helped to familiarize Poles with Japan.

Information about Poland and its history likewise began to reach Japan. Tōkai Sanshi, in his novel Kajin-no kigu 佳人之奇遇, unexpected encounters with beautiful women] (1885), mentioned the tragedy of the Polish nation, the partitions and the independence movement, wishing to caution Japan – just beginning to initiate international relations at the time – about great powers and their colonizing policies. Poland next appeared in Ochiai Naobumi’s poem Pōrando kaiko [remembrance of Poland], which is part of the longer poem Kiba ryokō [騎馬旅行 journey by horse] (Ochiai 1960: 114–5). Ochiai wrote this work, which is known in Japan essentially as a popular soldier’s song, on the basis of a lone horseback journey from Berlin to Vladivostok (February 11, 1892 – June 12, 1893) undertaken by Major Fukushima Yasumasa (福島安正 1852–1919; see Pałasz-Rutkowska 2000: 125–34), the precursor of intelligence-gathering operations soon to be conducted by the modern Japanese army in Europe and Asia. Fukushima’s main task was to obtain information about modern European armies and their strategies, particularly those of Japan’s most powerful and dangerous neighbor, Russia. Fukushima was the first representative of the Japanese authorities to make contact with Poles, as he believed that these traditional opponents of Russia – and especially those who sought to regain Poland’s independence by defeating Russia by force of arms – would provide him exact information concerning this power (Ōta 1941; Shimanuki 1979). Fukushima sent information about Russia and anti-Czarism movements in the Polish territories to the Japanese Army General Staff, which made use of it immediately prior to and during the Russo-Japanese War. This was the first time in history that cooperation, though still unofficial, took place between representatives of the government of Japan and Poles.

Polish-Japanese cooperation during the Russo-Japanese war

This subject has been relatively well covered by Polish and Japanese scholars³, so I will present the scattered information on this cooperation and its consequences in an ordered and abbreviated manner, limiting myself to cooperation and contacts between two political parties in Poland – the National League (NL) and Polish Socialist Party (PSP) – and representatives of the Japanese authorities.

Before the war began on February 10, 1904, the Japanese authorities decided to make contact with representatives of groups that opposed Russian rule over the nations of Europe, including Poles, and to exploit their efforts to regain independence for the purpose of weakening their huge enemy. Toward this end, colonel Akashi Motojirō (明石元二郎 1864–1919)⁴, till then the Japanese military attaché in St. Petersburg, was sent to Stockholm. The Japanese Army General Staff (Sambō Hombu 参謀本部) ordered him to build an intelligence network that would operate in Russia, to sabotage the Trans-Siberian Railway and to support revolutionary forces – an opposition against Czarism on the territory of great Russia, whose armed actions could effectively weaken the Russian military in Manchuria. Akashi made contact with representatives, among others, of the Finnish opposition (Fält 1976: 205–238), particularly its leader, the lawyer and writer, Konrad Viktor (Konni) Zilliacus (1855–1924), and Jonas Castren (1855–1922), a leader of the Finnish Constitutional Party. It was Jonas Castren who recommended to Akashi the NL in Poland and its leader, Roman Dmowski (1864–1939)⁵.

Akashi, who met Dmowski in Cracow at the beginning of the war, encouraged him to foment an uprising on the Polish territories, which together with other insurrections against Czarist rule in Europe (e.g. Finland), would divert Russian forces from the Far-Eastern theatre of war, as Akashi reasoned (Inaba 1995: 26–44). But Dmowski maintained that, considering the situation at that time, such an uprising would only end in yet another tragedy for the Poles (Dmowski 1988: 91–2). And it would not produce the expected benefits for Japan, as Russia would quickly suppress it and then redirect a part of its forces in the Polish lands to its army fighting Japan in the Far East – thus strengthening its forces against Japan. Dmowski argued the threat of an uprising breaking out would be more advantageous for Japan, than an actual uprising itself. He nevertheless proposed cooperation that would take the form of surrender without fighting by Poles in the Russian Army in Manchuria. Akashi liked this idea. He thought that if Poles began to surrender at a culminating moment

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⁵ Dmowski was a Polish delegate to the Versailles Conference (1919), Minister of Foreign Affairs (1923) and a preeminent right wing figure in Polish politics until World War II.
of the war, it could genuinely weaken the morale of the entire Russian Army and generate serious problems for the Russian command. Dmowski eventually accepted an invitation to visit Japan and, with letters of recommendation in hand from Akashi to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, General Kodama Gentarō (児玉源太郎 1852–1906), and the Chief of the Department II (Intelligence), the aforementioned General Fukushima Yasumasa, he left for Tokyo at the end of March. He wanted to present his views directly to the Japanese authorities; moreover, he wanted to warn them against what he felt would be the negative effects of insurrectional activities planned by the Polish socialists, whom he suspected – correctly, as it turned out – of having also made contact with the Japanese.

Akashi did not limit his Polish contacts to Dmowski. After Dmowski left for Japan, probably without his knowledge, Akashi contacted Jan Popławski (1854–1908) and Zygmunt Balicki (1858–1916), leaders of the NL, and proposed that they organize sabotage on the Trans-Siberian Railway, which constituted the only source of supply for the Russian Army in the Far East. The Poles liked this idea, realizing that if the railway were destroyed it would substantially hinder and possibly even prevent the sending of Poles impressed into the Czarist army to the Far East. But because the first attempts at sabotage failed, Akashi decided to train two persons specially selected for this purpose by Balicki. No one in the ranks of the National League was deemed to be suitable, so help was sought from the co-founder of the Polish Socialist Party, Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz (1864–1924). Jodko, who had previously made contact with the Japanese (see below) and proposed, among other things, to sabotage the Trans-Siberian Railway, found two appropriate candidates: Mieczysław Dąbkowski (1880–1946) of the Lwów-based Odrodzenie (Renaissance) Group, which sympathized with the PSP, and the socialist Wacław Harasymowicz (1875–1923). The training took place in Paris and lasted several weeks. It was conducted by Tanaka Hirotarō, whom Akashi brought in from Germany. However, despite the sincere intentions and enthusiasm of the trainees as well as interested representatives of both parties, Dąbkowski and Harasymowicz never went to Siberia. Thus, the plan to sabotage the Trans-Siberian Railway was ultimately a failure.

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War rekindled hopes among members of the PSP that Poland would be able to regain its independence. The party’s main leader, Józef Piłsudski (1867–1935), believed that Polish cooperation with the

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6 There were also many cases of desertion from the Russian Army, especially during mobilization in Poland; see: Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan (abbr. GGS), 1.6.3.2–9: Makino to Komura, no. 288 (Dec. 21, 1904), no. 292 (Dec. 31, 1904), no. 75 (March 1, 1905), etc.

7 Inaba 1995: 53–55. There were probably some attempts to destroy other railways, i.e. in Manchuria, see GGS, 5.2.15.13: Mizuno to Komura, no. 301 (Aug. 8, 1904).

