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SECURITIZATION OF ENERGY SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

ABSTRACT

This paper reviews the contemporary theoretical approaches to the subjects of international security policy and energy security. Apart from discussing the theory of securitization, especially in context of a theoretical debate between representatives of political realism and constructivism, key research dilemmas, concerning the defining of energy security and crucial security threats, will be presented as well. Second part of the paper contains a short description of international politics in the Central Asia, with particular reference to presentation of politics of the regional political powers and the post-Soviet republics. It is followed by presentation of securitizing actions of those subjects taken in the field of energy security. Among presented contexts of those actions are following issues: development of drilling infrastructure, security of transport, conflicts concerning access to alternative energy sources and political power game in presented region.

Key words

international security, energy security, securitization, Copenhagen School, Central Asia, international powers, energy cooperation, political rivalry

1. Introduction

In the debate on the issue of international security the subject of energy security emerged relatively recently – in the 1970s, as a consequence of the global oil crisis. Social and economic changes of the globalization era and a growing need for strategic resources of developing countries, merged with a growing ecological awareness of societies, contributed to significant increase of this subject's importance in the context of a debate on security politics of world states. The paper's subject takes on the challenges of definitional and theoretical nature. First of all, proposed by subjects and expert institutions definitions of energy security are more than often too broad and they refer to colloquial meanings of the described phenomena and issues. The problem with the theory of

securitization is slightly different in nature. This term was thoroughly described and reviewed in literature, also in a critical way. Yet still there is a research gap, especially in the Polish research studies, concerning the process of creation of security communities in context of energy security and securitization of issues of building up a strategic infrastructure of states.

The major goal of this paper, except for filling a research gap, is to present an idea of securitization of energy security as theoreticisation of issue of strategic actions. In this paper the authors will focus, above all, on one of the angles of energy security, namely on export and import of hydrocarbon fuels. The paper is divided in three major parts. In first of them the key issues concerning the term “security” and theory of securitization itself are presented. This part is supplemented by review of the works of the Copenhagen School, contemporary definitions of energy security and overview of securitizing strategies within the field. Second part describes the issues of security and international politics in the Central Asia. Among those are: mutual relations of the Central Asian states, role of global and regional powers in the security system, and key challenges to security in the region. Last of the parts consists of presentation of securitization strategies of the five post-Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China, all of them within the context of energy security.

2. Security: Definition and Evolution of the Term

Proper definition of the term “security” is one of the most important and complex problems addressed by international relations studies. Existing dictionary definitions are vague, at their best, or – in most cases – too broad to help in understanding mechanisms behind security policy either of individuals, or of states. According to Oxford Dictionary, security in general is “the state of being free from danger or threat”, while in political context it points out three key elements: *feeling* of safety, procedures and measures taken to ensure security, and the state of feeling safe¹. Collins Dictionary proposes the definition in which “security” and “the state of being secure” or “assured freedom from poverty or want” are synonymous². On the other hand, definitions used in international

¹ *Definition of security in English*, Oxford Dictionaries, <http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/security> [Access date: 29.06.2013].

² *Definition of 'security'*, Collins English Dictionary, <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/security> [Access date: 29.06.2013].

studies, had been for a long time way too narrow and too military-oriented, as Richard Ullman pointed out in 1983, while foreseeing the gradual emergence of non-military threats to national security³. In the Polish international studies those two contradictory approaches had been merged into one, effecting in listing out all the fields in which “feeling secure” was vital from the point of view of a state⁴.

In the 1940s, new research discipline, called security studies, was established. Within its framework two different approaches to defining security emerged. First, the negative one, was based on narrow understanding of security as a lack of threat. It was focused on the analysis of subject’s influence on the system and its goal was finding a way to protect the subject from threats to its internal values (sovereignty, freedom of economy, etc.). Second, the positive approach, derived on belief that safety is a process, based on subject’s creative activity in international system, and that framework of security is dynamic in its nature and dependent on various changing factors. Those two approaches point out the key issues discussed in so called “great debate” between realist and constructivist school of international relations. In Cold War period, as Ullman made it clear, the realist approach played the dominant role, especially in the United States. Military and political fields of international relations were perceived as a point of reference when describing international security. Also, state-centric approach played a dominant role in this area of studies⁵. Yet, a sudden crash of the bipolar political system effected in the decline of traditionalist approach and new aspects of international security have been brought to light. This effected in challenging the realist perspective, especially narrowing of the term “international security” to military and political matters⁶.

A challenge to the idea of state-centric, military-oriented global security system was the idea of security communities, initially introduced by Karl Deutsch in 1957. This concept underlined the role of common value systems in process of building a security community. For Deutsch, the key element to

³ R. Ullman, *Redefining security*, “International Security” 1983, No. 1, p. 129.

⁴ See: R. Zięba, *Kategoria bezpieczeństwa w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych* [Category of Security in Political Relations] [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe i Międzynarodowe u Schyłku XX w.* [National and International Security at the End of the 20th Century], D. Bobrow, E. Haliżak, R. Zięba (eds.), Warsaw 1997, passim.

⁵ S. Smith, *The Contested Concept of Security* [in:] *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, K. Booth (ed.), Boulder 2005, p. 87.

⁶ B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post Cold War Period*, Brighton 1991, p. 14.

peaceful changes (and, by that, improving the security level) was the agreement of parts upon common elements, which were to be pursued together⁷. This approach, diminishing a role of state-centric systems, was revived in the late 1990s by Emanuel Adler with Michael Barnett⁸ and by Peter Katzenstein⁹. Adler continued this line of work with his idea of “imagined security communities” where, as Adler claims, security communities are socially constructed “cognitive regions”, based on shared understandings and common identities¹⁰.

The work of aforementioned authors was preceded by structural realists like Barry Buzan and Richard Little, who also decided to stop following the idea of a global system of entwining vectors of power and influence in anarchical environment. For them, the Waltzian idea of “like units” gathered by hierarchical centre of hegemonic power as the only scenario for achieving peace was way too narrow in scope and lacked in “dynamic density”¹¹. They also made an attempt to reinstate the role of language, persuasion and interpretation in understanding power, and indirectly – international security.

The idea of security was not the only thing that have changed in the last years of Cold War and first few years after the decline of bipolar international system. Same went for objective criterion of defining security. As Marek Pietraś claims, security theorists first began to seriously consider areas of security not falling into field of political or military matters in 1970s, when oil crisis erupted¹². This claim is backed by Wojciech Kostecki, as well as Barry Buzan with Lene Hansen, who also pointed at international terrorism and armed conflicts in Third World as a source of new challenges to global security that emerged in the late years of the Cold War¹³. The globalist perspective of international relations, based mainly

⁷ K. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*, Princeton 1957, p. 5.

⁸ E. Adler, M. Barnett, *A Framework for the Study of Security Communities* [in:] *Security Communities*, E. Adler, M. Barnett (eds.), Cambridge 1998.

⁹ *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, P.J. Katzenstein (ed.), New York 1996.

¹⁰ E. Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations*, London–New York 2005, p. 179.

¹¹ B. Buzan, C. Jones, R. Little, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, New York 1993, p. 38.

