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## Strategic kulture as an important way of security

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## STRATEGIC CULTURE AS AN IMPORTANT WAY OF SECURITY

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### ABSTRACT

Roles, fears, ideas, beliefs all influence behaviour. Strategic culture is an alternative way of explaining strategic behaviour, is a part of specific culture influence behaviour. Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (e.g. argumentation, structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious. political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites. Therefore the EU as a multicultural space has one too. It may be the case that the EU strategic culture is a 'weak' strategic culture, a culture that is in the process of formation. The EU is expected to have a very special strategic culture because of its nature of foreign policy. State formation implied that the army had an important role to play in forming the identity of each state. However, the EU had no military and the emphasis on foreign policy was put on soft elements of external relations. Each state and security institution has a strategic culture as a part of cultural development. Different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the state and are influenced to some

degree, by the philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.

#### KEY WORDS

strategic culture, security, behavior, identity



The contemporary massive globalization process refers to national culture, national identity, legal and political system, education and economics, as well as new forms of security policy. The globalization leads to a removal of national identities and at the same time to a creation of other specific forms of identity and a rediscovery of national culture paradoxically. A new hybrid culture is formed with this phenomenon in parallel, which is the part of heterogeneous society. The space for transcultural conversion and a complete redefinition of the notion culture is created. Big communities take into consideration globalization factors in their developing programmes and culture includes the notion dialogue, diversity, multiculturalism, tolerance. The multicultural space understands culture as the building stone of social life and the tool of identification of economic and political processes, is the source of improvement and also the source of potential conflict.<sup>1</sup>

The globalization in the meaning of effort about integrity in different areas means a precise understanding of original cultural traditions and particularities for creating common strategies. The example is the formation of cultural politics from local to European level which is created by the integrated whole of aesthetic, scientific, moral, eudaemonistic and also religious elements in favour of a development of a member of the cultural community. The symbolic and institutional mechanism of culture is created by development so that it would influence a modern way of a political system. The united European cultural politics is not and cannot be a uniformed and universal document, but the file of supportive tools for reaching the modernization of European space for development of culture as a tool of international cooperation. Its priorities and aims are built on the analysis of the single cultural politics of the member states according to which are defined the principles and common topics,

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<sup>1</sup> HORÁKOVÁ, H. *Kultura jako všelék? Kritika soudobých přístupů*, Praha. Slon. 2012.

among others also the support of blossoming of cultures with respect and preserving of diversity.<sup>2</sup>

The common situation happens in the area of creation of Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP. The absence of common inspection of a topic of safety and defence is based on the specific development of a strategic culture of single member states and an individual historical experience, a value system and cultural norms and models. Despite of the apparent common mental background of the member states of EU which are three columns of European society – Greek philosophy, Roman law and Christian values, cultural diversity and historical development single out the diversity of behaving and approaches of single involved people and creators of a potential common strategy. The objective view on this topics forces competent people to accept a procedure which takes into a consideration also single national attributes.<sup>3</sup> The role of culture in the international safety and its influence on the behavior of the states required to identify basic directions which are for the creation of the safety concepts, namely organizational, political, global, and strategic culture.<sup>4</sup>

The concept which has a potential to include and take into account the certain types of ideational factors such as history, norms, values, identity, ideas, is the strategic culture. In his work one of the first creators of the concept of the strategic culture, Colin Gray, confirms it when he forces to acknowledge differences of other people involved in the framework of communication and give attention to local contexts.<sup>5</sup> Gray defines the strategic culture on the level of a strategy itself theoretically and which has more dimensions and influences a strategic dealing essentially.<sup>6</sup> Gray integrates dimensions into three following categories:

People and politics with a subcategory people, society, culture etc.

Preparation for a war with a subcategory economics, logistics, military preparation, administration etc.

War itself, thus military operations, command, enemy etc.

