Jarosław Flis, Waldemar Wojtasik

Candidate Selection in the 2014 European Parliament Election in Poland

Preferencje Polityczne : postawy, identyfikacje, zachowania 9, 129-143

2014

Jarosław Flis,
Jagiellonian University, Poland

Waldemar Wojtasik
University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland

CANDIDATE SELECTION IN THE 2014 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTION IN POLAND

Abstract:

The article presents the determinants of creating candidate lists in European Parliament elections in Poland. Its subject context is the evaluation of importance of selected factors with reference to the effect obtained in the election. The main study hypothesis assumes different patterns of creating candidate lists in EP elections in comparison to parliamentary elections, involving the combined occurrence of several determinants. The first of them is the tendency to fill the highest positions in candidate lists with popular people well-known in the media, who have an advantage over anonymous ones. The second factor is territorial bonds connecting candidates with the electoral district where they stand for election. Another determinant taken into consideration is the territorial form of the candidate list. The last important element of analysis is the concentration of support, determined by the position on the candidate list.

Keywords:

party candidate selection, European parliamentary election, candidate list position, Polish party system

Introduction

One of the most important procedures defining elections in democratic states is the way of appointing candidates standing for election, often having a greater impact on the ultimate result of the elections than the applied electoral system. As William Cross [2008: 615] writes concerning the selection process, "*party candidate selection processes may be equally or more determinative of who ends up in the legislature than are general elections*". Regardless of the applied electoral system, the institutionalization of the electoral process in contemporary democracies means that receiving a political nomination is

the preliminary stage in the process of selection of political elites. The selection carried out by parties may have two main dimensions: the substantive one and the political one. The substantive demand assumes that the candidate should have the relevant qualities, which on the one hand can facilitate generating support and as a consequence, selection, and on the other hand, predestine them to correctly fulfil their role resulting from the potential election. The political dimension of candidate selection may assume the necessity of party membership or at least ideological identity with the key values which constitute the axiological and policy foundation. Apart from these, nomination can be obtained among others by way of coalition bargaining between political parties or family-and-friends connotations. The practical dimension of candidate lists selection is the process of appointing candidates to run for election. It adopts four basic types: non-regulated appointment, appointment by local authorities, appointment by central authorities, and primary election (appointment by party members) [Sokół 2003: 73-75].

The execution of the selection function involves the choice and strategic appointment of candidates to stand for election. The candidates are then verified in the voting procedure. Krister Lundell [2004: 27-30] mentions centralized and decentralized ways of candidate selection and points out the size of the party as the main determinant. Large parties prefer the application of decentralized model, and small ones adopt more democratic ways. In the way of selection, regional patterns are also important, as part of which he indicates preferences for the centralized model among south European political parties and the opposite among Scandinavian ones, where the selection is rather decentralized. An important consequence of the application of a certain way of selection is the possible differences in the candidates' political subjectivity level. The centralization of selection may contribute to reducing the candidates' subjectivity, and decentralization may increase it instead [Shomer 2009: 953].

The article presents the specificity of creating candidate lists in European Parliament elections in Poland. Its subject context is the evaluation of importance of selected factors with reference to the effect obtained in the election. The temporal context is the 2014 election. The subjective aspect includes the analysis of the structure of candidate lists in two largest parties – Platforma Obywatelska *(Civic Platform)* and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość *(Law and Justice)*. The main study hypothesis assumes different patterns of creating candidate lists in EP elections in comparison to parliamentary elections, involving the combined occurrence of several determinants. The first of them is the tendency to fill the highest positions in candidate lists with popular people well-known in the media, who have an advantage over anonymous ones. The second factor is territorial bonds connecting candidates with the electoral district where they

stand for election. Another determinant taken into consideration is the territorial form of the candidate list. The last important element of analysis is concentration of support.

Candidate selection procedure in European Parliament elections

Although there have only been three European Parliament elections in Poland so far, they have already managed to leave their imprint on political parties and the party system. Their institutional dimension and the character of party competition mostly make them similar to parliamentary elections, but with a lower rank. Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt [1980: 6-11] called EP elections *second-order elections*, mainly because they are carried out on the basis of internal political determinants which marginalize the meaning of divisions and conflicts of the European environment. In addition, although EP elections are organized in all EU states at the same time, their importance is largely reduced by the fact that they occur at different stages of internal (national) electoral cycles. The presented conclusions were confirmed in the research by Michael Marsh [1998: 595]; however, in some cases he formulated them in less absolute terms. Additionally, the researcher confirmed the connection between EP elections and national elections taking place subsequently, referring in practice to their temporal correlation and national parliamentary elections [Gabel 2000: 54].