¹² M. Pietraś, *Bezpieczeństwo ekologiczne w Europie. Studium politologiczne* [Ecological Security in Europe. A Politological Study], Lublin 2000, pp. 18–19.

¹³ W. Kostecki, *Strach i Potęga: bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w XXI w.* [Fear and Power: International Security in the 21st Century], Warsaw 2012, p. 17; B. Buzan, L. Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge 2009, p. 85.

on political economy and cultural approach, also added to switching focal points in security research. This vision of security takes the state off the global scene, replacing it with the rapidly increased position of non-state actors, be that international organizations or corporations, that remain independent of states' network of political influence¹⁴. According to Victor Cha, the emergence of globalization in international politics eventually forced the states to follow more cooperation-oriented model of security, especially on the regional level¹⁵. Those changes in understanding international security effected in major theoretical debate of the late 1980s and early 1990s.

A dominant side in this dispute was, for a long time, the realist school. This approach is based mainly on theoretical works of Kenneth Waltz. He proposed a vision of international relations based upon three principles: self-help community, anarchy as predominant force in international relations, and likeness of system units¹⁶. This meant that security was a primary concern of states, and key factor to guarantee a state of security was power. Offensive realists, such as John Mearsheimer or Stephen Walt, pursued this idea and came to conclusion that the only policy of security worth pursuing is the one that weakens potential enemies and allows to keep the upper hand in any possible military confrontation. Among security strategies one that they favour is containment¹⁷. Stephen Walt added that the primary role of security system is to constrain, with minimal input of unit-level factors such as internal policy or state's ideology¹⁸. Defensive realists, on the other hand, underline the importance of interdependence of states and excessive costs of military conflict. They point to the important role of initial relations between subjects of international system – different perception of mutual security are likely to occur between friendly states and between rival subjects¹⁹. They also consider security institutions, such as organizations, to maintain peace – within limited range of possibilities.

¹⁴ D. Held et. al., *Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture*, Cambridge 1999, pp. 7–9.

¹⁵ V.D. Cha, *Globalization and the Study of International Security*, "Journal of Peace Research" 2000, No. 3, pp. 391–394.

¹⁶ K. Waltz, *Theory of International Relations*, New York 1979, passim.

¹⁷ S.L. Lamy, *Contemporary Mainstream Approaches Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism* [in:] *The Globalization of World Politics*, J. Baylis, S. Smith (eds.), Oxford 2006, pp. 210–211.

¹⁸ S. Walt, *Revolution and War*, Ithaca 1997, p. 3.

¹⁹ R. Jervis, *System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life*, Princeton 1997, pp. 221–225.

This approach, state-centric and static, was challenged by numerous scholars, but the most important role was played by constructivists. This school of thought, based on interdisciplinary approach, emerged in 1980s, with the publications of Friedrich Kratochwil and Nicholas Onuf (who coined the term)²⁰. Both of the authors were deeply influenced by the sociological works of Anthony Giddens and Peter Berger²¹. The crucial role in the debate between neorealism and constructivism was played by Alexander Wendt, who challenged the Waltzian concept of anarchy by famously stating “anarchy is what states make of it”²². According to Wendt, anarchic environment of international relations may facilitate conflict as well as cooperation. International system, similarly to international security, is dynamic by nature, and is derived from structure of states, which is not material, but purely inter-subjective. Hence the security of states is based on norms and changes in their perception of international reality²³. Constructivists also challenged the idea of like-units struggling against each other. Instead, they highlighted issues like institutional isomorphism and institutionalization of norms, which effect in developed socialization of subject of international relations and reduce a risk of conflict through addressing common norms, concerning such various subjects and fields like human security, culture, international law or common energy policy²⁴. This positive vision was drastically different than the perspective of inevitable struggle for security envisioned by the neorealists.

3. Securitization: Definition and Theoretical Background

The term “Copenhagen School” was coined by Bill McSweeney, one of its most prominent critics²⁵. It referred to group of scientists gathered in Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) that attempted to find a new direction for

²⁰ See: N. Onuf, *Constructivism: A User's Manual* [in:] *International Relations in a Constructed World*, P. Kowert, V. Kubalkova, N. Onuf (eds.), New York–London 1998, pp. 67–69.

²¹ P. Berger, T. Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*, Oxford 1966.

²² A. Wendt, *Anarchy Is What States Make of It*, “International Relations” 1992, No. 2.

²³ A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge, 1999, passim.

²⁴ M. Barnett, *Social Constructivism* [in:] *The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations*, J. Baylis, S. Smith (eds.), Oxford 2006, pp. 264–266.

²⁵ D. Mutimer, *Critical Security Studies: A Schismatic History* [in:] *Contemporary Security Studies*, A. Collins (ed.), Oxford 2007, p. 60.

security studies. Above all, they aimed at broadening the range of term and filling the vacuum left by the end of Cold War with previously marginalized issues. This, and concentration on interaction between subjects put them in the same vein as Wendt's early constructivist approach, yet their vision of international environment has been definitely systemic²⁶. It is worthy to mention that the Copenhagen School was only initially present in the "wide versus narrow" debate, and in later years they chose to focus on aspect of determining factors that shape security relations between agents of international politics²⁷.

Pioneer work for the Copenhagen School was made by Barry Buzan, who already made an attempt to conjoin structural realist perspective with dynamic approach of constructivism. He pointed out that security has aspects – internal and external. Those "environments" may be examined together, for example in case when internal weakness provokes external aggression, or separately²⁸. Other substantial background for the Copenhagen School was heritage of Karl Deutsch's work and his concept of "security community". One of key features of the Copenhagen School's work was idea of regional security communities, which combined the idea of Deutsch's work with geopolitical angle. Concept of peaceful change was further specified and his list of conditions essential to achieve a state of successful amalgamation of security community was thoroughly reviewed²⁹. Buzan and Waever added to it their own classification of regional security complexes, dividing them in accord to number of actors and role of regional hegemonic power, and allowing global security processes (i.e. global economic change) into their theoretical model³⁰. This consistent "middle ground" approach allowed to formulate another important theoretical construct – securitization.

In scientific discourse securitization is commonly interpreted as "extreme form of politicization"³¹. Yet for Ole Waever and Barry Buzan securitization is, above all, a speech act, so their definition of securitization is a definition of

²⁶ B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. De Wilde, *Security – A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder 1998, p. 6.

²⁷ B. Buzan, L. Hansen, *The Evolution...*, op.cit., pp. 44–46.

²⁸ B. Buzan, *Security, the State, the 'New World Order' and Beyond [in:] On Security*, R.D. Lipschutz (ed.), New York 1998, pp. 144–145.

²⁹ See: A. Tuscisny, *Security Communities and Their Values: Taking Masses Seriously*, "International Political Science Review" 2007, No. 4, p. 428.

³⁰ B. Buzan, O. Waever, *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*, Cambridge 2003, passim.

³¹ K.M. Fierke, *Critical Approaches to International Security*, Cambridge 2007, p. 111.

specific type of discourse. B. Buzan and L. Hansen have distinguished three types of security discourse: non-political, political, and securitized. On the first level are any phenomena beyond the political debate, which are not important to state's security. On the second level of analysis are occurrences which interest political groups and their political social surroundings (audience). On the last level are securitized phenomena, where political actors and audience agree on the threatening character of such occurrences³². Among them are phenomena like international terrorism or energy security issues.