8 J. Piłsudski, was then the first Marshal of Poland (1920), Chief of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Military Forces (1919–1920), Minister of War (1926–1935), and Prime Minister (1926–1928, 1930).
Japanese could bring about the mutually advantageous weakening of the Russian Empire and, in the end, speed up its defeat. He wanted to exploit Russia’s engagement in the Far-Eastern war and lead an armed uprising on the Polish lands of the Russian Empire to restore Poland’s independence. The socialists undertook their first attempt to make contact with the Japanese, through Count Makino Nobuaki, the Minister of Japanese Legation in Vienna, in early February 1904 – before Akashi met with Dmowski. Because the attempt did not succeed, another try was made in London. In mid March, Witold Jodko-Narkiewicz met with the Japanese Minister to England, Viscount Hayashi Tadasu (林董 1850–1913). He presented him proposals concerning, inter alia, the creation of a Polish legion under the Japanese army, which would consist of Polish POWs and Poles from America, and the dissemination of revolutionary, anti-Czarism literature among Polish soldiers in the Russian army in Manchuria, which would encourage these soldiers to desert, thereby weakening Russian forces. Jodko also spoke about the possibility of destroying bridges and railroads in eastern Russia and Siberia. These proposals – particularly sabotaging the Trans-Siberian Railway, which was the only supply line for the Russian army in Manchuria, as well as propaganda encouraging Polish soldiers to desert – greatly interested Hayashi as well as the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Komura Jutarō (小村寿太郎 1855–1911). However, Komura agreed with Hayashi’s opinion that the Japanese government cannot incorporate foreigners into its army. Although no agreement was reached, talks in London and exchange of correspondence continued. Because the Polish side was very interested in building this cooperation, they began to provide the Japanese with information about the deployment of Russian forces, the number of soldiers placed in the Russian army before and after the outbreak of war. But the Polish socialists decided to demand some degree of reciprocity from the Japanese. Piłsudski even thought that Japan should pledge to place the matter of Poland on the agenda.

10 See: Jędrzejewicz 1974, 4–6; Makino 1989, vol. 1: 319–24. Makino was well informed about the situation by his ‘Cracow correspondent’; see his cables to minister Komura: GGS, 1.6.3.2–9: no. 238 (Nov. 18, 1904), no. 288 (Dec. 21, 1904), no. 75 (March 1, 1905), no. 135 (May 6, 1905).
12 Ibid., 528 (Komura to Hayashi, no. 194, March 20, 1904).
13 Ibid., 528–529 (no. 109, March 21, 1904); 529–533 (no. 110, March 21, 1904); 536–567 (no. 4, April 6, 1904); 540 (no. 6, April 14, 1904); see also: Jędrzejewicz 1974: 15–18.
14 Many years later, in his important work Poprawki historyczne [historical amendments] he wrote the following on the then Polish-Japanese co-operation: I made up my mind at once that I could be close with an intelligence organisation only if Japan would agree to give me technical assistance in terms of weapons and cartridges, because I did not expect that such a tremendous event like a war conducted by Russia, would be without any sign for Russian state and lead us, Poles to a situation of considerable improvement in the Polish fate; see Piłsudski, 1937b, vol. 9: 279–80.
of an international conference. Because the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
dragged its feet in issuing any kind of binding response, the PSP made contact
with the Japanese General Staff through Japan’s military attaché in London, Colonel
Utsunomiya Tarō (宇都宮太郎 1861–1922). The General Staff, which was mainly
interested in information of a military nature, began to consider the possibility of
inviting Piłsudski to Tokyo. It was decided that more could be decided through
direct, confidential talks than by means of official correspondence. Between May 21
and 23, Piłsudski met with Utsunomiya in Vienna to work out the details of the trip.
It was at that point that Piłsudski began to suspect that the Japanese did not entirely
believe in the efficacy of cooperation only with Polish socialists, as he learned that
the Japanese had contacted “other Poles and Finns” in the belief that it’s better to
rely on “united forces”, which he did not particularly like (Jędrzejewicz 1974: 32–3).
He did not know at the time that those “other Poles” were representatives of the NL
and Dmowski, who was already in Japan at that time. The next meeting with the
Japanese – this time in London (June 2) – convinced Piłsudski that the Japanese
treated his prospective trip to Tokyo seriously, as Hayashi had told Piłsudski, that
his superiors would decide the conditions and shape of cooperation with the PSP
(Lerski 1959: 84). Utsunomiya emphasized once again that the military authorities
were particularly interested in sabotage on the Trans-Siberian Railway. Thus, with
letters of recommendation to Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura Jūtarō, Deputy
Chief of the General Staff Kodama Gentarō and General Fukushima Yasumasa,
Piłsudski set off from England together with Tytus Filipowicz (1873–1953) at the
beginning of June and arrived in Tokyo on July 11, 1904. Only upon his arrival
did he find out that Dmowski had been in Tokyo since 15 May.

Dmowski, aware that a PSP representative would soon visit Japan, tried to see
Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura immediately after his arrival in the country. He
wanted to convince Komura that a revolution in Poland would bring about more
harm than good, because it wouldn’t give Japan anything and would be a catas-
throphe for Poland. Dmowski didn’t get to see Komura, but he had the occasion
to speak with his deputy, Chinda Sutemi (珍田捨巳 1856–1929), and the Director
of the Political Department and a close colleague of the minister, Yamaza Enjirō
(山座円次郎 1866–1914). He also met with the Deputy Chief of the General Staff,
general Kodama, as well as general Fukushima. At their insistence, he wrote two
memorials, translated into Japanese, in which he presented the political conditions
and parties in Russia, the significance of the Polish question in the foreign policy
of the three powers (Russia, Germany and Austro-Hungary) that had partitioned

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15 For details concerning his stay in Tokyo see: Jędrzejewicz 1974: 50–54; Jędrzejewicz 1986:
16 For details concerning Dmowski stay in Tokyo see: Bandō 1995: 35–44; Douglas 1931–1932:
Poland and the main aspirations of the Polish nation\textsuperscript{17}. He wrote a draft appeal of the Japanese government to Polish soldiers in the Russian Army calling upon them to desert and surrender to the Japanese. He also helped edit an appeal to soldiers of other nationalities. Then Dmowski asked the Japanese to separate Polish POWs from Russian POWs\textsuperscript{18}. He also obtained a promise from his hosts that, after the war, they would not send Polish POWs back to Russia who did not wish to return but to America instead, so as to avoid being court-martialed for desertion\textsuperscript{19}. Moreover, he visited a POW camp in Matsuyama on Shikoku island where Poles were being held.

Piłsudski, the day after arriving in Tokyo began talks in the General Staff, which was represented by General Murata Atsushi (村田惇 1854–1917). Unfortunately, he never met Kodama or Fukushima, to whom Utsunomiya had addressed letters of recommendation for him, because they had been sent to the staff commanding Japanese forces in Manchuria. Piłsudski, like Dmowski, presented a political memorandum and draft agreement on cooperation between the Japanese and PSP. In his memorial Piłsudski explained the internal situation in Russia and the position of the various nations, including the Poles, under Russian rule, suffering from forced russification and ready to take action against the Czarism (Piłsudski 1937a: 249–258). He wrote length about the Poles, their political aspirations, their revolutionary-organizational experience acquire over a century of struggle against the partitioning power, their aims and capacity to undertake specific actions. He emphasized that despite the cultural differences and discrepancies in objectives and political position of the two nations, only Poles, and mainly the PSP, were able to help Japan in its struggle against Russia. The draft agreement between the PSP and Japan was written in a similar tone\textsuperscript{20}. Although the fact that differences existed between Polish and Japanese interests was not ignored, it was felt that cooperation was possible and could yield favorable results for both parties. The PSP expected financial support from Japan, arms shipments, the organization of a Polish legion, special treatment of Polish POWs and cooperation on the international arena, inter alia, by helping Poles make contact with the governments of states whose foreign policy was directed against Russia. In exchange, the PSP pledged to provide information of a military nature, to send people to help the Japanese interrogate Russian POWs and organize a foreign legion, to write up appeals in various languages to soldiers in the Russian army calling upon them to desert, to undertake diversion activities in the case of mobilization in Poland, to organize an opposition in Poland, Lithuania and other captive nations of the Russian Empire,

\textsuperscript{17} The original documents have not been preserved; cf. Douglas 1931–1932: 183–5.
\textsuperscript{18} More about Polish POWs in: Inaba 2007: 137–144; Miyawaki 2005.
\textsuperscript{19} Inaba (1992: 237) maintains that finally they were sent to Russia.
\textsuperscript{20} For the text see Jędrzejewicz 1974: 45–9.
to organize a special spy ring that would provide information about Russian forces and to prepare for a possible insurrection.