<sup>2</sup> KLAMER, A., PETROVA, L., MIGNOSA, A. *European Parliament*. Financing the Arts and Culture in the EU. 2006. [online] Available on the Internet: [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL-CULT\\_ET\(2006\)375309](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=IPOL-CULT_ET(2006)375309)

<sup>3</sup> NYE, S. J. Jr. - LYNN-JONES, M. S. *International Security Studies: A Report on a Conference on the State of the Field, International Security*, 1998, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 14-15

<sup>4</sup> DESCH, C. M. *Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies*. *International Security*, 1998, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 142

<sup>5</sup> GRAY, C.S. *What RAND Hath Wrought*. *Foreign Policy*, No. 4, Fall.1971. pp. 111-129

<sup>6</sup> GRAY, S. C. *Modern Strategy*, Oxford. Oxford University Press. 1999. pp. 26-44

Gray integrates the defined strategic culture into the dimension culture in the first category while he warns that this is influenced by geopolitical, historical and economical factors etc.<sup>7</sup> On the basis of these partial definitions Gray perceives the strategic culture as the tool for understanding of several strategic decisions and also the variable which forms a context for a strategic behaviour.<sup>8</sup> Gray also claims that the strategic culture cannot be defined separately from the strategic behaviour because people with the certain type of behaviour are the part of that culture and act according to it thus the strategic behaviour influences the strategic culture which then influences the strategic behaviour vice versa.<sup>9</sup>

The next representative of the first generation of academicians, who were interested in the strategic culture, is Jack Snyder, who published the announcement *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* in 1977 where he describes the Soviet leaders deciding strategically as the leaders of the strict Soviet mode of the strategic thinking. Snyder describes the file of general opinions, attitudes and models of behaviour, in this case towards the atomic strategy whereby the state of attitudes can change towards technologies and international environment, but problems are evaluated according to the view offered by the strategic culture globally. Snyder defined the strategic culture as the sum of ideals, conditioned emotional reactions and patterns of learnt behaviour which relate to the atomic strategy which the members of the national community gain by an instruction or an imitation whereby the sum is formed by variables such as geography, technology, political culture, ideology and historical experience.<sup>10</sup>

One of the main works in the period of the first generation is *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* from the author Ken Booth, who emphasized the inherent ethnocentrism by studying and practise of the strategy and warned against deformations of the effects of culture, which lead to wrong analyses in international relationships. The truth is that the observer cannot

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<sup>7</sup> GRAY, S. C. *National Style in Strategy: The American Example, International Security*. Vol. 6, No. 02.1981. pp. 22

<sup>8</sup> GRAY, S. C. *Comparative Strategic Culture*. Journal of the US Army War College, Vol. 14, No. 4, Winter, 1984. pp. 28.

<sup>9</sup> GRAY, S. C. *Modern Strategy, Oxford*. Oxford University Press, 1999. pp. 135

<sup>10</sup> SNYDER, J. (1977): *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options*, RAND. [online] Available on the Internet: <http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R2154.pdf>, p.8

define his own cultural conditionality and its ideas and values, and that is why Booth suggests the access in the framework of cultural relativism, thus social and cultural phenomena are described from the perspective of a participant of that culture.<sup>11</sup> In the later period Booth defined the strategic culture as national traditions, values, attitudes, models of behaviour, customs, successes and particular ways of adaptation to environment and solution of problems relating to a threat or a use of strength.<sup>12</sup>

Despite of extensive critical reactions the contribution of the first generation of academicians defining the strategic culture was mainly in the warning on the danger of defining the strategy only in the environment of technologies, economics, or models of a rational person involved and the cultural definitions were lifted on the primary level which indicates the basic differences of safety strategies.<sup>13</sup>

The representative of the second generation of academicians and scientists defining the strategic culture is Bradley S. Klein, who viewed the strategic culture as a symbolic discursus, as a tool of political hegemony in the area of strategic deciding of a state with ways of legitimate use of violence for providing its aims. Klein's concept of the strategic culture says about reality, including state, safety and other commodities, thus culture which is constructed socially.<sup>14</sup> In his ideas is the strategic culture as the context which gives meaning to strategic decisions whereby this context differs in single safety communities in relation to social structures which can change and the context changes with them. Further Klein calls attention not only to different styles of conducting wars among states, but also to the whole process of political decision-making which approves a use of power. The final decision is the result of collective decision-making whereby in the framework of communication in society is used a certain system of symbols which can mean different things expressively in different strategic cultures.<sup>15</sup> The final affirmation of Klein remains that

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<sup>11</sup> BOOTH, K. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, New York, Holmes & Meier, 1979.

<sup>12</sup> BOOTH, K. *The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed* in Jacobsen, C.G. (ed.): *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, New York, St Martin's Press, 1990. pp. 121–128

<sup>13</sup> POORE, S. *What is the context? A reply to the Gray-Johnston debate on strategic culture*, *Review of International Studies*, No. 29. 2003. pp. 279–284.

