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## Greek liberty

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## GREEK LIBERTY

No historian is free from prejudice, and Polybius of Megalopolis was less free than most, but precisely that attribute of his which makes so unreliable his reports of the Antigonids, Ptolemies, and other royal families unpopular in Achaea, makes his observations in other areas not only authoritative but interesting. He insisted that only men of affairs could write proper history<sup>1</sup>, and he himself had been active in public life in the Achaean League and later an intimate friend of prominent Romans. While his judgment of his political opponents was clearly warped, his understanding of the mentality of Greeks and Romans in their first political contacts was profound. After the victory of Manius Glabrio in 191 B.C. over Antiochus the Great at Thermopylae, he reports, the Aetolians were frightened and decided to place themselves in the hands of the consul, "giving themselves into the πίστις of the Romans", not realizing what this meant but deceived by the hopeful suggestion of the term. For in Roman political legality entrusting oneself to a general's fides meant surrendering unconditionally. The envoys learned of their mistake when iron collars were placed about their necks<sup>2</sup>.

This, of course, is an old observation, familiar to the eminent jurist and historian whom we honor ourselves in honoring in this volume. It seems to me, however, that something of the same misunderstanding has attached to the terms libertas-ἐλευθερία, wherein the one had a technical meaning lacking in the other. I believe that this misunderstanding has been too little emphasized in modern times, and that it was of some considerable importance in Greco-Roman relationships from the Illyrian Wars down to the establishment of the Province of Macedonia; of greater importance, indeed, than any confusion over fides-πίστις. For when the Senate or the Roman People accepted a community as a civitas libera, they effected a constitutional act undreamed of by the Greeks when they declared a πόλις to be ἐλευθέρα.

It is the fluidity of the Greek term which has obscured the issue. Polybius himself, for all his interest in and association with Roman constitutional matters, continues to use ἐλεύθερος and its cognates as loosely as he subsequently uses

<sup>1</sup> XII, 28, 3: ὅταν οἱ πραγματικοὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γράφειν ἐπιχειρήσωσι τὰς ἱστορίας.

<sup>2</sup> XX, 9, 11-10, 8. He returns to the topic later (XXXVI, 3, 9; 4, 1-3), where he translates fides as ἐπιτροπή.

the πίστις of which he has taken pains to explain the precise significance<sup>3</sup>. We, certainly, can be in no doubt as to what libertas in the political area meant to the Romans, but Polybius seems not to have noted it, at least as far as his preserved text shows. For us, the jurist Proculus of Nero's time has explained the situation, and Mommsen's brilliant analysis only confirms it<sup>4</sup>. A Greek would, of course, accept his basic principle: "Liber autem populus est is, qui nullius alterius populi potestati est subjectus", and agree further that this general situation was not altered by obligations under a treaty. He would, however, have balked at continuing: "...sive aequo foedere in amicitiam venit, sive foedere comprehensum est, ut is populus alterius populi majestatem comiter conservaret; hoc enim adiicitur, ut intelligatur, alterum populum superiorem esse, non ut intelligatur, alterum non esse liberum". For Proculus continues with the analogy of clients who are regarded as free even though they are not the equals of their patrons in auctoritas or dignitas; „sic eos, qui majestatem nostram comiter conservare debent, liberos esse intelligendum est”.

It is not, of course, that factual differences of power and obligation could not exist in the Greek world of free cities. It is obvious that they often did. The point is that, for the Romans, any recognition of a civitas as libera, whether by foedus or lex data or any other means, carried with it this notion of superior-inferior, of patron-client, with obligations mutual and in principle permanent on both sides. This is not, of course, anything which Roman jurists of much less distinction than Professor Arangio-Ruiz have not known all along, but I submit that the Greeks of 196 B.C. did not know it, and that modern historians have failed to give proper weight to the political consequences of their ignorance. Seen in this light, what Flamininus meant and what the Greeks thought he meant were quite different things, and the subsequent Roman conduct in Greece, mystifying and infuriating to the one party, can have seemed only logical and legally obvious to the other.

Of this, more later. It is the purpose of the remainder of the discussion to insist the Greeks never used ἐλευθερία with technical exactness. It was a good thing, evidently, for the possessor, but what it meant in any given situation varied with the circumstances. "Freedom to" was constantly confused, as in modern times, with "freedom from", political or group freedom with freedom of the individual. This muddled thinking has been passed down from the Greeks to us, but in our general admiration and even affection for them, we must pay them the compliment of trying to understand them<sup>5</sup>.

<sup>3</sup> So XXII, 17, 1, where the πίστις was Ptolemy's, and XXIII, 3, 3, where it was Eumenes'.

<sup>4</sup> Digest, 49, 15, 7; Th. *Römisches Staatsrecht* (1887) 654, n. 4; 655-658; A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship* (1939) 149-163; A. Berger, *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law* (1953) 389 f. (with bibliography).

<sup>5</sup> So notably M. Pohlenz, *Griechische Freiheit* (1955). More immediately relevant

Time out of mind Greece and freedom have been associated in men's minds<sup>6</sup>. Typically, freedom was something for which you fought, not something (as with the Romans) to receive as a gift from a victorious enemy. In the *Iliad* men fought for their lives and for the protection of their families, and all knew the lot of those who did not win. Andromache reminded Hector that her father and her seven brothers had been slain by Achilles and her mother taken captive. She had been ransomed by her family, but if Hector was killed and Troy taken, her lot and that of little Astyanax would be slavery<sup>7</sup>. Similarly, at Sparta in the seventh century, the martial poet Tyrtæus sang of the glory of standing and fighting to the end—"And having done all, to stand",—so that the city might remain secure<sup>8</sup>. Later, with the Persian Wars, the names of Miltiades at Marathon and Leonidas at Thermopylae became symbols of man's determination to remain free. Instinctively the world has honored those who bravely faced the decision, liberty or Death? The alternative was liberty or slavery, which had the appeal of obvious and self-evident simplicity.

Simple things, however, are rarely true, and still in the early days of Greece the poet and adventurer Archilochus brazenly flaunted this categorical imperative<sup>9</sup>. "My shield I left beside a bush, and one of the Saians now carries it proudly. Let it go. I am alive, and I'll quickly get another just as good". "No man gets honor or glory once he is dead". His ambition was rational and therefore limited, "I do not envy the wealth of golden Gyges; I am not jealous of the works of gods, and I have no desire to become a tyrant. Such things exceed my vision". His desire was fixed on kneaded bread and Ismarian wine: that is to say, on the good life in so far as it was practicable and attainable. Life was an absolute, but not freedom. Better be a live dog than a dead lion. If absolute freedom was possible only with absolute power, then only a king could be free, and aside from the somewhat unsocial nature of this doctrine, the accomplishment of such a goal might cost more than it was worth. Freedom might be too expensive.

