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## The Forms of Organized Crime after the Change of Regime in Hungary

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### THE FORMS OF ORGANIZED CRIME AFTER THE CHANGE OF REGIME IN HUNGARY

**Summary:**

*In recent years the Hungarian administration of justice trialed some of the most famous murder cases of the 1990's which were contract killings between organized crime groups. These trials brought up many new information about the life of organized crime gangs and given a better opportunity to criminologists to understand the recent activity of the organized crime gangs. I'm focusing on how organized crime successfully survived the crisis of the regime change. The following research is based on a tight cooperation with the Pest County Police Headquarters where I analyzed criminal files about organized crime gangs after the regime change. The main question of the research was: what sociological and economical factors contributed to the strengthening of organized crime in Hungary? Where can we discover the responsibility of the state? How did state regulation affect organized crime?*

**Keywords:**

*organized crime, regime change, inflation, transformational crisis, the second economy*

### Hypothesis

The political and economical system, which was changing after the regime change, had an effect on crime as well. With the alteration of legislative framework, the monitoring of crime for the police was faced with various difficulties. To understand organized crime after the regime change, I would like to examine one specific case to grasp what possibilities criminals had in the first decades of the Third Republic of Hungary. On the basis of the sources, my intention is to answer how organized crime changed as a result of the regime change.

## The first Hungarian godfather

The first person to be declared mafia boss or godfather after the regime change was Péter Tasnádi. He built up his image in the media in such a way that he appeared as a powerful person whose wishes were taken as orders not only by his subordinates but his immediate environment as well. After his first release from custody in 1992, he wrote his autobiography, to which he enclosed the investigative and other judicial documents, which were parts of his accusation. Most of the information which was recovered from the file search at the Police Headquarters of Pest County was revealed by Tasnádi himself, so instead of the anonymisation of the person it is possible to compare different sources.

Péter Tasnádi compared Hungary, which was on its way to becoming a democratic state, with America, which was already known as the icon of the free world, in the 1990s by stating: “if Al Pacino plays the role of the Godfather then he gets an Oscar, but if Péter Tasnádi does the same thing, he will end up in prison”<sup>1</sup>.

The protagonist of the movie, which has since become a classic, defined himself publicly as a respected entrepreneur, but privately, he assured his wife that his dad’s mafia undertaking does not differ in the sense of its goal from a senator’s, or any other respected leaders’ job, so he intends to transform the life of the Corleone family on the level of the means as well to a legal undertaking. In the following it is intended to be proved that Péter Tasnádi, who tried to incorporate his illegal activities into the realm of legality, also defined himself in the eyes of the media as an entrepreneur. Some parts of his book’s, the “Mafia for life or death’s”, cases illustrate vividly how the mafia leader’s, who was called to life by Al Pacino, political advocacy with the avoidance of appearing to be illegal, occurred in Péter Tasnádi’s peculiar business activities.

He was born in 1950 to a Jewish family in Budapest. Both of his parents suffered through Holocaust, and since his father was a military officer he himself was put in a military school as well. At the beginning of his book, he writes that „’56’s purgatory swept him away” from a career in the military. Although it is revealed in a confessional letter, which was formerly written in prison that it was probably not his six-year-old resolution towards the revolution what changed but that the Rákóczi Military School where he was intending to go was closed due to a reform measure in 1956, so the little child Tasnádi’s dreams were shattered.

After secondary school, he finished the Marxist-Leninist University in seven years, while also serving the required time in the military. His Jewish origin was revealed to him at the age of thirteen by his father’s brother who had then just returned from Israel, because that had not been mentioned in his family up

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<sup>1</sup><[http://www.atv.hu/belfold/2008\\_okt\\_tasnadi\\_\\_voltak\\_besugoim\\_a\\_rendorsegen\\_is\\_\\_\\_vid\\_eo](http://www.atv.hu/belfold/2008_okt_tasnadi__voltak_besugoim_a_rendorsegen_is___vid_eo)> (01.11.2015).

until that point. In any case, it was after entering the army that he first experienced the negative judgement of his Jewish origin in person<sup>2</sup>. In those times he literally fought for the honour of his ancestors, according to him later on he did not do such things anymore. The negative experience from that time might have had a huge impact on him, because he explained the prejudicial, racist people's way of thinking with their genes, likewise with his Jewish origin, so he pictured the world as two opposing groups. He did not MARK his Hungarian or Jewish identity without question, so the importance of his self-identification with the Jews is showed only by his other remark, which is like the formerly mentioned reference. He interpreted his leaving for Israel as a call to his ancestors' land, which came from his heart and his empty pockets<sup>3</sup>.