Taking into consideration the case of Poland, it is a little difficult to classify European Parliament elections, mainly due to the fact of electing representatives for a supranational authority. This fact, despite its undeniably prestigious character, determines different strategies executed by political parties. Polish and European experiences in this regard show that parties treat these elections differently, regarding them as second order elections, which is also partly contributed to by the low public interest (concerning participation) [de Vreese, Banducci, Semetko, Boomgaarden 2006]. Radosław Markowski [2009: 31-32] observes that: "... the difference between parliamentary elections and EP elections is that in these elections the national issues are more important than the European ones, also, that people vote in a way which shows it is according to their sincere and first preference, so small parties get the advantage …". The place and character of exercising the mandate of MEP, which for obvious reasons makes it harder to engage fully in domestic politics and thus positions one far behind the national party leaders in the political hierarchy, is also important.

The presented determinants result in the fact that the process of creating European Parliament candidate lists in the key parties is strongly centralized, and the appointments, unlike in any other elections, mainly depend on the party authorities. It is so for strategic reasons as part of which the decentralization of

selecting candidates for the lists might cause the decrease of electoral potential of the whole party [Katz 2001: 290-291]. Dieter Nohlen [2004: 92] underscores that the form of a candidate list indicates both the voter-candidate relation and the candidate's attitude to their own party, which is reflected in parties' interests that might be harmed by individual ambitions of particular members. It does not mean, however, that the strategies of creating candidate lists of particular parties are identical, nor that they are not subject to any modifications during the election preparation phase. The dynamics of political situation even requires the creation of alternative scenarios that might potentially be used in the case of changing conditions of the conducted campaign. Simon Hix [2004: 199] also observes that the degree of centralization of candidate selection in EP elections affects their later relations with the parent parties. Strong centralization leads to the deputy's greater dependence on their party in the future. Finally, the attempt to centralize the way of creating candidate lists gives various effects, including a very limited ultimate result. It is so especially in the case of the states where the democratic procedures of candidate selection are deeply rooted (e.g. Ireland) or where these procedures are even legally regulated [Katz 2001: 291].

The process of candidate selection for the lists is also determined by the existing electoral system, both its general character and individual components [Hazan, Rahat 2006: 109]. The proportional electoral formula, especially combined with the relatively low number of seats to apportion, forces the parties to fill the candidate lists, which may be a considerable challenge taking into consideration the preferences for the national parliament among the key activists. And the problem is not the quantitative aspect, which is easy to manage for large parties, but the political position of the nominated candidates. The most significant party leaders execute their objectives at the national politics level, and treat the opportunity to participate in the EP as a risk of degradation or a loss of political influence. That is why, somewhat analogously to elections to second chambers of the parliament, it can be noted that the lists of the main parties include persons not engaged in the processes of current party management.

The high importance of candidate selection mechanisms in EP elections is also the result of combination of relatively big electoral districts (in terms of territory) and relatively low number of seats to be assigned in each district. It contributes to preparing candidate lists in a way which allows for party authorities considerably controlling the direction of seat allocation. The described mechanism results from two key factors. The first of them is geographic segmentation of support and the possibility to predict quite precisely the future number of achieved seats in particular districts. The second is empirically verifiable preference to support number one candidates from party lists, although obviously the fact of typically placing party leaders there also plays a role.

All this means that EP elections do not occur in a political vacuum but are subject to processes of transferring the patterns of internal party relations from the national level to the European platform [Meserve, Pemstein, Bernhard 2009: 2].

An important determinant of creating EP candidate lists is nominating persons weakly associated with politics or even having no political connotations. This mechanism is also present in parliamentary elections but its range is relatively smaller. Such actions, although often effective (in the case of very popular candidates), from the point of view of political party's interest may evoke some doubts about treating voters subjectively and cause conflicts with local structures of parties which may want to promote their representatives on the lists. So-called celebrities present on candidate lists are supposed to increase the interest in party's electoral offer, to warm up the technocratic image and to reduce the political distance to the voters. The previous experiences show, however, that only few candidates from beyond the party mainstream can expect election success and EP seats, although greater preference in this regard is noticeable in Central and Eastern Europe [Andretta, Chelotti 2012: 12].