Ole Wæver started his work on theory of securitization by stating that by naming a certain development a security problem, the subject (in this context: a state) may claim a special right to change the rules of political game³³. So, the security is rather a verbal representation of development in particular area and securitization stands for identification and discursive construction of an existential threat in referent object which, in turn, is being replaced from the realm of "non-political" or "political" issue to the category of emergency³⁴. This process is strictly subjective and doesn't mean automatic success. The changing of rules may also mean straining of such forms of consensus as democratic rules. For example, securitizing a terrorist threat led to limiting civil rights and building up additional tools of social control, like recently discussed PRISM program³⁵.

Important part in the theory of securitization was a concept of desecuritization, or acknowledging the security's increase and returning to institutionalized procedures of consensus (participatory democracy, system of international cooperation, etc.). Wæver uses an example of Europe after World War II, where feeling of reciprocal threat gradually diminished and was replaced by process

³² B. Buzan, L. Hansen, op.cit., p. 214.

³³ O. Wæver, *Securitization and Desecuritization* [in:] *On Security*, R.D. Lipschutz (ed.), op.cit., p. 44.

³⁴ R. Floyd, *Human Security and the Copenhagen School's Securitization Approach: Conceptualizing Security as a Securitizing Move*, "Human Security Journal" 2007, No. 5, p. 329.

³⁵ See: *Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering*, Ronald Deibert, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, Jonathan Zittrain (eds.), Cambridge 2008; B. Gellman, L. Poitras, U.S., *British Intelligence Mining Data From Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program*, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html, 06.06.2013 [Access date: 17.07.2013].

of Europeanization or evolution of common European political identity³⁶. For Buzan, Waever and de Wilde desecuritization was an ultimate goal for policy-makers, and securitization of referent objects was to be only temporary³⁷. Waever suggested three strategies of desecuritization: not calling an issue a threat, management of securitization so it does not develop beyond control, or moving the securitized issue back into normal politics (first of two security fields suggested by Buzan and Hansen)³⁸. For all of the authors security is understood as a presence of a threat, something entirely negative, proving an impotence of political measures in given situation. In the long-range perspective, the only viable option is desecuritization and letting go of threat-defence dyad³⁹.

Theory of securitization was being criticized from various points of view. For example, Claire Wilkinson criticizes Copenhagen School's take on identity, claiming that political stability and continuity it calls for is hardly ever present, either in the West or in the East⁴⁰. Rita Floyd points out that the concept of desecuritization is flawed, for not all securitizing actions have equally negative consequences, and not every form of desecuritization leads to "normal politics" understood as democratic transactions⁴¹. Other influential critique came from Thierry Balzacq, followed by Holger Stritzel. For them focusing on speech act may present itself rather strongly, yet equally important role is played by context – and this aspect was omitted by the Copenhagen School researchers. Stritzel claimed that securitization is not only a speech act, but also an action that follows. Following that trail of thought, he proposed an extension of Waever's theory and specification of linguistic (speech act) and active (selected actions) securitization⁴². For Balzacq, effective securitization is necessarily power-laden,

³⁶ O. Wæver, *Securitization and Desecuritization*, op.cit., p. 54.

³⁷ B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. De Wilde, *Security – A New Framework*, op.cit., p. 4.

³⁸ O. Waever, *The EU as a Security Actor: Reflections from a Pessimist Constructivist on PostSovereign Security Orders* [in:] *International Relations Theory and the Politics of European Integration: Power, Security and Community*, M. Kelstrup, M. Williams (eds.), London–New York 2000, p. 253.

³⁹ B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. De Wilde, *Security – A New Framework*, op.cit., p. 29.

⁴⁰ C. Wilkinson, *The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization Theory Useable Outside Europe?*, "Security Dialogue" 2007, No. 1, p. 10.

⁴¹ R. Floyd, *Human Security and the Copenhagen School's Securitization Approach*, op.cit., pp. 43–44.

⁴² A. Ziętek, *Kategoria „sekurtyzacji” w bezpieczeństwie kulturowym* [The Theory of 'Securitization' in Cultural Security], "Stosunki międzynarodowe" [International Studies] 2011, No. 1–2, pp. 202–203.

and dependent on specifics and character of audience. Hence, he proposed an alternative, which he dubbed “pragmatic act”. In this form securitization is a process where agents mobilize patterns of heuristic artefacts to persuade a target audience to build a “coherent network of implications” and undertake immediately a “customized political act” to stop the development of threat⁴³.

4. Definition of Energy Security

The term “energy security” may be defined in numerous ways. Tadeusz Zbigniew Leszczyński attempted to find common grounds for all of the above definitions. He singled out several subject criteria: energetic, economic, ecologic and social⁴⁴. The most common definition of the term comes from International Energy Agency and refers to the “uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”⁴⁵. It’s important to point out that IEA does not put a focus on crude oil and other carbohydrates, but attempts to include every other energy source, finding them equally important. It also underlines primary role of securing supplies, as *sine qua non* condition of energy security⁴⁶. Sascha Muller-Kraenner describes energy security, in accord with position of German government and of European Commission, as “a possibility of production and usage of relatively inexpensive, certain and environment-friendly energy”⁴⁷. This definition is rather unclear and opens the door to the rhetoric speculation on what “relatively” or “certain” means. Unfortunately, this is not the only definition that is too broad or unclear in defining the problem. For example, Cutler Cleveland and Christopher Morris described energy security in following way:

Energy security are the various security measures that a given nation, or the global community as a whole, must carry out to maintain adequate energy supply; this can include a wide range of issues such developing non-fossil fuel sources,

⁴³ T. Balzacq, *Constructivism and Securitization Studies* [in:] *The Routledge Handbook of Security Studies*, M. Cavelti, V. Mauer (eds.), Abingdon–New York 2010, p. 74.

⁴⁴ T. Leszczyński, *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne Unii Europejskiej do 2030 roku* [Energy Security of the European Union up to 2030], Warsaw 2009, p. 11.

⁴⁵ *Energy Security*, International Energy Agency, <http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/> [Access date: 26.06.2013].

⁴⁶ *Canadian Energy Security: What Does Energy Security Mean for Canada?*, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/cdmctrch/Cnd_nrg_Scrt_Rprt-eng.pdf [Access date: 11.07.2013].

⁴⁷ S. Muller-Kraenner, *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne. Nowy pomiar świata* [Energy Security. New Word Measurement], Szczecin 2009, p. 7.

maintaining military forces to protect pipelines and other components of the supply chain, and encouraging the stability of governments in oil-exporting countries⁴⁸.

Center of Strategic and International Studies accomplished to select and describe numerous facets of energy security, selecting eleven possible variables which may help in pointing out possible areas of securitization. Among the factors are: energy intensity (amount of energy used in domestic market), import levels, feasibility, geopolitics and economics, security of trade flows and diversity of energy sources, to name only a few⁴⁹. Researchers of CSIS underline the main problem of defining energy security, which is relativity of term and its constant broadening – energy security of today is not by all means limited to volatility of energy prices or disruptions of oil supplies⁵⁰.