<sup>14</sup> KLEIN, S. B. *Strategic Studies and World Order*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 3

<sup>15</sup> LOCK, E. *Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation*. *Review of International Studies*. 2010, Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 696.

the strategic culture is created by those who are involved in the strategic decision-making at the moment and have a possibility to re-form thus this can become the tool of a political hegemony which legitimizes some strategic decisions.<sup>16</sup>

The second generation of academic theories is closed by Robin Luckham, who identified the existence of so-called culture of arming and weapon fetishism which became the tool for keeping the importance of weapon culture as a privilege of western interests. These are supported by the media mechanism and the educational system, also in the hands of state apparatus, which apologize a conducted war through adjusted symbols of peace.<sup>17</sup>

1990s mean the beginning of the third generation of outstanding scientific attitudes towards examination and definition of the strategic culture. The work of this generation moves the whole concept of the strategic culture into the position of testing competitive theories. Among representatives belongs Alastair Lain Johnston who speaks about the strategic culture as an interconnected system of symbols among which are: language, analogy, metaphors, structure of argumentation. These create long-lasting concepts of a role and a cooperation of military forces in international political questions whereby these concepts have the realistic and effective character.<sup>18</sup> The basis of Johnson's work is the separation of the strategic culture from the strategic behavior of a state. The strategic culture becomes an independent variable, which binds different preferences to single strategic possibilities. If a state has a sufficient time period, from formative years, or the establishment of existing community, for binding preferences to single strategic possibilities, we can claim that the existing community, state, has the strategic culture.<sup>19</sup> To the third generation belong also Elizabeth Kier and Jeffrey Legro. The first mentioned applied a cultural perspective to changes in a military doctrine whereby the choice of its offensive or defensive form. Legro moved the military and organizational culture on the level of its influ-

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<sup>16</sup> KLEIN, S. B. *Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics*. *Review of International Studies*. 1988, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 136.

<sup>17</sup> LUCKHAM, R. (1994): *Armaments Culture, Alternatives*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 1-44

<sup>18</sup> JOHNSTON, I. A. *Thinking about Strategic Culture, International Security*. 1995, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring, pp. 46

<sup>19</sup> Item pp. 49-50

ence on outs of a state in the meaning of a escalation or a descalation of a conflict.<sup>20</sup>

1990s brought the strong conversion towards constructivism. Among representatives belong for example Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein who are connected also with others by the effort to incorporate cultural elements in a research of the strategic culture. The main topics are creation and change of cultures, domestic factors influencing the outs of people involved whereby material factors are relativized. Constructivism emphasizes the importance of intersubjective structures which give the sense and meaning to the materialistic world such as norms, culture, identity and ideas.<sup>21</sup> The role of constructivism is widening or returning of culture and domestic factors into a study of international relationships. According to arguments of Theo Farrell it is the actual work on the strategic culture by joining of two streams of social sciences namely culturalism and constructivism.<sup>22</sup>

The actual millennium spreads theories of the strategic culture more into a geographic width and also into an extent of people involved and topics. At present time the interest about the strategic

cultures of China, Russia, India, EU, but also the combined analyses of relationships of single states toward the USA, toward Islam etc. is growing.

#### DEFINITION OF THE STRATEGIC CULTURE

The basis of the notion of the strategic culture is derived from two meaning-independent notions. Culture, as itself, has a huge amount of definitions. The most frequent is the definition of E.B. Tylor, who speaks about culture as a complex whole comprising belief, knowledge, art, morality, law and other abilities and customs learnt by human as a member of society.<sup>23</sup> General culture is the universal human phenomenon which is not typical for biological forms of life and it expresses itself in the amount of local cultures. The specific level of culture marks the learnt complex of all political, economical, social, psychological, philosophical and material elements of a certain group of people, thanks to which individuals in

<sup>20</sup> KIER, E. *Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars*, International Security, 1995, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 65-93

<sup>21</sup> KATZENSTEIN, P. - KEOHANE, R. - KRASNER, S. *International Organization and the Study of World Politics*. International Organization, 1998, Vol. 52, No. 4, pp. 645-685

<sup>22</sup> FARRELL, T. *Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program*, International Studies Review, 2002, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring, pp. 49-72.