The third important aspect of creating candidate lists in EP elections is the possibility to use the potential of first positions on the lists. It is connected with the voters' tendency to vote for persons from the top of the list, although – obviously – the fact of typically placing party leaders there also plays a role. In the 2009 election, among number one candidates from the 4 parties which participated in seat distribution, the leaders lost to party rivals with farther positions only in 8 cases (15.4%). This may prove the supposed relation between the position on the candidate list and the achieved support, although it does not fully explain the character of the phenomenon [Wojtasik 2010: 394].

Candidate lists in the 2014 EP election

The key element of creating the lists in European Parliament election was the attempt to find balance between three factors. The first of them is the general tendency to place persons the most popular in the media on the first positions of candidate lists, as they attract voters by their public visibility. The second element of this balance is taking territorial bonds into consideration. Polish electoral districts in European Parliament elections are big and most of them are territorially diversified. Other studies on the behaviours of Polish voters, in turn, show that the territorial bond is an important factor influencing their decisions and hence the tendency to take this diversity into consideration when constructing candidate lists [Flis 2011]. But in this case the additional element was the wish to influence the personal composition of party representation in the European Parliament election. This wish is not so obvious, as is proved by

the fact that the Warsaw district had an excess of candidates with a strong position in the media or inside the party who were interested in acquiring seats in relation to the number of available seats. Hence the clear tendency to put up candidates from Warsaw in other districts.

In both main parties the phenomenon of putting up candidates in districts other than the places of residence had a similar extent. From PO (Civic Platform), 8 candidates stood in other districts, 6 out of whom were registered in Warsaw or the agglomeration. From PiS (Law and Justice), 9 candidates stood in other districts, 8 out of whom were registered in Warsaw or the agglomeration. In PiS, 2 of them had the first position on the lists, and 3 of them, the second position. In PO, there were five number-one candidates in that group, and one candidate from the second position. In PO, four of the positions were seat-ensuring positions, which means that they would give the candidates seats if the apportionment only depended on the order on the list. All of them were the first positions of the lists. In PiS, four places taken by "parachute candidates" were also seat--ensuring positions defined this way: two first positions and two second ones.

In the group of so-called "parachute candidates", two persons in each party were candidates who had been born and raised in the districts from which they stood but later moved to bigger centres. Al these four persons had previously acquired seats standing in those districts in European or national elections. The same was typical of the other four candidates – two from each of the discussed parties. Among the first position candidates, three persons from PO and two persons from PiS had no previous connections with the electoral districts. A clear tendency is noticeable here: if candidates from outside the districts appeared on the lists, they were more often placed on top positions, although it was not a 100% rule.

Eight out of the 17 candidates standing for election in places other than the places of residence – nearly a half – received the EP seats. This means a higher percentage of success than in the whole candidate group (in each of the main parties, fewer than 15% of candidates obtained seats). Two of such candidates placed on seat-ensuring positions were beaten by candidates from farther positions – the losers were Jacek Rostowski (according to the National Electoral Commission database, Jan Vincent-Rostowski) from position no. 1 on the PO list in Bydgoszcz, and Hanna Foltyn-Kubicka from position no. 2 on the PiS list in Warsaw. Three candidates acquired seats despite having completely no previous relations with the districts where they stood for election. All of them were candidates from the top list positions – Dariusz Rosati from PO as well as Karol Karski and Ryszard Czarnecki from PiS. The other candidates who received seats, especially the three candidates from positions other than first (Kazimierz Ujazdowski and Beata Gosiewska from PiS and Tadeusz Zwiefka from PO) are

persons who had previously obtained seats in the districts where they were put up. These were the seats of: an MP, a senator and an MEP, respectively. Putting up a candidate from another district on the first position in Lublin by PO did not pay off, because the party lost the seat it had obtained there before.

The attempts to ensure seats for the chosen candidates by putting them up in other districts were generally limited to a small scale and had even more limited effects. Even placing a candidate at no. 1 position on the list did not guarantee the seat if the candidate had not had anything in common with the particular district. Still, 3 out of 5 main party candidates received the seats. As for registration outside the district, it does not seem to be a particularly great burden if the candidate has clear relations with the district – either historical or resulting from previously obtaining a seat in that district, even if the success had been the result of having the first position on a *sejm* election list (Kazimierz Ujazdowski, Julia Pitera).

