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"Untersuchungen zur Geschichte
Ptolemaios I", Jakob Seibert, München
1969 : [recenzja]

The Journal of Juristic Papyrology 18, 304-310

1974

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her death. The supposition that Callicrates came to Egypt in her company (p. 67) is, in the author's own words, "completely in the realm of conjecture" — but what an intriguing conjecture it is! It should be noted, however, that in his "loyal and almost pious sentiments toward Ptolemy and his sister-wife" Callicrates was by no means an exception at the Alexandrian court — as the reader might be inclined to believe after reading Hauben's remarks (p. 66) on Sotades, who, however, was a specific case. While speaking of poets, we must not forget how close, for instance, were the relations between someone like Callimachus and the king and his sister-spouse.

Hauben is probably right about the range and scope of Callicrates' powers. For I think we can now take it as proved that he was the supreme commander of the Ptolemaic navy, although there is nothing to indicate that he possessed extensive political and judicial powers, as did the plenipotentiary generals Philocles and Patroclus, who, in Hauben's opinion, were not nauarchs (p. 69). Hauben believes that Callicrates held the office of nauarch for about 20 years, but this duration is not altogether sure, since neither the beginning nor the end of this period are dated definitely. Nevertheless the author is quite right in saying that Tam's theory of the ten years' duration of the nauarchate may be definitely rejected (p. 69).

Although Chapter III, dealing with Callicrates of Samos's family, establishes little that is definite, it is nevertheless good testimony to the author's excellent choice of method and his caution in arriving at conclusions.

At the very end of this booklet there is an appendix in which Günter D u n s t presents a very fragmentary inscription from Samos, mentioning Callicrates, son of Boiscus. It should be noted that in Chapter II Hauben had suggested a rather different restoration of the text (II C 5 p. 48/49).

[Warszawa]

Anna Świderek

Jakob Seibert, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Ptolemaios I, Münchener Beiträge zur Papyrusforschung und antiken Rechtsgeschichte*, 56. Heft, C. H. Beck, München 1969.

The title of his work exactly conveys the author's aim, which is to examine carefully all the sources and literature on the history of Ptolemy I, up to the time of the Battle of Ipsos (301 B.C.). A point which one might be inclined to cavil at is his choice of time framework. On the one hand it is perfectly natural that the author should begin by considering the position and role of Ptolemy, son of Lagos, even as early as the time of Alexander's expedition, while simultaneously attempting to assess him as a historian. Undoubtedly no history of

the first Macedonian king of Egypt should neglect the early period of his life. What is less justifiable, however, is his decision to go no further than the Battle of Ipsos. The arguments which Seibert puts forward for this decision in the Conclusion (Schluss, pp. 235—236) are inadequate. True, there are very few sources connected with the later period, and what sources do exist are not at all easy to make use of. But this is the very reason why I think they should be studied. Nor is this gap filled by the author's reference, in a footnote, to another publication of his (*Historische Beiträge zu den dynastischen Verbindungen, Historia-Einzelschriften, H. 10, 1967*), since it concerns only one aspect of Ptolemy I's diplomatic activities. Then there are quite a number of problems arising after the Battle of Ipsos, which throw important light on Ptolemy's policies, such as his relations with Demetrius Poliorcetes or with Pyrrhus, or the establishment of a protectorate over the Nesiotic League, or the question of Cyrene.

After the year 301 B.C. we never again find Ptolemy on the field of battle. This perhaps explains why Seibert does not go beyond that date, for his main interest is in Ptolemy's strategy (without of course neglecting to study his politics). It is probably also the reason why Cyrene and its connections with Egypt, even in the period 323—301 B.C., has been treated rather perfunctorily — which is rather a pity, as it is a problem which illuminates Ptolemy's policy and his attitude to the Greek cities rather well.

Admirable features of Seibert's book are its orderliness and precision. Its construction is exceptionally clear, the various chapters having been divided very conveniently into small sub-sections. First of all the author presents and analyses the sources that are available on the given problem, then he discusses the literature on the subject, and finally states his conclusions and own results. One is everywhere aware of his determination (mostly justified) to question established opinions and cast doubt on the assertions of the universally accepted vulgate. Sometimes, however, he goes too far.

Seibert is probably too hard on Ptolemy judged as a historian, although he convincingly (but perhaps too extensively) criticizes the view put forward by C. B. Welles (p. 7). He himself takes exception to the prominence Ptolemy gives to his own person. Yet surely it was only natural that the memoirs written by the King of Egypt himself should have a somewhat subjective bias. Arrian was able to read all Ptolemy's writings, as well as the works of other historians on the subject of Alexander, so it was easier for him than for us today to assess their value and reliability. Of course if we recognize this fact it does not mean that we should throw all caution to the winds when dealing with the information given us by Ptolemy.