When, in the early years of the fifth century, the Greek cities of Ionia revolted from Persia, they set to work and assembled a fleet, and Dionysius, the Phocaean admiral, addressed the company<sup>10</sup>: "Men of Ionia, our affairs

to my present point of view are the brief comments of E. Seidl, *Studia et Documenta Historiae et Juris* (1961) 478. But it is impossible to cite everything relevant.

<sup>6</sup> This concept, romantic rather than historical, is commonly reflected in histories of Greece or of Greek culture. Among the more meritorious recent examples of this point of view may be cited A.-J. Festugière, *Liberté et civilisation chez les Grecs* (1947); R. Andreotti, *Monarchie orientale e libertà greche* (1948); H. J. Miller, *Freedom in the Ancient World* (1961).

<sup>7</sup> *Iliad* VI, 406-481.

<sup>8</sup> Frag. 10 (Bergk).

<sup>9</sup> Frags. 6, 64, 25, and 3 (Bergk).

<sup>10</sup> Herodotus VI, 11-17.



hang on the razor's edge, either to be free or to be slaves. Now you must choose whether you will endure hardships and so for the present lead a life of toil, but thereby gain ability to overcome your enemies and establish your own freedom; or to persist in sloth and disorder, in which case I see no hope of your escaping the king's vengeance". Dionysius was, accordingly, charged with turning them into fighting men, and proceeded every day to make the ships move in column and the rowers ply their oars, while the marines were held under arms, so that the men had nothing but toil from morning to night. Seven days did the Ionians continue obedient, but on the eighth, worn out by the hardness of the work and the heat of the sun, they began to say one to another: "What god have we offended to bring upon ourselves such a punishment as this? Even the slavery with which we are threatened can be no worse than our present servitude". So they gave up training and reposed in the shade, and when the Persian fleet appeared, some fought bravely and some deserted. Some of the Ionians migrated to the west and some remained to endure their punishment, but before the year was out the satrap of Sardes forced the cities to agree not to harass each other by force of arms but to settle their differences by arbitration. He surveyed their land and established an equitable tribute, and converted all their governments into democracies<sup>11</sup>. And some may well have wondered why they thought of fighting in the first place.

Freedom, evidently, required definition, and unlike the Romans, the Greeks always had trouble with definitions. Freedom from what, or freedom for whom to do what? Later Greeks were typically to associate freedom with democracy. One hundred and eighty years later the same Ionians, in the city of Miletus, were to record in their annals that in the year of the stephanophore Hippomachus "the city was made free and autonomous by Antigonos (the one of Alexander's Successors who then controlled Asia Minor) and the democracy was restored".<sup>12</sup> Was it not better to be free and democratic under the Persians or Antigonos than to be free of outside control under a local tyrant? The story of the Ionian Revolt, with its seemingly happy if paradoxical ending, is told by the same Herodotus who earlier in his narrative (not much earlier) had reported the effect of freedom upon Athens. Cleisthenes had established the Athenian democracy in something like its final and classical form, and Athens defeated its neighbors in war, as soon it was to play a major role in the repulse of Persia. And Herodotus moralizes<sup>13</sup>: "It is plain enough that freedom is an excellent thing; since even the Athenians, who, while they continued under the rule of tyrants, were not a whit more valiant than any of their neighbors, no sooner

<sup>11</sup> Herodotus, VI, 42-43.

<sup>12</sup> G. Kawerau, A. Rehm, *Das Delphinion in Milet* (1914; cited hereafter as *I. Milet*), 259, No. 123, 1-3: ἡ πόλις ἐλευθέρα καὶ αὐτόνομος ἐγένετο ὑπὸ Ἀντιγόνου καὶ ἡ δημοκρατία ἀπεδόθη. The sentiment is common. Cf. e.g. SIG 323 (308 B.C.), from Eretria.

<sup>13</sup> Herodotus, V, 78.

shook off the yoke than they became decidedly the first of all. They let themselves be beaten when they worked for a master, but so soon as they got their freedom, each man was eager to do the best he could for himself".

Similarly, later in the century, Thucydides was to have Pericles find in Athens' democracy the source of its strength<sup>14</sup>: "Our constitution does not copy the laws of neighboring states; we are rather a pattern to others than imitators ourselves. Its administration favors the many in stead of the few; that is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if to social standing, advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life. There, far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbor for doing what he likes. But all this ease does not make us lawless as citizens. Against this, fear is our chief safeguard, teaching us to obey the magistrates and the laws". And later: "We cultivate refinement without extravagance and knowledge without effeminacy; wealth we employ more for use than for show and place the real disgrace of poverty not in owning to the fact but in declining the struggle against it. Our public men have, besides politics, their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters. For unlike any other nation, regarding him who takes no part in these duties not as unambitious but as useless, we Athenians are able to judge at all events if we cannot originate".

This was the so-called government of universal participation, wherein a quarter or a third of the citizens worked in rotation for the city, ruling and being ruled by turns; and at the end of the Funeral Oration<sup>15</sup>, from which I have been quoting, Pericles directs the citizens, if their age permits it, to return home and beget more sons to replace those killed in the war. Athens was free and democratic but obedient to the laws and to the magistrates. As Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta who was with Xerxes, said to the Great King<sup>16</sup>: "When the Lacedaemonians fight in a body, they are the bravest of all. For though they be freemen, they are not in all respects free. Law is the master whom they own, and this master they fear more than thy subjects fear thee". In the same way, Polybius could claim that freedom was best preserved under the mixed but clearly aristocratic constitution of the Roman Republic<sup>17</sup>, and Cassius

<sup>14</sup> Thucydides, II, 37-40. This is the "Crawley Translation", which renders the Greek about as well as anything can except a paraphrase.

<sup>15</sup> Thucydides, II, 44.

<sup>16</sup> Herodotus, VII, 104.

<sup>17</sup> Polybius, VI, 11-18.

Dio in his history<sup>18</sup> make Maecenas advise Augustus that only under a monarchy do people have a true democracy and secure freedom.

