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**JIHADIST HYBRID WAR AS MILITARY STRATEGY FOR  
AGGRESSIVE NON-STATE RELIGIOUS ACTORS –  
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS  
OF MODERN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS  
(DAESH, TALIBAN AND “CAUCASUS ISLAMIC EMIRATE” CASES)**

**Abstract:**

*Two geostrategically important regions the Caucasus and Central Asia still remain as one of the instable and “blackly” pliable ones from international security perspective. Namely, on case of Afghanistan is very clear case. The country is still considering as a source-drive actor of so-called “Asymmetric Threats” emanated from the “Taliban” movement as a non-state political actor. Jihadist movements’ activation in Afghanistan caused direct military threats toward Central Asia and Caucasus regions and certainly after NATO ISAF mission, the situation could more deteriorate. Among asymmetric threats include – drug smuggling, arms illegal trafficking, export of Political Islam doctrinal scripts, military Jihadist network, international terrorism, etc. Global actors – USA, Russia, NATO, and China are seeking to cope with those challenges stemming from “Taliban” and “Islamic Caliphate” (DAESH) forces as well as “Al-Qaida” and this strategy needs joint efforts together with strategic partners in combating these new military actors at global and regional levels.*

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*The authors are going to describe in the article the DAESH's, the Taliban's and the Caucasus Islamic Emirate's military tactics, sources of financing, war crimes as well as foreign powers' policies and attitudes toward these military non-state aggressive actors over time. Moreover it envisages hybrid warfare component implications in Jihadist military strategic and tactical operational planning.*

**Keywords:**

*Asymmetric warfare, Asymmetric threats, Fourth Warfare Generation, Taliban, ISIS, NATO ISAF, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), DAESH, Deoband movement, CSTO, Vilayat "Khorasan", Jihadist Military Strategy, hybrid warfare*

## Introduction

There are many transformations in developing and understanding of true content of Military Strategy and new realities have delivered fresh trends in analyzing, planning, performing and reviewing combat operations in contemporary period of time. The transformation in Military Strategic Thoughts is affiliated with new conception of the Fourth Generation Warfare, exactly adopted at the turn of 20<sup>th</sup> and the 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. According to some academic conceptualizations – Fourth Generation Warfare is defined as military conflicts which involve the following elements:

- high technology
- terrorism
- a non-national or transitional base
- a direct attack on enemy's culture
- highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media
- deliver of a high-intensity, short duration attack and creating a sense of vulnerability, debilitation and abasement in the enemy<sup>3</sup>.

In addition to that as a part of Fourth Generation Warfare as a non-combat tactical elements is being considered – Drug smuggling case as Actor-Cantered

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<sup>3</sup> W. Lind, *Understanding Fourth Generation War*, "Military Review", September-October, 2004, pp. 12-16.

Asymmetric Challenges<sup>4</sup> (*see below Jihadist Drug Transit case*). There is quite new approach what are to be formulating in waging a war and what kind of criteria for the Fourth Generation Warfare are to be considering. How far the Military Strategy has been shifting since classical period of its origination since 18<sup>th</sup> century till 21<sup>st</sup> century. In that regard, it is interesting to stress that the Fourth Generation Warfare includes elements of Asymmetric Warfare doctrine that is very plausible for waging wars in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. According to some academic sources, there are many different definitions of the doctrine, but one of them: **Asymmetric Warfare** – *is war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly from or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly*<sup>5</sup>. This is contrast to symmetric warfare, where two powers have similar military power and resources and rely on strategy that are similar overall, differing only in details and execution<sup>6</sup>. A popularity of new war theory in strategic studies, labelled as “hybrid war” is being determined by the importance of globalization effect on global security and contemporary international relations system. Here is to be considered hybrid war phenomenon. Having considered several assumptions, it is possible to identify definition of the hybrid war - **hybrid war** *is primarily based on the ability to target distant objects and processes through non-traditional military means, particularly those critical to state and military functions*<sup>7</sup>. It is important to admit that hybrid war is waging mainly between state and non-state opponents (including terrorists, like “Taliban”, DAESH, etc.) that is fully corresponded to realms of fourth war generation<sup>8</sup>. Herewith is being interested to present the author’s view on identification of hybrid war. **Hybrid War Concept** – *method of waging combat operations by coercive power elements with non-military means and with insurgency tactical components pursuing goal of destroying and demoralizing excessive enemy forces and subverting their will for further resistance*. Hence, hybrid war is indispensable component of the Fourth War generation concept aiming at de-