<sup>23</sup> SOUKUP, V. *Přehled antropologických teorií kultury*. Praha: Portál. 2000. p.20

the existing group adapt to an external environment.<sup>24</sup> In relation to symbols culture can be defined also as a movable model of meanings historically which represents the system of hereditary and inherited concepts expressed in the form of symbols used for communication, development of knowledge and attitude to life.<sup>25</sup>

The strategy is defined in Oxford explanatory dictionary a plan proposed to reach a long-lasting or whole aim and also art to plan and conduct military operations.<sup>26</sup>

The single definition of the strategic culture or authors of definitions come from the cultures in the framework of which are subject to constant efforts of defining past, present, future, motivation, morality, whereby they are subject to models and norms.

Alastair Johnston defines the strategic culture as an integrated system of symbols which set all long-lasting preferences so that they formulate the role and the effectiveness of military force in international political issues so that it would appear as unique and effective.<sup>27</sup>

Sten Rynning defines the strategic culture as a custom to think in certain ways whereby the historical development influences understanding of person involved about his/her role in a system. The strategic culture is the certain variable which influences a decision of people involved whereby it has its anthropological origin in language, religion, customs and socialization, and also historical origin.<sup>28</sup> The strategic culture sets the boundaries of that what is considered to be a normal behavior and proposes the offer of possible political tools.<sup>29</sup>

Christoph Meyer, who primarily moves in the topic of European strategic culture, speaks about four variables, namely aim for using strength,

<sup>24</sup> HORÁKOVÁ, H. *Kultura jako všelék? Kritika soudobých přístupů*. Praha. Slon. 2012. p.13

<sup>25</sup> GEERTZ, C. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*, New York, Basic Books. 1973.

<sup>26</sup> *Oxford Dictionaries – strategy*. [online] Available on the Internet: <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/strategy?q=strategy>

<sup>27</sup> JOHNSTON, A.I. *Thinking about Strategic Culture*. International Security, 1995, Vol. 19, No. 4, Spring, p. 46.

<sup>28</sup> GREATHOUSE, C.B. (2010): *Examining the Role and Methodology of Strategic Culture, Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy*. 2010. Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 57-85

<sup>29</sup> SEDIVY, J., ZABOROWSKI, M. *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Relations* in Longhurst, K. - Zaborowski, M. (eds.): *Old Europe, new Europe and the transatlantic security agenda*, London, Routledge, 2005. pp. 1-27

way how the strength is used, a preferred mode of cooperation and a level of domestic and international authorization.<sup>30</sup>

#### THE ROLE OF THE STRATEGIC CULTURE

According to Longhurst the strategic culture offers an authentic understanding whereby it brings psychological, anthropological, societal elements into a study.<sup>31</sup> The role of the strategic culture is important in every phase of a conflict. It helps to overcome a mistaken communication and presumptions whereby it is able to explain weird and irrational behaviour which it defines with words such as pride, fear, egocentrism, negation etc.

#### THE SOURCES OF THE STRATEGIC CULTURE

The sources of the strategic culture are all factors and phenomena which with their influence create a final product. With the words of Darryl Howlett they are material as well as ideational sources or defined differently as geography, climate, sources, history and experience, political structure, character of organizations in defence, other political and decision structures, myths and symbols, key documents and norms, technologies etc.<sup>32</sup> According to Johnson there belong also religious traditions, demographic setting and trends, persuasion and values of people involved and elites.<sup>33</sup> To these belong also elements like hierarchy of threats and risks, preference of unilateral or multilateral attitude, inclination to international law and UN, attitude to losses, attitude to army, experiences with use of army etc.

#### THE CHANGE OF THE STRATEGIC CULTURE

Two basic mechanisms reflect the process of shock on the strategic culture, which causes trauma or continual transformation and self-evaluation

<sup>30</sup> MEYER, Ch. *Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms*, European Journal of International Relations, 2005, Vol. 11, No.4, pp. 523-549

<sup>31</sup> LONGHURST, K. *The Concept of Strategic Culture* in Kümmel, G. - Prufert, A.D. (eds): *Military Sociology*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000. pp. 301-310

<sup>32</sup> HOWLETT, D. *Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature*, Strategic Insights, 2005, Vol. 4, No. 10, [online] Available on the Internet: <http://www.nps.edu/Academics/centers/ccc/publications/OnlineJournal/2005/Oct/howlettOct05.html>

<sup>33</sup> JOHNSON, J.L. *Conclusion: Toward a Standard Methodological Approach* in Johnson, J. L. - Kartchner, K.M. - Larsen, J.A. (eds.): *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. pp. 243-257.