Evidently, then, even on the purely political side, the problem of freedom is not so simple, and it is naturally made worse when philosophy enters; and Greeks were attracted to philosophy fully as much as they were to freedom. Instinctively, in the third century, the people of Priene wrote in a resolution in honor of some faithful guards<sup>19</sup>, "nothing means more to Greek people than freedom", but if you analyzed it, was freedom an absolute good, something good in itself, or only a relative good, desirable for something else than itself? Was it good for the body or for the soul, for the individual or for the group? Why, as Euripides wrote in the "Suppliants"<sup>20</sup>, was freedom for the weak or the poor only present when there were written laws? It was freedom when the herald announced in the assembly: "Who wishes to come forward with same wise counsel the city"? But did freedom also require wisdom? In the "Republic"<sup>21</sup> Plato comments that a free man would only wish to live in a democratic city, but then proceeds to argue that freedom brings with itself an insatiable greediness which leads to tyranny and loss of freedom, in a state and in the individual. The democratic man leads a life without controls<sup>22</sup>. "Sometimes he is lapped in drink and strains of the flute; then he becomes a water-drinker and tries to get thin; then he takes a turn at gymnastic; sometimes idling und neglecting everything, then once more the life of a philosopher. Often he is busy with politics, and starts to his feet and says and does whatever comes into his head. And if he is emulous of any one who is a warrior, off he is in that direction, or of men of business, once more in that. His life has neither law nor order and this distracted existence he terms joy and bliss and freedom". And Socrates' interlocutor agrees: „He is all liberty and equality". With his pleasures as with his companions, one is as good as another, or seems so to him at least, however they may look to others. So almost in the lifetime of Pericles an Old Oligarch<sup>23</sup> had written of his native Athens: "With the demos is the greatest ignorance and license and rascality. If anyone not of the demos chooses to live in a democratic city rather than in an oligarchic, it is only that he has decided on the life of a criminal and realized there he will be least easily

<sup>18</sup> L, 14-40. As two recent essays on the problem of personal freedom in Greece I may cite A. W. Gomme, *Concepts of Freedom* (1962) 139-155, and J. A. O. Larsen, *Classical Philology*, LVII (1962) 230-234.

<sup>19</sup> F. Frhr. Hiller von Gaertringen, *Inscriptionen von Priene* (1906) 19, 18-20: ὡς οὐθὲν μετῴζον ἔστιν ἀνθρώποις Ἑλλησιν τῆς ἐλευθερίας. Much later Dio Chrysostom said the same thing (14, 1): φασὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν, but he was thinking of slavery as the alternative, and not of political freedom.

<sup>20</sup> Lines 433-438.

<sup>21</sup> VIII, 557 B.

<sup>22</sup> VIII, 561 D/E; this is the Jowett translation.

<sup>23</sup> Ps.-Xenophon, *Ath. Pol.*, I, 5-8.

discovered. These are not the circumstances under which a city will be best governed, but the demos does not wish to be enslaved in a well-governed city, but to be free and to rule". This is a far cry from the Roman concept of freedom.

For political freedom in Greek eyes is relative, as Plato reminds us in the Republic<sup>24</sup>: "For indeed any city, however small, is in fact divided into two, one the city of the poor, the other of the rich; these are at war with each other". If the best people got power, the demos was enslaved, as happened at Miletus in the mid-fifth century<sup>25</sup>. The issue might be less important between Greeks and barbarians. Euripides, like Plato and Aristotle, insisted that the barbarians were by nature slaves, the Greeks by nature free<sup>26</sup>. But what of the issue between Greeks and Greeks? The freedom of Athens and the power of the democracy depended on the Empire, and Pericles (as quoted by Thucydides) makes no bones<sup>27</sup> of it: "For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny (in contrast, under the same circumstances, a Roman would have regarded the cities as "free"); to take it perhaps was wrong, but to let go of it is unsafe". In the war with Sparta they were to keep a tight rein on the allies. The Athenians (as the ambassador Euphemus explained at Camarina in Sicily)<sup>28</sup> had done nothing unfair in reducing to subjection the Ionians and islanders, their kinsfolk whom the Syracusans said they had enslaved. They had taken the lead against Persia and had had the opportunity, and "no one can be quarrelled with for providing for his proper safety. Fear makes us hold our empire in Hellas". Such arguments were to prove an embarrassment in the fourth century<sup>29</sup>, but they point to the nature and the pervasiveness of the problem: Athens' freedom depended on the subjection of others, and in the case of Mytilene, which had revolted and been recovered, it was debated at length whether even mercy was advantageous<sup>30</sup>.

So freedom involved another problem also, and that was justice. Cleisthenes' settlement of 507 was later regarded as *isonomia*, equality under law<sup>31</sup>, and about the middle of the fourth century Isocrates equated democracy and equality, thus combining two of the three slogans of the French Revolution. Paradoxically he argued that the greatest liberty and democracy existed under the

<sup>24</sup> IV, 422 E-423 A.

<sup>25</sup> Ps.-Xenophon, *Ath. Pol.*, III, 11.

<sup>26</sup> *Iphigenia at Aulis*, 1400-1401; Plato, *Republic*, V, 469 B/C; (G. R. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* (1960) 150); *Laws*, VI, 777 C. Aristotle, *Politics*, I, 6, 18, 1255 a, 28-29, and earlier, Isocrates, *Panegy.* 181. It was the normal Greek point of view.

<sup>27</sup> Thucydides, II, 63, 2.

<sup>28</sup> Thucydides, VI, 82-83.

<sup>29</sup> Notably Isocrates, *Peace*, 82-89.

<sup>30</sup> Thucydides, III, 36-50.

<sup>31</sup> In the earliest reference, Herodotus (V, 78) calls it *ισηγορίη*. Isocrates, *Areopagiticus*. 20, uses *isonomia*; in 60, *ισότης*. Unlike the Romans, the Greeks avoided technical terms. Polybius even uses *παρησιία* in the same sense (XXX, 31, 16).



strict Spartan rule of law<sup>32</sup>, for as Aristotle was to point out<sup>33</sup>, equality did not consist in treating unequals equally, but this is slippery ground. What if a group or even one man is so manifestly superior as to have no even close equals? Thinking possibly of either Philip or Alexander of Macedon, Aristotle suggested that such a person should be accepted as a god and so by definition above human law<sup>34</sup>; he may therein have planted the seeds of the Hellenistic ruler cult, but the question would still remain open, by whom and how was any man's superiority to be judged? Was justice in practice to be merely, as Thrasymachus argued in the "Republic"<sup>35</sup>, the interest of the stronger: anything which he could succeed in doing would be by definition just? When in 416 Athens decided to compel the independent island of Melos to join her empire as a tributary ally, Thucydides imagines the Athenian envoys to state a monstrous thing<sup>36</sup>: "Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they rule wherever they can." But no people, however logical, could long accept such moral nihilism. In the "Laws"<sup>37</sup>, Plato insisted that his contemplated city must be, internally as well as externally, free and harmonious and smart. Could not these principles be applied to the entire world of the Greek city states so that Greek would not enslave Greek, but all remain free?

It is true that there are two different, opposite, ways of winning freedom. One is that of being able to do whatever one wishes with no unpleasant consequences, and this method is certainly more intrinsically appealing, if not necessarily easy. The other is to condition yourself freely to accept whatever happens, as a Christian's freedom consists in voluntary submission to the Will of God<sup>38</sup>, and this was the way of Socrates, who became in his heroic death the

<sup>32</sup> *Areopagiticus*, 61.