After he had left the army, he explained, it was not a coincidence that he married a Jewish girl. The religious wedding ceremony was not attended by his parents who had communist beliefs, but possibly only by the bride's parents who were merchants. It was that time when Péter Tasnádi got into the world of the self-employed, which he identified as „the well-defined circle of the Jewish families of Budapest”<sup>4</sup>. He wanted to belong there and he managed to realize that wish. The Jewish marriage, being an ancient ceremony, helped him to fully accept his Jewish identity. Although, as he later said, that was continuously in connection with his financial interests.

In the beginning of the 1970s, prosperity and wealth did not come at once, as he expected. His wife's family and group of friends did not accept him fully, so he started working at the National Insurance Company as an agent. According to him, he quickly became the district's best in his trade, which he learned in three months, and later on he continuously finished first on the revenue list. The reward of this job was six thousand forints, which he slowly started to take home with continuous additions to it. He began to make deals and do business with various kinds of things. He procured the car allocational lists through official means, and mediated the information about those people's cars that were next in line for getting a car, but refused to take it to people who wanted to get one as soon as possible. There are no precise figures about how many people could have refused yearly, after paying the advance, the cars which they were legally entitled to take. Due to the waiting time of several years, there were possibly many who gave up the idea of getting a car because of a change in their financial background. The success of Tasnádi's informal business was the legally procured allocational list, which helped him to get cars illegally from the Merkúr Company, which held monopoly power in the car market. In return he received a significant premium from those who wanted a car as soon as possible. With tricks like the formerly mentioned, all by himself, he managed to

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<sup>2</sup> P. Tasnádi, *Maffia életre-halálra?*, Budapest 1994.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibidem*.

increase his monthly payment from six thousand forints to twelve thousand a month.

### **The significance of the second economy**

According to Endre Sik's research, Grossman was the first who used the expression *second economy* for the description of the observable informal market conditions' in the Soviet Union<sup>5</sup>. Grossman heavily criticized those researchers who used the expressions: resistive economy, unofficial economy, or parallel market<sup>6</sup>. Grossman's theoretical premise, that there were intertwined formal and informal ways between the first and the second economy, presumes that this is not merely an additional, and particularly not a resistive economy. It is rather the necessary and non-negligible part of the altered political, legal, and social system. Galasi and R. Gábor's formerly analyzed corruptional research's further consideration drew attention to the same results. István Kemény emphasized in the 1980s that those who live in the second economy receive a portion of their income in the first economy as registered payment, while they obtain the other half, which is necessary for them to make ends meet, illegally. On the basis of his estimates, which were based on the data of the CSA (Central Statistical Agency), approximately half of the country was more or less interested in the operation of the second economy, and respectively half of the houses were built up privately in the 1970s<sup>7</sup>.

The definition of Grossman, who introduced the idea, is sensitive to the former framework of interpretation and albeit being too general, it is still the „most precise” one. „The second economy includes every productional and trading activity, which fulfils the following two conditions: (a) it is intended for personal, financial gain; (b) deliberately violates the law on the basis of specified criteria.”<sup>8</sup> On the basis of these it is worthwhile to analyze Tasnádi's activities in the socialist period.

For the second part of the 1970s, he claims to have started looking for new challenges, changed his job, and in the framework of the Barbers' Cooperative Society of Southern Buda, he created the first Hungarian gym. He equipped the almost a hundred square meters' big place with an air conditioner, making it a predecessor of the gyms, which appeared after the regime change. The idea turned out to be successful, wealthy people scheduled themselves sometimes even for months ahead. He agreed with the president of the cooperative society in a 32% share, which, according to Tasnádi, meant in those years 60-70 thou-

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<sup>5</sup> E. Sik, *Egy ló-öszvér a lovakról és a szamarakról. Adalék a második gazdaság hazai eszmetörténetéhez*, „Közgazdasági Szemle”, No. 7-8, 1996, p. 706-707.

<sup>6</sup> Grossman G., *The Second Economy of the USSR*, “Problems of Communism”, No. 9, 1977.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*.

sand forints of income in a month. The third law of 1971 about the establishment and operation of cooperative societies declared that the shares after various items had to be settled on the basis of the legal framework regarding the given economic sector, but in the constitution of the cooperative society<sup>9</sup>. The president of the cooperative society, due to the unexpectedly high income, gave Tasnádi the aforementioned high percentage of the shares. The cooperative society owned the barber room, the equipment, and they had to finance the maintenance costs from the remaining 68% as well. The specific reason behind the conflict was put down by Tasnádi to the typical Hungarian disease, envy. Behind the simplifying explanation there could have been some kind of an accounting or financial conflict of interest between the participants of the second economy; the president, the managers belonging to the cooperative society and Tasnádi, about how to divide up the income among themselves, and to what extent should they increase their undivided joint ownership.

At the beginning of the 1980s he worked as an advertisement organizer for the Hírlapkiadó (Publishing) Company, and also acted on behalf of Népszabadság. During this period, he must have already been enjoying the benefits of the already developed facade. He bought a black Mercedes, and had appointments with government and economic leaders as an employee of Népszabadság, the central paper of the party. The importance of appearances and status symbols was also reflected in the case of match-fixing in football, which led to one of the largest media scandals of the 1980s. Molnár Tibor who was known as the king of Totó, made his living, after several temporary jobs in the second economy, from illegal sports betting. He also frequented the countryside with his black Mercedes and with his network of farmers' co-operative section leaders and purchasing agents, he fixed football matches at several different points of the country. According to him, he only acted on behalf of others, as a kind of informal agent<sup>10</sup>.

Next to his job as an agent, he facilitated the financing of various sports magazines, which, due to his cost-effective operation, got him a position as advertising manager by several professional associations. According to the National Office for Physical Education and Sports's (NOPEP) later issued non-official declaration it was forbidden to work together with Tasnádi. As he noted on the basis of his memories, due to that declaration the leaders of the associations and the journalists both wanted to work henceforth explicitly with him<sup>11</sup>.

In the case of the Totó scandal a similar process took place on the level of society. After the representatives of the media wrote about the mass match-fixing cases, the journalists expected the number of the bets to drastically decline. Before the Totó case, 4,5 million tickets were sold by the Lottery retailers

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<sup>9</sup> <<http://www.1000ev.hu/index.php?a=3&param=8484>> (01.11.2015).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>11</sup> P. Tasnádi *Maffia...*

on average, after the scandal the number of customers almost immediately increased by one million, and by the second half of the 1980s this number doubled itself<sup>12</sup>.

Tasnádi managed, despite the short deadlines, to acquire significant amounts of aid, in some cases for allowances, which were higher than the monthly income of the payers. As an innovation, he would ask for some of his payments not in money, but in foreign trips. On the basis of the rules in force, he could have only gone abroad once every three years, so this way he managed to visit foreign countries plenty of times. According to him, he returned from these trips with various valuable items – like technical devices, which were in short supply in Hungary – often with the purpose of selling them.

What put an end to his career was that it attracted the attention of the authorities that Tasnádi traveled to the United States as a replacement in the female basketball team. Before leaving for Vienna, he owned a house of 360 square meters, a shop at Rákóczi street, and western cars and cash. All of his successes at home, he put down to his own creative and good business skills, which were ruined by the beggarliness of Hungarian conditions, and the malicious accusations of his immediate environment. He thought that in the west he would have better opportunities for emergence. He got married fictitiously to an Austrian woman and opened a model agency in Vienna. Tasnádi's calculations did not come true, which led to a major financial catastrophe, so he had to return to Hungary where he still wanted to present himself as the head of a successful model agency in Vienna. He believed that what he managed to accomplish in Hungary, he could manage to create in immeasurably greater extents anywhere else in the world. Those conditions at home, which he thought to be inevitable and disadvantageous, he did not take into consideration at all as aspects, which contributed to his success. The benefits stemming from the second economy and the flaws of the legislation he only recognized as parts of his own initiative<sup>13</sup>.

He defected to Israel without any financial background where he started to work as an aerobic trainer. He applied and got accepted into a military survival training camp. Although he did not finish it, he acquired such special skills that a Jewish jewellery merchant hired him as bodyguard. At this point in his recollection, the admitting of self-incriminating illegal activities or tricks, which stem from the lack of regulation stops suddenly.

### **Inflation and transformational crisis**

The things he highlighted about his stay in Israel were mainly the luxury and the various forms of the advanced security technology. In 1991 when he returned to Hungary, the inflation was currently at the highest level compared

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<sup>12</sup> M. Bocskák, *Psz, jön a totókirály!*, Budapest, 1987.

<sup>13</sup> P. Tasnádi *Maffia...*

to the country's past forty years, more than 35%. The greatest decrease in the standard of living (calculated with net real income) was also in the same year. So it did not matter if an average worker earned 25% more net income, the money he got was only worth 93% compared to its former value in the past year<sup>14</sup>.

Dominguez conducted an anthropological research in the 1980s about the inflation in Israel. The American dollar took over the functions of the national currency, the lira of Israel, on an informal basis due it slowly getting into a hyperinflationary spiral. Due to the country's financial policy the lira remained. Partially because of this, the lenders of loans used in ordinary courses of business managed to get serious amounts of exchange rate gains. The author refers to several examples from interviews when, by the time of repayment, the debtor had to pay back multiple amounts of the original money. One of the examples of Dominguez illustrated that the debtor sent the amount by cheque, which arrived four days later to the lender who then demanded by phone to be paid the difference between the sums, which arose after sending the cheque due to the exchange rate fluctuations. The borrowers, for the sake of their own undertakings had to invest their loans, which were taken up in U.S. dollars, in Israeli lira as well, and this led to multiple exchange rate losses by the repayment<sup>15</sup>.

In 1992, Tasnádi was arrested by commandos in his office on Rákóczi street. According to the statement of the police for the newspapers, several thousands of U.S. dollars, German marks, Austrian shillings and Italian liras were confiscated. [10] In his book and later interviews he emphasized that the police did not find any weapons, or tools capable of piercing or cutting, but he never once mentioned the different kinds of money which were found by him. In 1994 after his release, he told András Bárdos in his show, *Terefere*, on Balaton Tv that at the time in question he was responsible, on behalf of various individuals, for the repayment of loans by entrepreneurs with a lack of capital, who wished to succeed in the recovering market economy<sup>16</sup>. During his stay in Israel due to the hyperinflation the true value was in the U.S. dollar, in a similar case after the regime change in Hungary all western currencies held the same function for those who wanted to become entrepreneurs without own resources.

Using the experience, he acquired in Israel, he not only functioned as a debt collector, but as a money-lender as well. He was interested primarily in connecting the two activities together. That is how he established the Maccabi Sportsclub where he employed those street fighters, whose manager was also he, in jobs concerning guarding and financial recovery. With the Hebrew name Maccabeus the organization referred to both the Jewish combat resistance and

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<sup>14</sup> <<http://tasnadipeter.com/indexweb.php>> (01.11.2015).

<sup>15</sup> V.R. Dominguez, *Representing Value and the Value of Representation: A Different Look at Money*, "Cultural Anthropology", 1990, No. 1. pp. 36-42.

<sup>16</sup> *Terefere Magazin*. Balaton TV, 1994, <<http://tasnadipeter.com/kuzdosportok.php>> (01.11.2015).



competitive sports as well. By Tasnádi's definition, his behavior, which differed from the mentality of his Jewish brothers, expressed itself in the fact that instead of fear promoted assimilation he took responsibility for conflicts as parts of the openly accepted power demonstration. In the name of Maccabi SC, which was registered under the name of his office on Rákóczi street, he organized several sport events, and he presented himself for the media as a successful sports manager<sup>17</sup>.

The IV. law of 1998 was the first one to provide for security, and private investigational activities that were carried out within undertakings. The Comel Trade Ltd., which was established by Tasnádi, was able to offer security services in the beginning of the 1990s since there was no legislation. Besides the sportsmen already belonging to the Maccabi Sportsclub he also employed former policemen because the latter, with their weapons licences, were at least as valuable as an experienced athlete<sup>18</sup>.

On the 28th February in 1992 twenty commandos detained him, and the members of the Pest County Police Headquarters' Department of Organized Crime confiscated all items to be found there, which qualified as weapons, furthermore several foreign currencies as well. He later presented the serious looking action of the police as mere theatre on various TV channels and interviews<sup>19</sup>. Later on he talked about himself as well, as someone who played the role of the godfather<sup>20</sup>. During the time of his provisional detention, he was the first captive to hold a press conference<sup>21</sup>. He used his appearance in the media, and the publicity, which surrounded him during his arrest to build a prestige, which would show him to be dangerous and thus usefully contribute to his security related activities. However, at the time of the completion of the democratic state it was of symbolic importance for the police as well in order to confirm its own function. It was possibly because of that, that he was allowed to give a statement, even if, according to Tasnádi, he was not given a chance to prepare<sup>22</sup>.

On the basis of the criminal case 312/1992 the prosecutor's office of the VI-VII. districts of Budapest created the indictment marked as B. VI-VII. 3539/1993/1-I. according to which the sports organization, the foundation established for its support and the ltd.-s created for security purposes did not separate, because „Tasnádi looked upon all financial stocks and staff belonging to the organizations as his exclusive property and managed them as his own.”<sup>23</sup> The aforementioned quote was boldfaced in the book of Péter Tasnádi, showing

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<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>18</sup> *Megkezdődött a Tasnádi-peR*, "Esti Hírlap", 24.06.1994, p. 8.

<sup>19</sup> *Vádiratra várva*, "Cash Flow", 3.01.1994, p. 37-39; P. Tasnádi, *Maffia...*

<sup>20</sup> <<http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20020516tasnadi.html>> (01.11.2015).

<sup>21</sup> *Ajtót nyitott a kommandónak*, "Kurir", 3.10.1993, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> *Nem vagyok keresztapa*, „Mai Nap”, 3.11.1993, p. 3.

<sup>23</sup> P. Tasnádi, *Maffia...*

the absurdity of the charges. According to my understanding, on the one hand since the legal definition of criminal organization is missing, the text provides only a rough definition of organized crime, on the other hand it tells that the illegal economic and employment conditions of the organizations of Tasnádi were not controlled at all. Partially because of this the indictment failed, so a little while after a year he was released from his provisional detention.

Consequently, with the support of his father-in-law, major general Lóriné Láposi, he established the Mesterdetektív ltd., about which Tasnádi thought that, like Comel Trade ltd., it would be responsible for providing security services with the joint cooperation of the police<sup>24</sup>. Tasnádi wanted to enforce a form of alternative legal certainty, and evaluation, which he wanted to incorporate informally into justice, to be able to present himself out of his income of debt collecting as an entrepreneur who is a participant of the legal economic sector. The economist, János Kornai already pointed out in his pamphlet in 1989 that there will be economic operators who will prefer to stay in the gray and the black economy. These, according to Kornai, only have to accept the facts that they are conducting illegal operations, and that if they are tricked, they cannot turn to the police<sup>25</sup>. Tasnádi recognized this market gap and created a supply for those people who would not turn to legal justice. Kornai explained the period of the regime change as transformational crisis. In the face of transformational recession, which was a characteristic of the official economy, organized crime, the second economy found itself in a transformational conjunctural situation. Kornai interpreted the economy of the early 1990s as something that changed from the market of sellers to the market of buyers. The organized crime groups increased the demand with illegal money lending techniques. As a result of the radical restructuring, which took place in the production, the new ideas of those who made their living from illegal activities affected the economic operators as well. After the degradation of the socialist bureaucratic system, because of the slow redevelopment, the demand for the non-regulated executor and exactor jobs increases. Due to macroeconomic reasons, keeping the solvency of the state with an artificially increased financial discipline the requirements of the new investments are extraordinarily hard to fulfil. As a result of the underdevelopment of the new banking and financial sector, private loans, primarily in value certain currencies, are extremely popular amongst entrepreneurs who want to implement their new ideas, and for those former second economy operators who wish to invest as well.

He wished to further increase the supply, which he offered, after his release. Before the publication of *Mafia for life or death* the legislator had already had experience as a judgment enforcement officer, since several debtors with valid judgments could not reclaim their demanded money. The LIII. law of

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem.*

<sup>25</sup> J. Kornai, *Indulatos röpirat a gazdasági átmenet ügyében*. Budapest 1989, p. 72.

1994 concerning judicial enforcement, introduced the notion of the independent judgment enforcement officer and the legislation of private debt collector bureaus began as well. However, Tasnádi never became a judgment enforcement officer, but at the end of his book he reviewed the governmental plans concerning this, because as the „*judgment enforcement officer*” of the gray and black zone, he wanted to present himself after his release as if he had only done all of it in the white economy, and the introduction of the legislation would only be there to prove him right. During a civil proceeding the illegal activities of those entrepreneurs and money lenders involved in the gray and black economy might be found out, furthermore their demands are fulfilled at a much slower rate as well. Even Tasnádi himself confirmed that among those people who turned to him, there is a man with criminal records who had to leave the country because of his debts<sup>26</sup>.