towards inner and external conditions. The reaction to these two mechanisms is a radical, fundamental change or a running fluidized change whereby culture absorbs new trends and experiences slowly.<sup>34</sup> The shock is meant by revolution, wars, crises, catastrophes or other historical experiences. Other types of changes can be implementation of new technologies, learning, socialization, distorsion by delivering from generation to generation. Also inner processes have an influence on the strategic culture, e.g. the inner resistance of the original generation with the fear of losing power.<sup>35</sup> The concept of these changes brought Theo Farrell who defined two mechanisms which realize these changes namely political mobilization and social learning.<sup>36</sup>

#### THE LEVELS OF ANALYSE OF THE STRATEGIC CULTURE

The strategic culture is the phenomenon which is possible to analyze on more analytical levels. On the theoretical level we can speak about transnational strategy which stands on the common mental bases between world regions. The example is Charter of the United Nations. However, the absence of this strategic culture is specific information and attitudes deriving from diversity of cultures. The new element of the present is analyses on the level of the strategic cultures of supranational organizations such as EU or the USA. The most frequent subject of analyses is still state as the subject with legitimacy to use a power. The new phenomena of analyses are people involved of the type of terroristic groups, but also subsidiary structures in state as single resorts in a government, single types of military forces. The last analytical level remains an individual as an example of a leader who as a dictator can influence dealing of a whole state.

The important factor of analysis is the number of subcultures in the framework of analytical levels and their interaction. The example is a state as a part of bigger whole which except its strategic culture enters into the creation and accepting of norms of the strategic culture of a bigger integrating whole. These two cultures do not have to be in conformity mainly

<sup>34</sup> LONGHURST, K. *Germany and the use of force*, Manchester, Manchester University Press. 2004.

<sup>35</sup> LANTIS, J.S. *Strategic Culture and National Security Policy*, International Studies Review, 2002, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn, pp. 87-113

<sup>36</sup> FARRELL, T. *Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland's Professional Army*, European Journal of International Relations, 2001, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 63-102.

and a state can stand against a supranational type of the strategic culture in different situations.

The question by analysis remains the reference object of a research which we classify into passive elements, executors, to which belong elites of person involved, elements with an access to creation of politics and decisions. However, the most dominant question remains the definition of the strategic culture itself, which can have a different angle of view and content in single cultures. In the framework of analyses there exist questions which relate to safety in a wider range or all interactions to which a person involved can get, or Snyder's strategic culture of atomic safety or the strategic culture like military issues generally. The solution in this case would offer above mentioned definition of Gray, who speaks about the strategic culture as a context in which decisions are made. This context can be formed by an institutional background and processes of a management and a placement of military forces. The strategic culture in this case is the tool for starting processes for gaining abilities in the framework of political status.<sup>37</sup>

#### THE STRATEGIC CULTURE OF COMMUNITY

On the level of a discussion about existence of the strategic culture of EU was this topic discusses in the key document CSDP-Common security and defense policy from the year 2003, where it is spoken that it is a necessity of EU to develop the strategic culture, which will support early, rapid and robust intervention.<sup>38</sup> In the framework of scientific works in the area of creation and potential existence of a common strategic culture of community more authors agree that a discussion becomes faint when historical experiences of a community in single strategic cultures are ignored. The important question is the future character or characteristic of common strategic culture. Christopher Meyer speaks about joining of values of some member states so that the centre of gravitation moves towards bigger and not to the lowest acceptance of using military force.<sup>39</sup> The good shot

<sup>37</sup> CORNISH, P. - Edwards, G. *Beyond the EU/NATO Dichotomy: The Beginnings of a European Strategic Culture*, International Affairs, 2001, Vol. 77, No. 3, p. 587-603.

<sup>38</sup> BAILES, A.J.K. *The European Security Strategy. An Evolutionary History*, SIPRI Policy Paper No. 10, 2005. [online] Available on the Internet: <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRI10.pdf>

<sup>39</sup> MEYER, Ch. *The Quest for a European Strategic Culture*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan. 2006

in the centre is the work of running who defines EU as the subject joined with liberal advance which inhibits the use of power and the formation of the strategic culture with the support of military invasions at all. EU, standing on its three pillars of European culture, does not fight to defeat, but forms improvement and development. EU has an economical-peaceful character naturally. The absence of Running's view on the topic of the strategic culture, is its definition as a tool for application of force, not as mental and value background.<sup>40</sup> It is the truth that the actual procedure in forming of the common strategic culture of EU is inhibited by definitions of a strategic environment and further manipulations with it in the framework of single states, the priority in the projection of power, the emphasis on civil and military tools etc.