<sup>33</sup> *Politics*, III, 9, 8, 1280 a, 11-13; already noted by Isocrates, *Nicocles*, 14, and *Areopagiticus* 21 (cf. Norlin's note *ad. loc.*).

<sup>34</sup> *Politics*, III, 13, 2, 1284a, 2-14. This remark of Aristotle regularly occupies a place in the enormous and ever increasing bibliography on the Ruler Cult, which in Hellenistic and Roman times was a regular attribute of monarchy. Aristotle states that if there is one or a number of persons outstanding in ability (*διαφέρων κατ' ἀρετῆς ὑπερβολήν*), then he or they would be outside the body politic (*οὐκέτι θετέον τούτους μέρος πόλεως*). Such an one would be like a god (*ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὼς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον*). Thus far he has not gone beyond the ordinary Greek outlook, which accepted extraordinary persons as gods, in more or less pure form (e.g., Isocrates, *To Nicocles*, 5; *Philip*, 137, 143). The discussion, however, occurs in connection with kingship, and the suspicion has always existed that he had Philip or Alexander in mind. As it stands, however, it does not argue that a king deserved worship merely by virtue of being a king, as was believed later on.

<sup>35</sup> I, 343 B — 344 C.

<sup>36</sup> V, 105, 2.

<sup>37</sup> III, 701 D: ἡ νομοθετουμένη πόλις ἐλευθέρα τε ἔσται καὶ φίλη ἑαυτῇ καὶ νοῦν ἔξει.

<sup>38</sup> So in II Cor. 3, 17; 6, 18; 8, 2. Among the enormous bibliography dealing with the relation of Christianity to Greek philosophy I may cite. I. L a n a, *Rivista di Filologia*, XXXIII (1955), 1-28.



model of the Stoic sage who alone could be really free, because he alone was indifferent to what might happen to him so long as he remained true to his own convictions. But this way required fortitude and was admired more than imitated. Socrates might insist that no evil could happen to a good man living or dead<sup>39</sup>, but this called for a definition of "evil" other than that to which men were accustomed. Socrates' example was not without influence in later generations<sup>40</sup>, on individuals first and then on states, but for the moment, in the fourth century, Greece tried something else.

The Freedom of the Greeks was a slogan which went back to the Persian Wars. "On, ye sons of Greeks, free your land, free your children, wives, the seats of your ancestral gods and the tombs of your ancestors; this is your supreme struggle", as the soldiers and sailors at Salamis shouted in Aeschylus' play<sup>41</sup>. Two generations later, this was the ultimatum of Sparta to Athens: "Let the Greeks go free"<sup>42</sup>. The destruction of Athens' walls in 404 was universally hailed as the day of Greek freedom<sup>43</sup>, and when ten years later, disillusioned with the Spartan hegemony<sup>44</sup>, the Greek world set itself seriously to the problem, it was able to come a little further with it. Would not the renunciation of war help? About the year 391 an Athenian statesman could plead with his countrymen<sup>45</sup>: "Do not fail to consider this, that you are now fashioning a common peace and freedom for all the Greeks" if you accept the Spartan proposals. They did not, and it was hard to get Greeks to agree, but the new formula stuck.

Four year later, in desperation of finding a solution by themselves, the Greeks turned to the arbitriments of the King of Persia, and the sole major provision of the King's Peace<sup>46</sup> was that the Greeks should all be free (with some exceptions, of course), but the king also offered to guarantee the peace by military action. This foreshadowed the Roman solution later, although the king proved feckless. Nothing could have seemed more promising, but again there were problems. Did this agreed freedom obligate the cities not to change their governments or to enter into voluntary associations? Sparta, as the strongest Greek military power, ruled that it did, and enforced accordingly, until in the winter of 377/6 Athens published a great decree of the assembly, preserved on a mo-

<sup>39</sup> *Apology*, 41 C/D.

<sup>40</sup> The old study of H. G omper z, *Die Lebensauffassung der griechischen Philosophen und das Ideal der inneren Freiheit* (1904) is still of value. The phenomenon is treated by everyone who deals with Cynics and Stoics.

<sup>41</sup> *The Persians*, 402-405.

<sup>42</sup> Thucydides, I, 139 3: τοὺς Ἑλλήνας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖτε. On the equivalence of the terms αὐτονομία and ἐλευθερία cf. especially Isocrates, *Panegyricus*, 175.

<sup>43</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, II, ii, 23.

<sup>44</sup> Cf. Isocrates, *Peace*, 67.

<sup>45</sup> Andocides, *On the Peace with Sparta*, 1.

<sup>46</sup> Xenophon, *Hellenica*, V, i, 31. For this and later agreements cf. H. Bengtson, *Die Verträge der griechisch-römischen Welt*, II (1962).

numental stele<sup>47</sup>, inviting all of the Greeks (other than those left subjects of the Greak King) to become her allies so that "the Spartans may leave the Greeks free and autonomous and in peace, possessing their own land in security" and that the King's Peace may prevail. Beyond splitting the adherents to the Peace into two warring camps, this proposal of the Athenians accomplished little, but the formula remained alive, to be employed by Philip of Macedon in 338 after the battle of Chaeronea.

The oath of the members of the League of Corinth is preserved in part<sup>48</sup>: "I shall abide by the peace. I shall observe the agreement with Philip. I shall not carry arms against any of the signatories. I shall not subvert the kingship of Philip or the constitutions now existing in the signatories". The members pledged themselves to enforce the treaty and maintain the peace by joint military action under Philip's command, and Greek freedom under the status quo seemed assured; but two of the major cities, Athens and Thebes, regarded this freedom as slavery<sup>49</sup>, and when Thebes revolted against Philip's son Alexander three years later, it raised the slogan of the King's Peace against him<sup>50</sup>.

Everyone was for peace and freedom, militantly, but they did not agree as to how these worthy objectives were to be attained, or even as to what they specifically were. Did peace exclude any use of armed force, or, on the other hand, did it require the use of armed force? Did freedom exclude any associations or agreements of free cities, or any changes in government or constitution or even the recall or return of political exiles? For when Plato spoke of every city being made up of two cities, one of the rich and one of the poor<sup>51</sup>, he might have added that the political leaders of one or the other were likely to be living in foreign parts, plotting. Did the formula "Peace and Freedom" mean actually the rigid maintenance of the status quo, and so actually, as in Greece in the fourth century, little of either?

Alexander, master of Greece in 335, acted realistically without much concern for what would seem to have been the spirit of the League of Corinth, although he doubtless observed its letter. Except in defense of its integrity, he fought no member and changed no government, but this gave him occasion enough. Athens submitted to a modified democracy loyal to Macedonia but

<sup>47</sup> W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum*, I, (1914) (SIG), 147; M. N. Tod, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, II (1948) („Tod"), 123, 9-12.

<sup>48</sup> SIG 260; Tod 177. This is a constantly recurring theme in the speeches of Isocrates, and the matter has been often discussed. It is not necessary to deal with it here.