Global legal framework for energy security is based mainly on the United Nation's Resolution 1803 (XVII) on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, which claims that only a state has a jurisdiction and other implementing instruments over energy sources laying on and under its territory⁵¹. So, according to the United Nations, natural resources are exclusive goods of states, which underlines primary role of national political organizations (governments and such) in defining goals, threats and economic aspects of energetic industry and trade. Polish Energy Law defines energy security as "state of economy which allows for covering of current and perspective consumers' needs for energy in technically and economically justified way, in accord with requirements of environmental protection"⁵².

As Daniel Yergin points out, a concept of energy security is the subject of permanent evolution. To underline that, he proposed a new framework for energy policy: expanded to cover not only potential disruption in oil production, but also to cover entire supply chain and infrastructure⁵³. First of all, today is

⁴⁸ C. Cleveland, C. Morris, *Dictionary of Energy. Expanded Edition*, Oxford 2009, p. 170.

⁴⁹ B. Childs-Staley, S. Ladislav, K. Zyla, J. Goodward, *Evaluating the Energy Security Implications of a Carbon-Constrained U.S. Economy*, Washington 2009, pp. 3–4.

⁵⁰ S. Ladislav, K. Zyla, B. Childs, *Managing the Transition to a Secure, Low-Carbon Energy Future*, Washington 2008, p. 4.

⁵¹ *Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources*, G.A. res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).

⁵² *Ustawa z dn. 10 kwietnia 1997 r. Prawo energetyczne* art 3. pkt. 16 [Act as of May 10, 1997, Energy Law Act, Art. 3 (16)].

⁵³ D. Yergin, *Ensuring Energy Security*, "Foreign Affairs" 2006, No. 2, p. 78.

a time of sector's transition. New sources of energy are being introduced. Renewable energy sources (RES, among them: wind, solar energy, etc.) may serve as a positive example, with their increasing share in overall energy market (20 to 30%) and goal of becoming the single most important energy source⁵⁴, which was vividly expressed by political bodies such as European Union. A fair assessment is that the availability of RES will rearrange the mosaic of tensions and stresses in international relations, especially that, contrarily to expectations, rich countries do not renounce their control over the areas rich in conventional energy resources⁵⁵. Yet, several factors are unchangeable. First of all, the degree of energetic interdependence can be reduced by political will and cooperation. Secondly, price of "old" energy sources, based on hydrocarbon, should be reduced according to a standard law of supply and demand. This is where rule of Arps-Roberts comes in to sum up the majority of energy policy dilemmas. According to it, 80% of current energy consumption, all hydrocarbons, follow the geostrategical rule, which definition borders on probabilistic studies:

for each additional wildcat well drilled, the probability of finding a field of a certain size class is proportional to the number of remaining undiscovered fields in that class. The model is based on the fundamental principle that since large fields tend to have largest areas, they are more likely to be found earlier in the exploration process⁵⁶.

Several other works on strategy for energy security refer to one common element: long-term cooperation⁵⁷. The most important of agreements concerning this subjects, such as Energy Charter Treaty (also known as the Lisbon Energy Charter), are meant to stabilize relation between their parties⁵⁸. This may be an effect of high level of global energy insecurity, which, according to the Maplecroft Index, is a concern to more than 100 states in the world⁵⁹. Main reason behind

⁵⁴ V. Smil, *Moore's Curse and the Great Energy Delusion*, The American, <http://www.american.com/archive/2008/november-december-magazine/moore2019s-curse-and-the-great-energy-delusion>, 19.11.2008 [access 26.06.2013].

⁵⁵ V. Šušić, J. Živković, *Energy Resources and Global Geopolitical Processes*, "Facta Universitatis" 2012, No. 1, p. 40.

⁵⁶ C. Cleveland, C. Morris, *Dictionary of Energy*, op.cit., p. 26.

⁵⁷ See: D. Yergin, *Ensuring Energy Security*, op.cit.

⁵⁸ Energy Charter Secretariat, *The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents*, Brussels 2004, passim.

⁵⁹ *China and MENA States Face Long-Term Energy Challenges*, Maplecroft Global Risk Analytics, http://maplecroft.com/about/news/energy_security_2011.html, 02.06.2011 [Access date: 25.06.2013].

it is the situation of international energy markets. Consider United States: one of the biggest economies in the world, second only to EU-28, relies deeply on import of oil. Petroleum is the biggest energy source for United States and claims 36% of whole energy consumption in USA, ahead of natural gas (25%) and coal (20%). Total annual energy consumption in USA sums up at 97,5 quads⁶⁰. It means that important part of economy remains dependent on political decisions of organizations like OPEC. Effects of OPEC's price war were clearly visible during oil crisis in the 70s, which adds the gravitas to the claim of increasing role of non-state actors in context of energy security.

Despite continuing states' dominance, other actors have increased their role in energy sector – international corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or ethnic groups, which hold claims to grounds where research confirmed a presence of crude oil or other important sources of energy. In this context, especially important role is being played by national companies (NC). NC is a business consortium, whose main shareholder is a state. Key global NCs are present in Russia, and they are part of such deals as recent 25-year contract (starting in 2015) between Russia and China which constitutes supplies of 350 million tonnes of oil by ASPO pipeline, which in turn was constructed with share of financial credit from China. The Russian side was represented by Rosneft, yet the deal was sealed between Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin⁶¹.

5. Securitizing Energy Security: Theoretical Approach

Thomas Homer-Dixon stated in 1994 that the forthcoming decades will bring a steady increase in the incidents of violent conflict that is caused, at least in part, by environmental scarcity⁶². Oil, gas, water or pollution are likely to be the new major source of conflict. Access to diminishing sources of hydrocarbons is considered to be one of key elements of strategic advantage in the future, especially after the shock of oil crisis in 1973. Analysis of narrative of political

⁶⁰ "Quad" stands for one quadrillion of BTU (British Thermal Units, which measure fuel use by the energy content of each fuel source) and equals 172 million barrels of oil. See: *What are the major sources and users of energy in the United States?*, U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/major_energy_sources_and_users.cfm, 18.05.2012 [Access date: 26.06.2013].

⁶¹ *Russia, China to Sign \$270bn Oil Contract*, Press TV, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/06/21/310109/russia-china-to-ink-major-oil-deal/> [Access date: 29.06.2013].

⁶² T. Homer-Dixon, *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*, West Sussex 1994, p. 4.

strategy of the United States indicates that, especially after 9/11, access to resources became one of the most important subjects for neoconservatives from the White House and the Capitol Hill⁶³.

Multiple theoretical approaches show various subjects that may be securitized while pursuing energy security⁶⁴. If one takes on the perspective of the Copenhagen School to retrace the patterns of energy security, then it should not be limited to subject of resources availability (which is characteristic to neorealist point of view⁶⁵), but also try to retrace the historical ties and rivalries, which may effectively alter the perspective of economic relations⁶⁶. Following this logic, dependency on oil supplies has different meaning for the former Russian republics, which share common identity and history with Moscow, and to Poland, where Russia is perceived as a perennial threat and Moscow's policy or symbolic acts are hardly considered as friendly. Same goes for level of authority, where hegemonic influence may be perceived in positive or negative light.

