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## The Combined Joint Task Forces - A Virtual army?

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Połączone Siły Wielonarodowe do Zadań Specjalnych – wirtualne armie?

The shaping up of the new international order on the political level tends to be reflected in the military dimension. A change in the nature of challenges and threats makes both individual states and international organizations, in particular military alliances, adjust their structure to them. In the present-day security system four different characteristics can be noticed. First, because of the process of globalization differences between the national and the international sphere tend to blur; geographical borders no longer impede the flow of ideas, people, goods or even unrest. Second, the today's level of technology through the rapid acquisition, processing and transfer of information allows to control international structures, no matter how widespread they are. Third, diversity leads to new threats, which in turn provoke new ways to counteract them. Finally, the international system is characterized by a huge degree of variability; as a result processes of adjustment are taking place in international organizations.<sup>1</sup>

In view of the conditions above, one must bear in mind that the instruments of collective operations can be used effectively only when taking into account three principles: a political strategy should not only combine political, economic and military capabilities but also be sensitive to cultural factors; military forces must be mobile, flexible, and capable of adjusting themselves to new technologies; an international coalition of states should be aware of the supranational capabilities of a unified, flexible command structure.<sup>2</sup> These rules have been fully taken into account in the case of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).

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<sup>1</sup> P. D. Miller, *Adapting national forces and alliances to a new security environment*, [in:] *Brassey's Defence Yearbook 1995*, London 1995, pp. 83–88.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 84.

The idea of the Combined Joint Task Forces is to create separable but not separate units, which are institutionally incorporated into the North Atlantic Alliance's military structure. This follows from the fact that the NATO countries do not want to duplicate the existing structures, which on functional and economic grounds would not be justified. Moreover, the efficiency of the NATO political and military structures makes the implementation of the CJTF concept very likely. Therefore, in the unpredictable international environment of the future the CJTF may become an instrument of collective conflict solution.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the CJTF military structure in the broader perspective of NATO's new military structure and the political structure of the forces. In other words, we will look at particular decision-making models on the basis of which CJTF can be used.<sup>3</sup>

#### THE MILITARY STRUCTURE OF THE CJTF

The CJTF military structure would become an integral part of NATO's military command structure. As a result, everything which relates to the functioning of NATO also indirectly concerns the CJTF. An analysis of the military structure of the Combined Joint Task Forces must begin with the explanation of its name: 'Force' denotes the grouping of appropriate military capacity, manpower and equipment, in organized units; 'Task Force' refers to a group of units organized for the purpose of carrying out a specific mission or execute a specific task; they are disbanded after the task has been accomplished; 'Joint Task Force' concerns units involving two or more military services (army, navy, airforce); 'Combined Joint Task Force' means that the military forces of two or more nations are involved.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, a Combined Joint Task Force can be defined as a multinational, multiservice *ad hoc* task force set up primarily to execute military operations that do not directly involve the defence of the Alliance territory (although their involvement in Article 5 missions is not ruled out), such as humanitarian relief, peace-enforcement and peace-keeping missions.<sup>5</sup>

The wide variety of ways and circumstances under which CJTFs may be deployed would place considerable demands on the command and control

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<sup>3</sup> The analysis of the military aspects of CJTF concept is extremely difficult, because the materials available are highly general and contradictory, while detailed documents and studies are still being prepared or have been given security classification.

<sup>4</sup> *The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm>.

<sup>5</sup> A. Cragg, *The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: A Key Component of the Alliance's Adaptation*, "NATO Review" 1996, no. 4, pp. 7-10. See: A. Dumoulin, *Les Forces Combines Interarmes*, "Défense Nationale" 1994, no 11, pp. 89-97.

centers of the CJTF operations. For that reason the role played by the CJTF Headquarters (CJTF HQ)<sup>6</sup> is crucial. They should fulfil four basic criteria<sup>7</sup>:

- \* Support the three main objectives of the NATO transformation process<sup>8</sup>;
- \* Ensure priority to missions relating to collective defence, should circumstances require so;
- \* Maintain the Alliance's transatlantic character and its integrated military structure;
- \* Be set up at a minimal additional cost.<sup>9</sup>

Because of the above criteria the CJTF military structure should become a specific element of NATO's integrated military structure. From the conceptual point of view, the CJTF headquarters would be some kind of ad hoc, multinational and multiservice NATO headquarters of variable size; they would command and control CJTF during operations on and within non-NATO territory. They should be composed of appropriate personnel and equipment, including communication systems and logistic support, depending on the requirements of the situation. The CJTF headquarters could be used for operations carried out by the Alliance and the WEU (only with the North Atlantic Council's consent); they could also be supported by non-NATO nations<sup>10</sup> (if they decide so).