Territorial construction of the lists

The next stage of the analysis was to verify the degree of relevance of the final form of candidate lists of the two main parties to the territorial divisions in particular districts. Only the cases of Platforma Obywatelska and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość were chosen for analysis, because in the other parties, only one seat was received by a candidate from a position other than first. In addition, PiS obtained seats in all the districts, and PO in twelve out of the thirteen districts. In a considerable number of districts, these parties obtained two seats each. So in the case of these parties, the territorial diversity was significant. Not only first position candidates and not only candidates who managed to beat them had a chance to receive the seats but also persons from farther positions.

So the electoral district applied in senate elections was adopted as a territorial diversity unit. This choice was motivated by the fact that the number of senate districts after the reform is similar to the number of candidates put up by the parties in the European Parliament elections. Neither the division into voivodeships, nor sejm election districts, nor even the division into poviats had this feature. A hundred and thirty candidates theoretically could be evenly distributed in a hundred senate districts. It should be remembered, however, that European Parliament electoral districts have different sizes and – as a result – cover different numbers of senate districts. Hence, ideal allocation of candidates in this division was impossible.

For the purpose of the analysis, some of the senate districts were combined so that the number of units in none of the EP electoral district exceeded ten. In addition, the metropolises which are split into several districts in senate

elections were treated as entire units. It was assumed that divisions of metropolises into senate districts are not based on deeper territorial differences.

Apart from metropolises, there was only a problem with the fit in Śląskie Voivodeshipi: thirteen senators are elected there, whereas only ten European Parliament candidates can be put up. For the purpose of the analysis, two adjacent districts were combined in three cases. Two Częstochowa districts were combined, as were Rybnik and Jastrzębie Zdrój districts as well as Katowice district and the one including Tychy and Mysłowice towns and the Bieruń and Lędziny poviat.

This way, 91 units were isolated for analysis: from 3 in Warsaw I district up to 10 in Kraków, Katowice and Wrocław districts. For each unit it was computed what percentage of votes cast for a given party in the 2009 election in each district came from this particular unit. This allowed to estimate the significance each part of the district should have for the candidate list created according to such a conjecture.

In order to determine the importance of the territorial factor for the candidate lists, the significance of particular positions on the EP candidate lists was also estimated. The result of the 2009 election was adopted as the point of reference, calculating for both parties what percentage of votes obtained in the whole country was obtained by the candidates from particular positions on the lists. The objective was to determine a general pattern with the greatest possible averaging of effects resulting from the candidates' individual qualities. Importantly, the patterns resulting from this calculation were very similar to those concerning other (smaller) parties. There were some deviations, especially in the case of small or very specific parties, such as PSL *(Polish Peasants' Party)*, but in the majority of parties the same division occurred. Number one candidates received approximately half the votes, and then the vote participation of candidates from the next positions successively decreased, although at the end it grew again. The results averaged for both parties are presented in Chart 1.

Chart 1. Participation of candidates from particular positions in votes cast for the list on the 2009 election and the estimated significance of the position on the list



Source: Own study based on information from the National Electoral Commission.

Individual candidates' results in the system of open list are distributed in accordance with the power law probability distribution, which suggests the multiplication of various kinds of advantage of the candidates. And as research shows, the position on the list is only one of such advantages [Raciborski, Rakocy 2009]. That is why not the empirically determined percentage of votes obtained by each candidate but rather the root of such participation was adopted as the weight of the position. Such rescaling led to the first position losing nearly half of its weight at the expense of the other positions. Values assumed this way are also presented in Chart 1.

In the next step, the candidates coming from particular senate districts and their weights resulting from the positions on the list was determined for each senate district. Thus the significance of each senate district from the perspective of the particular party's list was attributed to that district. This significance was compared with the significance of the district for the result of voting for the given party in the previous European Parliament election.