Despite his letters of recommendation, Piłsudski did not succeed in meeting Minister of Foreign Affairs Komura. The reason why may have been the intervention of Dmowski, who shortly before his departure from Japan on July 20 submitted – without Piłsudski’s knowledge – a third memorial in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to minister Komura. Dmowski felt compelled to write it after exchanging views with Piłsudski during the three meetings they held in Tokyo, including a 9-hour discussion on various political topics that took place on July 14. At that point he became convinced that they held diametrically opposed positions concerning exploitation of the Russo-Japanese war for the Polish cause and could not leave the matter without further comment on his part. So, in his third memorial he explained his fears concerning revolutionary activities in the Polish lands, which he was convinced would be suppressed quickly and bloodily by Russian forces. He emphasized that any form of rebellion in Poland would be unfavorable for Japan and desirable for the Czarist authorities, who were waiting for some way to compensate for the defeats they had suffered in the Far East. He explained that the National League sought to maintain its political line, which he believed to be the only path leading to a favorable outcome for the Polish cause; by contrast, armed activities of any sort would only retard this process. He made it clear that Poles have a strong interest in Japan’s victory over Russia and would be happy to help the Japanese achieve it, though not at the cost of damaging their own interests.

In the end, the Japanese authorities did not agree to the cooperation proposed by the PSP, which can probably be attributed in part to Dmowski’s actions in Tokyo. But the main reason for their decision was the difference in interests between the PSP and Japanese government, and also differences in views about cooperation with the PSP between Japanese military authorities, represented by the General Staff, and Japanese civil authorities, as represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Above all, Piłsudski was interested in gaining political support, while the Japanese General Staff mainly wanted military intelligence information and sabotage along the Trans-Siberian Railway and had no interest at all in Polish political aspirations. Nor did these aspirations interest the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as Poland was simply too distant from Japan, in a geopolitical as well as cultural sense; moreover, Poland didn’t even exist as an independent state. Japan had only just entered the international arena and did not wish to risk the standing it had achieved for a cause not directly related to the furtherance of its established foreign policy. It also had to proceed in accordance with the policies

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21 Original in English see: GGS: 5.2.15–13 (Dmowski to Komura, July 20, 1904); cf. Gaimushō (ed.) 1958: 576–9 (Dmowski to Komura, July 20, 1904).
and opinions of its allies, primarily Great Britain, which cautioned it from getting involved in the Polish question. It is worth emphasizing, however, that Piłsudski made the first attempt to get the Polish cause onto the international agenda since the failed Polish uprising against Russia in 1863.

Even though Piłsudski’s mission ended in failure, the Japanese maintained limited contacts with Poles – mainly PSP members – until the end of the Russo-Japanese War. The Japanese provided assistance in buying arms and organizing a conference of anti-Czarism organizations active within the Russian Empire, which was meant to lead to the formation of a common front. Akashi Motojirō was primarily responsible for both these forms of cooperation; his goal, as I’ve mentioned before, was to create a united front of opposition groups from the nations under Russian rule, whose joint revolutionary actions against the Czarism would significantly weaken Russia. The first unsuccessful conference (Paris, October 1–5, 1904) was attended by representatives of only eight of the nineteen parties invited, including Dmowski and Balicki from the NL and Jodko, Malinowski and Kazimierz Kelles-Krauz (1872–1905) from the PSP (Bandō 1995: 215–29). Despite a joint declaration, none of the parties departed from its program. That’s why representatives of only the more radical parties, such as the PSP, were invited to the next conference in Geneva (April 2–9, 1905; Bandō 1995: 229–43; Inaba 1995: 127–37) and representatives of moderate parties, such as the NL, were left out. It was decided at this conference that revolutionary demonstrations would be launched that summer, first in the vicinity of St. Petersburg, then spreading out over a broad scale. The revolution was to be supported by the PSP on the territory of the Polish Kingdom. Demonstrations against the Czarism took place in the Polish Kingdom in late 1904 and early 1905. They were initiated on November 13, 1904 by a great armed demonstration conducted by the PSP on Grzybowski Square in Warsaw. There is no evidence, however, directly linking this demonstration and others to financial aid provided by the Japanese, who provided the PSP funds every month until nearly the end of the war – that is, until September 5, 1905 – to buy weapons, ammunition and explosives (Jędrzejewicz 1974: 71–85). In exchange, they received information about the course of mobilization, movements and morale of Russian forces sent to the Far East, Russian policies in the Polish lands and the mood of the general public.

Although Polish-Japanese cooperation during the war did not yield all the benefits the two parties had hoped for, it undoubtedly contributed to future ties between the two nations when they initiated official relations after World War I. Moreover, the war itself and Japan’s victory over Russia left an imprint on Dmowski’s and Piłsudski’s views as well as the image of Japan in Poland.
The war’s impact on the views of Roman Dmowski and Józef Piłsudski

The Russo-Japanese war and Piłsudski and Dmowski trips to Tokyo exerted an influence on their views and actions in later years. Although the two politicians differed in their opinions and attitudes toward taking advantage of the Russo-Japanese war for Polish benefit, there was something what joined them – an admiration of Japan, a characteristic true for the entire Polish society at that time. Dmowski very willingly referred to his observations from Japan in his later works. He admired Japanese civilisation and culture, and the civil and human values of the Japanese nation. He realised how important moral values and the connection of the individual with society and its history were. He wrote (1904, 9: 625–53; 10: 751):

*Japan’s victories are victories of moral power over universally recognised material power. /.../ Millions, hundreds of millions /.../ were spent to strengthen Russian rule in Asia /.../ – and all that is becoming shattered into fragments under the influence of power accumulated in Japanese souls, power which concentrated them in one wish expressed in one cry: Dai Nihon banzai! banzai!*

*Japan must be great and must live for ever – its every son wants it and is ready to sacrifice for it. This wish and this readiness of self-sacrifice – is exactly the main treasure of Japan, the source of its power, the secret of its victories. /.../

*Twenty centuries of national existence due to the power of its continuity have united and cemented this nation where collective instincts excel individual ones; the Japanese [are] more part of the society than individual[s], he behaves more with a view to the common good than to individual benefit. /.../

*Whereas Japanese collective instincts are so strong that they limit in great measure the free will of man, in other nations with unsteady histories and influences they are so weak, that everything becomes subject to discretion. Therefore we are the nation with the most free will, which settles into the shape of lawlessness and playfulness if we do not feel we are in captivity.*

Dmowski also wrote about the Japanese in the preface to Aleksander Czechowski’s *Historia wojny rosyjsko-japońskiej* [history of the Russo-Japanese War] (Czechowski 1906: XXIII–XXIV):

*A strong patriarchal family, strong monarchy, patriarchal despite constitutional forms, traditional loyalty between subordinate and superior /.../ all based on a sense of duty and honor so great as to be incomprehensible to our world – this is the moral core of Japanese society and the Japanese state. It’s mainly thanks to this that the Japanese were able to perform the unprecedented task of assimilating all of Europe’s achievements in science, technology and warfare they needed to preserve their national
independence /*...*/ thanks to this they were capable of conducting an exceptionally precise campaign /*...*/ finally, thanks to this they set extraordinary examples of heroism and sacrifice.

On one side /*...*/ fought people who mainly thought about what they deserve for service to the state – on the other side, people who mainly concerned with fulfilling their duty. During this war the idea of duty prevailed. This is a good reminder for all of us who speak more and more about the rights due to us and who are increasingly losing a sense of the duties incumbent upon every member of society.

Under the influence of the war, a turning point can be observed in Dmowski’s opinions concerning man and the nation, and nationalism, which were revealed in his later life.

Piłsudski, a soldier and commander was not – unlike Dmowski – interested in the traits of the Japanese people, but in the morale of Japanese soldiers and in skills of Japanese commanders as well as the strategy they adopted during the war. He considered their strategic and tactical ideas to be precursory, and behind the strategy taken in World War I, as well as in the Polish-Bolshevik War of 1920. He studied analyses of the topic and used examples set by the Japanese during lectures for officers at courses of the Związek Strzelecki [Rifle Association] and in articles published in the journal Strzelec22.

He had a high opinion of the Japanese Army, and when in 1925 the first official military attaché (till 1928), Colonel Wacław Jędrzejewicz (1893–1993), was leaving for Tokyo, Marshal Piłsudski decided to honour 51 Japanese commanders from the war with the Virtuti Militari, the highest Polish military decoration23. He specified not only the number of medals and their class, but also the units and battles in which they fought. The only highest commanders from the war still alive at the time were Admiral of the Fleet Tōgō Heihachirō (東郷平八郎 1847–1934), the commander of the Japanese Combined Fleet, who defeated Russia’s Baltic Fleet in the battle on the Straits of Tsushima, Marshal Oku Yasukata (奥保鞏 1846–1930), commander of the 2nd Army and Marshall Kawamura Kageaki (川村景明 1850–1926), Commander of the 10th Division. Tōgō was decorated earlier – on August 7, 1925 – during a ceremony held at the Polish legation in Tokyo, where he received the Polonia Restituta medal from Polish Minister Plenipotentiary Stanisław Patek (1866–1945) for merit in service to the state and society24. Oku was awarded the Virtuti Militari together with Kawamura on March 12, 1925, and the presentation ceremony was

24 See: GGS: 6.2.1.2–30: Tōgō gensui (Polish Legation in Tokyo to minister Shidehara, Aug. 4, 1925); The Japan Times 1925.
held a year later on March 9, 1926, also at the Polish legation. Marshall Oku was unable to participate due to illness, thus the decoration was given him through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Jędrzejewicz recalls, however, that only Kawamura was decorated at that time, that the ceremony took place in his home, and that Oku, like Tōgō, received the Polonia Restituta (Jędrzejewicz 1993: 166–7).

The rest of the officers’ names were to be established by the Japanese. The fact is that Marshal Piłsudski unintentionally caused the Japanese quite a problem, as drawing up a list that met his instructions was not so easy 20 years after the end of the war. A majority of the most meritorious commanders were no longer alive, so it was necessary to find worthy replacements for them. It was decided that recipients of the Polish medals would be chosen from among those who had been awarded Japanese decorations that were the equivalent of the Polish Virtuti Militari. But Piłsudski also mentioned specific units that had fought in particular battles, which had to be taken into account when putting together the list of recipients. Thus, work on preparing the complete list lasted two and a half years – it wasn’t until early 1928 that it was handed over to Jędrzejewicz. The decorating ceremony took place in Tokyo’s Imperial Hotel on March 28, 1928. The list of medal recipients, which has been preserved in the Gaimushō Gaikō Shiryōkan [Diplomatic Record Office of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs], contains 50 names. General Oku took part in the ceremony, but as a guest of honor, as he had been officially decorated together with general Kawamura in 1926. Jędrzejewicz described this event in his memoirs, and summarized it in a manuscript for the magazine Niepodległość (Jędrzejewicz (unpublished): 10–11):

This is how I performed the task I received from Marshal Piłsudski. The most outstanding commanders of the Russo-Japanese War received proof of gratitude from reborn Poland for their toil and combat, which unbeknownst to them had significance in our struggle for freedom and independence.

Publications on Japan in Poland

Interest among Poles about Japan sharply increased during the war, which is evident from the number of publications on Japan – and not only directly about war-related topics – that appeared in 1904–1905. This is all the more revealing when

25 See GGS: 6.2.1.2–30: Oku gensui (Polish Legation in Tokyo to Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, no. 9654, March 6, 1926); The Japan Times 1926.
26 For the list see: GGS: L.2.2.2–2–10 (Jędrzejewicz to minister Tanaka, no. 12933 (March 29, 1928); comp.: Pałasz-Rutkowska & Romer 2009a: 349 (Annex 5); Pałasz-Rutkowska & Romer 2009b: 41 (Annex 5).
the quantity of publications on Japan is compared before and after the war\textsuperscript{27}. They included works translated from European languages as well as longer and shorter publications by Polish authors. The first group included, among others, Henry Dumolard's \textit{Japonia. Pod względem politycznym, ekonomicznym i społecznym} [Japan, political, economic and social aspects] (1904), Andre Bellesort's \textit{Podróż do Japonii. Społeczeństwo Japońskie} [journey to Japan; Japanese society] (1903), Wilhelm Depping's \textit{Japonja} [Japan] (1904), Rudyard Kipling's \textit{Listy z Japonii} [letters from Japan] (1904), G. Weulersse's \textit{Współczesna Japonia} [contemporary Japan] (1904), A. Herrich's \textit{Azja Wschodnia, Japonia, Korea, Chiny i Rosja Azjatycka} [Eastern Asia, Japan, Korea, China and Asiatic Russia] (1904), Alice Bacon's \textit{Kobiety samurajskie} [samurai's women] (1905), Bennett Burleigh's \textit{Państwo Wschodu, czyli wojna japońsko-rosyjska 1904–1905} [an Eastern state – the Russo-Japanese war] (1905), W. Doroszewicz's \textit{Wschód i wojna} [the East and the war] (1905), E. B. \textit{Japonia, kraj i ludzie} [Japan, land and people] (1905), Irving Hancock's \textit{Japoński system trenowania ciała} [Japanese body training system] (1906) and the same author's \textit{Japoński system trenowania ciała dla kobiet} [Japanese body training system for women] (1906), Lafcadio Hearn's \textit{Kokoro} [heart] (1906). There were also indirect translations of Japanese works like: Tokutomi Kenjirō (Roka)'s \textit{Namiko} (1905; in Japanese original as \textit{Hototogisu} [cuckoo]), \textit{Terakoja albo szkoła wiejska} [terakoya, or a village school] (1905; based on Takeda Izumo and others \textit{Sugawara denju tenarai kagami} [Sugawara and the secrets of calligraphy]), Nitobe Inazō's \textit{Bushidō} (1904) and Okakura Kakuzō's \textit{Księga herbaty} (1905; \textit{Book of Tea}), \textit{Przebudzenie się Japonii} (1905; \textit{The Awakening of Japan}). Jan Grzegorzewski's \textit{Opowieści japońskie w spolszczeniu} [Japanese stories in Polish] (1905).