In order to avoid duplicating additional levels of military bureaucracy CJTF headquarters could be established within NATO's existing Major Subordinate Commands (MSC).<sup>11</sup> Three such headquarters have been created so far: AFSOUTH in Naples, AFCENT in Brunssum and STRIKFLANT in Norfolk.<sup>12</sup> These headquarters, being established on a permanent basis within selected NATO 'parent' headquarters, could constitute the CJTF headquarter nuclei. The nuclei would be constant components in the military structure of the Forces. As far as the structural framework is concerned, they would be the core

<sup>6</sup> A. Cragg, *Internal Adaptation: Reshaping NATO for the Challenges of Tomorrow*, "NATO Review" 1997, no. 4, p. 34. See: E. Foster, *NATO's Military in the Age of Crisis Management*, London 1994, pp. 34–48.

<sup>7</sup> See: J. Petersen (General Rapporteur), *Defining Moments: Alliance Developments 1996*, AN 255 STC (96) 10, URL: <http://www.nato.int/related/naa/docu/1996/an/244pc.htm>.

<sup>8</sup> These are: carrying out new-type missions, the possibility of structural adaptation of new members and inclusion of non-member states in cooperation, support of the WEU's operational needs.

<sup>9</sup> Ch. Barry, *NATO's Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice*, "Survival" 1996, no. 1, vol. 38, pp. 81–97.

<sup>10</sup> R. Estrella (General Rapporteur), *CJTF and the Reform of NATO*, AN 230 DSC (96) 10, <http://www.nato.int/related/naa/docu/1996/an230dsc.htm>.

<sup>11</sup> It has not been published so far, which of the 20 new NATO Commands will at the same time be CJTF headquarters, despite the fact that the CJTF concept has been taken into account while reforming the Alliance's structures.

<sup>12</sup> AFSOUTH – NATO Allied Forces Southern Europe; AFCENT – NATO Allied Forces Central Europe; STRIKFLANT – Strike Fleet Atlantic.

around which a complete CJTF structure could be constructed as soon as a decision to form and deploy its units has been taken. The headquarters nuclei personnel would be the core staff that provides basic expertise for commanding and controlling these formations. The staff would be mostly composed of officials that hold specific posts in parent headquarters at the same time. The creation of dual-hatted personnel would avoid unnecessary duplication of functions and posts, which not only would be not cost-effective, but could also undermine the principle of NATO's single command structure.<sup>13</sup>

Once the North Atlantic Council has taken a decision to establish full-scale CJTF headquarters for the purpose of carrying out a specific mission, those headquarters nuclei would be activated that are most appropriate as far as the location and nature of a given operation are concerned. This basic organizational framework would then be reinforced with supplementary elements of a non-permanent nature. Within the CJTF military structure supplementary elements are called modules. Their size and composition would be determined by the type and requirements of a given operation.<sup>14</sup> An 'Augmentation' Module is a supplementary staff element provided by NATO or other multinational or national command structures, or consist of individual staff officials of these command structures. A 'Support Module' would be organized on the same basis. Its goal would be to provide specialized support from the command structure for a specific mission.<sup>15</sup>

The CJTF headquarters thus formed would command and control the units provided by the nations that joined a given operation. The appointed Chief of Staff would assume all commanding and controlling functions from his deputy, who manages the staff personnel of the headquarters nuclei in ordinary circumstances, i.e. before a decision to fully activate the CJTF headquarters has been taken for the purpose of executing a specific mission.<sup>16</sup> The CJTF headquarters thus activated would perform the following functions:

<sup>13</sup> A. Cragg, *The Combined Joint Task Force Concept...*, pp. 8–9.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9. See : N. Bensahel, *Separable But Not Separate Forces: NATO's Development of the Combined Joint Task Force*, "European Security" 1999, no. 2, vol. 8, pp. 52–72.