Very high correlation indices were obtained for both parties. Generally, the index was 0.75-0.76, but even when ignoring the extreme case of Warsaw I district, where one town clearly dominates over the rest of the district, the correlation coefficients still exceeded 0.6. In social sciences, such correlations are regarded as very strong. Such a strong correlation indicates the dominant pattern, as part of which the territorial bond is one of the key elements of candidate list construction. Candidates from particular parts of districts are placed on the lists in the order resulting from the weight these parts have for the general result of the party. We can suppose that each of them is to "serve" the relevant part of territorial identities making up the whole district in European elections. This observation follows the phenomena also occurring in countries where closed candidate lists are used [Rahat, Hazan 2001]. This issue might be seen from the perspective of general mechanisms of representative democracy: such a construction of the list would then be expected to ensure possibly complete representation of individual parts of the country. The problem is that even in the largest parties the list of each party receives only one seat in most electoral districts. Hence, logically it is impossible to provide such representation. So putting up excessive numbers of candidates has a purely marketing character. "Serving" the voters gives them slight chance for real representation, whereas it ensures additional votes for the list – cast for candidates who are known in advance to be losers.

However, this correlation – incomplete anyway – shows that there is no absolute consistency between the construction of the list and the weight of particular parts of the district in European elections. At a closer look, a number of senate electoral districts, sometimes important for the election result, had no

representatives from those districts on the lists, while in the neighbouring districts there were a few such representatives. The examples of electoral districts with no local candidates on either of the two main lists were e.g. the Tarnów district in Małopolskie Voivodeship or the Pińczów district in Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship.

Concentration of support

The importance of this factor is observed when the results of first position candidates are compared to the best of the remaining candidates in particular senate districts. The results for both parties are presented in Table 1. For each senate district (with the modifications described above) it shows what percentage of votes was cast for the candidate from no. 1 position and for the best of the remaining ones. The first candidate received on average 53% in PO and 45% in PiS. The best one of the rest received on average 26% in PO and 30% in PiS. The lighter background indicates the cases when support for the candidate was at least 1/3 higher than the mean for that candidate type. The darker background indicates the cases when support for the candidate was 1/3 lower than the mean.

Table 1. Results of no. 1 candidates and their strongest rivals in EP election divided into senate electoral districts

EP	Senate	main town	PO 1	PO other	PiS 1	PiS other
1	62	Słupsk	49%	23%	40%	23%
1	63	Chojnice	43%	18%	46%	20%
1	64	Gdynia	55%	25%	40%	36%
1	65	Gdańsk	49%	31%	55%	24%
1	66	Starogard Gd.	45%	24%	54%	9%
1	67	Malbork	52%	23%	59%	12%
2	9	Bydgoszcz	31%	49%	57%	36%
2	10	Inowrocław	27%	40%	48%	25%
2	11	Toruń	42%	43%	24%	65%
2	12	Grudziądz	26%	43%	32%	46%
2	13	Włocławek	30%	36%	40%	34%
3	59	Suwałki	70%	12%	49%	28%
3	60	Białystok	82%	8%	42%	45%
3	61	Bielsk Podl.	72%	16%	35%	28%
3	84	Elbląg	43%	27%	73%	6%
3	85	Ostróda	43%	25%	46%	34%
3	86	Olsztyn	46%	44%	55%	16%

EP	Senate	main town	PO 1	PO other	PiS 1	PiS other
3	87	Ełk	48%	28%	55%	11%
4	40	Wołomin	69%	10%	31%	32%
4	41	Pruszków	71%	10%	40%	37%
4	42.45	Warsaw	74%	10%	49%	29%
5	38	Płock	51%	21%	47%	25%
5	39	Ciechanów	53%	22%	37%	25%
5	46	Ostrołęka	47%	35%	20%	36%
5	47	Mińsk Maz.	49%	31%	19%	22%
5	48	Siedlce	50%	25%	17%	34%
5	49	Grójec	51%	33%	11%	66%
5	50	Radom	47%	25%	6%	77%
6	23.24	Łódź	67%	18%	73%	[illegible]
6	25	Łęczyca	68%	20%	76%	[illegible]
6	26	Zgierz	64%	24%	73%	10%
6	27	Sieradz	61%	16%	76%	10%
6	28	Piotrków Tryb.	62%	19%	82%	4%
6	29	Skierniewice	62%	16%	79%	12%
7	88	Piła	22%	65%	71%	8%
7	89	Szamotuły	28%	48%	65%	12%
7	90	Swarzędz	39%	27%	53%	26%
7	91	Poznań	42%	31%	48%	29%
7	92	Gniezno	34%	29%	61%	[illegible]
7	93	Konin	24%	31%	72%	[illegible]
7	94	Leszno	35%	28%	66%	[illegible]
7	95	Ostrów Wlkp.	34%	39%	61%	15%
7	96	Kalisz	27%	42%	43%	46%
8	14	Puławy	41%	16%	30%	37%
8	15	Kraśnik	39%	31%	27%	49%
8	16	Lublin	33%	41%	36%	53%
8	17	Biała Podl.	44%	17%	25%	43%
8	18	Chełm	21%	66%	24%	43%
8	19	Zamość	38%	33%	15%	40%
9	54	Tarnobrzeg	33%	28%	58%	24%
9	55	Mielec	38%	47%	64%	22%
9	56	Rzeszów	66%	20%	58%	32%
9	57	Krosno	78%	6%	42%	30%
9	58	Przemyśl	65%	23%	65%	13%
10	30	Chrzanów	53%	14%	37%	37%
10	31	Olkusz	50%	19%	27%	45%