<sup>49</sup> So Lycurgus as quoted in Diodorus, XVI, 88, 2. It is stated as a fact in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *Roman Antiquities*, II, 17, 2. The Athenians did not act at the moment enslaved, or angry (Diodorus, XVI, 92, 2).

<sup>50</sup> Diodorus, XVII, 9, 5; Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*, 11, 4.

<sup>51</sup> *Republic*, IV, 422 E-423 A.

kept her walls, army, and fleet. Thebes was destroyed as a city, although still occupied by Thebans, and her citadel was held by a Macedonian garrison. Pellene in Achaea<sup>52</sup>, as apparently other cities in the Peloponnese, was held for Alexander by a tyrant. On the other hand, the Anatolian cities and islands liberated from the Persians in 334 were placed under democracies and were called free, although they were not necessarily taken into the League of Corinth and probably contributed troops and money to his expedition, just as they also were placed under obligations. Among others, Ilium was adorned with new buildings<sup>53</sup>, Priene received a contribution for the Athena temple<sup>54</sup>, and at Miletus Alexander took over the function of stephanephore or chief priest<sup>55</sup>. And Theopompus, in writing to Alexander<sup>56</sup>, referred to the Greeks killed in the battle of Ipsus as having died "in behalf of your kingship and the freedom of the Greeks". During the Asiatic campaign, Alexander regularly sent back

<sup>52</sup> Pausanias, VII, 27, 7. The date is disputed; cf. for example H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage* (1926) I, 243; G. Glotz, P. Roussel, R. Cohen, *Histoire Grecque*, IV, 1 (1938) 191.

<sup>53</sup> Strabo, XIII, 1, 26 (593) says that it received the designation of a πόλις. For Smyrna cf. Pliny, *Nat. Hist.*, V, 31, 118; Pausanias, VII, 5, 1; Berve, I, 296.

<sup>54</sup> Tod 184.

<sup>55</sup> *I. Milet* 122, 81: Ἀλέξανδρος Φιλίππου. All modern historians of Alexander have considered his treatment of and attitude to the Anatolian cities, but serious study of the problem of their legal and administrative position began with the paper of E. Bickermann, *Revue des Etudes Grecques*, XLVII, (1934), 346-374, who argued that they were treated like other conquered peoples, according to the wishes of the conqueror. They were not taken into the League of Corinth or formally adopted as allies. His proposal has led to an active discussion: A. Heuss, *Staat und Herrscher des Hellenismus* (1937); V. Ehrenberg, *Alexander and the Greeks*, (1938) 1-51; E. Bickerman, *Revue des Etudes Anciennes*, XLII (1940) 25-35; W. W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* (1948) II, 199-232; A. B. Ranowitsch, *Der Hellenismus und seine geschichtliche Rolle* (1958; German translation of the 1948 Russian edition), 38-45; G. Tibiletti, *Athenaeum*, XXXII (1954) 1-22. It can hardly be claimed that any positive agreement has come of this, and I suspect that part of the trouble is the elasticity of the Greek concept of freedom. The cities were certainly „free“, or most of them, but the meaning of the term varied with circumstances and the point of view. In one point, however, I believe that Tarn has been misleading. On page 231 he states: „the cities of the League had to, and did, furnish contingents of troops for the war, while the cities of Asia Minor furnished no troops“. So far as I know, there is no evidence that they did not, and the presumption must be the reverse. Not only were re-inforcements regularly forwarded to Alexander by the satraps in Asia Minor (Berve, I, 176-185), and the most desirable of these would certainly have been urban and Hellenized, if not specifically Greek, but the presence of Anatolian Greeks in the service of the Successors can be best explained on occasion as the result of recruitment under Alexander. Notable in this regard are the men from the tiny Aeolic town of Temnus in the garrison of Elephantine in upper Egypt under the first Ptolemy (O. Rubensohn, *Elephantine-Papyri*, 1907, nos. 1 and 2). I find it difficult to think of so many as having been recruited by Ptolemy himself, lacking any political control of his own over that area. The competition for soldiers was intense at that time, and the sources of supply were carefully guarded.

<sup>56</sup> F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker*, II, B, 1 (1927) No. 115, F. 253.

dedications to the Greek temples from the spoils of war, and returned to Athens the statues of the tyrannicides Harmodius and Aristogeiton which Xerxes had removed to Susa<sup>57</sup>. With all this the Greeks had little specific cause to complain, although many were not happy.

Then in 324, a year before his death, Alexander took two measures which threw the Greek world into a turmoil. Safely back from the Indus campaign and master of the Persian Empire, Alexander sent word to the Greek cities to worship him as a god and to restore their political exiles<sup>58</sup>. To ancients and to moderns, one of these measures seems reasonable and the other not, but in a precisely reversed sense. Even Pausanias, the Greek Baedeker, writing under the Emperor Antoninus Pius, who found it hard to think that Heracles had built a temple and invested a priestess to himself, found no difficulty with the idea of men becoming or being gods, as such; he objected only because Heracles helped men rather than made trouble for them, and everyone knew that he did not become a god until his death<sup>59</sup>. On the other hand, the return of political exiles posed precisely the problems of which Israel is now conscious: their probable unfriendliness and the difficulty of returning their former property. This was the measure which caused the Greeks to revolt after Alexander died, although since Alexander was not popular, there was little enthusiasm for honoring him with deification<sup>60</sup>.

It has been claimed that the Exiles Decree was a violation of the charter of the League of Corinth, and that the request for divine status was designed to provide a quasi-legal basis for such interference in the internal affairs of the member states<sup>61</sup>, but an analysis of both measures seems to me to refute this claim<sup>62</sup>. The Exiles Decree was promulgated first in Alexander's headquarters, in Susa in the late spring of 324<sup>63</sup>. A special messenger was sent to the Olympic Games to make public proclamation that while Alexander had not been responsible for their exile, he would be responsible for their return.

<sup>57</sup> References in Glotz-Roussel-Cohen, 105.

<sup>58</sup> References in Berve, I, 96 f.; Glotz-Roussel-Cohen, 217 f.; C. A. Robinson, Jr., *The History of Alexander the Great*, II (1963) 79 f.

<sup>59</sup> IX, xxvii, 6-8.

<sup>60</sup> The evidence is given by Chr. Habicht, *Gottmenschentum und griechische Städte* (1956) 28-36. The religious or other significance of this has been much discussed, but does not concern us now. I have outlined my own view in the *Propyläen-Weltgeschichte*, III (1962) 546-549.

<sup>61</sup> There is a full discussion of the problem in Tarn (note 53 above), who rejects the association. Cf. also U. Wilcken, *Alexander der Grosse* (1931) 196-202; Glotz-Roussel-Cohen, 217; P. Cloché, *Alexandre le Grand* (1947) 190-102; Fr. Schachermeyr, *Alexander der Grosse* (1949) 433-438. It is, of course, possible and necessary to cite only a few of the Alexander historians. These are representative.