<sup>15</sup> A. Kintis, *NATO – WEU: an Enduring Relationship*, "European Foreign Affairs Review" 1998, no. 4, vol. 3, p. 550. See: E. Jones, *After the Summit: Military Realities*, "RUSI Journal" 1994, no. 1, vol. 439, p. 4; M. da Silva, *Połączone Siły Wielonarodowe do Zadań Specjalnych*, "Przegląd NATO" 1998, no 4, pp. 16–19; Id., *Combined Joint Task Forces Concept*, "NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace" 1999, no. 1, pp. 150–155; R. E. Hunter, *The US and Europe: A Parting of the Ways or New Commitments?* [in:] *CJTF – A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy*, ed. by E. Foster, G. Wilson, London 1997, pp. 68–77.

<sup>16</sup> Ch. Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 87; the specific structure of CJTF results from the transfer into the military forces area of the system of *network management* that has so far been applied in the economic sphere; absence of permanent structures, mobility and flexibility are features of the new type of economic agents; for more see: J. Sosnowski, *Procesy wirtualizacji firm (Processes of Company Virtualization)*, [w:] *Przedsiębiorstwo w gospodarce rynkowej (A company in a market economy)*, "Zeszyt Naukowy Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomii i Administracji w Kielcach" 2000, no 2, pp. 79–88; A. Szplit, *Przedsiębiorstwo wirtualne w logistyce (A Virtual Company in Logistics)*, [in:] *Przedsiębiorstwo w gospodarce rynkowej*, "Zeszyt Naukowy Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomii i Administracji w Kielcach" 2000, no 2, pp. 91–99.

\* Set-up a timetable for the operation and decide about the size of the Forces deployed;

- \* Oversee the operations;
- \* Prepare operational plans and orders;
- \* Prepare logistic support;
- \* Information-sharing with major, adjacent and supporting command structures about the progress of the mission;
- \* Coordinate operations with other forces, governments and agencies;
- \* Monitor ongoing actions.<sup>17</sup>

The CJTF headquarters' capabilities could be defined as follows:

- \* The rapid formation and deployment of troops in the operational area:
  - (a) at seven days' notice for its key elements,
  - (b) at fifteen days' notice for its follow-up elements;
- \* Command and control over NATO and non-NATO forces;
- \* Communication with supporting, adjacent and higher command structures, civil authorities, as well as with governmental and non-governmental organizations;
  - \* Maintaining and extending intelligence activities;
  - \* Sustainability for thirty days;
  - \* Local protection of manpower, equipment and information.<sup>18</sup>

All activities of CJTF headquarters and forces would be conducted following NATO's standing operating procedures (SOPs) and standardization agreements (STANAGs). They would also apply to operations in which non-NATO units participate. In this way the single command structure and efficiency of staff work would be ensured.<sup>19</sup>

The size of CJTF headquarters would depend on the requirements of the potential operation and would be limited by the availability of appropriate assets and resources. According to recommendations suggested by analysts, the Alliance should deploy at least two CJTF headquarters (land- and sea-based), which would be able to conduct large-scale operations. For the purposes of small-scale missions, lower-echelon CJTF headquarters (brigade-size or its maritime and air equivalent, e.g. a squadron)<sup>20</sup> would be deployed.

<sup>17</sup> M. Jackson, *IFOR and Lessons for Future CJTFs*, [in:] *CJTF – A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy*, ed. by E. Foster, G. Wilson, London 1997, pp. 94–104.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95. See: Ch. Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

<sup>19</sup> Ch. Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 88. See: I. Dörfer, *The Nordic Nations in the New Western Security Regime*, Washington D.C. 1997, pp. 50–53.

<sup>20</sup> R. Estrella, *op. cit.*, p. 18; see J. P. Jumper, *Allied Air Forces Central Europe and the Air Force's contribution to NATO*, [in:] *NATO at 50. The Alliance on Its Way to the Future*, Bonn 1999, p. 51–54; K. E. J. Borck, *Allied command Baltic approaches to-day, joint command northeast to-morrow*, [in:] *NATO at 50. The Alliance on Its Way to the Future*, Bonn 1999, pp. 55–62; I. Garnet, *The Maritime Alliance*, [in:] *The Atlantic Alliance. NATO's 50 Years of Peace 1949–1999*, London 1999, pp. 114–123.

The CJTF military structure would be supplemented by the following three institutions:

- \* The Capabilities Coordination Cell, which would be part of the NATO Headquarters' International Military Staff (IMS) in Brussels, would provide staff support to the Military Committee in order to deal with contingency planning and crisis situations and would help it with strategic planning for major NATO commanders;

- \* The Combined Joint Planning Staff, which would be based at the SHAPE headquarters in Mons would perform planning and coordinating functions vis-à-vis appropriate CJTF headquarters and units and the WEU Planning Cell;

- \* A Policy Coordination Group based at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels would give political-military advice to the North Atlantic Council in the area of management and control of the Alliance's military operations, in particular crisis missions.<sup>21</sup>

The CJTF military structure would not only be an integral component of NATO's military structure but also a practical instrument for an efficient, multidirectional and rapid response of the Alliance (and other non-Alliance nations concerned) to the challenges and threats emerging from an increasingly unpredictable international system.<sup>22</sup> From the military standpoint, its structure would be devised in such a way that it would provide greater flexibility than NATO's existing, static military structure, while simultaneously minimizing the costs of its formation.

#### THE CJTF POLITICAL STRUCTURE

An extremely important element for the formation and functioning of the CJTF is, alongside its military structure, the political structure of the Forces, i. e. the political conditions under which CJTF could be deployed.

The general principle would be that of the North Atlantic Council's political responsibility for all CJTF operations, which means, inter alia, that only the Council can decide to transfer NATO resources and assets to meet the needs of an operation involving the use of CJTF under WEU supervision.<sup>23</sup> In taking decisions involving the use of CJTF the Council would be assisted by the Military

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<sup>21</sup> D. S. Yost, *NATO Transformed. The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*, Washington D.C. 1998, p. 205. See: M. Bentinck, *NATO's structural reform and the ESDI*, [in:] *CJTF – A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy*, ed. by E. Foster, G. Wilson, London 1997, pp. 78–84; R. Smith, *ESDI in NATO*, [in:] *NATO at 50. The Alliance on its Way to the Future*, Bonn 1999, pp. 37–39.

<sup>22</sup> See: R. Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego (Institutionalizing European Security)*, Warszawa 1999, pp. 59–115.

<sup>23</sup> R. Estrella, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

Committee. Once formulated on the highest level of political-military decision-making, a decision would then go through the successive levels of the Alliance's military command structure: strategic, tactical and operational ones<sup>24</sup> (see Fig. 1). This is how a political decision would be implemented on the military level.

The separation of the political and military structures of the CJTF is thus purely theoretical and follows from methodological considerations. In practice, both structures are closely interconnected and mutually dependent.




Fig. 1. Author's own diagram based on: *NATO at 50. The Alliance on its Way to the Future*, Bonn 1999, p. 39<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> R. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>25</sup> NAC – North Atlantic Council; MC – Military Committee; SACEUR – Supreme Allied Commander Europe; SACLANT – Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic; EXEC BOARD – Executive Board; CJPS – Combined Joint Planning Staff; CJTF HQ – Combined Joint Task Force Headquarter.



The following part analyzes three main forms of CJTF operations:

\* NATO-only CJTF, entirely or partly composed of NATO member states, without any outside units;

\* NATO-plus CJTF, composed of Partnership for Peace (PfP) member states or other interested countries that offer to participate in CJTF operations;

\* WEU-led CJTF, in which case WEU would use NATO assets, including the use of CJTF headquarters, to conduct its own operations.<sup>26</sup>

The above arrangements reflect the necessary political flexibility of CJTFs, which, when combined with similar flexibility on the military level, would ensure the efficiency and rationality of CJTF formation and deployment.<sup>27</sup>

NATO-only CJTF – Under this arrangement the Combined Joint Task Forces would be composed exclusively of NATO members' military units. All members of the Alliance which have military forces (only Iceland does not) would collectively participate in the formation of CJTF units, by providing, proportionately to their own capabilities and the desire to be involved in a given operation, manpower and material.<sup>28</sup> However, the decision to form and deploy CJTF by NATO as a whole would not mean that individual member states are obliged to participate in this undertaking. Every member state would decide on its own whether or not to participate in the CJTF.

Because CJTF units must be able to reach combat readiness in a very short time, the forces that NATO member states allocate to CJTF would constitute NATO rapid reaction forces at the same time.<sup>29</sup> These concern in particular: ARRC – ACE (Allied Command Europe) Rapid Reaction Corps; Central Division; STANAVFORLANT – Standing Naval Force Atlantic; STANAVFORMED<sup>30</sup> – Standing Naval Force Mediterranean.

The forces assigned to CJTF missions should focus on peace-keeping/supporting operations and participate in training and exercises of entirely different types than those conducted during the Cold War period. That is why the greatest challenge facing NATO military personnel would be to meet the demands of strategic deployment and sustainability of CJTF units.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> NATO-only CJTF are CJTFs operated exclusively by NATO; NATO-plus CJTF are mixed CJTFs; WEU-led CJTF are CJTF directly by WEU, N. Bensahel, *op. cit.*, p. 57. An interesting classification of models where CJTF can be involved is proposed by G. C. de Nooy: UNO/OSCE; NATO/WEU; CFSP/ "The Fourth Pillar"; *Ad hoc* coalition; "Six EU states core", for more see: G. C. de Nooy, *Towards a military core group in Europe*, [in:] *Managing Security in Europe. The European Union and the Challenge of Enlargement*, eds. F. Algieri, J. Janning, D. Rumberg, Gütersloh 1996, pp. 159–185.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>28</sup> Ch. Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>30</sup> For more see: R. H. Palin, *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects*, London 1995, pp. 55–65.

<sup>31</sup> Ch. Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

The above CJTF variant would be, from the military standpoint, an effective instrument for carrying out operations of various types in an area outside the Alliance territory. This follows mainly from the fact that NATO has an efficient decision-making mechanism, plus a tested and efficient military structure, which ensures a correct and effective implementation of this decision. From the political and legal standpoint, however, this variant should be assessed quite differently. It is a common principle of international law to ban the use of force in relations between states and to delegatize a war of aggression. In view of the above, any use of military force on the international level can only be tolerated following a resolution of the UN Security Council, which has the right to authorize the use of force. The UN Security Council's permanent members (China, France, the United States, Russia, and Great Britain), who have the right to veto any decision of the Council, rarely reach unanimity if strategic interests of any of them are concerned, and this would precisely be the case with NATO-only CJTF<sup>32</sup>). It is therefore highly unlikely for this model of CJTF to become popular as an instrument of operation outside the Alliance territory. Besides, the Alliance's member states are cutting down their defence and military spending. In order to spread operational costs, they would encourage as wide an involvement as possible of non-member countries in all kinds of joint ventures. It seems far more likely that this first model of CJTF would be deployed in Washington Treaty Article 5 missions, i.e. collective self-defence. Two basic premises account for this: first, the defense of the integrity of Alliance territory and its inviolability are fundamental objectives of both NATO as an organization and the individual member states and this regardless of the cost; second, in this case the UN Security Council's authorization would not be required. In practice, the deployment of NATO's CJTF would largely depend on the international situation, the balance of power and the strategic interests of NATO countries at a given time.

NATO-plus CJTF – Because the arena where CJTF units would be deployed may also directly threaten PfP countries, interested Partner nations could be included in NATO's CJTF, thus creating the NATO-plus CJTF formula.<sup>33</sup> This model is one of the most attractive of the CJTF concept. Both PfP program planners and the founding fathers of the CJTF concept attach considerable importance to it. The ability to conduct joint military operations with NATO is the fundamental goal of the PfP.<sup>34</sup> The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), a body supervising the development of dialogue, cooperation and

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<sup>32</sup> See. G. C. de Nooy, *Towards a Military Core...*, pp. 175–178.

<sup>33</sup> Ch. Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

<sup>34</sup> The tasks of enlarged PfP are defined as follows: strengthening of the element of political consultation within PfP; development of PfP's operational role; extending the participation of partnership nations in the processes of decision-making and planning in PfP; for more see: *Vademecum NATO*, Warszawa 1999, pp. 92–94.

consultation between NATO and Partner nations, comprises at present 44 countries (19 NATO members and 25 Partner nations).<sup>35</sup> The EAPC's operation plan consists of four departments:

- \* A short-term plan of EAPC consultations, practical cooperation and its management;
- \* A long-term programme and areas of consultation and cooperation;
- \* Preparations for natural disasters and civil defence contingency planning;
- \* Areas of cooperation in the military field, including military cooperation under the PfP programme.<sup>36</sup>

The EAPC's composition, goals and operation plans allow for cooperation between the Alliance members and Partner nations in the field of planning and carrying out operations with shared CJTF. Moreover, the new operational role of Partnership for Peace envisages:

- \* joint participation of willing Partner nations and NATO members in future PfP operations authorized by the North Atlantic Council;
- \* widening the extent of NATO/PfP exercises for the purpose of testing the full range of the Alliance's new missions, including peace-keeping/supporting operations;
- \* involving Partner nations in planning and conducting PfP activities, including planning and conducting NATO/PfP exercises and other PfP operations, namely through the appointment of PfP staff within various NATO command structures;
- \* the possibility of participation of PfP staff in planning, concept- and doctrine-development, and in operational matters involving CJTF exercises;
- \* possible participation of Partner nations personnel in CJTF headquarters.<sup>37</sup>

The advantages for CJTF of cooperation with PfP countries are obvious. First, formal ties with NATO and the practical aspects of this cooperation, i.e. exercises and operations based on NATO procedures and standards, provide grounds for the rapid formation of CJTF and their effective deployment (despite the fact that language problems, cultural differences or divergences between particular military doctrines of the participating countries may arise). Second, the division of expenses of such an operation between a greater number of countries will enhance cost-effectiveness, i.e. reduce the cost per country, thereby raising interest in such missions. Third, there is greater likelihood for such an operation to be authorized by the UN Security Council because the larger the number of participants the more genuine the need to solve a particular problem by some part of the international community, and the less likely the actions are

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<sup>35</sup> For more see: *Further Development of the EAPC*, [in:] *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington. 23–25 April 1999*, Brussels 1999, pp. 91–92.

<sup>36</sup> For more see: *Vademecum...*, pp. 84–86.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 95.

dictated by narrow national interests. Fourth, it would be possible to fully involve Russia, which indisputably plays a significant role in the international arena.<sup>38</sup>

WEU-led CJTF – Under exceptional circumstances, NATO members could, upon a decision taken by the North Atlantic Council, assign CJTF headquarters and their appropriate assets and resources to operations led by the WEU. Military forces, i.e. manpower, would be set up by the WEU, which would ask NATO members, associated members and associated partners to earmark military contingents for a specific mission.<sup>39</sup> Under this arrangement NATO's command structure would perform a supporting role. Following a decision by the North Atlantic Council, NATO Commands would be set up to activate CJTF headquarters and prepare them for deployment. During the process of CJTF headquarters activation, the type of the mission and the nature of forces would be defined. In due time, control over CJTF would be transferred to the WEU.<sup>40</sup>

Rather than activate NATO-based CJTF headquarters, it would also be possible to activate the national command structure of a WEU member, which would serve as CJTF headquarters. This option raises fears among politicians who do not wish to weaken NATO by strengthening the national character of European military forces.<sup>41</sup> A similar threat would be posed by the potential use of the Eurocorps for the purposes of WEU-directed CJTF operations. Despite being answerable to NATO, the Eurocorps Headquarters are outside the former's integrated military structure.<sup>42</sup> From the standpoint of the WEU, each of the foregoing options is far more advantageous than 'borrowing' from NATO part of its structure in the form of CJTF headquarters.

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<sup>38</sup> See: Ch. Barry, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–92; *Partnership for peace – An enhanced and more operational partnership*, [in:] *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington. 23–25 April 1999*, Brussels 1999, pp. 93–94.

<sup>39</sup> 28 countries are connected with the WEU: ten member states, six associated members, five observer status countries, seven associated partners. Members and associated members assign their military forces to the WEU under the FAWEU concept (Forces Answerable to Western European Union). The WEU earmarked military units are allocated out of the national conventional forces. They serve the purposes of common defence and Petersberg-type tasks. There are two categories of FAWEUs: national – comprising units and headquarters designated by states, assigned to the WEU, that can be used for the purpose of tasks being carried out under the WEU's auspices; multinational – comprising international units and headquarters, already formed or in the process of being formed, assigned by the participating countries to jointly carry out similar missions to those executed by the forces of the former type. Also associated partners can offer their military forces to be used in specific operations by the Union. Therefore the WEU can count on the use of units from twenty-two countries (Iceland does not have its military forces; nor were the regulations formulated relating to the forces of the WEU observer countries. For more see: R. Zięba, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–193.

<sup>40</sup> Ch. Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>42</sup> For more see: R. H. Palin, *op. cit.*, pp. 62–65.