With regard to the division of the satrapies in Babylon, Seibert subjects to scrutiny the universally held view that Ptolemy chose Egypt for himself. An exhaustive examination of the sources reveals that this view was propounded

for the first time by J. P. Mahaffy (*A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 1899, p. 25), and it is not supported by any sources; while Paus. I 6 cannot be regarded as adequate even for regarding Ptolemy as initiator of the very fact of division.

In a chapter on Cleomenes of Naucratis, Seibert very rightly points out that the sources are biased, for they evaluate the actions of this first Greek governor of Egypt solely from the point of view of the Greeks, and ignore the fact that above all he has to reckon with the needs of the whole country he was administering. That Cleomenes of Naucratis was a good administrator is documented by the fact that Ptolemy found 8,000 talents in the treasury (from Diod. XVIII 14,1 he concludes that Ptolemy got this money during the lifetime of Cleomenes, but it should be noted that Diodorus says nothing about Cleomenes's death, nor about his relations with Ptolemy). This attempt to rehabilitate Cleomenes to some extent is certainly justified (cf. also e.g. E. Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique* I, Nancy 1966, p. 33, 153, 177). On the other hand Seibert possibly goes too far in trying to prove that Cleomenes "did not try to feather his own nest" (p. 50). For in those days, as long as things were kept within certain limits, it was thought quite natural to link one's own interests with those of the state administration, and no one made any objection.

Coming now to the sources for the history of Ptolemy I, and to the account of Ptolemy given in Books XVIII and XIX by Diodorus, the author quite naturally pays most attention to Hieronymus of Cardia. In this case his conclusions are in line with the generally accepted opinion as to the worth of that historian, for after careful and painstaking appraisal of all the data, Seibert, too, looks upon him as the main source of Books XVIII and XIX by Diodorus. Seibert does not try to identify any of the other sources used by Diodorus with any of the known historians, but cannily confines himself to mentioning them in the text and saying which trend they represent.

The chapter dealing with Ptolemy's foreign policy begins with an analysis of Pol. V 34, 3—9 — the text on which our ideas about the policy of the first three Ptolemies are usually based (cf. E. Will, *op. cit.*, p. 139). As far as method is concerned, Seibert is undoubtedly right in saying that what we have here is no more than an opinion expressed by one of the ancient historians, and that not his opinion, but the source material should be taken as the foundation for forming one's own opinion (pp. 85/86). It is incomprehensible to me, however, why Seibert thinks this text by Polybius can refer only to the reign of Ptolemy III: for both Coele-Syria and Cyprus had already been taken over long before this, by Ptolemy I, while the whole picture no doubt corresponds to the situation in the reign of Ptolemy II. Seibert proceeds to discuss the views of previous authors on the foreign policy of Ptolemy I, and accuses them of starting off from some *a priori* assumption of a general political principle.

In reply to this it may be said that in most cases the various authors had arrived at these "general political principles" through studying the sources, and that the differences that were evident in their views stemmed from the possibility of diverse subjective interpretations. Seibert's assertion that "die uns bekannten Ereignisse sind nicht nur actio, sondern auch reactio" (p. 88) can be applied equally well to the politics of every country and every epoch. It does not, however, rule out the possibility that a general political line did exist.

As for the question of the expedition to Cyrenaica, which significantly he calls "Ptolemy's first military undertaking" (p. 91), Seibert seeks to prove that its aim was not territorial expansion, nor confirmation of Egypt's power (cf. the opinion of H. Bengtson quoted in footnote 13, p. 95). Ptolemy only intervened because he was persuaded to do so by the exiles from Cyrene (p. 93). Yet we know very well that statesmen and kings only listen to the pleas of exiles when by responding to them they can thereby further their own policy. Thus the very fact that Ptolemy listened to the Cyrenaicans' pleas is eloquent testimony to the kind of plans he was nursing towards the land from which the exiles had come.

The sources we have on the war between Perdiccas and Ptolemy are not, as the author's convincing analysis shows, a convenient starting-point for the objective reconstruction of facts, for they are biased, mostly on the side of Ptolemy. The book gives a very lucid and interesting analysis of the various reasons which are given for the war by different sources (see Table on p. 107). Seibert himself looks upon all these reasons as being of no importance; or at most he regards only one of them as being at all plausible: that is, the murder of Cleomenes. His conclusion is that Ptolemy himself provoked the war by entering a coalition with Antigonos and Antipater. In my opinion, however, he does not appreciate sufficiently the importance of the abduction of Alexander's body to Egypt. In suggesting that Perdiccas would not have risked war on two fronts unless he had had important reasons for doing so (p. 111), he is thinking in twentieth century categories. Then having analysed the course of the war and its outcome, he comes to the conclusion that Peithon played a much more important role in these events than has been attributed to him by sources which are favourable to Ptolemy. He even suggests that the real position was not that the satrap of Egypt voluntarily relinquished the post of regent, but that he was not strong enough to seize it. He also challenges the general view that it was the war against Perdiccas that moulded Ptolemy's later strategy. "Da der Krieg nicht auf dem Schlachtfeld, sondern im Zelt des feindlichen Heerführers entschieden wurde, konnte Ptolemaios für der Zukunft keine strategische Hinweise für die Sicherheit seines Landes gewinnen" (p. 128). To this it may be replied that it was before the death of Perdiccas that Ptolemy won this war and that victorious generals are not usually murdered by their own soldiers.

It is here that the main thread of the author's argument becomes apparent: he wants to challenge all the generally accepted views and above all to demonstrate that Ptolemy in actual fact did not pursue any systematic policy, to show that was neither such a wise diplomat nor such a far-sighted strategist as is usually believed. Since he had no definite aim, declares Seibert, his only purpose was not just to maintain and strengthen his position in Egypt. But in actual fact practically all Ptolemy's moves, both diplomatic and military, can best be interpreted along these lines. Seibert decidedly rejects this interpretation, and seeks another one, and since he cannot find one, he accuses the King of Egypt of being inconsistent and undecided, and denies him both political and military talent. Proof of this he seeks both in the war against Polyperchon (see pp. 134—135), and, above all, in the war against Antigonos (period 315—311 B.C.), and sharply criticizes all three members of the coalition mounted against Antigonos. His opinion (p. 140) is based on a single sentence in Diodorus (XIX 75, 2). He forgets that both Cassander and Lysimachus (to say nothing even of Ptolemy) later proved their military and diplomatic talents on repeated occasions. If all three really had been incompetent politicians and generals, Antigonos and Demetrius would have had no difficulty in dealing with them, especially as even Seibert does not deny them those talents (e.g. see p. 141—2). Discussing Ptolemy's strategy in the year 315 B.C., the author accuses him of inactivity even during the operations on Cyprus, although he does not deny a certain logic in those operations (pp. 143—145). What he does allege against him is that he did not make the best use of the preponderance of his fleet, and as an explanation of this fact he suggests that having accompanied Alexander on his expedition, Ptolemy had no experience in naval warfare. Strangely enough he does not cite another reason for this inactivity at sea — the formation of the Nesiotic League, by Antigonos, which he dates to this very same year, 315 B.C. (see p. 146). Another criticism that Seibert levels against Ptolemy is that his sole reaction to Antigonos' proclamation of freedom for the Greeks was a similar proclamation (p. 145), but he does not tell us what better move Ptolemy could have made.

With the Battle of Gaza the author initiates a series of precise, admirable military analysis that constitute an important and valuable part of this book. They also spotlight his interest in military history (see also his analysis of the Battle of Salamis on Cyprus, the expedition of Antigonos against Egypt, and the Battle of Ipsus). Seleucus's role at Gaza surprises the author, although it seems quite natural to me that Ptolemy should regard the exiled satrap, whose expulsion from Babylon he had never accepted, as more or less equal to himself in rank. Seleucus's expedition to Babylon was by no means an undertaking by Ptolemy himself, for he had no intention of annexing that satrapy to Egypt (cf. Droysen's comment, cited by Seibert in footnote 33 on p. 150). The author describes the peace that was concluded in 311 B.C. as an "indispu-

table victory for Antigonus", although he cites no arguments that could convince all those which regard this peace rather as a compromise agreement (cf. footnote 35 on p. 151, which however does not seem to be weighty enough to justify the categorical formulation in the text).

When analysing Ptolemy's policy after the peace of 311, Seibert remains faithful to the line he has adopted. Even when he is compelled to admit that in 310 B.C. the ruler of Egypt shrewdly took advantage of the situation in Cilicia and to approve Ptolemy's strategic manoeuvres, he hastens to add that although Ptolemy proclaimed the freedom of the Greek cities "die Ausdrucksweise Diodors zeigt deutlich, dass man sich wohl schon damals von diesen Worten nicht täuschen liess" (p. 184). It must, however, be remembered that, as the author himself points out, the historian who was Diodorus's main source in Books XVIII and XIX belonged to Antigonus's camp. This must also be borne in mind when considering the description of the death of Antigonus's nephew (p. 186). Seibert commends Ptolemy's expedition to Greece in 308 B.C. He remarks that Ptolemy grasped the opportunity when it was ripe, and yet was cautious enough to withdraw before it was too late. But here too he adds that "vom propagandischen Standpunkt war ... das Unternehmen gescheitert", since the ruler's "Befreiungspolitik" inspired less and less confidence (p. 189).

The Battle of Salamis on Cyprus also provides another occasion for sharp criticism of Ptolemy, and especially his behaviour after the battle (pp. 202—203). I am not in a position to say whether this judgement of Ptolemy's military talents was right or wrong, but it seems to me a telling point that Seibert is equally severe on Antigonus for his unsuccessful expedition to Egypt (p. 222), while he emphasizes the diplomatic agility of Ptolemy there (p. 216). It is no doubt true that defeats are generally at least partially the outcome of errors committed by the generals, even if sometimes these generals may be geniuses. So the errors that Ptolemy committed at Salamis are insufficient grounds for denying his worth as a general.

Antigonus's expedition to Egypt inevitably calls for comparison with that of Perdikkas. Ptolemy's strategy in both wars was identical. Does this not prove—despite Seibert's conclusions—the very consistency of that policy?

The author seems on the whole to be on the right lines in adhering to Diodorus's text and in rejecting the amendments accepted by most scholars (XX 18,4 see p. 179; XX 19,2 see p. 178; XIX 57, 1; 57,4; 60,2 see p. 197ff— but see also E. Will, *op. cit.*, p. 49).

Lack of space prevents us from mentioning all the convincing conclusions reached by the author on certain more detailed matters, nor other statements for which he can be taken to task. For instance, despite what Seibert says on p. 8, the Ptolemy mentioned in Arrian III 18,9 is surely the son of Lagos, as is indicated by the absence of the patronymic. Then Ptolemy's interest in Syria does not seem today to call for any other explanation than that generally

given by the historians. For to say that every strong Egyptian government aimed at dominating Syria does not mean at all that Ptolemy deliberately and consciously imitated his predecessors (this was understood very well by Bouché-Leclercq, see the text quoted on p. 134). When discussing Antigonos's unfortunate expedition to Egypt, the author argues the exact meaning of Diodorus's words about the Pleiades (XX 74,1). He rightly rejects the old translation by Wurm, but wrongly rejects Geer's translation (p. 212). For "Das Siebengestirn erfasste sie" means the same as the more comprehensible version by the latter translator: "the setting of the Pleiades overtook them". It seems neither correct nor necessary to introduce here the question of "superstition" (*Aberglaube*), for after all Seibert himself admits that after the setting of the Pleiades sailing was dangerous, and on the whole no one risked it because of the winter winds (p. 210).

These remarks or criticisms are by no means intended to belittle the value of this book, which is an impressive and most useful disquisition. Even where the author is not always convincing, he invariably supplies a wealth of material on which the reader can base his own conclusions.

[Warszawa]

Anna Świderek

Jean Gaudemet, *Institutions de l'Antiquité*, Paris, Sirey, 1967, pp. XIX + 909, 11 planches et 8 cartes hors texte.

Dans l'avant-propos de son manuel d'histoire des institutions de l'Antiquité (pp. V-VI) l'auteur déclare que ce livre «ne s'est pas tenu pour lié strictement par les programmes universitaires français» et qu'il «souhaiterait pouvoir rendre quelque service à ceux qui, en France ou à l'étranger, s'intéressent aux institutions politiques, juridiques et sociales de l'Antiquité, sans être les esclaves des programmes scolaires». C'est pourquoi le manuel en question est en réalité une synthèse de l'histoire du droit et des institutions de l'Antiquité. Il se divise en trois livres: I. Traditions orientales (pp. 1—124); II. La Grèce (pp. 125—150); III. Rome (pp. 250—810), suivis de six tableaux chronologiques (pp. 811—826), une liste des empereurs romains (pp. 827—828), un index alphabétique (pp. 829—845), un index des sources (pp. 847—887), une table des matières (pp. 891—909) et huit cartes géographiques hors texte. Une bibliographie générale et un index des abréviations se trouvent aux pages XII—XIX.

Ayant en vue que ce manuel a été déjà le sujet d'un compte-rendu détaillé de M. J. Modrzejewski (cf. *RIDA* XV/1968, pp. 498—504) ainsi qu'étant