<sup>62</sup> So notably Wilcken, *loc. cit.*

<sup>63</sup> So Chr. Habicht, *Athenische Mittheilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts*, LXXII (1957) 168. Bickerman had argued that the decision was taken earlier (*Revue des Etudes Anciennes*, XLII (1940) 34), and this is by no means impossible.



This proposed was incorporated in a collection of ἐπιτάγματα dealing with various matters and then<sup>64</sup> presumably — for this is the only step which is not specifically attested — letters were sent to the individual cities concerned, informing them of Alexander's plan and inviting them to put it into effect. At all events, the request for worship, about which we are less well informed, was handled in this way, and the procedure became standard in the Hellenistic period: the king did not order but recommended ("We think it best")<sup>65</sup>. The cities may have been unable to refuse, but the measure as adopted was an autonomous act of the city government quite unlike the compliance of a *civitas libera* with Roman orders.

Whether or to what extent it was proper, desirable, or necessary for Alexander to have a cult in the Greek cities may be left moot. Alexander may have died before any could be set up<sup>66</sup> but such existed commonly for his successors, the Hellenistic kings; and no case is known where it served any political purpose<sup>67</sup>. As matter of fact, the first certain instance of such a cult is that of Ptolemy, called the "Savior", at Rhodes<sup>68</sup>, and that powerful merchant city notably preserved its freedom in fact as well as in form. On the other hand, if the Greek cities were to enjoy peace as well as freedom, the problem of the exiles was one which had to be solved. There were twenty thousand of them at Olympia to hear Alexander's proclamation<sup>69</sup>, and many thousand more were serving with Alexander or otherwise trying to make a living as mercenary soldiers. Cape Taenarum at the southern tip of Laconia was their place of assembly and of hire, and as iron of itself draws the man, so the existence of bands of unemployed mercenaries was an invitation to any adventurer with money to try his hand at war. In some cases these exiles included most of a city's population, as at

<sup>64</sup> Hypereides, V, col. 18.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. the examples in my *Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic Period* (1934) e.g. no. 1, 65: καλῶς δὴ μοι δοκεῖ εἶχειν. Such verbs as κρίνομεν (*ib.* 36, 10) occur rather in administrative matters of an internal character.

<sup>66</sup> This is the usual opinion and it has chronology on its side. If the cities were approached in the matter only in the late summer or autumn of 324, it may well have taken the following winter to decide what, if anything, to do about it. A number of cities agreed to recognize Alexander as a god, although there was opposition and discussion, but what was called for was a cult place and a cult; and such matters could not be handled over-night. Probably little positive had been done by the summer of 323, when word came of Alexander's death, and thereafter Greece was in revolt. The only reference to a temple known to me is the one mentioned in an anecdote of Lycurgus told by Plutarch (*Moralia*, 842 D). When they were „proclaiming” (ἀναγορευόντων) Alexander to be a god at Athens, Lycurgus commented: „What kind of a god would that be, when those who come out of his temple have to be purified” (οὐ τὸ ἱερὸν ἐξιόντας δεῖσαι περιρραίνεσθαι). This does not mean, of course, that this temple had already been erected, but it was at the least in prospect and part of the proposal.

<sup>67</sup> Tarn (page 372) says properly, why should it have been mentioned even if it existed?

<sup>68</sup> Diodorus, XX, 100, 3/4; Habicht, *Gottmenschentum*, 109 f.

<sup>69</sup> Diodorus, XVIII, 8, 4.



Samos which the Athenians had reoccupied with their own people<sup>70</sup>. Justice might call for their return to their homes, but everywhere the security of the Greeks demanded the end of a dangerous situation. Alexander's proposal had only a limited success, but it foreshadowed the way in which (on quite different theoretical bases) the kings and the Roman emperors after them might deal with urgent problems while still leaving the cities free and autonomous.

Alexander's premature death was followed by forty years of struggle before the separate parts of his kingdom assumed an approach to stability as separate states. The leaders of the struggle and the eventual founders of new royal dynasties were the Macedonian generals, but the agents of the struggle were the Macedonians and especially the Greeks in their service, and the Greek cities became vitally important, as bases and as the source of men and money). It was a turbulent and trying time for the cities, but inevitably again the slogan of the Freedom of the Greeks was raised as a weapon of propaganda. In 315 Antigonos had this formally voted by his soldiers as a part of their program at a time when most of the cities were controlled by his rivals<sup>71</sup>, and claimed credit four years later for having written this principle into a treaty with them. As he wrote to the city of Scepsis in the Troad<sup>72</sup>; "Peace is made. We have provided in the treaty that all the Greeks are to swear to aid each other in preserving their freedom and autonomy". This was an ingenious way of involving the Greeks in a conflict otherwise neither welcome to nor important for them, but Ptolemy, satrap of Egypt, turned this provision into a *casus belli* against Antigonos the following year<sup>73</sup>. Antigonos's son Demetrius Poliorcetes freed Athens from Cassander in 307 and restored its democracy<sup>74</sup>, and two years later undertook a spectacular and protracted siege of his ally Rhodes, not to subvert its freedom, but to compel it to only to be less friendly to Ptolemy<sup>75</sup>. A city had to be both powerful and lucky to maintain a policy of neutrality, and for most cities it was a question only of getting on as well as possible with the dominant power, or possibly of playing one off against another for favors. Miletus, „freed" by Antigonos in 313<sup>76</sup>, held for Demetrius until 295<sup>77</sup> in spite of the death of his father and the loss of his Asiatic empire in 301, but then accepted Lysimachus, only to shift back to Demetrius in 287 in his last desperate attempt at

<sup>70</sup> SIG 312 and especially inscriptions 1 and 2 published by Habicht, *Athenische Mitteilungen*, LXXII (1957), 154-169.

<sup>71</sup> Diodorus, XIX, 61, 3. Antigonos was only imitating Philip III and his regent Polyperchon: Diodorus, XVIII, 56. He was promptly followed by Ptolemy (*ibid.* 62,1).

<sup>72</sup> *Royal Correspondence*, 1, 51-56.

<sup>73</sup> Diodorus, XX, 19, 3.

<sup>74</sup> Plutarch, *Life of Demetrius*, 10, 1.

<sup>75</sup> Diodorus, XX, 81-82.

<sup>76</sup> *I. Milet*, 123, 1-3.