<sup>4</sup> Actor-Centered Challenge – is treated and considered as new types of threats deriving from actors alike of international terrorist organizations or networks and international criminal organized groups.

<sup>5</sup> P. Bator, *International Conflict Management – Crisis, War and Peace*, “Introduction to Security Studies”, Bratislava 2014, p. 42.

<sup>6</sup> I. Arrenguín-Toft, *How to Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict*, “International Security”, Vol. 26, 2001, pp. 93-128.

<sup>7</sup> Y. Danyk, T. Maliarchuk, Ch. Briggs, *Hybrid War: High-tech, Information and Cyber Conflicts*, “Connections. The Quarterly Journal, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes”, Vol. 16, No. 2, Spring 2017, p. 6.

<sup>8</sup> W. Lind, *op. cit.*

structed enemies political will and culture for continuous further resistance. In this respective manner, the combination of the modern warfare strategy could be identified as the following:

### **Fourth War Generation Doctrine – Asymmetric Warfare Strategy – Hybrid War Concept**

As it is known the Fourth War Generation was originated in 1980s of the last century and the modality has been reflected post-Westphalia Peace realities and those world order been re-shaped after the “Cold War” period and hence, a close examination of the of the Fourth War Generation provides an opportunity to expose fallacies common about war – past, present and future<sup>9</sup>. Even though there is very short description what are difference between War Generation Warfare approaches. First generation is affiliated with massed manpower, second generation with firepower, third generation with manoeuvre strategy and tactics priority and the fourth with insurgency form combat operations<sup>10</sup>.

The concrete cases of waging asymmetric warfare are seen in Central Asia and in the Caucasus. Due to transformation of military strategy modalities into modern realities where new dimension of Fourth Warfare Generation plays very important provision. In aegis of the military conception, asymmetric warfare is being reserved central-pillar consideration. Namely, all processes linked with recent geostrategic implications and certainly Jihadist asymmetric warfare doctrine are regarded to be sought to be very decisive factor for further analyzing and forecasting in right way events taking place in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan with shadow-shed toward Caucasus region. Therefore is pretty difficult to forecast, based on these latest events, including massive operational attrition in Helmand province, how Western “happy end” scenario in Afghanistan is to be realized. Suffice it to say, the NATO ISAF mission actually was over when Al-Qaida” leader Osama Bin Laden had killed in Pakistani city Karachi and all “Al-Qaida” network left the country moving to these Pakistani regions that are not under the control of the Pakistani government. At large, when the “Al-Qaeda” and DAESH problem have been dissolved, Taliban could not be seen as a challenge to the coalition forces and to the western society at all. Hence, a time has reaped to launch a dialogue with Taliban regarding future political developments in Afghanistan when the NATO ISAF forces leave the country and use a cohabitation strategy, at least backed on the Georgian case-study in

<sup>9</sup> A. J. Echevarria II, *Fourth Generation War and Other Myths*, Strategic Studies Institute, November 2005, pp. 1-2.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibidem*, p. V.

order to promote stability and peaceful resolution of the internal problems in the country. However, the situation in Afghanistan is still stalemate and is boiling with a perspective of “Taliban” military forces full scaled warfare activation all over the country. Afghanistan problem remains in a tray not to step into security dilemma geopolitical dialectics.

### **Warrior Culture as New Concept for Non-State Aggressive Actor Modality – Doctrinal Adaption for Jihadist Military Strategy**

There was no time for celebration, and little time of relaxation among enlightened minds and scarred veterans following the 1991 collapse of one of the greater scourges of mankind. The long awaited “peace dividend” that many in Washington D.C. believed would certainly follow the re-ordering of the world, was indeed short lived. The re-ordered world quickly revealed thinly camouflaged fault-lines in the Balkans, and festering problems in places like Chechnya and Africa<sup>11</sup>. Threats that had bound divergent cultures under one ideology dissolved and disappeared, old memories and wounds were opened, and opportunities arose for the marginalized new type of non-state actors (like terrorist organizations) to gain an opportunity and launch their own geopolitical game.

In some ways, the time was reminiscent of Post-World War II when colonialism receded and downtrodden rose-up. In that period, as colonialism faded, the rising downtrodden were quickly swept into the camp of an ideology that masqueraded as the answer to their problems. Those managers of the workers’ paradise were replaced in the mid-90s by other managers, purveyors of hostility, extremism, and brutalities largely unseen before the Cold War and the sweeping changes in communications. Exacerbating the problem of vacuum, or lack of order, once the Soviets disappeared, was the attendant collapse of infrastructure, support for infrastructure and a rapidly expanding interconnected world economy where those without and in nefarious environments of drought and famine rapidly became hungrier, poorer and susceptible to extremism. But a key, driving and unifying factor replacing colonialism, feeding the fires of extremism is the use of religion.

How to counter such brutality and difficult adversaries; adversaries not driven by failed ideologies which were a joke to all except doddering, and feeble party chiefs, became the challenge of the West, and particularly the leading champion of the west. Failing states and instability combined with ethnic ha-

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<sup>11</sup> Samuel Huntington addresses fault lines and torn countries in *The Class of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

treds and terrorism became common operating environments. Such operating environments with complexities and ferociousness now openly seen, witnessed and played back on videos and evening news called to leaders for adjustments in doctrine, but also adjustments in language and symbolism. It called for a descriptor or term now applied in text and pop-culture to the bravest and most professional of combatants (as well as the most bloodthirsty and savage). The term “warrior” became historically what we created of it. A term or descriptor for exceptionally heroic fighters and masters at warfare, somewhat rooted in history and becoming a file name for desired attributes. This seemed to be what many in the west deemed as needed – modern day warriors. And the extremist, united by radical Islam are cultivating the title as well<sup>12</sup>. Is it a practical descriptor with reality and value for the west? Is it an appropriate description of what radical Islamist and terrorist are advocating and practicing?

The English term warrior has its origins in a 13<sup>th</sup> century French word – “guerrier” or Middle English “warrior” which seems to have been another way of identifying combatants or fighters<sup>13</sup>. Translations of stories and text to English began to apply the term. English translations of an early work by the Greek, Herodotus, uses the term in describing a class of professional Egyptian soldiers of the Ptolemaic period<sup>14</sup>. In contrast, when we look for the use of the term “warrior” in *The Life of Saladin*, written by Beha Eddin Abu Elmeheasan Yosuf (a disciple and lieutenant of Saladin), and translated into English by C.R. Conder, we see no reference or use of the term<sup>15</sup>. It would seem that the Arabic word equivalent to warrior should appear in a biography one of the most widely recognized fighters for Islam in the period of the Crusades. Islam does have a term, “hirabah” and its practitioners “muharib” which indicates the evil practice of violence by organized force (plunder, rape, and terrorism – the opposite of a just war) and its warriors<sup>16</sup>. However, there are a special code of ethics applicable to Jihadist warrior culture. For example, “Taliban” movement has successfully adopted its own military culture or warrior culture follow up and enforced

<sup>12</sup> T. Lister, *What does ISIS Really Want?*, <<https://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/11/middle-east/isis-syria-iraq-caliphate/index.html>> (30.06.2018).

<sup>13</sup> *Oxford English Dictionary*, <<http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.lib.apsu.edu/view/Entry/22-5874?redirectedFrom=warrior#eid>> (30.06.2018).

<sup>14</sup> Herodotus, *The Histories*, ed. J. Marincola, trans. A. De Selincourt, New York 2014, c. 2.

<sup>15</sup> B. Eddin, *The Life of Saladin*, trans. C.R. Conder, London 1897.

<sup>16</sup> R. D. Crane, *Hirabah vs Jihad*, Islamic Research Foundation, <[http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles\\_301\\_350/hirabah\\_versus\\_jihad.htm](http://www.irfi.org/articles/articles_301_350/hirabah_versus_jihad.htm)> (30.06.2018).

by the “Taliban” warriors in Afghanistan that corresponds to warrior culture phenomenon for non-state religious actors<sup>17</sup>.

Historians, novelist, and movie producers have used the term with great license to depict both good and bad. Most often, the images that come to mind, largely courtesy of the western television and movie industry, are those of muscled, and often painted fighters wielding swords or hammers in combat choreographed to exaggerate thrust and slicing in interest of shock and bloodshed. There is some degree of truth to the method and result for ancient fighters, and even in modern sense, but certainly more so in the former. Historians comfortable in applying the term when describing ancient and medieval fighters more often assert that warriors were those specialized in warfare and sometimes drawn or recruited to a fight for the sake of fame, treasure, or plunder. Sometimes armies or units of warriors could be enticed to aid in a campaign or battle if lands were at stake and alliances could be forged.

It is the plunder, purposeless destruction, and negative application of the term warrior which turns-away critics of modern American and Western use of the term<sup>18</sup>. But we have not heard dissent from Islamic circles about the use of the term for their combatants. The medieval or older usage was also applied to those fighting for people, nations and faith. Application also usage also contained those more accepted reasons.

While the older, traditional application of the term is not completely replaced in the west, there is certainly more emphasis on the value of the term for the discipline and resilience that a “warrior ethos” or warrior values lends in the morale and image for western combatants. More specifically, it downplays or diminishes the use of the term soldiers and servicemen (or women) preferring instead the term more leaders believe reflective of the lifestyle and dedication requirements asked of those in military uniform today. But it is also a term that the American people have directly or indirectly embraced in the collective way of looking at conflict and the military – in essence, a warrior strategic culture.

The warrior strategic culture is not the citizen-soldier concept that was comfortable and useful in the long Cold War, but it has adequately met the needs of America’s fight against extremism and efforts to stabilize collapsing nations and circumstances; however, not without times of stress and concern.

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<sup>17</sup> A. Brahimi, *The Taliban’s Evolving Ideology*, LSE Global Governance, Working Paper WP 02/2010, University of Oxford, July 2010, p. 14.

<sup>18</sup> T. Ricks, *What’s a soldier? What’s a warrior? Well do you want to live in a state or a tribe?*, <<https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/15/whats-a-soldier-whats-a-warrior-well-do-you-want-to-live-in-a-state-or-in-a-tribe/>> (30.06.2018).

Over the more recent long war there have been points where capabilities were strained, but the operations to stabilize have often included engagements and missions against extremism – Islamic extremism, and this is a comfortable fit for the ethos and the popular image that the warrior culture embraces. The environment is often against religious zealots, and in counter-insurgencies that feed the romantic notions of elite, limited numbers of professionals taking the fight to the foreign places fight against extremism<sup>19</sup>. The narrative and language is woven through Army and Marine Corps doctrine, as professionals are frequently reminded of the ethos and skills, as well as determination they will need to demonstrate in order to defeat the foe<sup>20</sup>. The message is also carried by political leaders and pundits<sup>21</sup>. But just as the environment and language/narrative fit comfortably with the strategic culture the American public has embraced, the extremist are also comfortable with the image and enthusiasm a warrior culture promotes<sup>22</sup>.

### **The Central Asia-Caucasus Regions under Jihadist Threat – Afghanistan Case-Study: Taliban’s Military Strategy in Action**

In midst April of 2016 in Afghanistan, “Taliban” movement reshuffled its local political and military structures and began coordinating its operations with the ISIS-sponsored “Khorasan” Vilayat and the “Haqqani” Jihadist grouping. With these new forces at its disposal, it began to launch a massive strategic operation, called “OMAR”, in various parts of the country. “Taliban” this strategic operation met with initial success in Kunduz and Badakhshan Provinces. On the back of this, the “Haqqani” element launched three large asymmetric warfare urban strikes in Kabul – against Spanish, Russian and American Embassies and the Ministry of Defense and National Intelligence Agency buildings in which over 64 people were killed and 350 injured<sup>23</sup>.

<sup>19</sup> M. Cox, *Army Launches New Warriors Wanted Campaign Aimed at Generation Z*, <[www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/10/19/army-launches-new-warriors-wanted-campaign-aimed-generation-z.html](http://www.military.com/dodbuzz/2018/10/19/army-launches-new-warriors-wanted-campaign-aimed-generation-z.html)> (30.06.2018).

<sup>20</sup> Department of the Army, *FM3-24-MCWP 3-33.5, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, June 2014.

<sup>21</sup> R. Peters, *Fighting for the Future: Will America Triumph*, Mechanicsburg 1999.

<sup>22</sup> M. Van Vugt, *ISIS and the Real Reason why Young Muslim Men Join the Jihad: The Male Warrior Phenomenon*, <https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/naturally-selected/201409/isis-and-the-real-reason-why-young-muslim-men-join-the-jihad> > (30.06.2018).

<sup>23</sup> *Afghanistan in Turmoil and Central Asia – The Caucasus Facing Jihadist Threat*, “The Georgian Times”, No. 5(1568), April 29, 2016.



Unfortunately the Afghan governmental crisis and inter-clan and tribal clashes have encouraged and facilitated the success of the “Taliban” operation. This has been confirmed by the Western mass-media means – for instance, CNN has stated: “The Taliban do look a lot like they are winning. It is a grotesque slow grind, their pursuit of victory... Little of this could have been avoided, but much of it was predictable. The West simply ran out of funds and appetite for the battle, and left Afghanistan to come to its own devices... So what is left? Taliban’s current gains mean they are unlikely to imminently change their current disinterest in talks”<sup>24</sup>. Even Russia has expressed deep concern regarding the situation in Afghanistan and has created a joint anti-Taliban military coalition with Uzbekistan designed to prevent “Taliban” spill-over into the Central Asia region and held a massive drill in Tajikistan for the same purpose, theoretically under the auspices of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)<sup>25</sup>.

As CNN implied, all this might have been predictable because it is a repeat of what happened in spring 2015 after the ISAF mission concluded. Then the “Taliban” launched a massive campaign of attrition against the central government of Afghanistan from both the North and South, trying to seize the most important parts of the country<sup>26</sup>. Several key cities – Kabul, Kunduz and Kandahar – were attacked simultaneously, and the Supreme Court headquarters were raided. The “Taliban” has now taken control of roughly 60% of the country, and is continuing to advance.

On 18 May of 2015 “Taliban” and “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan” (IMU) units suddenly retook more than 80% of one of the influential province of Afghanistan – Badakhshan province which borders Tajikistan. This was the first time the “Taliban” had officially approached the Central Asia region since 2001, when US military units toppled the “Taliban” government. Since then “Taliban” formations have been reinforced by new units from North Waziristan (Pakistan) and though rebuffed by local Turkmen tribe volunteers, they have advanced to the northern parts of Afghanistan and really threaten to regional security in the Central Asia.

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<sup>24</sup> M. K. Bhadrakumar, *Out-of-the-box thinking needed to ease the pain of Taliban takeover in Afghanistan*, “Asian Times”, April 25, 2016.

<sup>25</sup> J. Kucera, *After Putin-Karimov Meeting, Disagreements on Afghanistan Remain*, <<http://www.eurasianet.org/node/78511>> (30.06.2018).

<sup>26</sup> N. P. Walsh, *Analysis: Afghanistan must recognize “Taliban” are winning*, <<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/04/20/asia/afghanistan-escalation-analysis/>> (30.06.2018).