EP	Senate	main town	PO 1	PO other	PiS 1	PiS other
10	32.33	Kraków	65%	19%	32%	47%
10	34	Bochnia	42%	25%	25%	34%
10	35	Tarnów	56%	15%	24%	28%
10	36	Nowy Targ	48%	29%	25%	25%
10	37	Nowy Sącz	53%	13%	25%	29%
10	81	Pińczów	37%	51%	17%	56%
10	82	Sandomierz	49%	41%	18%	50%
10	83	Kielce	37%	52%	19%	54%
11	68.69	Częstochowa	76%	12%	24%	68%
11	70	Gliwice	84%	5%	60%	5%
11	71	Zabrze	82%	6%	63%	4%
11	72.73	Rybnik-Jastrzębie-Zdrój	72%	14%	71%	9%
11	74	Chorzów	79%	8%	59%	6%
11	75.8	Katowice-Tychy	74%	12%	62%	6%
11	76	Dąbrowa G.	83%	5%	53%	25%
11	77	Sosnowiec	79%	7%	51%	18%
11	78	Bielsko-Biała	67%	17%	36%	41%
11	79	Cieszyn	59%	32%	36%	43%
12	1	Bolesławiec	67%	11%	52%	22%
12	2	Jelenia Góra	75%	7%	37%	29%
12	3	Legnica	68%	9%	62%	21%
12	4	Wałbrzych	60%	23%	26%	48%
12	5	Kłodzko	76%	8%	27%	29%
12	6	Oleśnica	78%	15%	52%	33%
12	7.8	Wrocław	75%	18%	48%	40%
12	51	Nysa	51%	37%	40%	20%
12	52	Opole	24%	66%	30%	32%
12	53	Kędzierzyn-Koźle	34%	55%	34%	23%
13	20	Zielona Góra	54%	34%	37%	39%
13	21	Gorzów Wlkp.	60%	18%	34%	51%
13	22	Żagań	51%	36%	42%	30%
13	97	Szczecin	46%	41%	79%	7%
13	98	Stargard Sz.	53%	16%	65%	8%
13	99	Kołobrzeg	65%	10%	28%	58%
13	100	Koszalin	52%	27%	34%	54%

Source: Own study based on information from the National Electoral Commission.

The cases of list leaders who obtained the greatest participation in particular electoral districts (exceeding 80%) have one thing in common. The majority of them are persons closely connected with the particular electoral districts and at the same time popular in the media. In the case of Civic Platform, Jerzy Buzek is such a person, and in the case of Law and Justice, it is Janusz Wojciechowski. Each of them achieves similar results in several neighbouring senate electoral districts. This way, media visibility and the bond with a larger area may give such a cumulated effect and a very high support index. However, if we look at the cases when no. 1 candidates had the poorest results, the huge significance of local rivals is noticeable. In the case of PO, Chełm and Piła were such districts, and in PiS, Radom and Zamość. These cases are similar because none of these senate districts includes the central town of the EP electoral districts. In territorial opposition of this kind, internal competition within the list is the most clearly seen.