<sup>77</sup> *I. Milet*, 123, 22: Δημήτριος Ἀντιγόνου (under 295/4 B.C.).

recovery, but<sup>78</sup> five years later appears borrowing money to pay Lysimachus an indemnity<sup>79</sup>. Two years more and Miletus basked in the favor of Demetrius' son-in-law, ally, and rival the Seleucid king Antiochus.<sup>80</sup> One more year and Miletus, still or again free but differently oriented, recorded a rich gift of territory from Antiochus' arch enemy, Ptolemy of Egypt<sup>81</sup>. It called for some agility for the cities to maintain their freedom in the early Hellenistic period, but it was possible.

The history of the Greek cities through the remaining two hundred and fifty years of Hellenism and on into the Roman Empire is a rich and complex one, often vividly documented by public documents inscribed on stones which have survived to us and sometimes also by Polybius and other contemporary historians whose works have survived in quotation<sup>82</sup>, but the principles established in the time of Alexander and the Successors remained firm. Practice varied, inevitably, but freedom, autonomy, and democracy were accepted as essential attribute of the city, however they might sometimes seem to be in disaccord with the actual situation. Few cities could hope to go it alone: Athens, Rhodes, Cyzicus, Byzantium, Heracleia. In Greece itself, where Macedonia did not rule the cities combined in federal leagues and pooled their resources in order to survive, but this delegation of sovereignty was not held to involve loss of freedom. In Asia and in Africa the cities were royal allies or even residences, but still technically free and autonomous<sup>83</sup>.

<sup>78</sup> *Royal Correspondence*, 5. Cf. my comments, *Propyläen-Weltgeschichte*, III, 449.

<sup>79</sup> *I. Milet*, 138. The money was borrowed from Cnidus (6-7: ὧν δεῖ ἀποδοῦναι ἡμᾶς βασιλεῖ Λυσιμάχῳ).

<sup>80</sup> *I. Milet*, 123, 37: Ἀντίοχος Σελεύκου.

<sup>81</sup> *I. Milet*, 123, 38-40: ἐδόθη ἡ χώρα τῷ δῆμῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Πτολεμαίου. The expression „the territory” is odd, for it can hardly mean the entire city territory. Anyway, this would not be a „gift” (ἐδόθη) but a „return” (ἀπεδόθη). And yet the χώρα was notable enough to need no further definition.

<sup>82</sup> The usage of the inscriptions is more difficult to check, but the narrative of Polybius furnishes a commentary on his usage. Generally speaking, he regards a city or community as not free when it is garrisoned or subject to a king. So in XV, 24, 2, Thasos would not be free if it were turned over (παραδοῦναι) to Philip, even though he left the Thasians ἀφρουρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, ἀνεπισταθμεύτους, νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις; but these are otherwise the normal attributes of a free city. He believes that the Macedonians at the end of the monarchy were μεταλαβόντες ἀπὸ δουλείας ὁμολογουμένως ἐλευθερίαν, and is puzzled and indignant that they did not like it (XXXVI, 17, 13). Sparta was free with the death of Nabis (XXI, 1, 4). On the other hand, the Lycian cities given to Rhodes ἐν δωρεᾷ were not free, although Eumenes thought that they would be if they became his allies (XXI, 19-23). There may be an element of Roman thinking here, especially in the attitude toward kings, but the basic concept is Greek, fluid rather than technical, practical rather than legal.

<sup>83</sup> The best and fullest systematic account of the cities is given by A. H. M. Jones in his *Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (1937) and *The Greek City from Alexander to Justinian* (1940). Much useful information is given by E. Bickerman, *Institutions des Séleucides* (1938) 141-145, and V. Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (1960) 191-205. But each instance has its

In the period of Roman intervention, the Freedom of the Greeks again appears as a political formula, mainly employed by Rome against the kings<sup>84</sup>, and in 196 the Roman general Flamininus, victorious over Philip V of Macedon, received a huge ovation when he proclaimed at the Isthmian Games that Philip's former Greek allies would be restored to freedom, neither garrisoned nor taxed<sup>85</sup>. It is true that they were largely, in the sequel, given over to various Greek allies of the Romans, so that their absolute freedom existed no more after than it had before<sup>86</sup>. In the same way a few years later the Romans were to demand

own evidence and its own problems, and it is hard to generalize. It must be remembered that Isocrates has seen no difficulty in this relation of city and king (*Philip*, 122, 154).

<sup>84</sup> As early as 229, in the operations against Teuta, Rome took Corcyra and Epidamnus into her fides and gave them her friendship, which involved recognition of them as *civitates liberae* (Polybius, II, 11), and the Peace of Phoenice, which Philip was in 200 accused of breaking, must have involved recognition of the freedom of the parties, although the slogan itself does not appear in our sources. The Roman demand on Philip was that he refrain from making war on any of the Greeks (XVI, 34, 3), but this was quickly expanded into the order to vacate (i.e. liberate) Greece altogether (XVII, 1, 13; 11, 11). Certainly none of the Greeks who then gladly accepted Roman help realized that Rome was moving in as a guide and protector to stay.

<sup>85</sup> The dramatic story in Polybius, XVIII, 44-46, is repeated with only slight changes in Livy, XXXIII, 30-33. The basic document was a *senatus consultum* providing that the other Greeks in Asia and Europe were to be free and autonomous (ἐλευθέρους ὑπάρχειν καὶ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς ἰδίοις; *omnes Graecorum civitates, quae in Europa quaeque in Asia essent, libertatem ac suas haberent leges*), while those in Greece subject to or garrisoned by Philip should be turned over to the Romans (τοὺς δὲ ταττομένους ὑπὸ Φίλιππον καὶ τὰς πόλεις τὰς ἐμφορούς; *quae earum sub dicione Philippi fuissent, praesidia ex iis Philippus deduceret*; this with an eye on King Antiochus), those in Asia and Thrace set free. The Aetolians objected that this neither satisfied their territorial claims nor was logical. Stirred by this last argument, Flamininus in his Isthmian proclamation specifically freed the former allies of Philip in Greece also (ἀφιᾶσιν ἐλευθέρους, ἀφορρήτους, ἀφορολογήτους, νόμοις χρωμένους τοῖς πατρίοις; *liberos, immunes, suis legibus esse*). Livy's omission of the freedom from garrison may be accidental, but more likely due to the fact that he, as presumably also the Senate, was thinking in Roman constitutional terms. The Greek communities were to be *civitates liberae et immunes*, and the presence or absence of a Roman garrison was immaterial, a matter to be determined by the specific circumstances.

