Abstracts

MUZEUM HISTORII POLSKI

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Sebastian Tomasz Kołodziejczyk, Nonconceptual Content and Demonstrative Strategies

In speaking of Demonstrative Strategy (DS), we may have two different things in mind. First, we can mean that demonstratives constitute and organize logical-linguistic activity. Zenon Pylyshyn convincingly argues that demonstratives play a crucial role as preconceptual functions associated with so-called visual indexes. At that level, demonstratives are regarded as elements initiating subsequent stages of logical-linguistic (or, generally speaking, representational) activity. I call this function of demonstratives "Initiating Function of Demonstratives" (IFD) and precisely distinguish it from their most obvious and common use, introduced to the debate on nonconceptual content by Gareth Evans and John McDowell, then discussed in detail by Bill Brewer, Sean Kelly, and their followers. I call it "Instantiating Role of Demonstratives" (IRD). In my paper I argue that both roles of demonstratives strongly support conceptualism as a view on the nature of content of a perceptual state.

Keywords: nonconceptual content, conceptualism, demonstrative strategy, FINST

Wojciech Rostworowski, The Attributive–Referential Distinction and Uses of Definite Descriptions

The paper discusses various uses of definite descriptions. The aim is to demonstrate that the commonly adopted Donnellan's dichotomous division into "attributive" and "referential" uses is inadequate. The uses of definite descriptions exhibit a significant variety and do not constitute two homogenous classes. In particular, there are uses which have some features of both referential and attributive uses. These are the cases where the speaker's use of a description rests on some causal links to a particular object — like in the case of referential uses — but the speaker intends her audience to make an independent identification of that object, which is characteristic

of the attributive use. Such uses match Ludlow's and Neale's characterization of the *specific* use of indefinite descriptions. At the end of the article, the author briefly considers the impact of his observations on the widely discussed issue of a proper semantic theory of definite descriptions.

Olena Yaskorska, Katarzyna Budzyńska, Communicative Acts in Formal Dialogues

The aim of this paper is to propose the description of formal dialogues in terms of speech act theory similarly to the description typical for contemporary dialogue systems of natural communication (Prakken 2006). The main motivation is the problem with Lorenzen's dialogical logic (Lorenz, Lorenzen 1978) as pointed out in (Hodges 2009): "he [Lorenzen] spoke of moves as »attacks«, even when […] they look more like help than hostility. To repair Lorenzen's omission, one certainly needs to distinguish between different stances that a person might take in an argument: stating, assuming, conceding, querying, attacking, committing oneself". The solution proposed in the paper is to map the dialogical logic onto the general language for natural dialogue systems, which uses speech acts as a basic unit of communication (Prakken 2006).

To this end, dialogical logic has been reconstructed by specifying three types of rules which describe the usage of speech acts during a dialogue game. The rules of the first type, called locution rules, determine speech acts players are allowed to perform during a dialogue game (e.g. an attack on the conjunction can be made by performing a speech act *question* which has a conjunct as its propositional content); the second set of rules, called protocol, describes the interaction of the speech acts during the dialogue (e.g. the player defends the conjunction ψ by claiming the truth of its conjunct $?$ which was questioned during the attack; i.e. after *question $?$* the player can perform *claim $?$*); the rules of the third type, called effect rules, specify effects of performing speech acts during the dialogue (e.g. after the player performs *claim $?$*, the formula $?$ is added to her commitment store, i.e. to the set of propositions that she publicly declared as her beliefs).

The proposed description of dialogical logic in the general language of dialogue systems can be used for studying and systematising structures of sound informal communication as suggested by Hodges. In particular, it allows to embed Lorenzen's system in a protocol of dialogue systems designed for natural communication and, as a result, to detect formal fallacies committed during a natural dialogue. In other words, during a dialogue the players can decide to verify the validity of an inference scheme they used in argumentation by shifting from the natural dialogue to a formal (Lorenzen-style) dialogue both expressed in the same language. After finishing the formal dialogue, the players return to the natural one and accept or reject the inference scheme depending on who won the formal game: the proponent (then they ac-

cept that the scheme is valid in a given logic) or the opponent (then they reject the scheme as incorrect).

Keywords: dialogical logic, formal dialogues, speech acts, dialogue systems

Jarosław Boruszewski, The Problem of Measurement in Neooperationalist Semantics

The aim of the article is to elaborate on the project of Jan M. Żytkow's neooperationalist semantics. The basic idea of neooperationalism is to interpret empirical terms by coherent sets of operational procedures. Żytkow formulated a definition of coherence of a set of procedures for procedures of ?*A* type. Such procedures take the form of whether-questions and represent diagnostic procedures. Żytkow applied his definition of coherence also to the measurement procedures, but he did not introduce their formal representation in the language of interpretation. The author of the article, following Żytkow's suggestion, has introduced representation of measurement procedures by means of which-questions. Such an attempt requires extending the lexicon of language of interpretation and introducing a new type of procedure — ?α type procedure. Introducing which-questions involves a significant problem as to whether the uniqueness assumption of these questions is satisfied. Depending on whether this assumption is satisfied or not, we obtain two different accounts of measurement which correspond to opposite positions in the realism—antirealism controversy.

Keywords: semantics, measurement, neooperationalism, which-questions, realism

Tomasz Rzepiński, Signal Decoding Systems in the Mechanistic Theory of Explanation

The article discusses the mechanistic account of explanation and uses it to propose a novel description of signal decoding systems (SDS) that occur in living organisms. The considerations are based on examples taken from the field of immunology. The results may be used in the analysis of decoding systems in computer science.

Keywords: theory of mechanistic explanation, signal decoding systems in biology, immunology

Mateusz Kotowski, On the Evolution of Scientific Realism as Selective Scepticism

The article discusses the evolution which scientific realism underwent within the last thirty years. It is argued that this evolution was to a large extent fuelled by attempts at arriving at a formulation of realism which would be immune to the pessimistic induction argument. The argument, whose most influential formulation is due to Laudan, is targeted at any version of realism about theories understood as unified wholes. The central claim defended in the article is that, although pessimistic induction was presented as a confutation of scientific realism, it has had a very positive effect on the evolution of realistic positions. It is because it has forced realists to limit their claims and, at the same time, to make them more subtle and precise. As a consequence, some realists ceased to defend realism as an attitude towards whole

theories (or whole scientific knowledge) and tried to distinguish the parts of theories which realist should be committed to as approximate descriptions of the unobservable (and at the same time as the most stable aspects of scientific knowledge) from the parts they should be sceptical about. Any form of realism which makes use of such a strategy may be referred to as selective scepticism. Although the initial attempts at adopting selective scepticism (exemplified by the conceptions of Hacking and Worrall) proved to be problematic, the most recent proposal — Chakravartty's semirealism, with its commitment to concrete structures — seems to have achieved the general goal and allowed realists to dismiss the problems connected with pessimistic induction.

Adam Andrzejewski, The Structure of Everyday Aesthetic Experience

In the project of everyday aesthetics all elements of daily life, such as sunset, cooking one's favourite dish, or sitting in a comfortable chair, are a subject of philosophical reflection. According to the proponents of the project (e.g. Yuriko Saito, Sherry Irvin, Ted Leddy), these activities and objects, despite their commonness, have a profoundly aesthetic character. The main goal of this paper is to present and analyze a general structure of the central category of everyday aesthetics — the concept of aesthetic experience.

The paper consists of three sections. First, I outline two common understandings of everyday aesthetic experience, introduced by Saito and Irvin. It is shown that despite their novelty they appear to be rather confusing. A major doubt is that they do not clearly show how to distinguish aesthetic pleasures from non-aesthetic pleasures (Irvin) or everyday aesthetic experience from other daily experiences (Saito). As a result, the concept of everyday aesthetic experience turns out to be too broad, and thus it lacks explanatory power.

Second, I argue that the categories used by Saito and Irvin to describe everyday aesthetics, although immensely helpful, are not sufficient to capture all phenomena of ordinary life. It is because they only apply to some of the properties which can be recognized as aesthetic in everyday life (e.g. "dirty"), but they say nothing about the very structure of the experience. Therefore, I put forward definitions of certain properties which, in my opinion, adequately describe and individualize experiences characteristic of everyday aesthetics. These are: contingency, repetition, and permeability.

Finally, it is highlighted how a reconsidered concept of everyday experience matter to the issues outside the realm of aesthetics. It is revealed that the crucial feature of everyday aesthetic experience is its ambivalence. Our immersion into society, current affairs, and complex relations with other agents force us to make decisions all the time. Each everyday aesthetic judgement requires decision(s) which may be followed by serious consequences (e.g. in socio-economical life). Thus I would contend that judgements in everyday aesthetics are "decision-making" (contrary to tradition-

ally understood aesthetic judgements, which do not require, necessarily, any action in the outer world). In perceiving common things as objects eliciting aesthetic experience, we are always asked to choose which dimension (a set of meanings) of particular experience is crucial for us. The structure of everyday aesthetic experience, as defined above, explains and justifies what we often call (following Saito) "the power of the aesthetic".

Keywords: everyday aesthetics, aesthetic experience, aesthetic qualities, judgment

Katarzyna Paprzycka, Some Remarks on Fallibility and *Meta Logu*. Comments on Andrzej Nowakowski's *Uzasadnienie epistemiczne*

The paper is a critical notice of Andrzej Nowakowski's book on epistemic justification (Andrzej Nowakowski, *Uzasadnienie epistemiczne*, Wydawnictwo UMCS, Lublin 2011). I examine the author's discussion of the third condition on knowledge and expose multiple errors. The main problem with Nowakowski's proposal is that it is seriously underdeveloped. Moreover, under the most natural interpretation, it suffers from many of the same problems as some of the accounts Nowakowski criticizes.

Keywords: knowledge, infallibility, omniscience, epistemological externalism, epistemological internalism, Nozick