The scale of operations carried out by the WEU as well as the composition and deployment of headquarters and units should be proportionately smaller than NATO-conducted CJTF operations. This is based on the unwritten assumption that where a contingency situation is serious enough to arouse the interest of all Alliance nations (and not only of the European NATO members), the command and control of units should be left in the hands of the NATO decision-makers. Moreover, the process of formation of the WEU's new operational role is still at a very early stage; this organization has not yet managed to develop an autonomous command and control (C2) structure similar to that of NATO. Therefore, in the nearest future the WEU will not be able to carry out more complicated missions or large-scale operations.<sup>43</sup>

As far as CJTF under the auspices of the WEU are concerned, an important issue is the role that will be performed by SACEUR and SACLANT (Supreme Allied NATO Commanders, Europe and the Atlantic). They are most likely to become 'supporting commanders' with the WEU's operational commander. Another problem that needs to be solved is the adaptation of the WEU's political-military structures to make sure they will be able to meet strategic and operation demands of CJTF missions, without creating parallel structures to the existing ones.<sup>44</sup>

The creation and deployment of CJTF in this model seems highly unlikely in the nearest future albeit it is not impossible. The shortcomings of the model stem first of all from the absence of formal structures within the WEU that would be able to command and control European CJTF efficiently. Furthermore, WEU nations do not constitute a uniform group; their actions in the European arena are first of all governed by their own national interests. Individual European countries define the term 'Europe' in three different ways: Europe as a 'super-market', i.e. Europe is viewed through the prism of the successes of the Single Market (British approach); Europe as some kind of 'Switzerland', i.e. its economy functions very well but it is inside-oriented, without aspiring to play a greater role on the world scene (German standpoint); Europe as a power, composed of different states that share the ambition of strengthening and protecting common interests through diplomatic, economic, or monetary means (French position<sup>45</sup>). Furthermore, it is hard to imagine the United States, which de facto supplies the WEU with necessary CJTF-assigned assets and resources, relinquishing control over them.

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<sup>43</sup> Ch. Barry, *op. cit.*, p. 92. See.: L. Rühl, *The way ahead – partnership or competition?* [in:] *CJTF – A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy*, ed. E. Foster, G. Wilson, London 1997, pp. 44–52.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 93.

<sup>45</sup> Y. Boyer, *The challenge for Europe*, [in:] *CJTF – A Lifeline for a European Defence Policy*, ed. E. Foster, G. Wilson, London 1997, pp. 53–58.

The merits of the last model include the possibility of small-scale operations, maintaining the Euro-Atlantic bonds while simultaneously enhancing the operational role of WEU/CFSP and realizing in practice the European Security and Defence Identity.

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The CJTF military and political structures reflect wider adaptation processes on the international level. First, they would be characterized by flexibility, which, on account of the unpredictable nature of the present-day international environment, is a sine qua non condition for every mission to be carried out properly on a supranational scale. Second, they would be efficient since the procedures under which they operate would be appropriately developed. Third, at each stage (i.e. origin and implementation) they would be fully multinational, which would ensure their competence and high cost-effectiveness, i.e. low cost per state involved.

A full assessment of CJTF structures can only be made after the implementation process has been completed, which is not expected before the year 2002.<sup>46</sup>

#### STRESZCZENIE

Połączone Siły Wielonarodowe do Zadań Specjalnych – CJTF stanowią odzwierciedlenie procesu transformacji euroatlantyckiego systemu bezpieczeństwa. Nowy charakter wyzwań i zagrożeń powoduje konieczność utworzenia mobilnych, elastycznych, łatwo adaptujących się do wymogów środowiska, sprawnie dowodzonych, efektywnych, a jednocześnie powstałych przy jak najmniejszych kosztach i niedubujących już istniejących struktur militarnych formacji wojskowych. Zatem struktura militarna CJTF, opisana w pierwszej części artykułu, stanowi integralną część Sojuszu Północnoatlantyckiego i jest zaprojektowana w taki sposób, by CJTF był praktycznym narzędziem rozwiązywania sporów i konfliktów różnego typu, zarówno w obrębie NATO, jak i na terytoriach pozasojusznicych. Polityczna struktura CJTF – konfiguracje, w których siły te mogą występować, jest przedstawiona w drugiej części artykułu. Trzy podstawowe modele: NATO-only CJTF, NATO-plus CJTF, WEU-led CJTF przesadzają o tym, że Połączone Siły Wielonarodowe do Zadań Specjalnych, to potencjalnie najlepszy mechanizm militarny w pełni uwzględniający złożoność i problemy obecnego środowiska międzynarodowego.

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<sup>46</sup> This date is given as the expected for the complete realization of the concept rather than the absolute deadline. Sometimes the year 2004 is given as the final date.