The poor result on the list does not necessarily mean that the candidate is weak. In the Opole district, previous MEP Danuta Jazłowiecka, coming from that district, received two thirds of the votes cast for PO – more than twice as many as the person from no. 1 position on the PO list, the Minister of Culture Bogdan Zdrojewski, a person present in the media and commonly recognisable. On the other side of the district, in Jelenia Góra, the same Bogdan Zdrojewski received ten times greater support than the strongest of his rivals.

Even greater relations of this kind occur on the lists of PiS, where Zbigniew Kuźmiuk standing from a far position obtained more than a dozen times greater support in the Radom district than the no. 1 candidate, Wojciech Jasiński, residing in Płock. But there are cases in which the weakness of number one candidate results from the dispersion of support among a group of other candidates, where the sum of candidate number one and the best candidate in the district does not exceed 50%.

To sum up, it may be said that the ordinance in which a voter is forced to choose one candidate on the list and districts cover geographically and historically varied areas activates a very complicated game among parties, individual candidates, their position in the media and local connections. All that leads to the fact that a considerable part of attention of political actors themselves and the media coverage is focused on this game. The game has an important impact on the personal composition of Polish representation in the European Parliament. The advantage of the candidates placed on the first positions on the lists is clearly visible. However, it must be said that the advantage is not overwhelming and can be eliminated by territorial bonds or the advantage of the incumbent.

References:

Andretta M., Chelotti N. (2012), *Investigating candidate selection strategies: the case of 2009 European Parliament elections*, [in:] *An Audit of Democracy in The European Union*, Brussels: European University Institute (EUI).

Cross W. (2008), *Democratic Norms and Party Candidate Selection. Taking Contextual Factors into Account*, „Party Politics", vol. 14(5).

de Vreese C. H., Banducci S. A., Semetko H. A., Boomgaarden H. G. (2006), *The News Coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 Countries*, „European Union Politics", vol. 7(4).

Flis J. (2011), *Instytucjonalny labirynt demokracji wewnętrznej*, [in:] M. Chmaj, M. Waszak, J. Zbieranek (eds.), *O demokracji w polskich partiach politycznych*, Warszawa: ISP.

Gabel M. J. (2000), *European Integration. Voters and National Politics,* „West European Politics", vol. 23 (4).

Rahat G., Hazan R. Y. (2001), *Candidate selection methods an analytical framework*, „Party Politics", vol. 7 (3).

Hazan R. Y., Rahat G. (2006), *Candidate selection: methods and consequences*, [In:] R. S. Katz, W. Crotty (eds.), *Handbook of Party Politics*, London: Sage.

Hix S. (2004), *Electoral institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament*, „World Politics", vol. 56(2).

Katz R. S. (2001), *The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy,* „Party Politics", vol. 7(3).

Lundell K. (2004), *Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective*, "Party Politics", vol. 10(1).

Markowski R. (2009), *Seminarium „Partycypacja wyborcza Polaków". Zapis stenograficzny,* Warszawa: ISP.

Marsh M. (1998), *Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections*, „British Journal of Political Science", vol. 28(4).

Meserve S. A., Pemstein D., Bernhard W. T. (2009), *Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament,* „Journal of Politics" 71(3)/2009

Nohlen D. (2004), *Prawo wyborcze i system partyjny*, Warszawa: Scholar.

Raciborski F., Rakocy K. (2009), *Internet, politycy, wybory – o możliwości badań zawartości Internetu do przewidywania wyniku wyborów* [in:] M. Zahorska, E. Nasalska (eds.), *Wartości, polityka, społeczeństwo*, Warszawa: Scholar.

Reif K., Schmitt H. (1980), *Nine Second-Order National Elections – a Conceptual framework for the Analysis of European Election Results,* „European Journal of Political Research", vol. 8(1).

Shomer Y. (2009), *Candidate Selection Procedures, Seniority, and Vote-Seeking Behavior* „Comparative Political Studies", vol. 42(7).

Sokół W. (2003), *Funkcje partii politycznych*, [in:] W. Sokół, M. Żmigrodzki (eds.), *Współczesne partie i systemy partyjne,* Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS.

Wojtasik W. (2010), *Efektywność strategii selekcji kandydatów na listy wyborcze w wyborach do Parlamentu Europejskiego 2009 roku*, [in:] K. Sobolewska-Myślik, A. Hess, K. Kowalczyk (eds.), *Polska scena polityczna. Środowiska–komunikacja polityczna–strategie,* Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego.