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Jarosław J. Piątek*

SMART POWER VERSUS ASYMMETRY OF USING MILITARY FORCE

Introduction

The issue under analysis is an extension of the reflections which cropped up after reading the latest book by Joseph S. Nye, published in Poland as well.¹

Armed forces, commonly referred to as the army or the military, comprise armed soldiers organised in military units varying in type and size, and appointed by the state both to safeguard the latter's interests (security) and to conduct armed struggle. Actually, the character of armed struggle conducted by and towards the state in the past forced the state-run armed forces to adopt the homogeneous organisational structure, training system, centralised command and strictly defined combat principles.

The ongoing dynamic change of the international order has recently been the source of significant changes in the roles, functions and tasks of the armed forces. In the foregone order, in the times of the Cold War, the meaning and usefulness of the armed forces used to be indisputable as well as obvious and intelligible. The jeopardy and its structure was recognised at the time sufficient for rational forecasting and planning. In relation to the jeopardy's character – whether ideological, or economic, or else influencing the vital interests of the whole state – there existed few dilemmas as regards the use of the armed forces. The targets assigned to the armed forces, understood as enormous operational and tactical formations,

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¹ J.S. Nye Jr, *Soft Power. Jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej*. Warszawa: WAIP 2007; idem, *Przyszłość siły*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2012.

acting with enormous temporal and territorial momentum, were clear and attainable. The use of force was treated as a national state's duty.

Contrary to the above, in the new international environment it is difficult to recognise which interests ought to be safeguarded by the state, and demarcating the activities of the state adequate for particular theatres has come near to impossible. Another year of the so-called war against terrorism is coming to an end. The invasion of Iraq, and the later Afghanistan war have been part of such a war. Over the time of the above mentioned war, its perception has diametrically changed from its initial praise in the media to its assessment as the worst example of military interventionism. Today, the international coalition is being criticised by people whose opinions have little in common with any substantive event assessment, both from the political and the military points of view. The voices of reason as well as the appropriate judgement of the situation are slowly but surely disappearing among the myriad slogans offered by the critics of the conflict in question.²

The dilemmas in question are also related to the appropriate definition of the ways that military troops are employed. How should the latter be used? In what way should the troops fulfill their tasks? Inasmuch the military forces as a whole still remain the rudimentary element of every state's defence system and are designated for protecting and defending its interests, only the appointed troops – components of a vast system – are used as either a deterrent, or means of enforcing and maintaining peace. In this way, small organisational forms of a huge structure which fulfill missions – frequently expeditional or humanitarian in character – abroad, reflect the capabilities of the whole armed forces of the state. These troops adopting appropriate solutions concerning organisation, training, and combat can influence the contemporary requirements assigned to the military to a larger extent than hitherto as well as contribute to forecasting the

² For an elaboration of this topic see e.g. P. Winczorek, "Po co tam pojechaliśmy. Pytania o Polskę i Irak." *Rzeczpospolita* 12.08.2004: 7; cf. M. Węgrowka, "Udział Polski w interwencji zbrojnej i misji stabilizacyjnej w Iraku." *Raporty i Analizy* No. 12, 2004: 26–27; M. Jurek, "Racja stanu jest po stronie Stanów Zjednoczonych." *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny* No. 2, 2003: 112–116; cf. B. Komorowski, "Decyzja o wsparciu polityki USA była i jest słuszna." *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny* No. 2, 2003: 117–119; A. Kalicki, "Tysiące ton do Afganistanu." *Raport WTO* No. 4, 2007; cf. G. Indulski, "Polowanie się rozpoczęło." *Newsweek* No. 18, 2007; cf. G. Hołdanowicz, "Odliczanie przed Afganistanem." *Raport WTO* No. 1, 2007. See also: M. Baran, "Polscy żołnierze w służbie poza granicami kraju – misja w Iraku." *Wojsko wobec wyzwań współczesnego świata*. Ed. M. Cieślarczyk, A. Dębska. Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych 2005: 252; cf. M. Lasoń. "Zmiana charakteru obecności Polskiego Kontyngentu Wojskowego w Afganistanie. Próba analizy." *Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego*. Wrocław 2011: 245–253.

future use of the military forces. Therefore, the statement that the tactics of the particular troops and even subunits decide about the strategy of the whole armed forces, is becoming justified.

Utility of the military force

The history of wars since the mid-20th century might be described as an ongoing development of the asymmetric struggle. I am employing the terms “war” and “asymmetric struggle” intentionally. The notions of asymmetric strategy or asymmetric warfare do exist in the common awareness, yet their definitions fall short of the assumptions of this article; ergo, I am leaving them aside. In my view, the contemporary asymmetrisation of struggle, brought about by transferring the combat zone into the *civil war* dimension, both by redefining the means of conducting a war, and employing new resources, results from the emergence of asymmetry in world politics.³ Actually, the asymmetry of struggle and the low cost of conducting it have led to a situation where certain groups, e.g. terrorists, guerrillas, criminals and hackers made asymmetric struggle an ideal tool for achieving their objectives. What is unusual in the asymmetric struggle is the possibility to employ one-time or non-standard tactics.⁴ Nineteen American soldiers killed during the battle of Mogadishu were enough for President Clinton to withdraw the USA forces from Somalia.⁵ Most frequently, the factors that give rise to the determinants of asymmetric warfare, emerge as a result of economic, technological and military superiority of political actors possessing the capability of using military force. Also, the domination within the realm of mass culture is gaining considerable significance and it engenders the largest number of specu-

³ R. Ord, “U.S. Army, Pacific. Historic Ties, Dynamic Future.” *Army* No 10. 1995: 233–234; cf. M. Madej, “Zagrożenia asymetryczne – ‘nowy’ problem bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego.” *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe*. Ed. A. Kaniewska. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar 2012: 80.

⁴ For more, see e.g.: R. Perl, R.O. Rourke. “Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress.” *CRS Report for Congress*, 30.01.2001, www.history.navy.mil. Accessed: 2.10.2014.

⁵ During the clash between the American special forces and the Somali militia which lasted only several hours over a thousand Somalis were killed and three thousand were injured. The American public were astonished by the pictures of the American soldiers’ desecrated bodies. And although the whole operation under the code name “Irene” was conducted appropriately, President Clinton, under the pressure of the public, resolved to withdraw the army from Somalia. Cf. M. Bowden, “Black Hawk down: a Story of Modern War.” *Atlantic Monthly Press* No. 2, 1999.

lations,⁶ as nowadays it is difficult to obtain a clear-cut view of the battlefield. We mostly rely on the work of journalists, that is to say, war correspondents who have participated in such a large amount of wars that they outdo many a general; yet, even they are prone to manipulation.⁷ In practice, this proneness leads to presenting the military reality in the context of various forms of human activity, which does not facilitate explaining this reality. Therefore, we need to perform it with deep conviction that we contribute to further enriching the knowledge of the past in that we supplement such knowledge with facts and processes relating to the preparation to and conducting armed conflicts.⁸ We often forget that building up military power and its skilful use is an extremely complicated task, especially if governmental actions are confronted with the distrust displayed by the general public.⁹

Each generation develops their particular way of conducting military activities and determines the latter's character as well. Nowadays, we are witnessing the change both of the reasons for the outbreak of wars and the means of fighting them. Former "forbidden areas" from the Balkans to Tajikistan have opened to conflicts.¹⁰ Over the subsequent decades, the role of the military staff has been strengthened, because the obstacles which the modern military units encounter on their way have become increasingly difficult and more complicated. The combat assets have entirely changed, which is clearly visible on our television scre-

⁶ A. Kalicki, "Krok ku piechocie morskiej." *Raport WTO* No. 11, 2006: 46–50. cf. I. Leszczyńska, "Armia komandosów." *Dziennik* 27 September 2006:14.

⁷ E. Durschmied, *Niezwykłe bitwy*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Amber; cf. *Manipulacje w mediach. Przykład fotomontażu obrazującego wojnę domową w Syrii w austriackiej gazecie*, <http://natemat.pl/25491,manipulacje-w-mediach-przyklad-fotomontazu-obrazujacego-wojne-domowa-w-syrii-w-austriackiej-gazecie> . Accessed: 20.12.2014.

⁸ J.S. Nye Jr, *op.cit.*, pp. 209–272.

⁹ R. Smith, *Przydatność siły militarnej. Sztuka wojenna we współczesnym świecie*. Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych 2010: 96–97.

¹⁰ C. Bartlett, *Konflikt globalny. Międzynarodowa rywalizacja wielkich mocarstw w latach 1980–1990*. Wrocław: Ossolineum 1997: 393–400; E. O'Ballance, *Afghan wars 1839–1992*. New York: Brassey's 1993: 97–121; M. Urban, *War in Afghanistan*. London: Palgrave 1990: 44–56; R. Ratnesar, "In the line of fire." *Time* 16.09.2002: 44–45; M. Frank, Mazar-i-Sharif. "The bloody history of 'The Noble Tomb'." *Time* 19.11.2001: 31; J. Bañbor, J. Berny, D. Kuziel, *Konflikty na Kaukazie*. Warszawa: DSW MON 1997: 114–115.

ens.¹¹ Widely available means have always been employed for military purposes in various social contexts – this is not asymmetry.¹² War itself is being liberated from particular rules and occasional restrictions; unfortunately, to many, such contrasts are gradually becoming the standard and are related to the fetishisation of the phenomenon of asymmetry by many people.¹³

The fall of the totalitarian ideologies which accompanied the industrial revolution; the disintegration of the Soviet empire; the diminishing of the state as the only issuer of currency and the organizer of the armed forces; the appearance, on a large scale, of the supranational power and influence centres, from world financial markets to international criminal groups; the reappearance of tribal war, not only in the ex-communist states – all these factors have influenced the change in the nature of military action.¹⁴

Certainly, there are more indicators of this kind as regards the transformation in question.¹⁵ G. Kennan writes: “for over thirty years, wise and far-sighted people have been warning us about the pointlessness of any war and the danger related to the preparation to it.” Kennan further continues: “The genuine weapon – is at best something which can be employed as a means of exerting influence on another society, by affecting the feelings, calculations and plans of the people heading it; a weapon cannot be a thing with the help of which the whole life without exception is annihilated, with its whole essence, all the hopes, culture and civilisation of other nations.”¹⁶ After J. Keegan, one could venture the opinion that, “...[t]he army which meets the above-mentioned conditions is the symbol of civilisation and without the latter the world would remain on the primitive level

¹¹ On the one hand, the war in the Persian Gulf in which video technology was used on a large scale, and on the other – Rwanda where more people were killed with primitive machetes than with “intelligent weaponry” in the war with Iraq or Afghanistan. Uncomplicated land mines kill and mutilate thousands of civilians a long time after they have been decommissioned. Yet, even in such cases primitive technology is employed in order to maximise the destruction inflicted with the simplest weapon. For more, see: B. Bińkowski, “Międzynarodowe uwarunkowania nielegalnego rozprzestrzeniania broni ręcznej i lekkiej.” *Północ wobec Południa. Południe wobec Północy*. Ed. M.W. Solarz. Warszawa: Bellona 2005: 174; cf. “Hey, anybody want a gun?” *The Economist* 14 May 1998, <http://www.economist.com>. Accessed: 10.08.2014.

¹² A. Giddens, *Konsekwencje nowoczesności*. Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 2008: 43.

¹³ M. Madej, “Zagrożenia asymetryczne – „nowy” problem bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego.” *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe*. Ed. A. Kaniewska. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar 2012: 80.

¹⁴ F. Heisbourg, *Wojna*. Warszawa: Prószyński i S-ka 1998: 7.

¹⁵ For more, see: R. Flor, “Thesen zur künftigen Rüstungsentwicklung.” *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* No. 5, 1990: 407.

¹⁶ G.F. Kennan, *Im Schatten der Atombombe*. Köln: H.G. Räder, 1982: 129, 161.

of development, below the 'military horizon', or it would decline into chaos of the eternal, desultory, 'everyone against everyone' wars."¹⁷ Armed territorial conflicts, ethnic conflicts as well as religious conflicts and wars plus a number of other causative factors fall within the notion of civil war (frequently used in the Polish literature on historical-military theory) or internal war.¹⁸ Civil war is often reinforced by other states which officially do not participate in it. The support usually assumes the form of political aid, supplies of war equipment and material as well as political and military consulting. At the end of the Cold War, operational aspects of the staff work became inferior to logistics: during the 1st Gulf War it had been necessary to transport millions of tons of materials before the first missile was launched. Each break of the logistic operation would disrupt the process of building up the forces and disorganise conducting the operation. Fortunately for the armies of the coalition, Saddam Hussain did not attack with cruise missiles the military staging areas in the port of Al-Jubail and in the airbase in Dhahran on a daily basis.¹⁹ In the future, it will be difficult for intervention forces to build a vast logistics system without being disturbed by an actual enemy.²⁰ For us, these logistic problems are a novelty.

If we complement those observations with the evaluation of the political and strategic realities of the post-Cold War era, we should not be surprised that the

¹⁷ J. Keegan, *Historia wojen*. Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza 1998: 375.

¹⁸ In the older studies, the former is defined as the "entirety of the hostilities, battles and operations taking place within the borders of a given state, mainly between the citizens of one state, organised by political groupings (parties, factions) which usually represent the interests of the opposing social classes, groups and strata, with the aim of assuming or maintaining power." In the Western publications 'Civil War' is defined as the conflict between parts of the same society aiming at winning or maintaining control over the state, or establishing an independent state. It is assumed that the key condition, practically indispensable for an outburst of fight in the civil war, is the capability of the parties to arm their supporters. The civil war can be differentiated from other forms of violence such as rebellion, riots, banditry or piracy e.g. by the following factors: the duration time, territorial coverage within the borders of a given state, and the intensity of actions. Depending on the strategic aims of the parties, two types of civil war can be distinguished. While the first type involves the fights for the distribution of power in a given state, the other one – the struggle to seize power. The latter also encompasses e.g. secessionist wars and wars for state unification. A somewhat wider concept, often employed in defining internal armed struggle is the 'Internal War' (a conflict within a certain political group, usually one that wields power), including the political phenomena such as revolutions, insurrections and rebellions. The civil war is also classified as a constituent of the notion of internal war.

¹⁹ *Działania militarne w rejonie Zatoki Perskiej w dniach 2.08.1990 – 28.02.1991*. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo: DSW MON 1991: 14–26; H.N. Schwarzkopf, *Nie trzeba bohatera. Autobiografia*. Warszawa: Ryton 1993: 410–411; cf. *Desert Shield and Desert Storm. A Chronology and Troop List for the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf Crisis*. U.S Army War College 1991: 69; cf. P.S. Kindsvatter, "VII Corps in the Gulf War. Ground Offensive." *Military Review* No. 2, 1992: 17.

²⁰ M. Fiszer, J. Gruszczyński, "Burza nadciąga." *Nowa Technika Wojskowa* No. 3, 2003: 13–14; G. Hołdanowicz, T. Hypki. "Wojna na pustyni." *Raport* No. 4, 2003: 4–6.

environmental transformation of the armed struggle entails other changes. The era of the military as “war managers” is coming to its end and other actors will perform an important part. Therefore, I am going to present the four archetypes – starting points of our future research. These archetypes are not brand new demarcations, but not all of them have played an important role so far. One could reach the conclusion that, to a degree, the archetypes in question will help shape the character of war.

In the sphere of warfare, as in others, rigours and principles have very often disappeared.²¹ The beginnings of mercenary armies in Western Europe constituted the *terminus a quo* for the fall of the feudal knighthood, a change that nothing could prevent. A new weapon – firearms – appeared on the battlefield and entailed a complete revolution in the military art. In the course of time, as firearms were being improved, and with the rise in the significance of infantry, fundamental changes in battle arrays and tactics took place. Additionally, the constant evolution of artillery exerted enormous influence on the art of fortification. At the beginning of the 16th century, artillery began to play a decisive role on the battlefield where it was used with increasing frequency. These transformations resulted not so much from the fact of significant inventions taking place within the fields of science and technology; rather, they were an effect of a trial-and-error process and minor improvements in the art of weapons production, remaining within the framework of a fixed and limited system of warfare technology. Similarly, nowadays one could extol the advantages of modern systems resulting from the RMA,²² but we will still be unable to solve the main dilemmas of military actions – the people.

Soldiers will remain the most significant, and almost identical as in the past, but at the same time different.²³ Above all, soldiers have to face larger responsibility. If modern combat assets come into widespread use, the battlefield will requi-

²¹ M. van Creeveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999: 376, cf. B. Balcerowicz, *Sily zbrojne w stanie pokoju, kryzysu, wojny*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar 2010: 27.

²² J. Piątek, “RMA gwarantem utraconej symetrii bezpieczeństwa?” *Wybrane aspekty bezpieczeństwa*. Vol. 2. Ed. J. Piątek, R. Podgórzńska. Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego 2007: 230–245; cf. J. Piątek, “New Conditions and Changing Image of Military Forces in the Early 21st c. Readiness to Unlimited Violence?” *Polish Political Science XXXVII*, Yearbook 2008: 31–43.

²³ Infantry soldiers of the 21st century will have one advantage over their predecessors, although they will have to bear as large a responsibility. They will utilise weapons which are easier to use, owing to what modern technology is offering. The rifle, GPS receiver allowing precise navigation, handy computer or one built in the uniform, and fire-and-forget anti-tank missiles are incomparably more comfortable to use, especially in battle.

re soldiers to be particularly well-prepared and mentally strong. Owing to night vision devices, the difference between night and day will become considerably smaller, due to man-portable fire-and-forget missiles, and rapid-fire individual weapons it is possible to respond with fire to the attack of a poorly visible enemy. An immediate contact with the long-range weaponry such as field artillery, combat helicopters, direct support aircraft will allow rapid and accurate concentration of heavy fire on any part of the battlefield. These conditions will force any unit of infantry to deploy battle formation as widely as possible so as to avoid concentration of soldiers in the target, and, therefore, individual soldiers will be, more than ever before, left to their own devices. The contemporary battlefield has already partially become like that, and in the future it will be so to an even larger extent. All soldiers will have to stand up to constant, very intensive struggle thus making decisions about life and death in every second, under extreme stress. The aim of the struggle nowadays is to evoke fear of a sudden and violent death. The act of killing is not always necessary to arouse this fear, but undoubtedly it is the easiest way to achieve this goal.²⁴ As a consequence, preventing and counteracting the ability to fight will become increasingly significant in the scope of security and defence policy. The armed forces have to adapt to the new circumstances. Therefore, the role performed by soldiers capable of acting in the new conditions, the conditions of the “new war,” will increase.²⁵ The British military Rupert Smith has written about the change of war paradigm. Wars and conflicts which appeared at the end of the 20th century and later, at the beginning of the 21st century turned out to be different from their predecessors. General R. Smith – former commander of the NATO forces in Kosovo – does not in fact employ the term “new wars.” Instead, he demonstrates the oncoming changes in the character of wars, contrasting the paradigm of industrial wars existing so far with the new war between the nations (or “war amongst the people”). According to him, the traditional scenery of the battlefield is gradually disappearing, and classic armies no longer stand opposite one another. The significance achieved by soldiers of special operations or specialised units reflect the actual scale of importance of the tasks.

²⁴ For an elaboration of this issue see: an interview with S. Perry, “Nie jest bezpiecznie.” *Businessman*, August 2004: 40–41.

²⁵ M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stranford: Stanford University Press 1999: 76.

Soft/Smart Power – working methods of the military?²⁶

Peacekeeping operations accomplished under the auspices of the UN or other international organisation ought to aim at, above all, preventing the outbursts and the escalation of armed conflicts (civil wars). These operations are usually conducted in the conditions of the lack of legally operating government in crisis areas. The states taking part in peacekeeping operations engage in a conflict as a mediator between the conflicted parties and do it for various reasons – for instance, so as to protect crucial national interests, when there exists a jeopardy to a state's natural resources, or else to prevent spreading the conflict onto further regions or states.

While taking the decision about engaging state forces in a peacekeeping operation, many factors are taken into consideration, including, among others, the troops' numerical force, the action type, and the duration of the mission. The fundamental limit is the amount of financial means which a state participating in the mission is able to assign to a particular aim. Usually, the cheapest option is selected, which allows for sending only not very numerous forces for a short time.

Still, when deciding whether to engage in a peacekeeping operation, the following conditions should be observed: the governments of the sending states have to specify clearly the political aims of a peacekeeping operation; the intervention forces in the crisis region should act impartially; the presence of representatives of all types of forces and humanitarian organisations (if they are going to take part in a peacekeeping operation) is recommended.

The process of arising of an armed conflict is usually determined by various motives and factors – e.g. cultural, religious and ethnic ones. The aim of the fighting parties may be taking control of a territory or securing political domination in a given region. The primary means of exerting impact on the opponent by the conflicting party (or parties) is, most frequently, using force (intimidation, brutality, ravaging etc.). As a rule, the fighting parties utilise the scattered combat arsenal (weaponry) of the former central power. The “scattering” does not denote an equal distribution; a reason why one of the chief aims of a peacekeeping operation must be the gradual alignment of the fighting parties' potentials – where attempts should be made to weaken the more powerful party, and not the reverse, i.e. to strengthen the weaker side.

It should be remembered that the success of peacekeeping operations depends on a number of determinants, including the geographical and political-

²⁶ Both terms were introduced into debate by Joseph S. Nye Jr. in his books (see Note 1).

military factors. In an internally differentiated environment, various modes and means that serve resolving the conflict might be employed, e.g. preventive diplomacy, enforcing peace or forcing to maintain peace. In all of these cases the effort will be concentrated especially on persuading the fighting parties to acknowledge the fact that settling peace will be more beneficial for them than the continuation of struggle. Ceasing to fight will also depend on the degree of mutual distrust, the will to make concessions, the measure of subjectivism when evaluating particular situations, and the determination of the states (parties of the conflict) to establish cooperation. Apart from the above-mentioned factors, also the consent of the states concerned (the parties of a conflict) is a decisive condition for the peacekeeping troops to enter.

An analysis of the latest regional conflicts, including the one in the Persian Gulf, in Haiti, Somalia or Afghanistan allows to make a conclusion that appropriate methods of military activity are becoming increasingly significant. The presentation of the military potential can by itself convince the fighting parties as to the vast capabilities of the intervention forces. However, appropriate engagement of the ground forces is necessary for the parties of the conflict to understand that possible breaking (violation) of peace agreements will immediately be punished.

Ground forces seem to be particularly useful when some of the targets are situated outside the range of the planes (snipers, light mortars etc.) or in the case civilians are in danger (e.g. weapons deployed in densely populated areas).

Losses among civilians may have negative influence on the attitude of the society towards the soldiers of the peacekeeping forces. The attacks on facilities and infrastructure as well as on electrical plants, refineries, schools, hospitals etc. have similar effect. Destroying or damaging these objects aggravates the life of civilians and, at the same time, lengthens the duration of peace consolidation and the post-war reconstruction of the state. The peacekeeping operations conducted so far have corroborated as well as weakened the military units' capabilities of conducting actions within the frames of the assigned structures. Despite numerous deficiencies, the prevailing attitude is that employing military troops in operations of the type is an effective and economic factor of imposing national interests and international security in the world.

Organisation of preventive actions during peacekeeping missions

Each day, soldiers serving in the international peacekeeping forces have to face new, singular situations, while they are accomplishing tasks appointed to them. The world undergoes constant changes. Attempts to alleviate local conflicts made by the international organisations are not always successful. The use of force does not always bring a desired effect.

During the peace support operations, preventive actions ought to play a significant role. Nowadays, prevention during the mission is of utmost importance. All operations should be based on this kind of activity as it would allow both for minimising the use of weapons towards civilians and decreasing the number of victims. At this point, I am going to present the primary techniques of preventive actions, also called operational procedures, which the soldiers are charged with during the peacekeeping missions.

The soldiers' activity while fulfilling peacekeeping missions encompasses a number of organised actions aiming at safe but also accurate accomplishing specified tasks as appointed to them. The first type of the above-mentioned means are the checkpoints (CPs). These are specially organised control posts on a road or a route, where people and vehicles are controlled to prevent arms trafficking, movement of wanted persons etc. Usually the checkpoint allows for searching vehicles and people, and local security services can also take part in these activities. The network of checkpoints is to prevent the penetration of a definite area (zone). They are usually situated in the localities where particularly intense migration is observed, along the traffic routes and in the areas which might pose a potential threat to the troops staying in rest areas.²⁷

The main task assigned to members of the sub-units performing service at the checkpoint is controlling vehicle and pedestrian traffic. Here, one ought to bear in mind that it concerns all the people remaining within the zone belonging to the checkpoint. Yet another significant action performed by them is also organisation of the roadblocks in order to prevent those who do not have authorisation from passing through. Apart from the assignment type mentioned here, there are also other types.²⁸

Still another type of preventive action supposed to complement the network of checkpoints are patrols ensuring full control in the zone not covered by the

²⁷ K. Olszak, M. Opara, A. Sobilo, "Postępowanie żołnierzy podczas wykonywania zadań w Iraku." *Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych* No. 12, 2003: 16.

²⁸ *Misje Pokojowe – Poradnik*. Świątoszów: 10 Batalion Zmechanizowany 2003: 6–7.

CPs observation. Patrolling consists in obtaining information – i.e. collecting or confirming the data – about the people or terrain in a specified area. Along with the observation, patrolling is the primary means of performing duties by the peacekeeping forces. Patrolling can be done on foot or by vehicles. A foot patrol can move around in columns of twos (in a built-up or covered area, on both sides of the road), or in a scattered formation (in an open area soldiers carry out circular observation, each is appointed an observation sector). The patrol in vehicles (a motorised patrol) moves around in close formation. There is a weapon station on each vehicle. The patrol can move in reconnaissance armoured carriers (each crew has its appointed observation sector), or in motor vehicles (the circular observation is carried out).²⁹ The basic tasks pursued during patrols are: maintaining full control over a zone, preventing infiltration, protecting local people and maintaining friendly relations with them. At the same time, the accomplishment of these tasks allows for the performance of the other, more detailed tasks such as patrolling sub-sectors along an appointed and verified route; monitoring the zone not covered with observation conducted from a CP; investigating incidents; demonstrating the presence of peacekeeping forces to all parties of a conflict in the operation area; collecting information; avoiding the static accomplishment of tasks; ensuring the freedom of movement; providing aid to members of governmental and non-governmental organisations; verifying whether main roads are passable; and confiscating weapons in the case it has been found.³⁰

During the service at the checkpoint or performing a patrol around the area, searches are frequently conducted. They are to allow for establishing explicitly and reliably the presence of suspicious substances, weapons, drugs or unwelcome people. The soldiers serving in the subunit which carries out searches ought to do strictly defined actions facilitating the professional and efficient control so as not to congest the traffic flow and at the same time thoroughly examine a suspiciously looking or moving car. Military groups accomplishing these tasks can also include representatives of the local authorities and police.³¹ It is forbidden to carry out searching of a person of the opposite gender – without exceptions. If there is not a woman appointed to performing the search, the latter is conducted in a contactless way – with the use of a metal detector. Controlling women and clergy members is often very troublesome in Arabic countries and may lead to a strong

²⁹ K. Olszak, M. Opara, A. Sobiło, *op.cit.*, pp.18–19.

³⁰ *Misje Pokojowe – Poradnik, op.cit.*, p. 8.

³¹ K. Dudek, *Wykorzystanie pododdziałów zmechanizowanych w działaniach na rzecz wsparcia pokoju (drużyna – pluton)*. Wrocław: WSO im. T. Kościuszki 2001: 79.

objection against the searcher. Women are usually checked with a metal detector. Elderly women may remain in the vehicle during the control.

Another equally significant preventive action is searching the buildings. This action is carried out in order to find wanted people (criminals, terrorists) or dangerous materials (weapon, ammunition and explosives). Because of considerable risk involved, it ought to have the form of an assault whose basic characteristics are the following: surprise, impetus and coordination of fire. Seized or inspected rooms ought to be marked as in the procedures elaborated before and known to all soldiers.³²

One necessary preventive activity while performing the tasks of peacekeeping missions is establishing an observation post (OP).³³ The aim of such an action is to observe a certain area, along the roads and in areas restricted for local people. Moreover, they can serve the demonstration of peacekeepers' presence to all the parties of the conflict. The chief operational rule of an observation post is extremely interesting: "see and be seen" meaning that eye contact should possibly be kept between individual observation posts. What is more, the posts ought to be established in the early phase of the operation, to let the local people become accustomed to their presence. The observation is supposed to be conducted in an appointed sector, with the use of available technical means. In remote and inaccessible areas, also temporary observation posts (TOPs) are organised, usually operating by way of a vehicle.

Reacting towards crowds or riots engaging a sub-unit is the shortest definition of yet another type of preventive action. This operating mode depends on the kind of crowd formation, its number and the character of conduct such a crowd demonstrates. Usually the aim which soldiers are supposed to achieve is providing safety and security to local people and troops via rapid and effective dispersing of the crowd, employing possibly soft measures as well as protecting both military and civilian property from destruction. However, the main target is forcing the crowd to disperse without the use of force, unless necessary.³⁴ Crowd management is one of the most difficult techniques employed during peacekeeping missions. The adequacy of soldiers' reactions to the signals sent by a gathering of people is an extremely significant element. Soldiers' actions are subject

³² K. Olszak, M. Opara, A. Sobiło. *op.cit.*, pp. 19–20.

³³ R. Łukaszewicz, "Technika działania na posterunku obserwacyjnym." *Przegląd Wojsk Lądowych* 2003: 29–32.

³⁴ K. Olszak, M. Opara, A. Sobiło, *op.cit.*, pp. 22–24.

to achieving certain targets, while the task of the military is to prevent achieving them and dispersing people without using force.³⁵

Rules of Engagement – new quality of the force use by peacekeeping soldiers

The procedures of using force by the soldiers while performing mandatory tasks is one of the most difficult issues that soldiers have to face, since they need to recognise the subtle borderline between when it is advisable to use force in a certain situation and when it is not. Also, soldiers assume full responsibility for the results of their decisions, the death of a person included.

One of the rudimentary documents elaborated for each peacekeeping operation conducted by the UN is the procedures of force use – *Rules of Engagement* (ROE).

Rules of Engagement is the directives for the armed forces (including individuals) determining the circumstances, conditions, degree and manner in which force or other activities that might be perceived as provocative might be employed. Consequently, *Rules of Engagement* is nothing else but principles one should follow.³⁶ They render permission for and/or limitations of the use of force in strictly defined situations.³⁷ In some countries, *Rules of Engagement* has the status of lawful commands for the armed forces, while in others it is only a guidance for realization in certain situations, e.g. when units of the armed forces operate abroad, which is the case of the Polish Armed Forces. In a country where *Rules of Engagement* is not binding, they are usually substituted by other regulations.

The aims achieved by applying the rules of using force, can be divided into:

- political – ROE enables the commander of the peacekeeping forces, various military commanders on different levels as well as individual soldiers to act in compliance with the policy adopted and realised by the chief authorities. ROE are particularly significant when it is not possible to establish a direct information link between the commander and the commanded does not work;

³⁵ For a detailed analysis of this issue see e.g. *MC 0402/1 NATO Military Policy on Psychological Operations*.

³⁶ For details see: *MC 0362/1 NATO Rules of Engagement*.

³⁷ A. Cole, F. Drew, R. McLaughlin, D. Mandsager, *Rules of Engagement handbook*, San Remo: International Institute of Humanitarian Law 2009.

- military – ROE determine the parameters which define the situation when a commander, a sub-unit, or an individual soldier may conduct activities including the use of weapon. Moreover, they contain the definition of the maximum extent of using force in order to prevent excess escalation of a conflict. The document also defines the potential which the commanders have at their disposal. ROE also forbid using certain types of weapon, techniques or tactics;
- legal – applying the principles of using force guarantees that all actions undertaken in the course of a mission are in line with the regulations adopted for a given peacekeeping operation.³⁸

In order to apply the principles of using force proficiently, one needs to correctly determine against whom it is to be directed. The *Rules of Engagement* elaborated for soldiers of peacekeeping forces contain three basic notions conditioning the possibilities, necessity, or abandoning force use. The three basic factors allowing for the use of force are, above all: the hostile forces,³⁹ hostile intent,⁴⁰ and hostile act.⁴¹

Rules of Engagement fulfills the following functions: it determines the principles of using force for the operational forces in accordance with procedures adopted and approved by the chief authorities; works as a controlling (regulating) mechanism for the conduct during the transition from the typical peacekeeping activities to force-related conduct; facilitates the planning process to the commanders.⁴²

The way particular notions will be defined and understood by soldiers and their commanders has considerable influence on the course and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations. One consequence of an incorrect interpretation or inaccurate elaboration of *Rules of Engagement* can be jeopardising the soldiers' or civilians' health or even lives. Therefore, the principles of using force, including the necessary procedures, have to be minutely elaborated in order to avoid unfortunate incidents of this kind.

³⁸ A. Józwiak, C. Marcinkowski, *Wybrane problemy współczesnych operacji pokojowych*. Warszawa: Wydział Wydawniczy AON 2002: 43.

³⁹ Any kind of force (individuals, groups) committing a hostile act, exhibiting hostile intent, or declared hostile.

⁴⁰ The threat of imminent use of force by hostile forces against the peacekeeping forces' personnel or property. When a hostile intent is demonstrated, there is the right to employ the proportional force in self-defence in order to inhibit, neutralise, avoid or eradicate the threat.

⁴¹ An attack or using force against peacekeeping forces or their property aiming at preventing or hampering the realisation of assigned tasks.

⁴² A. Józwiak, C. Marcinkowski, *op.cit.*, p. 42.

Rules of Engagement is a means with the use of which the command authorities regulate the use of force by the soldiers subject to them, taking into account the policy pursued by given states and military determinants as well as observing the legal regulations remaining in force at the time.

As a result, the principles of using force have been elaborated. It is therefore extremely significant for this subject to define the following issues:

- use of force – influencing people (object) by force, in order to impose one's own will;
- demonstration of power – demonstrating the presence of the military by using barriers or roadblocks and the presence of sub-units or weapons without the intention of using them. The demonstration of power is an intent for preventive action, or as impeding actions before their escalation to the level of serious confrontation;
- use of unarmed sub-units – using unarmed forces oriented towards maintaining and controlling a situation before it escalates. The use of weapons ought to be limited to using bayonets and gun butts. Using an unarmed sub-unit should not be oriented towards inflicting mortal wounds;
- use of armed forces – using soldiers armed with live ammunition weapons and bayonets with the aim of frightening, wounding or inflicting mortal wounds in the necessity of self-defence. Introducing force is permissible only in self-defence!!!
- self-defence – defending one's life and health or the life and health of UN personnel and other people entrusted to the soldiers' protection and defence as well as the defence of one's own post, position, convoy and weapons belonging to the UN.⁴³

Only observing the operational aims in compliance with *Rules of Engagement*, accomplishing particular tasks according to the functions appointed by the principles of using force, and minute analysis of factors authorising using force do guarantee proper and safe accomplishment of a peacekeeping mission and achieving relative stability in a conflict area without unnecessary bloodshed.

Conclusions

An attempt to provide an answer to the question of the effective operational methods of the armed forces during humanitarian missions would be untimely.

⁴³ A. Cole, F. Drew, R. McLaughlin, D. Mandsager, *op.cit.*, pp. 25–32.

Describing the responsibilities of the contemporary warfare is similarly difficult.

According to Smith, “military force can become a solution, or at least help in solving numerous problems, although in the original conception of the politicians it was not probably taken into consideration.”⁴⁴ At the same time, Smith adds that political and strategic military aims are never identical. He assumes a military aim to be accomplished when warfare has been used, while demarcating an accomplished political aim as a consequence of the military success. Forty years had passed since the Napoleonic wars before any European power engaged in a conflict of a limited range, and almost a hundred years for the outburst of the Great War in which almost all the nations of Europe took part. After WW II there was a further increase in the range and significance of the asymmetric warfare (previously irregular actions). In wars and armed conflicts, when a small or medium-sized state opposed aggression or occupation from a large state (power), the warfare of this type, including mainly guerrilla warfare, used to be a dominant form of armed struggle. It suffices to name China, Vietnam (against France, and, subsequently, the USA), Algeria or Afghanistan as well as the warfare on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The strategic efficiency of the contemporary irregular warfare has been proved by, among others, the military defeat which two superpowers had to face in Vietnam and Afghanistan. It was difficult to draw definite conclusions from the singular conditions of the area. The specific terrain, climatic conditions and, mainly, the character of the conducted warfare pushed the command of particular troops to introducing organisational changes in the existing tactical formations, autonomous units and sub-units, and to creating the new ones, suited for conducting such a type of warfare.

When attempting to predict the mode of action of the units as the *Rules of Engagement* specifies it, we need to face various dilemmas. When soldiers encounter a firing opponent, they begin to function as a fighting force after a short time, even if in active self-defence. The degree of success will still depend on the nature and extent of previous training, the level of professionalism and integrity of units and sub-units. Contemporary soldiers often have the advantage over their opponents, which, in turn, results in the former assuming greater, than before, responsibility for their actions. The range contemporary soldiers’ activity when on a mission will require the particularly good preparation and mental endurance, since all soldiers need to withstand constant struggle, involving the resolutions as

⁴⁴ Qtd. R. Smith, *Przydatność siły militarnej. Sztuka wojenna we współczesnym świecie*, Warszawa: Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, p. 34.

to the questions of life and death, or of the success of a mission, each and every second, under extreme strain.

The contemporary image of world security is vague and obscure. As long as state wars played a leading role in the international relations, there was symmetry as regards the organising and operational methods of the armed forces. The complexity of the past used to set the classic armed forces in the first place in the context of solving conflicts and international problems. Unfortunately, globalisation, fall of the bipolar system, and a number of other issues have transformed the world, armed forces included, beyond recognition. Asymmetry has become the factor determining the requirements assigned to the armed forces, whether within the tactical, operational, or strategic dimensions.

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Summary

Recently, the ongoing dynamic transformation of the international order has activated significant changes in the roles, functions and tasks of the military. In the erstwhile, Cold War order, the significance and utility of the armed forces were indisputable, obvious and intelligible. Jeopardies and their structures would be recognised at the time sufficient for undertaking any rational actions against them. The character of these jeopardies ranging from ideological to economic influencing vital state interests would cause few dilemmas as regards the exercise of the armed forces. The rationale behind the armed forces was therefore clear and workable.

In the new international environment it is far more difficult to recognise which interests ought to be safeguarded by the state, and delineating state activity theatres borders on infeasibility. Another year of the so-called war on terrorism is coming to its close. An attempt both to provide an answer to the question of the effectiveness of the military's operational methods utilized during humanitarian missions and to demarcate the responsibilities of the contemporary warfare would be untimely.

Keywords: armed forces, role of the Engagement, Soft Power, Smart Power, security, peacekeeping

SMART POWER WOBEC ASYMETRII UŻYCIA SIŁY WOJSKOWEJ

Streszczenie

Źródłem istotnej zmiany ról, funkcji, zadań sił zbrojnych pozostaje w ostatnim czasie dokonująca się dynamicznie zmiana ładu międzynarodowego. W ładzie minionym, w czasach zimnej wojny, znaczenie oraz użyteczność sił zbrojnych nie podlegały dyskusji, były oczywiste i zrozumiałe. Zagrożenia i ich struktura były znane w wystarczającym dla racjonalnego przewidywania i planowania czasie. W związku z charakterem zagrożeń dla interesów życiowych całego państwa – od ideologicznych po gospodarcze – nie występowały dylematy dotyczące użycia sił zbrojnych. Jasne i osiągalne były cele stawiane przed siłami zbrojnymi. W nowym środowisku międzynarodowym w istocie nie wiadomo, jakie interesy powinny być chronione przy państwo; prawie niemożliwe staje się określenie teatrów działań państwa. Dobiega końca kolejny rok tzw. wojny z terroryzmem. Przedwczesna byłaby próba udzielenia odpowiedzi na postawione pytanie, jak mają wyglądać skuteczne metody działania sił zbrojnych w czasie misji humanitarnych. Podobnie jak trudno opisać wymogi współczesnej walki zbrojnej.

Słowa kluczowe: siły zbrojne, siła militarna, siły pokojowe, procedury użycia siły wojskowej, bezpieczeństwo