Péter Tasnádi, as an economic operator, managed to uphold a protective system independent of the violence monopoly of the state, while famous and popular people risked their own reputation while defending his person in the media. As this is exemplified by an open letter, after his second accusation in 1999, written by artists, sportsmen and entrepreneurs<sup>27</sup>, which relativizes it once and for all who could be a criminal and who is merely an honest, good willing entrepreneur.

### Conclusions:

In the socialist period, organized crime consisted of people who got rich by smuggling or illegal currency exchange in the shortage economy of the period before the regime change, some groups in the catering industry who acquired significant amounts of profit in the second economy and criminal groups who were involved in prostitution and property crimes. These formations used their financial reserves and contacts in the gray and black economy to be able to keep up their illegal undertakings cost-effectively in the face of the negative effects of the transformational crisis after the regime change of Hungary in the 1990s.

In the beginning of the 1990s the leaders of organized crime groups wanted to present themselves as entrepreneurs who are repressed by the arbitrage of the state, because it either does not want to accept their success or does not wish to tolerate it. Due to the slow transformation of the socialist legal order, these criminal groups got the chance to conduct such activities which, at the time, were not resolved by the required legislation of the democratic system, furthermore, they committed criminal offences, which are especially hard to prove or without personal evidence it is outright impossible. Those groups

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<sup>26</sup> P. Tasnádi, *Maffia...*

<sup>27</sup> *Miért került célkeresztbe Tasnádi Péter?*, <[http://index.hu/belfold/tasn\\_level/](http://index.hu/belfold/tasn_level/)> (01.11.2015).

which were managed and operated by debt recovery or illegal money lending, participated in the exploit of tax and other economic supports as well. Although organized crime networks only specialized themselves in a few of the aforementioned types, they had interests in other criminal businesses as well so they maintained contacts with those who represented those businesses. This necessitates the assumption of the existence of criminal networks, which are wider but only loosely connected to each other. The economic crisis and the structural problems, which appeared at the time of the regime change did not make the survival of organized crime groups impossible, but rather gave them such possibilities that were even supported by the speeding up of the social-economic change and slowing down of the legislation, which was to follow it.

### **Summary**

In the socialist period, organized crime consisted of people who got rich by smuggling or illegal currency exchange in the shortage economy of the period before the regime change, some groups in the catering industry who acquired significant amounts of profit in the second economy and criminal groups who were involved in prostitution and property crimes. These formations used their financial reserves and contacts in the gray and black economy to be able to keep up their illegal undertakings cost-effectively in the face of the negative effects of the transformational crisis after the regime change of Hungary in the 1990s.

In the beginning of the 1990s the leaders of organized crime groups wanted to present themselves as entrepreneurs who are repressed by the arbitrage of the state, because it either does not want to accept their success or does not wish to tolerate it. Due to the slow transformation of the socialist legal order, these criminal groups got the chance to conduct such activities which, at the time, were not resolved by the required legislation of the democratic system, furthermore, they committed criminal offences, which are especially hard to prove or without personal evidence it is outright impossible. Those groups which were managed and operated by debt recovery or illegal money lending, participated in the exploit of tax and other economic supports as well. Although organized crime networks only specialized themselves in a few of the aforementioned types, they had interests in other criminal businesses as well so they maintained contacts with those who represented those businesses. This necessitates the assumption of the existence of criminal networks, which are wider but only loosely connected to each other. The economic crisis and the structural problems, which appeared at the time of the regime change did not make the survival of organized crime groups impossible, but rather gave them such possibilities that were even supported by the speeding up of the social-economic change and slowing down of the legislation, which was to follow it.

These organized criminal networks discovered and used the media, which was not anymore under the control of the state, to their own advantage. The representatives of the legal system had to realize that they had to win criminal cases not only in court rooms, but before the public domain of the media as well. Hungary inherited, after the regime change, the intent in the general public for over interpreting, due to getting used to always receiving only bits and pieces of information about everything during the socialist period. The intent to over interpret was inherited primarily due to the mistrust between the new owners of certain media platforms and justice, and the omitting of information for the sake of the efficient operation of investigating officials. But in the eyes of the media, which was experimenting with the buzzwords of the democratic state, this was able to lead to enormous debates or scandals, because it was not supported by the sometimes repressive institutional system of the socialist governmental authority.

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