<sup>86</sup> Some were freed, actually: Thessalians, Perrhaebians, Dolopians, Magnesians. On the other hand, the Phthiotic Achaeans (specifically freed in the proclamation) were not only not freed (in the Greek sense) but split, being given half to the Thessalians and half to the Aetolians. The Aetolians received also the Phocians and the Locrians, also specifically freed in the proclamation. In a similar way, the Achaeans received Corinth, and Eumenes almost got Oreus and Eretria, but missed on grounds rather of expediency than of principle. Pleuratus and Amynander, Roman allies, also were given Greek communities. In this (to our eye) illogical or even hypocritical procedure, both Greek and Roman political concepts acquiesced, but from different points of view. To the Greeks, freedom was a fluid notion, and the Phocians and Corinthians were certainly regarded as free by the Aetolians and Achaeans when they were compelled to join their respective Leagues. Similarly Eumenes would certainly have regarded Oreus and Eretria as free, if he had got them as allies. To the Romans, on the other hand, a *civitas libera*, obligated to guard the majestas of the Roman people, might logically be combined in whatever larger

that Antiochus the Great grant Lysimacheia its freedom, only themselves after the war to turn it over to their ally Eumenes of Pergamum<sup>87</sup>. Perhaps we may see here one of the many instances where Roman legalism was being corrupted by Greek liberalism.

With the establishment of the Roman Empire, which we may date with Polybius to 146 B.C., the concept of ἐλευθερία and its counterpart, libertas, took on new meanings. Political freedom in the old sense was no longer possible<sup>88</sup>, but personal freedom within and without the city entered upon a new world of opportunity. The next hundred and fifteen years brought little to the Greek world but trouble and unhappiness, but even before Augustus a development had set in affecting the Greek city which was salutary and good. The cities became less exciting and less precarious, but as they came under the control of higher powers capable of preventing them from fighting each other<sup>89</sup> they acquired internal and external peace without loss of the feeling, at least, of freedom and democracy; and that was what really counted, as the philosophers had pointed out long ago. Absolute freedom meant chaos, but real freedom meant order and obedience.

In the old, fiercely competitive world of the Greek city states, class conflict within and foreign war without was the rule if the individual, the faction, and the city was to be protected, satisfy its pride, and attain prosperity. It was a period of great intellectual, artistic, and moral productivity, but it was not an easy period to live in and required a sublimation of normal human values. In particular, the individual life or desires mattered little; Socrates insisted

political groupings were desirable, for of course, strictly speaking, the Aetolians and the Achaeans were civitates liberae also (though they would have been shocked to know what Romans meant by the term). They could not so logically assign a civitas libera to a king, and it is not clear how they got around this difficulty.

Whether any of this is discussed by M. L e m o s s e in his article in *Mnemosyne Perikles K. Bizoukides* (Thessalonike, 1960, 123-135). I cannot say. I have not been able to see it. A Greek might also regard the release of a city from the control of a king (or a different king) as „freeing”. So Isocrates, *Philip*, 64, 123, 129, 139; *Peace*, 42; etc.

<sup>87</sup> Polybius, XVIII, 50; XXI, 45.

<sup>88</sup> Plutarch comments (*Moralia*, 824 C) that there is still much for the πολιτικός to do. His major responsibility is to guard against civil strife, στάσις. Then Plutarch lists the „goods” of a city: εἰρήνη, ἐλευθερία, εὐετηρία, εὐανδρία, ὁμόνοια, and points out that the first in the list is taken care of automatically, while of the second the Greeks have as much as the rulers, οἱ κρατοῦντες, allow them, but the other three invite local concern. Dio Chrysostom also (XLIV, 10), while recognizing that τιμή, δόξα, and εὐπορία χρημάτων come from the κρατοῦντες, comments that there still remain many things which the people of Prusa can do for themselves.

<sup>89</sup> When Nero „freed” the Greeks by removing them from the control of a provincial governor (a sentimental revival of the old slogan), they began quarreling, and Vespasian restored the province, remarking that they had forgotten how to be free. It was he, of course, who had forgotten, if he ever knew, what freedom had meant earlier to the Greeks. (Pausanias, VII, 17, 4).



on the integrity of the individual mind and was executed. It was magnificent but it was hardly tolerable, and it is little wonder that the Greeks of the fourth century should have begun searching for something more comfortable and more secure. It was a hard search. Whether or not the Greeks could have worked things out for themselves, they were not allowed to do so. Macedonia and then, in a more terrible and final way, Rome provided the solution. The wider world of the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Empire opened up new areas of economic and social freedom undreamed of or despised before: the freedom of the individual to make his fortune and find his happiness where and how he could. The city lost none of its appeal as a social and economic, religious and intellectual center, and the Greek remained always in antiquity a πολιτικὸν ζῶον, a creature<sup>1</sup> of the city; but as the militant and competitive struggle for existence lessened or was prevented by a higher power, so the city became stable and secure.

In form, little was changed<sup>90</sup>. The typical democratic constitution remained with magistrates, council, and assembly, and provided a satisfactory formula for rich and poor. The magistracies, more and more rarely demanding military competence, presided over things civil and religious. They handled relations with the sovereign, saw to routine administration and justice, and took care of the city's welfare, its schools and gymnasia, food supply, and public building. Taxes were collected, but the magistrates had ample opportunity to display their generosity and reap an answering harvest of praise. The people in assembly legislated and elected, but legislation involved less and less important things. There was no point in electing a poor man to an office which called for lavish expenditure. In form and certainly also in name they were democracies, but the cities were actually administered by the rich, at first from necessity and then under law.

This is the pattern of the older cities in Greece itself and in Asia Minor. In the East the picture is complicated by the presence in the new foundations of Hellenistic and Roman date of a large, often a preponderant number of non-Greek orientals within the city. We are not well informed about any of these, although occasionally, as in the case of Tarsus, it is possible to glimpse the process of gradual assimilation and stabilization which went on there as elsewhere in an atmosphere of freedom and democracy<sup>91</sup>. Dura-Europos has given us other information, although that, as a Macedonian rather than a Greek city, may not be representative. It is, at all events, of interest that in a contract dated in the year 254 of the Christian Era, only two or three years before its capture and destruction by the Persians, the city displays the proud titles of holy and

<sup>90</sup> Best seen in the books of Jones cited above, note 83.

<sup>91</sup> I have presented the evidence and my interpretation in „Hellenistic Tarsus”, *Mélanges de l'Université Saint Joseph*, XXXVIII, (1962) 2 (offert au Père René Mousterde).



inviolable and autonomous, granted by an Emperor<sup>92</sup>. What these meant practically, if anything, is unimportant. They testify to the strength and persistence of a concept. They are a reminder that while in the later Greek world ἐλευθερία was largely confined to individual interests, its political sense and its original flexibility had not disappeared, even if, in fact, the concept of the Roman *civitas libera* had prevailed even in an age which was shortly to see the end of almost all freedom of any sort.

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<sup>92</sup> *The Excavations at Dura-Europos, Final Report V, Part I: The Parchments and Papyri* (1959) 166-169, No. 32, line 5. The best general account of Dura is still M. Rostovtzeff, *Dura-Europos and its Art* (1938) although more is known in many respects. For the social pattern of the city see my „Population of Roman Dura”, *Studies in Roman Economic and Social History in Honor of Allan Chester Johnson*, (1951) 251-274.