One of the over-elaborate concepts seems to be the analysis of Christoph Meyer who classified the strategic culture into four variables namely aim for using power, way how the power is used, preferred mode of cooperation and level for domestic and international authorization whereby every variable has its level from the lowest to the high. The result is the formation of different types of convergencies from preferences of nonmilitary means, will for nonmilitary solutions, minimalization of victims, support of multilateralism and international law up to inclination for neutrality.<sup>41</sup>

The next theory about the common strategic culture is the theory of Bastian Giegerich who classified the strategic culture into four values on two levels: aim of military dimension, tools, basis for safety and defence and form of cooperation. The result is defining elements of the common strategic culture, projection of strength, full spectrum of tools, cooperation and European dimension of defence which are compared with single values of member states.<sup>42</sup> Both these concepts come from the existence of the common European culture and at the same time from diversity of single national cultures. The is that any view on the common European cultural models brings the picture of EU as the framework which acts as mul-

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<sup>40</sup> RYNNING, S. *Less May Be Better in EU Security and Defence Policy*, Oxford Journal on Good Governance, 2005, Vol. 2, No. 1, March, pp. 45-50

<sup>41</sup> MEYER, Ch. *Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms*, European Journal of International Relations, 2005, Vol. 11, No.4, pp. 523-549

<sup>42</sup> GIEGERICH, B. *European Security and Strategic Culture. National Responses to the EU's Security and Defence Policy*, Nomos. 2006

tilateralistic, with principles of fair war, with holistic attitude to safety and with preference of political solutions and diplomacy or soft power instead of power solution externally. The interesting manual to further procedure of creation of a united strategic culture is the concept of three attitudes from Toje who sees it: as instrumental, on the basis of request and aim which we want to reach; as the top of closing of single national strategic cultures; as the result of common European historical experience, political climate, norms and values.<sup>43</sup>

## CONCLUSION

Every member state of the European Union has its national strategic culture, which includes its particularities in harmony with cultural norms and models. The nature of supranational strategic culture, which should be the summary of all national cultures is the hybrid political entity, which should take the role of authority and at the same time it has to include details of national strategic cultures. This new type of the strategic type stands outside the national cultures and at the same time it completes them. It does not become its compensation. The common strategic culture of EU creates the file of norms with which all member states agree, they are the common single elements of national strategic cultures, which in the framework of convergency form a unique strategic culture. However, the basis of the whole pyramid is the common definition of the strategic culture which should be the file of shared convictions, presupposition and form of behavior derived from common experiences and accepted narratives which form a collective identity and relations to other people involved. This state defines a proper aim and means for reaching safety aims.<sup>44</sup>

The actual state of the European strategic culture, on the basis of cultural norms and models of European culture, does not support a development of power component for safety politics of EU. This type of politics of EU is orientated on soft power and peaceful mission of solving problems in the long-term. Hard effort to install into the position of so-called 'modern world' won't bring her the expected authority. On the second hand the

<sup>43</sup> TOJE, A. *Introduction: the EU Strategic Culture*, Oxford Journal on Good Governance, 2005, Vol. 2, No. 1, March, p. 9-16./

<sup>44</sup> JOHNSON, J.L. *Conclusion: Toward a Standard Methodological Approach* in Johnson, J. L. - Kartchner, K.M. - Larsen, J.A. (eds.): *Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, pp. 243-257

current situation connected with multilateral focuses of conflicts, effort about a change in a geopolitical organization and current immigration crisis brings a significant warning that the boundaries of 'modern' Europe have to be protected systematically despite of efforts to neglect this fact in the functional democratic concept. The European strategic culture has to get across a systematical sharpening of edges in the short time and despite of European ambitions and ideals to set priorities of logical protection of own boundaries which are an attacked commodity in the history of whole mankind. A level of development of democracy does not mean crashing of the concept of the protection of citizens of the European Union in any case because they are the source of the huge cultural diversity, values, symbols, principles, idea and they participated and participate in flowering and progressing of this unique concept. The prompt of following days of the year 2016 will be the European strategic culture as the most expected document with the high effectiveness .

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