Knowledge from these publications was used by Polish authors who had not yet had an opportunity to travel to Japan. So we have to keep in mind that this information was to some extent limited, fragmentary and not free of distortions, but considerably more accurate and about not merely the course of the war, but primarily about Japanese history and its culture in general.


Owing to the limited scope of this article, it is impossible to discuss all of the works mentioned, but they can be generally characterised as presenting a favourable image of Japan and even admiration for the Japanese. During the war, Japan appears to have become a model of the traits essential for a strong nation and state – traits which were so badly needed by Poland under the partitioning powers. Poles were impressed by the courage of the Japanese, who – barely a few decades after having launched the process of modernisation and disregarding their dearth of experience in contacts with Western powers – fought a victorious war against the mighty Russian Empire. Poles were also impressed by the Japanese’ capacity to draw upon appropriate models from other cultures to build their might, adapting them to the framework of their native culture. Much was also written about the Japanese’ love for their homeland, their sacrifice for the good of society as a whole and the national cause, their loyalty, courage and lack of individualism and egoism.

Bolesław Prus (1847–1912), one of the most outstanding Polish novelists of the positivist era, often referred to the national traits of the Japanese in the hope that Poles would change theirs accordingly. In a series of articles entitled “Japonia i Japończycy” [Japan and the Japanese] published in Kurier Codzienny between April 19 and June 30, 1904, i.e., basing on the works introduced above, he wrote about Japan and the personal characteristics of the Japanese that enabled Japan to defeat Russia. He thus stressed valor, honor, personal dignity, spirit of sacrifice, obedience, which in his opinions were traits worthy of emulation.

The quintessence of his views can be found in an article that appeared in the January 22, 1905 edition of Goniec Poranny (Prus 1968: 52–8):

The Japanese have attracted attention to themselves not only with their victories, but also with their extraordinary virtues, for which even the Russians admire

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28 Positivism in Poland was a socio-cultural movement that defined progressive thought in literature, etc. in partitioned Poland after the January 1863 Uprising against Russia, until the turn of the 20th century.
The opinions of friends may be pleasant, but the respect of enemies is certification of true value. /.../

The quality that lies deepest in the soul of the Japanese is a great sense of personal dignity /.../, the mainstay of this dignity is courage, which the Japanese have proven so often during the present war that we need not underscore it. /.../ It appears that no other nation surpasses the Japanese in their scorn for death, and this constitutes their true strength.

Because Japan consists of a great many mountainous islands, it’s easy to understand that its inhabitants combine the virtues of highlanders and sailors, that they are strong and exceptionally adroit. /.../

Another enormously valuable virtue of the Japanese is their self-control. A person who is unable to control his anger, grief or joy is considered a barbarian in Japan. /.../ A Japanese always converses with a polite smile, but he will not divulge a secret, even if tortured, even if killed.

No less beautiful are their social virtues, supreme among which is patriotism. Japanese patriotism is not based on hatred or disparagement of outsiders, but on love of everything that is theirs. When the good of the army requires that several people sacrifice themselves to certain death, not several but... several thousand volunteers step forward. /.../

Such is the nation that only two years ago was still called “monkeys” by European wags, but whom now are publicly respected by their opponents. Everyone must work on themselves in these directions if they wish to receive respect.

Japan was a topic of another outstanding writer, the ethnographer Waclaw Sieroszewski, who conducted research on the Ainu culture in Hokkaido with the help of Bronislaw Piłsudski in 1903. On the way back to Poland, he visited Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe. He presented the information and impressions he acquired about Japan in a book that was published in 1904, *Na Daleki Wschód. Kartki z podróży* [to the Far East. Pages from the journey] (Sieroszewski 1911), and in articles that appeared in high-circulation illustrated cultural magazines like *Tygodnik Ilustrowany*, which was mainly devoted to history and current events, and in *Wędrowiec*, which focused on travel accounts. He created, in keeping with the conventional conceptions of Japan of the time, an image of Japan as a land of fearless knights and of virginally charming women. He painted with great skill the Japanese landscape and described the mentality of the Japanese people.

Publications from the era show that Poles began to take a liking to Japan – that distant country which had only just begun to step into the international arena and had so quickly defeated a powerful neighbor which was also Poland’s main

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29 Sieroszewski described that expedition in *Wśród kosmatych ludzi* [among hairy people], 1926 (in newspaper instalments), 1927 (separately; it had several book editions).
opponent. This was connected to the Poles’ hopes of regaining their independence and admiration for the national traits of the Japanese thanks to which the country achieved its goals so quickly and defeated their common enemy.

The impact of the war in the longer perspective

When one examines the influence of the war on Polish-Japanese relations in the longer run (the 1920s and 1930s), it is evident that these relations continued to be dominated by the two countries’ antipathy to their mutual enemy, Russia, which had become the Soviet Union. Poland, which regained its independence after World War I, sought to solidify its statehood and strengthen its position on the international arena. That’s why Japan – for whom Russia and then the USRR was still a potential opponent – constituted a good counterweight for the mainly difficult relations Poland had with its eastern neighbor.

This was particularly important for Japan, which, as a young world power, badly needed accurate information about its most dangerous neighbor. This need determined the choice of Japanese diplomatic representatives in Warsaw – nearly all of them were specialists on Russia, and the first Japanese envoy after the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1919 was Kawakami Toshitsune (川上俊彦 1861–1935; from 1921 to 1923), who had translated for Piłsudski and Dmowski, when they visited Japan during the war.

Polish-Japanese relations, however, were dominated by military co-operation, including co-operation between intelligence services. Polish cryptologists, whom the Japanese considered to be outstanding (particularly in deciphering Russian codes), passed on their knowledge to Japanese officers in Tokyo as well as in Poland in various training centers. This co-operation continued unofficially even during World War II, when Poland and Japan officially belonged to opposite sides.

Polish-Japanese military cooperation in the 1920s and 1930s

The importance of Poland for Japan as a source of information about Russia is indicated by the Japanese military attachés selected to serve in Warsaw. Nearly all of them were connected with military intelligence focused on Russia, whether through their positions in the Army General Staff, usually in its Department II (Dainibu 第二部) or in its special intelligence agencies (tokumu kikan 特務機関) in Manchuria and other places, or in the Kwantung Army, or in the Japanese military attaché office in Moscow. The first Japanese attaché in Warsaw was Captain Yamawaki

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30 For biographical notes on Japanese officers see Hata (ed.) 1991.
Masataka (山脇正隆 1886–1974; from May 1921 to June 1922), who played a special role in tightening military cooperation between the two countries in the 1920s and 1930s and who had come to Poland from Russia as early as 1919. His successor, Major Okabe Naosaburō (岡部直三郎 1887–1946; from June 1922 to May 1925), had previously trained for a year in Khabarovsky (1917) and later served in the special intelligence agency – an intelligence post there, which reported to the Japanese command in Vladivostok during the Siberian expedition. Major Higuchi Kiichirō (樋口季一郎 1888–1970; from May 1925 to February 1928) had likewise been assigned to perform intelligence work for the Japanese Army command in Vladivostok, later heading up the intelligence post at Khabarovsky. Colonel Suzuki Shigeyasu (鈴木重康 1886–1957; from February 1928 to June 1930) had been delegated to Japanese units in Siberia during his stay in China from 1916 to 1919. Major Hata Hikosaburō (秦彦三郎 1890–1959; from June 1930 to December 1932) worked in intelligence units focused on the USSR, as an employee of the Russian Section [Roshiahanロシア班] of Department II, head of the special intelligence agency in Manzhouli and a military attaché assistant in Moscow. Major Yanagida Genzō (柳田元三 1893–1952; from December 1932 to March 1934) had received training in the USSR and in Poland, from 1927 to 1929. Colonel Yamawaki Masataka, after returning to Japan from Poland in 1922, worked in the General Staff and in the General Inspectorate of Military Education [Kyōiku Sōkanbu 教育総監部] before being reassigned to Warsaw (March 1934 – December 1935). General Sawada Shigeru (沢田茂 1887–1980; from December 1935 to March 1938) had previously been delegated to work in special intelligence agencies in Omsk and Vladivostok as well as Harbin in Manchuria. The last Japanese military attaché assigned to Warsaw before World War II (officially recalled in March 1940) was Lieutenant Colonel Ueda Masao (上田昌雄 1897-?), who had been delegated to Siberia in 1920–1922, headed the intelligence post in Manzhouli in 1930–1931 and then worked in the staff of the Kwantung Army. It should be added that after returning to Japan, he became director of the school that trained Japanese intelligence personnel, the so-called Nakano Army School [Rikugun Nakano Gakkō 陸軍中野学校] (Hata (ed.) 1991: 724–5).

When Yamawaki officially assumed the post of military attaché in Warsaw, he began his efforts to establish regular cooperation between the Japanese and Polish General Staffs. He was mainly interested in having Japanese personnel trained in cryptography by Poles, who were considered to be specialists due to their long experience in the field. Years later, he recalled these efforts:

During the Polish-Soviet War, the Polish side often provided us concrete information on the breaking of Soviet codes. They had such highly developed deciphering capabilities that they were able to read an order before it came down from the Supreme Command of the Red Army from the front lines and reached the battalions through
the regiment. /.../ The main person involved in this was Jan Kowalewski. I passed this information to my successor, Captain Okabe Naosaburō. After discussing the matter together and listening to the opinion of this specialist, I decided to present the matter in Japan. After returning home, I submitted a report to the head of Department II, general Itami Matsuo. At first he was very unfavorably disposed toward the idea, saying such things as, “How can the land forces of a first-class state take lessons from the army of a third-class state?” But in the end he agreed.

Not only Yamawaki but also Okabe and Kasahara Yukio (笠原幸雄 1889–1988), a trainee assigned to Warsaw, held talks in this matter in Department II of the General Staff in Warsaw. They most often spoke with the aforementioned Waclaw Jędrzejewicz of the Russian Section, who was favorably disposed toward Japan (and who became the first Polish military attaché in Japan in 1925). Finally, at the beginning of 1923, Captain Jan Kowalewski (1892–1965) traveled to Tokyo for three months at the official invitation of the Japanese General Staff. The most details concerning this course and its results can be found in the documents of one of the pioneers of Japanese cryptography, Colonel Ōkubo Shunjirō 大久保俊次郎, which are stored in the Bōei Kenkyūjo Senshibu Toshokan [Library of Military History Department in National Institute for Defense Studies] in Tokyo (Ōkubo 1961).

According to these documents, Kowalewski’s course was mainly about methods of deciphering various kinds of Soviet codes, though he also taught the structure of diplomatic codes and intelligence codes used at the time by European countries. The person responsible for the entire course from the General Staff was the head of the VIII Section of Department III (Communication), Colonel Iwakoshi Tsuneichi (岩越恒一 1878–1945), and it was supervised by Captain Nakamura Masao (中村正雄 1892–1939) of the same section. The course participants specially designated by Department II were: Captain Hyakutake Haruyoshi (百武晴吉 1888–1947) of the Russian Section, Captain Inoue Yoshisa 井上芳佐 of the English Section [Igirisuhan イギリス班], Captain Mikuni Naotomi (三国直福 1893–1990) of the French Section [Furansuhan フランス班], Captain Takeda Hajime 武田肇 of the German Section [Doitsuhan ドイツ班] and others. Other participants included Lieutenant Colonel Mike Kazuo (三毛一夫 1883–1973), who was assigned to the Guards Division (Konoe Shidan 近衛師団), but who

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32 Ibid., 141. See also: Jędrzejewicz 1993: 113. After Jędrzejewicz, the post was consecutively held by Major Henryk Rajchman-Floyar (1928–1931), Captain Antoni Słosarczyk (1931–1935), Major Antoni Przybylski (1935–1938) and Lieutenant Colonel Jerzy Levittoux (1938–1941).
had previously been involved in Russian-related intelligence, having worked in a post in Omsk among other places.

The course conducted by Kowalewski became the basis for further research and work. They raised the level of cryptography in the Japanese Army (Ariga 1994: 144–5). After the course came to a close, following a plan prepared by Captain Nakamura Masao, materials were collected in all the sections of Department II and a handbook was written up on their basis entitled Angō kaidoku no sankō [暗号解読の参考; aids for deciphering], which was then distributed to a majority of units in the army. The handbook was mainly about Soviet codes, but it also included information about codes used by other countries. In order to further improve the Soviet code-breaking skills of General Staff personnel who had taken Kowalewski’s course, the Japanese decided to send officers to Poland for longer courses of study, lasting about a year. Major Hyakutake and Major Kudō Katsuhiko 工藤勝彦 were sent to Poland for this purpose in 1926, Major Sakai Naōji (1891–1942) and Major Ōkubo Shunjiro in 1929, Captain Sakurai Nobuta 桜井信太 and Captain Fukai Eiichi 深井英一 in 1935. After returning to Japan, all of them worked in the General Staff or in Japanese units in China, where they put the skills they had acquired in Poland into practice. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Hyakutake was in charge of the Codes Section from July 1927 to mid–1931, when he went to Harbin to head up the intelligence post there. Besides the aforementioned cryptographers, other Japanese officers visited Poland in the 1920s mainly for the purpose of exchanging information about the USSR, but also to learn the organizational methods of the Polish Army.

The most important event during this period appears to have been a visit by representatives of the Japanese General Staff, organized by the Polish Ministry of Military Affairs and the General Staff. According to General Staff documents, in the first half of 1929 an official visit was made to Poland by General Matsui Iwane (松井岩根 1878–1948), head of Department II at the General Staff, together with his brother General Matsui Shichio (松井七夫 1880–1943), who were accompanied by Major Tominaga Kyōji (富永恭次 1892–1960), the aid to Japanese attaché in Moscow, and most likely Captain Terada Seiichi (寺田済一 1895–1969; who appears simply as “Seiichi” in the documents). They visited the 1st Light Calvary Regiment and the 1st Horse Artillery Division between April 27 and May 2, 1929. It is likely that the main purpose of their visit was to discuss further cooperation with Department II of the Polish General Staff concerning the exchange of information. Possible confirmation of this hypothesis is a document written by Poland’s military attaché in Moscow, Captain Grudzień, in which he states that as a result of the visit, the military authorities of Japan had come to the conclusion that Warsaw

34 For a list see: GGS, 6.1.6.1.–1; AAN, OII SzG–617; cf.: Pałasz-Rutkowska 1998: 79–81.
should be their center for collecting information about the Red Army\textsuperscript{36}. Captain Grudzień also wrote that in a conversation with Major Tominaga he found out that the Japanese General Staff was thinking about reducing personnel in Moscow and increasing staff in Warsaw.

Co-operation, which consisted mainly of exchanging information, was also conducted in Tokyo, particularly at the behest of General Yamawaki, who from the end of 1925 worked at Department II. It was he who brought Colonel Waclaw Jędrzejewicz to the Japanese General Staff. Jędrzejewicz, who as the Polish military attaché in Tokyo worked together with the Japanese from 1925 to 1928, described this co-operation as follows:

\begin{quote}
We decided that we would hold sessions once a week, discussing specific issues at each. It began by comparing the information the two staffs had on the deployment of large units of the Soviet Army. /.../ The differences were evident. We had to compare the sources of the two staffs. /.../ Japanese [foreign] policy was mainly connected with the Russian question, which made my work considerably easier. Manchuria and the Russian Far East – those were the territories that specially interested the Japanese government. This direction was expressed by the Japanese Army and General Staff\textsuperscript{37}.
\end{quote}

Before leaving Poland, Jędrzejewicz was thoroughly aware that:

\begin{quote}
that which divides Poland territorially from Japan (Soviet Russia) is precisely the element that closely connects these two countries. Thus an exact study of the Russian situation, constantly posing a threat to Poland as well as Japan, will be the element that fills up the work of the Polish military representative. /.../ Our relations with Japan were to be based on not having any secrets in relation to Japan in the matter of Russia\textsuperscript{38}.
\end{quote}

Co-operation between representatives of the two Staffs expanded substantially over the next decade, which primarily stemmed from increasing fears about the USSR’s actions in Asia. It took place mainly in Warsaw, Tokyo and Manchuria, where an intelligence-gathering post under Department II of the Polish General Staff in Harbin (established in 1932) maintained contact with Japanese intelligence operatives under the Kwantung Army (Peploński 1996: 165–170). At that time, the Japanese decided that Warsaw constituted a very good strategic point for setting up a kind of coordinating center for Japanese intelligence in Europe directed mainly toward the East, but also the West. Accordingly, they sent extra military assistants

\textsuperscript{36} AAN, OII SzG 617/41, Captain Grudzień to Chief of Department II (May 14, 1929), p. 70.
\textsuperscript{37} Jędrzejewicz 1993: 133, 180.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 120.
and advisors to the military attaché office in Warsaw. They also sent students to Poland, who, in addition to broadening their military knowledge or learning foreign languages, were also supposed to help the attaché office in its work, among other ways, by obtaining information (Matsumura 1977: 14–15). Also, probably over a hundred officers and non-commissioned officers came to Poland to study or to take brief training courses in the 1930s. However, in this case as well it is impossible to reconstruct the entire list, because almost none of the Japanese documents on the subject have survived, and Polish source materials contain varying and sometimes contradictory information. It is certain that in accordance with what was decided in the 1920s, the Japanese General Staff delegated Captain Fukai Eiichi and Captain Sakurai Nobuta to Poland for the sake of deepening their skills in the field of cryptography, especially relating to the USSR. They took a training program in the Codes Section of Department II from 22 August 1935 to 1 June 1936.

Evidence that the Japanese General Staff cooperated with Poles and that its main aim was to collect information about the USSR was a conference of General Staff representatives, which took place in Warsaw 10–13 December 1937. It was primarily devoted to verifying information about the Soviet army in peacetime, discussing issues relating to its mobilization and the country's rail transport capacity in the event of war. The Japanese were represented by: attaché Sawada, who was an expert on the Soviet military (as noted in the document cited), Lieutenant Colonel Futami, a specialist in mobilization-related matters who was temporarily staying at the Japanese military attaché office in Warsaw, Major Hirose Shiro, the secretary of the Japanese attaché office in Moscow and a specialist in rail transport issues who was gathering intelligence on the territory of the USSR, Major Takeda from the General Staff in Tokyo who was studying the Soviet army, and Captain Hayashi, who was also from the attaché office in Warsaw. It was possible to establish that Lieutenant Colonel Futami had the first name Akisaburō (1895–1987) and that he traveled around Europe from August 1937 to March of the following year as a representative of the Japanese General Staff in Europe. Takeda Isao (1902–1947) was in the Soviet Union and Germany beginning...

[40] See in: Centralna Agencja Wojskowa [Central Military Agency] (abbr. CAW), OIISzGG 56, 57: Wykaz oficerów japońskich na stażach w Polsce [a list of Japanese officers on training courses in Poland].
[43] AAN, OIISzG 616/249, p. 317; also Sakō Shūichi, an ambassador in Warsaw (1937–1941) wrote to Minister Hirota about the conference, but he maintained that it took place at the beginning of January 1938; GGS, B.1.0.0.Po/R, cable no. 131 (May 11, 1938).
in mid–1936. The last of the aforementioned Japanese participants in the conference was probably Hayashi Saburō (林三郎 1904–1998), an employee of the Russian Section of the General Staff who was sent to Moscow in April 1938, where he began work the next year as a Japanese attaché assistant. Japanese sources do not mention anything, however, about his stay in Poland (Hata (ed.) 1991: 116–117).

Thus, the most important task for Japanese military representatives in Poland in the 1920s and 1930s was to obtain information about the USSR and to deepen their cryptographic skills and general knowledge on intelligence operations. The attachés were responsible for this, particularly active among whom were Yamawaki Masataka and Sawada Shigeru. Because military cooperation with Poles went very well due to their efforts, they also tried to take advantage of their position and influence Japanese foreign policy in relation to Poland – a topic that goes beyond the scope of this paper (Pałasz-Rutkowska 1998: 138–143). It is possible only to cite a passage from a telegram sent by Tadeusz Romer, the Polish ambassador in Tokyo from 1937 to 1941, which confirms that the foundation of Japan’s cooperation with Poland was the two countries’ identical relation to the USSR:

> It happens to be the case that we have military officers in higher positions of the Ministry of War and the General Staff most of whom have been in Poland for shorter or longer periods of time/.../. They are friendly to our country and demonstrate a good understanding of our interests and our policy on the Soviet front. This circumstance has created fairly familiar personal ties between our embassy and leading circles in the army, in contrast to other foreign embassies in Tokyo.

> The durability and solidity of our friendship with Japan is based on our mutual relation to Russia, which is treated by both countries on a footing of complete equality between them, and on essentially not transferring it to other areas, where Poland’s and Japan’s interests may be completely different.  

**Military cooperation during World War II**

After the outbreak of war in Europe on September 1, 1939, and evacuation of the Japanese embassy and military attaché office in Warsaw, which occurred a day after the evacuation of the Polish government on September 5, official contacts between Japanese military representatives and Poland were limited essentially only to Tokyo, where the Polish military attaché office continued to exist at the Polish embassy. Despite pressure applied by Germany, the Japanese military authorities did not change their relations with the representatives of Poland in Tokyo, even after the signing of the Tripartite Pact. In a letter to the minister of foreign affairs

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44 Romer, vol. 1: Kr.3/J/17 (ambassador Romer to minister of foreign affairs, July 5, 1939).
of the Polish government-in-exile, August Zaleski (1883–1972), dated October 10, 1940, ambassador Romer wrote:

*I have observed, even in the behavior of the local military authorities in relation to Polish officers employed in Japanese anti-Soviet intelligence, a distinct effort over the last few days to ensure them that their work continues to be valued and that the Japanese-German alliance has not changed the friendly attitude of their government to them in any way.*

Japan continued, as in the 1920s and 1930s, to take advantage of help provided by representatives of the Polish intelligence service. Cryptologists probably continued to operate in Manchukuo, helping the Kwantung Army to break Soviet codes and providing information about the USSR. Other officers of Department II, who had managed to escape from Nazi-occupied Warsaw, helped Japanese in Kaunas, Berlin, Königsberg, Riga and Stockholm. The Japanese could not gather intelligence themselves in Europe, nor did they trust their ally Germany, particularly after the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact on August 23, 1939. In exchange for information, they pledged to conceal Polish intelligence officers at their diplomatic posts in Germany, the Baltic countries and Scandinavia, and permitted them to send intelligence reports through Japanese diplomatic mail, mainly to the collecting center in Stockholm. Japan’s official policy toward Poland changed only in the second half of 1941 after Germany launched its invasion of the USSR and in connection with worsening Japanese-American relations. Japan, which sought to create the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, had to support German policy in Europe. On October 4, 1941, our embassies were officially closed, and on December 11, after Poland – an ally of Great Britain – declared war on Japan, our two countries found themselves in opposing camps. However, despite severed diplomatic ties, unofficial military cooperation between Poland and Japan continued throughout the war.

Because I have already discussed this subject at fairly great length, I will only mention the most important facts that attest to the continuation of cooperation between the Japanese and Polish intelligence services in relation to the USSR.

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46 I could not find any documents but only information on the subject in e.g. Onodera 1985: 142; Chapman 1995: 227; Pełplonski (1996: 170) maintains that a Polish intelligence post in Manchuria existed till December 1938 but in 1940 Romer in a cable to minister Zaleski (Romer, vol. 2: R.233/40) wrote that Colonel Pawłowicz, “until recently, chief of the post in Manchukuo prepared for me material concerning the Soviet Army to be presented to the Japanese”.
At the beginning of the war, one of the most important centers of this unofficial cooperation was Kaunas, Lithuania, where Japan opened a new diplomatic post in 1939 headed by vice-consul Sugihara Chiune (杉原千畝 1900–1986). Because there were no Japanese citizens in Lithuania, there was no need for consular care, thus it is likely that the Japanese government chose that location because it afforded an opportunity to observe this part of Europe, mainly the Soviet Union, particularly in view of worsening relations between Japan and the USSR in connection with the Nomonhan incident. Sugihara wrote about the reasons for opening the consulate in Kaunas himself in a report he wrote in Russian, probably in 1969, at the request of a Pole or Poles who had cooperated with him during the war.

Sugihara, who realized that he would have difficulty gathering information himself, made contact with Poles, including representatives of the command of Polish Underground (ZWZ) in Kaunas, the resident of Department II of the Polish General Staff in Lithuania, the commander of the Wierza [Willow] intelligence unit, 2nd Lieutenant Ludwik Hryncewicz (1904–1993), and intelligence officers of the Grodno regional office of Department II, Captain Alfons Jakubianiec (“Jerzy/George Kunczewicz” or “Kuba”; 1905–1945) and Lieutenant Leszek Daszkiewicz, who used the pseudonym “Jan Stanisław Perz.” In exchange for information about the USSR, Sugihara issued both of them Japanese passports and enabled the Polish underground to send mail via Japanese diplomatic post to Berlin and also to Stockholm, where one more representative of the Polish intelligence service resided, Major Michał Rybikowski (“Ian Jacobsen”, “Peter Ivanow”, 1900–1991). And when Sugihara had to leave Kaunas – among other reasons because of the widely known episode in which he issued transit visas to several thousand Jews – he sent both Poles to Germany. Jakubianiec was officially assigned to the Japanese military attaché office in Berlin as a translator, but in fact he assumed the function of commanding officer of Polish intelligence unit in Berlin. Daszkiewicz continued to accompany Sugihara, first in Prague – where his Japanese protector was the consul general – and subsequently in Königsberg, where Sugihara assumed the post of vice-consul general in March 1941. Like the consulate in Kaunas, the Königsberg consulate was meant to be an observation point, and Sugihara was to collect information about German and Soviet troop movements. After Molotov’s visit to Berlin in October 1940, intelligence agents informed that war between Germany and the USSR was inevitable, yet Germany failed to inform its ally Japan about all its political and military decisions. Daszkiewicz continued to aid Sugihara

49 Published in Polish: Sugihara Ch. 1997: 131–140 (original from A. T. Romer private archive).
in collecting information until December 1941 when the Japanese diplomat was forced by the Germans to leave Königsberg.

The Japanese cooperated the longest with the Poles in Stockholm, where Major Michał Rybikowski and General Onodera Makoto (小野寺真 1897–1987) were posted. Onodera was preceded by Colonel Onouchi Hiroshi (小野打寛 1899–1984) and Colonel Nishimura Toshio (西村敏雄 1898–1956), thanks to whom the North regional office of Department II was able to commence operations in January 1940. At the beginning of his stay in Stockholm, Onodera was interested primarily in whether the Germans would attack England or the Soviet Union first. Rybikowski also provided his Japanese superior information about the situation on the front in Europe and the activities of the USSR and Germany, in exchange for which Onodera helped him transfer mail to the West and warned him about Germans. This cooperation lasted until 1944. After Rybikowski departed, it was continued until the end of the war in Asia and the Pacific by the Polish attaché in Stockholm, Major Feliks Brzeskwiński (1896–1960).

Conclusion

Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 shocked the world, the Poles included. From that moment on, the Poles took a liking to and admired the Japanese for their courage, devotion to their country, and unswerving pursuit of their ideological and political goals. Moreover, Poles hoped that Japan’s defeat of Russia would improve the situation of Poland, and that the adoption by Poles of Japanese patterns of behavior would help Poland to regain its independence. Russia, in accordance with the principle that *your neighbor’s neighbor is your natural friend*, became the element that brought Poland and Japan together for the next 40 years and shaped the official relations of our two countries till the end of World War II. The most important aspect for the Japanese, as was the case during the war, was information, mainly military intelligence, about our common, dangerous neighbor. Poland, which just entered the international arena after the First World War and sought to bolster its standing in the world, was interested in support for its foreign policy by a country recognized to be a power, Japan, and the counterweight good relations with Japan provided to its mainly difficult relations with the USSR.

Moreover, as publications of the era show, in general, the Poles admired the Japanese mainly because of the spirit of Japan. Colonel Antoni Ślósarczyk (1899–1985),

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military attaché assistant in the Polish Legation in Tokyo (1931–1935), one of the most prominent writers on the samurai spirit and the martial spirit of the Japanese, who studied the principles of bushidō and the origins of Japan’s armed forces, in his work on the samurai sketched an interesting and informative image of the soul of Japan. He wrote (Ślósarczyk 1939: 47–8):

/.../ the influence the samurai exerted upon the whole Japanese nation has endured down to this day and continues to manifest itself in the national psychology and customs. It is the basic component of that powerful moral cement called “the spirit of ancient Japan” – Yamato damashii. /.../. Above all, it is the Japanese soldier who has become the heir to the ancient “way of the samurai” /.../. [In the war against Russia – EPR] Nippon’s fighting qualities truly shone to the fullest. Historically, this was of course not an unexpected phenomenon, but a logical conclusion of the millennia of the cult of military virtues prized so highly by the samurai.

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