Analysis of particular regions of the world presents them as areas of increased risk. Rise of separatism movements in the Central Asia may be perceived as a possible threat to internal stability and portent of region's possible Balkanization – that's the perspective of China toward Muslim separatism in Tajikistan. For the United States it means an increase in activity of terrorist organizations: threat thoroughly securitized after attack on the World Trade Center in 2001. Yet, it may also be perceived as threatening rise of smuggle and criminal activity, which may damage the delicate tissue of recreated transport network and put into hiatus plans of development of regional network of pipelines, reaching directly toward the East China Sea or Europe.

Having selected possible threats, one can apply model of regional security cooperation, in which securitizing strategies are being applied. First, rules and standards need to be set, in order to maintain or constrain certain behaviours. International Energy Agency may serve as an example of institution which tackles the short-term crisis in oil supply. Yet, key global oil importers, including

⁶³ R. Catley, D. Mosler, *The American Challenge: the World Resists US Liberalism*, Burlington 2007, p.162. See also: J. Burgess, *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, London–New York 2011, pp.142–145.

⁶⁴ R. Dannreuther, *International Relations Theories: Energy, Minerals and Conflict*, “POLINARES Working Paper” 2008, No. 8.

⁶⁵ See: D. Yergin, *Ensuring Energy Security*, op.cit.

⁶⁶ J. Sharples, *Russo-Polish Energy Security Relations: a Case of Threatening Dependency, Supply Guarantee, or Regional Energy Security Dynamics?*, “Political Perspectives” 2012, No. 1, pp. 30–31.

rising powers like China and India, are not members of IEA, which severely limits organization's range and applicability of rules⁶⁷.

As Buzan and Waever state, securitization within regional security complex is based on inter-subjectively constructed issues in given geographical area. This process may be asymmetrical, due to the fact that some facts may not be perceived as threat or may not be subject to counter-securitizing actions⁶⁸. As RSC theory indicates, the threats arising from energy dependencies are usually more intense between states (or regions) in close geographical proximity and several issues are securitized by all regional parties. Dynamics of regional energy transactions include production (export), purchasing (import) and transit of energy. In case of Central Asia several "referent objects" or constructed issues in this field may be distinguished. The first of them is the availability of strategic resources, such as gas, oil and alternative energy sources, among which key role is played by water (securitization of river dams). Another issue is the diversification of sources and security of transport. Last of the securitized issues is the activity of national companies and their influence on political transactions. It is also worth noting that "geographical proximity" in this case means a distance of thousands of kilometres.

In this model, regional distribution of energy resources and network of energy dependencies may be considered as parallel to the distribution of military power in traditional security complexes. This leads to an important question about the subjects' identities and their abilities in energy security complex. It is necessary to evaluate the level of energy dependency by measuring such factors as energy trade balance, share of domestic energy resources in annual use of energy, as well as consider possibilities for their diversification.

6. Regional Powers in Central Asia: Policies of the PRC and Russia

After dismantling of the Soviet Union, Russian political activity in the Central Asia can be divided in two periods. The first period, in the 1990s, was characterized by passive and reactive approaches. For a long time, Russia could not overcome the negative effects of transformation and limited its role to stabilizing the situation in former republics, mostly by continued military presence, which provided

⁶⁷ J. Prantl, *Cooperating in Energy Security Regime Complex*, "Asia Security Initiative Policy Series: Working Paper" 2011, No. 18, p. 10.

⁶⁸ B. Buzan, O. Waever, J. De Wilde, *Security – A New Framework*, op.cit., p. 72.

security to the Russian hinterland⁶⁹. Then, with Vladimir Putin replacing Boris Yeltsin at the helm in 2000, Russia took a more proactive approach, which coincided with improvement of the country's economic situation. A new strategy was formulated, and it was based on five points: unimpeded rights of transport, stability based on close partnerships with regional states, maintenance of common economic space, the use of the geostrategic potential of the region for practical military needs, and international recognition of Russia's leading role in regional and global politics⁷⁰. Putin's administration has shown a lot of determination to reinvigorate military ties with the Central Asia, especially in the Caspian Sea area. Putin visibly used the argument of terrorist threat after 9/11 only as an excuse to counterbalance American and NATO's influence in the region⁷¹. Several other threats were securitized: possible demographic threat to eastern part of Russia due to increase in Chinese immigration⁷² and stabilization of Russia's domestic situation, especially halting the decline of life quality, which put subjects of energy security and improvement of energy at trade in the imminent spotlight⁷³.

China pursued their political goals by strengthening their links to Central Asia since the second half of 1990s. A highlight of this policy was the purchase of PetroKazakhstan consortium by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) in 2005 and signing the contract with Turkmenistan for a large supplies of gas and oil until 2036⁷⁴. This change in policy toward China's neighbours was an effect of several factors. First of them was increasing feeling of threat due to rising separatist activity in China's biggest and westernmost province of Xinjiang. Chinese officials feared that it might have been increased due to

⁶⁹ A. Kortunov, *Russia and Central Asia: Evolution of Mutual Perceptions, Policies and Interdependence*, Rice 1998, p. 5.

⁷⁰ V. Naumkin, *Russian Policy Toward Kazakhstan* [in:] *Thinking Strategically: the Major Powers...*, op.cit, passim.

⁷¹ R. Allison, *Strategic Reassertion in Russia's Central Asia Policy*, "International Affairs" 2004, No. 2, pp. 287–289.

⁷² R. Azizian, *The Optimists Have the Lead, For Now: Russia's China Debate*, "Asian Pacific Center of Security Studies" 2003, Special Assessment, p. 5.

⁷³ O. Khrushcheva, *The Creation of an Energy Security Society as a Way to Decrease Securitization Levels between the European Union and Russia in Energy Trade*, "Journal of Contemporary European Research" 2011, No. 2, pp. 219–220.

⁷⁴ J. Yang, *A Strategic Game: China's Energy Relations with Japan and China* [in:] *China's Energy Relations with the Developing World*, C. Courier, M. Dorraj (eds.), London–New York 2011, pp. 154–155.

emergence of Islamic radical movements, especially in Kazakhstan. It went on par with increase in drug trafficking – China’s neighbour, Tajikistan, was perceived as a hub of regional drug smuggle⁷⁵. Last reason is considered, especially of late, the most crucial – it is ever increasing demand for energy due to China’s rapid economic growth. After 2001 this “energetic hunger” became imminent, and coincided in time with the rapid growth of prices of hydrocarbon fuels, which was followed by increase in rivalry for access to energy sources⁷⁶. This was the time when China took advantage of world’s biggest state passive policy and set up political connections with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As Karol Dobosz points out, it concurred with strengthening of bilateral ties between the PRC and Russia⁷⁷.

What helped to develop cooperation between Moscow and Beijing was their shared goal of limiting American influence in Asia, especially in the light of 9/11 events, followed by military operation in Afghanistan, organized under auspices of NATO. In Moscow and Beijing this was considered a prelude to American political actions aimed at maintaining indirect control over oil deposits under the Caspian Sea⁷⁸. This goal was set as official element of Chinese strategy, as China’s utmost strategic interests lie in diversification of suppliers of natural resources, especially oil and natural gas, on par with limiting Russian and American influence on major exporters in the Asia and Pacific region⁷⁹.

⁷⁵ P. Chalk, *Non-Military Security in the Wider Middle East*, “Conflict & Terrorism” 2006, No. 3, p. 199.

⁷⁶ E. Czarkowska, *Rosja i Chiny w Azji Środkowej: między współpracą a współzawodnictwem* [Russia and China in Central Asia: Between Cooperation and Rivalry], “Stosunki międzynarodowe” [International Relations] 2012, No. 1, p. 186.

⁷⁷ K. Dobosz, *Współpraca energetyczna Rosji i Chin w XXI wieku* [Energy Cooperation of Russia and China in the 21st Century], *Stosunki Międzynarodowe*, <http://www.stosunki.pl/?q=content/wsp%C3%B3wpraca-energetyczna-rosji-i-chin-w-xxi-wieku> [Access date: 25.06.2013].

⁷⁸ D. Holter, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Implications for Japanese Foreign and Security Policy*, Vienna 2007, p. 12.

⁷⁹ P. Mickiewicz, *Zapotrzebowanie surowcowe jako determinant chińskiej polityki wobec Azji Środkowej* [Resource Demand as a Determinant of the Chinese Politics Towards Central Asia] [in:] *Strategie w polityce azjatyckiej. Rozważania o aspiracjach i możliwościach współczesnej Azji* [Strategies in Asian Politics. Deliberations on the Aspirations and Potential of Contemporary Asia], J. Marszałek-Kawa (ed.), Toruń 2011, p. 179.

7. Republics of Central Asia: Political Background

For various reasons, including important geopolitical location and access to strategic resources as well as military cultural ties, the Central Asia has become a place where many countries try to strengthen their position and enhance their cooperation with the local states. Such different states, in terms of political potential, as well as economical and military capacity, as Russia, China, the USA, Iran, Turkey, or India continuously struggle to gain the upper hand in this region⁸⁰.

During the 1990s, the energy security wasn't perceived as a key issue in the Central Asia. Creation and maintaining of the regional balance of power was far more important, due to the political vacuum created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States in 1991 provided some provisional framework for institutionalized political cooperation. Issue of potential border conflicts and increased separatist tendencies were addressed by agreeing on initial frames of multilateral regional security system in 1995⁸¹. This threat was recognized in time, due to emergence of radical Islamic movements, which threatened the post-Soviet elites and utilized Kazakhstan and Tajikistan's territories to spread their activities to Chinese province of Xinjiang⁸². As Henryk Głębocki pointed out, the attacks on Fergana Valley initiated by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in December 2000, finally pushed the Central Asian states toward more formal multilateral agreement addressing the subject of international terrorism⁸³. According to Christopher M. Dent, the final step toward creation of military security system in the Central Asia was the creation of the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure in Tashkent (RATS) in 2004⁸⁴. RATS'

⁸⁰ L. Jonson, *Russia and Central Asia* [in:] *Central Asia Security: The New International Context*, R. Allison, L. Jonson (eds.), London–Washington 2001, p. 118.

⁸¹ O. Kasenov, *Central Asia: National, Regional and Global Aspects of Security* [in:] *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, R. Allison, C. Bluth (eds.), London 1998, pp. 188–189.

⁸² G. Xing, *China's Foreign Policy Toward Kazakhstan* [in:] *Thinking Strategically: the Major Powers, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Nexus*, R. Legvold (ed.), Cambridge 2003, p. 116.

⁸³ H. Głębocki, *Radykalizm islamski w Azji Środkowej jako czynnik zbliżenia między Chinami a Rosją* [Muslim Radicalism in Central Asia as a Motive for Rapprochement between China and Russia], "Biuletyn PISM" [Bulletin of the Polish Institute of International Affairs] 2001, No. 18, pp. 186–187.

⁸⁴ C.M. Dent, *China, Japan and Regional Leadership in East Asia*, Cheltenham 2008, p. 205.

formation has led to stronger military cooperation between the Central Asia states and aimed at reducing the threat of separatism, terrorism and extremism in the region. Another important step to stabilize the situation in the region was an official agreement with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which was signed in October 2007 in Dushanbe⁸⁵.

In spite of the fact that all of the post-Soviet republics in the Central Asia belong to the same network of various regional organizations, like the CIS, Shanghai Five (renamed to Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001), or the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), which require from their members to cooperate in the formation of regional political order, their relations are rather strained, mostly due to different approaches to management of renewable energy resources. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan may have a political upper hand in this matter, due to more favourable water access. In fact, energy production in those countries is based on the water plants. In Kyrgyzstan's case, the water plants account for the 90% of total domestic energy production. It also helps Bishkek to sell a significant share of natural energy to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and get fossil fuels in return. However, the lack of investments in the new plants and bureaucracy still results in frequent energy crises. As Alisher Karimov reports, the lack of appropriate state policy led the biggest water energy plant in the Toktogul region close to total breakdown in late 2012. It forced the Kyrgyz government to accelerate their work on infrastructure development which included increasing the number of small and medium sized water plants. Even though the plan was already presented in the parliament, no actions have been undertaken so far⁸⁶.

Those crises and persistence of already securitized threats (terrorism, drug trafficking) are partially an aftermath of different international policy strategies adopted by the Central Asia states. First of them is acting as a close political ally to Russia. This strategy is presented particularly well by Kazakhstan, which participates in numerous common political initiatives (CSTO, EurAsEC, Single

⁸⁵ H. Peimani, *Conflict and Security in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Santa Barbara 2009, p. 316.

⁸⁶ A. Karimov, *Kyrgyzstan to develop small hydro-plants*, Central Asia Online, http://centralasiaonline.com/en_GB/articles/caii/features/main/2013/02/05/feature-01 [Access date: 02.07.2013]. See also: R. Russell, A. Erkebayev, *Kyrgyzstan Risks Regional Water Fight, as Russia Waits in the Wings*, The Washington Times, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/9/kyrgyzstan-risks-regional-water-fight-russia-waits/?page=all>, 09.11.2012 [Access date: 09.07.2013].

Economic Space). Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, being already members of both the CSTO and the EurAsEC, have followed the Kazakh footsteps and proclaimed their desire to join the SES⁸⁷. Second of possible strategies is followed by Uzbekistan, which decided to cease its participation in regional military cooperation mostly due to new policy of neutrality, proclaimed by president Islam Karimov. In June 2012, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the CSTO, and denied a right of setting up a military base to any foreign party⁸⁸. Finally, Turkmenistan constantly sticks to its policy of “positive neutrality”, which keeps it partially detached politically from other regional states, Russia and China, in part due to its autarkical economic policy, and in part due to proclaimed in mid-1990s policy of military neutrality and non-alignment⁸⁹. This may be perceived as more radical version of the Uzbek policy.

8. Securitizing Strategies of Central Asia States

Securitizing priorities of the Central Asia states lay in stable transit of energy and its role in ensuring sustainable development and international cooperation⁹⁰. Authorities in Turkmenistan thus want to protect their interests by simultaneously supplying rival powers – Russia and China. They also aim to create a fixed infrastructural network, interconnected independently with Europe, which would serve as counterbalance against negative tendencies in trade with either Moscow or Beijing⁹¹. Both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan

⁸⁷ S. Aris, *Managing Central Asia: Russia's Approach*, International Relations and Security Network, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/Special-Feature/Detail/?lng=en&id=160464&tabid=1454180197&contextid774=160464&contextid775=160462,04.03.2012> [Access date: 11.07.2013].

⁸⁸ *Uzbekistan Bans Foreign Military Bases*, RT Network, <http://rt.com/politics/uzbekistan-military-base-ban-956/>, 30.08.2012 [Access date: 11.07.2013].

⁸⁹ *Priority Positions of Turkmenistan at the 67th Session of the UN General Assembly: Press Release*, The Turkmenistan Embassy, http://turkmenistanembassy.org/wp-content/wpcf7_captcha/2012/09/PRESS-RELEASE.pdf [Access date: 09.07.2013]; *Turkmenistan – Security Policy*, Global Security, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/centralasia/turkmen-policy.htm> [Access date: 09.07.2013].

⁹⁰ *Energy Policy of Turkmenistan and the UN Resolution on Reliable and Stable Transit of Energy*, News Central Asia, <http://newscentralasia.net/2013/05/23/energy-policy-of-turkmenistan-and-the-un-resolution-on-reliable-and-stable-transit-of-energy/>, 23.05.2013 [Access date: 27.06.2013].

⁹¹ *Turkmengaz: Europe is a Priority Direction of Turkmen Gas Export*, Azer News, http://www.azernews.az/oil_and_gas/55325.html, 12.06.2013 [Access date: 29.06.2013].

followed the same logic and managed to develop institutional network to defend their interests and provide energy security. The Ministry of Energy (Ashgabat) and the Ministry of Oil and Gas (Astana) are specialized agendas which monitor interests and energy security of their respective countries. Yet still, proximity of the two regional powers and lack of suitable technologies to extract the raw materials forced both countries to agree to less favourable terms in dealing with their partners. This weakened position of national institution allowed to significantly strengthen the national oil companies (NOC) both in Russia and China. The notable exception, according to Martha Olcott of Carnegie Endowment for Peace Institute, is Kazakh NOC, KazMunaiGaz⁹². Another one, due to the idiosyncrasy of the Turkmen political system, is the national consortium Turkmengaz, which is a main administrator of major Turkmen gas fields, including South Yolotan⁹³.

Another way of securitizing energy security is recreating traditional economic ties, which may help tackle the problem of securing the transport of energy resources. Ben Simpfendorfer, like many other analysts and politicians, dubbed this new initiative *the New Silk Road*, referring to the trade road, which stretched from Turkey to China⁹⁴. Under this banner, an economic revival for failing states like Afghanistan or Pakistan is also being envisioned⁹⁵. Former Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Blake, pointed out that organizational and financial input of Asia Development Bank became crucial to the birth of the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program and realization of the New Silk Road project, which would not have been otherwise possible. Their engagement in the Silk Road's revitalization led to the modernization of the local infrastructure (new roads, railways, pipelines), therefore countless

⁹² M. Olcott et al., *The Changing Role of National Oil Companies in International Energy Markets*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/03/08/changing-role-of-national-oil-companies-in-international-energy-markets/216>, 08.03.2007 [Access date: 01.07.2013].

⁹³ H. Bergsager, *China, Russia and Central Asia: The Energy Dilemma*, Fridtjof Nansen Institute 2012, p. 16.

⁹⁴ B. Simpfendorfer, *The New Silk Road: How a Rising Arab World is Turning Away from West and Rediscovering China*, London 2011, p. 10–14.

⁹⁵ H. Clinton, *Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton Speaks on India and the United States: A Vision for the 21st Century*, Embassy of the United States in Chennai, http://chennai.usconsulate.gov/secclintonspeechacl_110721.html [Access date: 23.06.2013].

of different goods and services can be transported⁹⁶. This vision led in turn to development of the TRACECA trade corridor, which, among other functions, allows to maintain cooperation within range of energy security⁹⁷.

Different strategy toward securing its own energy interests and maintaining advantage over other regional states may be based on developing infrastructure used to acquire of energy from renewable sources. Such is the case of Tajikistan. Its government decided to invest considerable amount of money into region's biggest hydro power plant. Roghun hydroelectric plant on the Vaksh river was completed in 1999 and plays important role in Tajikistan's energy export strategy. Several other projects, such as Sangduta 1 Hydroelectric Power Plant, were undertaken. Important role have been played by investors from China, Japan, the USA, and Russia⁹⁸. Especially the last of mentioned parts played a crucial role in the project, which was fully completed in 2009. In effect, 66% of the ownership papers belong to the Russian government⁹⁹. Also, Tajikistan's cooperation with foreign companies such as Tethys Petroleum or CNPC resulted in the increase of fossil extraction works. The research indicated that Bokhtar territory might have a prospective (unproven) resources estimated to stand at 3.22 trillion cubic meters of gas. Due to this finding, Tajikistan might become an energetically independent, potentially powerful regional export power¹⁰⁰. This has led to an increased rivalry with Uzbekistan and strain in relations between the sides. Tashkent decided to cut gas and oil supplies to the rival republic. Last temporary blockade of shipments took place in 2008. This effected in Tajikistan's acceleration of building water dams, such as Rogun Dam, which may help in

⁹⁶ R.O. Blake Jr., *The New Silk Road and Regional Economic Integration*, U.S. Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2013/206167.htm> [Access date: 27.06.2013].

⁹⁷ M. Bujnowski, "Jedwabny szlak XXI wieku" – Międzynarodowy Korytarz Transportowy Europa–Kaukaz–Azja ["Silk Road of the 21st Century" – International Transport Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia], "Stosunki międzynarodowe" [International Relations] 2012, No. 2, pp. 234–235.

⁹⁸ K. Abdullaev, *Historical Dictionary of Tajikistan*, Plymouth 2010, p. 280.

⁹⁹ M. Shoemaker, *Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States*, Lanham 2012, p. 275.

¹⁰⁰ A. Jarosiewicz, *Tadżycki gaz zmieni układ sil w Azji Centralnej?* [Tajik Gas Will Change Power Balance in Central Asia?], Centre For Eastern Studies, <http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/tydzien-na-wschodzie/2013-06-26/tadzycki-gaz-zmieni-uklad-sil-w-azji-centralnej> [Access date: 02.07.2013].

striving against the Uzbek embargoes. This project have been heatedly protested by Uzbek government, which pointed out its ill effect on environment, especially in the context of Uzbek agriculture, which may suffer due to desertification¹⁰¹.

9. Securitizing Strategies of Regional Powers

Russia in recent years securitized two key energy security issues. First of them is the constant decrease of demand for hydrocarbon fuels in Europe, due to its progress in development of alternative energy sources. For Moscow, it means decrease in revenue, which is crucial to the condition of the Russian's economy. However, the demand for hydrocarbon resources in the Far East is still high. Until 2008, Russia executed several joint projects with Japan and several others are in the planning stage. After 2008, China became Russia's key partner in the Asia-Pacific region, especially due to its rapid growth of demand for energy¹⁰². In this light, the post-Soviet republics appear to be a threat, due to their partnership with China and growing political self-reliance.

Another important issue is maintaining hegemonic position of Russia in the Central Asia region, both politically and economically, especially unhindered access to the Central Asian oil and gas, in order to meet resource demands of Russia's partners from Europe, China, Japan, and Korea. In November 2009, the government of the RF approved *Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period Up to 2030*. To facilitate international cooperation on energy security, Russia has adopted initiatives like modernization and development of energy infrastructure or increase in energy exports to the Asia-Pacific regional international market¹⁰³. This also means strengthening military ties with the former Soviet republics, which allows a deepened political cooperation. Russia abandoned the concept

¹⁰¹ *Dammed if they do*, The Economist, <http://www.economist.com/node/21563764>, 29.09.2012 [Access date: 29.06.2013]; D. Trilling, *Tajikistan: Rogun Dam a Hot Topic as Tajiks Make It Through Another Winter of Shortages*, EurasiaNet, <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav031309f.shtml>, 12.03.2009 [Access date: 22.06.2013].

¹⁰² J. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, *Polityka energetyczna Rosji wobec Unii Europejskiej w kontekście kryzysu gospodarczego* [Russian Energy Policy Toward the European Union in the Context of the Economic Crisis], "Sprawy międzynarodowe" [International Issues] 2011, No. 1, pp. 78–79.

¹⁰³ I. Pop, *China's Energy Strategy in Central Asia: Interactions with Russia, India and Japan*, "UNISCI Discussion Papers" 2010, No. 10, p. 211.

of maintaining military bases in the former Soviet Union territory, and followed an idea of institutionalized military cooperation (joint manoeuvres, strategic cooperation) within ranks of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF), established under the Collective Security Treaty (CST)¹⁰⁴.

China's key strategy is two-directional. First, Chinese find it necessary to diversify their energy sources. Since they cannot have full control over sea lanes, with key maritime transport lanes (such as the Malacca Strait) being under control of the USA and its allies, they turned their attention to land. Thus began an era of "energy diplomacy" as a securitizing strategy, followed by governmental support of Chinese NOCs. The ground for such actions was sufficiently prepared: the Central Asian republics have held the PRC in high regard, mostly due to its rapid recognition of their independence. This friendly policy was a base for institutional cooperation within the Shanghai Five and later the SCO, where China plays dominant role. This strategy proved to be successful – trade revenue between the parties increased rapidly (1368% of growth in trade with Tajikistan, 1067% in trade with Uzbekistan)¹⁰⁵.

The PRC's high demand for energy stood behind the introduction of strategic plans and concepts, of which the most recent is The 12th Five Year Plan (2011–2015) introduced in 2010. Regarding oil and natural gas industries, the plan focuses on the following elements: diversification of the sources of energy imports and increase in the imports from Russia and the Central Asia; increase of overseas investments by NOCs; limitation of transaction risks, development of gas and oil infrastructure, and above all: establishment of a regional energy system¹⁰⁶. This policy stood behind the decision of helping in development of hydroelectricity sector in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan or infrastructure sector in the Central Asia and Afghanistan (roads, tunnels, and railways, etc). This adds to an idea of recreating the Silk Road in order to connect China with Iran and Pakistan. Important part of this strategy is development of network of pipelines. This project was first launched in 1993, but its development was postponed until 2003. Finally, the pipeline was inaugurated in December 2009. It is divided in two major sections, one running from Turkmenistan up to Shanghai, second starting in Kazakhstan.

¹⁰⁴ R. Giragosian, *The Strategic Central Asian Arena*, "China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly" 2006, No. 1, pp. 138–139.

¹⁰⁵ H. Szadziewski, *How the West was Won: China's Expansion into Central Asia*, "Caucasian Review of International Affairs" 2009, No. 2, p. 214.

¹⁰⁶ I. Pop, *China's Energy Strategy in Central Asia*, op.cit, p. 202.

Uneasy partnership between Moscow and Beijing, which tended toward open rivalry, took an abrupt turn in 2001, when the USA decided to answer a terrorist threat by launching a military operation in Afghanistan. This was preceded by President Bill Clinton's administration efforts to diminish a Russian oil and gas monopoly by launching Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline. It added to American securitization of two issues: the growing energy insecurity and increase of political role of the PRC which, since late 1990s, was considered a new global rival that replaced the Soviet Union in the bipolar power struggle. This policy of increased presence in the Central Asia was perceived as threatening by both Russia and China, and facilitated the cooperation against further involvement of NATO in the Central Asia and against improvement of strategic ties between the USA and the Central Asia republics. Both Russia and China pushed their SCO fellows toward the greater assertiveness in relations with the USA, in security and economic matters alike¹⁰⁷.

These two regional powers are perfectly matched in their energy security interests. As it was mentioned, Russia aims at diversification of its energy exports away from Europe, while China wants to counterbalance its imports through the Strait of Malacca. In effect, China's crude oil imports from Russia has soared. Even still, there is a room for improvement in Russia's position, as Russia is only the fourth biggest crude oil exporter to China, behind Saudi Arabia, Angola and Iran¹⁰⁸.

10. Conclusion

In spite of critical voices, securitization theory is applicable in terms of energy security, especially after considering Thierry Balzacq's remarks and propositions of improving this approach by applying the "practical angle". In model of Regional Security Complex, vectors of resource trade may easily replace vectors of political influence and maintain its explanatory potential. This approach is consistent with the contemporary changes in the definition of security: it is broadly applicable, it underlines the inter-subjective character of security, and it emphasizes the necessity of dynamic approach to the ever-changing threats. This proposition answers the major problems of the realist approach – it does not assume an inevitable conflict, and offers some limitations to anarchic state of international relations.

¹⁰⁷ R. Giragosian, *The Strategic Central Asian Arena*, op.cit., p. 134.

¹⁰⁸ H. Bergsager, *China, Russia and Central Asia*, op.cit., pp. 6–7.

Still, two elements contradict the model proposed by Buzan and Waever. Desecuritization, or strategy of returning to regular, democratic transactions, is impossible to achieve: the threat of energy insecurity is perpetually increasing, due to surpassing of global oil peak. Thus, in context of energy security, one must admit that the state of full security may never be achieved, both for exporters of gas and oil (Russia, the post-Soviet republics) and importers of strategic resources (the PRC, the United States). This may lead to intensification of political struggle and ending of any form of alliance between regional powers in this politically unstable region. On the global scale, it indirectly proves the applicability of the Arps-Roberts rule, which severely reduces the chances of finding new, undiscovered oil or gas field of significant size.

Second remark refers to the negative perception of securitization. Even though securitizing process increases the tensions between subjects, it may effect in finding common solution which improve every subject's position (relative win-win situation). This scenario may be exemplified by increasing role of alternative energy sources, even though they ignite international conflict based on natural environment's degradation. Another positive effect of securitizing energy security is intensified modernization of infrastructure, which allows the more effective drilling and transport of goods. Same "side effect" is recreation of the Silk Road route, which in turn may increase not only economic, but also political integration of region. Thirdly, great powers' activity in region may be caused by their need to answer their vulnerabilities like unstable economy or dependence on import of goods. In process of securitization they partake in increasing region's stability, answering the threats which are not directly connected to trade or energy stability. Among them are: military instability, separatism and international terrorism, or intraregional political tensions, which may be limited due to presence of supervisory institutions.