Badakhshan province is considered the richest in Afghanistan, as apart from its famous black pearl deposits it has some gas and oil reserves and produces a massive heroin crop. Moreover, it borders the “Mountainous Badakhshan Autonomous Republic” of Tajikistan, China and Pakistan. The government of Tajikistan and its President Imamoli Rakhmanov has called for an immediate meeting of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and taken concrete measures to put a collective defense operation into motion, in line with the CSTO’s mission. The “Taliban”’s approach to Central Asia also causes geopolitical problems to Russia, which is supposed to guarantee political security to its Central Asian allies<sup>27</sup>.

After the suspending of the NATO ISAF mission the “Taliban” almost gained control of all the Northern provinces of Afghanistan, including Mazari-Sharif and Kunduz. This and the NATO-Russia tensions expressed through Russia’s refusal to transit NATO ISAF military cargos via the Russian Federation, the closing so-called “Northern Route” of the NATO transit and Russia’s cancelation of so-called ‘SOFA’ agreement, has created a doubly threatening situation for Russia. The “Taliban” is closely associated with such clandestine Islamic radical organizations as IMU and “Xizb-u-Tekhran” and these have given each other logistical support to launch massive intrusions into Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan which have a real possibility of deposing the local authoritarian regimes and installing theoretical ones, similar to those of the “Taliban” and DAESH.

Encroachment into the Central Asian countries has also given the “Taliban” leadership the chance to expand the network of smuggling transit routes to regional and international “black heroin” markets, including that of Georgia. How the “Taliban” can use the Georgian territory for its purposes was demonstrated in summer of 2014 when was confiscated 2.79 tons of Afghani liquid heroin run by the “Taliban” traders?

The “Taliban” has now almost seized second city in Afghanistan Kandahar and is getting ever closer to Kabul. All these factors have forced the incumbent Afghan government to begin negotiations with “Taliban” leadership and the President of Afghanistan Ashraf Gani first appealed in 2015 to all the local Afghan influential warlords, including local commanders affiliated to “Taliban” movement to come to a consensus for the sake of national reconciliation and

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<sup>27</sup> *The Taliban Returns: New Geopolitical Game in Central Asia*, “The Georgian Times”, No. 10(1553), May 30, 2015.

stability in the country<sup>28</sup>. However, the “Taliban” is continuing its campaign and is only interested in retaking power by force, which is now a very real possibility.

It is interesting to consider why the “Taliban” has become so active and gained the support it needs to conduct these campaigns. The reasons could be expressed as follows:

- NATO ISAF mission has ended and its military contingent has been steadily diminished. It now consists of only around 50 thousands peacekeepers, including almost 900 Georgians, who are deploying in these turbulent provinces. This has increased the “Taliban’s” motivation to topple the present Afghan government as they did the Communist government of Najibullah in 1989-1992. The local Afghanis government with its national Army are not strong enough to counter with strongly reinforced “Taliban” movement;
- The “Taliban” wishes to expand its heroin transit potency and take control of the rest of the country as it could make up to \$5 billion per year by doing this. For that sort of bonus, any sort of terrorist organizations or hybrid semi-governmental political actor could go for broke. Under the hybrid semi-governmental political actor could be considered notable “Taliban” movement due to keeping legal power in the country in 1996-2001 and remained some elements of semi-governmental structures (like local governors) to re-gain control over seized territories after the movement toppled after the NATO-led military campaign in 2001. Actually “Taliban” can readily been seen as a state falling under Islamist dominion<sup>29</sup> and hence, could be treated as hybrid semi-governmental actor. The “Taliban” needs these funds to enlarge the scope of its operational, financial and military capabilities and thus gain greater opportunity of coming to power again;
- The “Taliban” is in conflict with the “Islamic Caliphate” (IC)-DAESH, which is encroaching onto its territory from Iran’s Khorasan province. The DAESH wishes to create a new political entity in the territories under its control – the State of DAESH. Therefore “Taliban” is seeking to regain power in Kabul Quickly. The DAESH is also seeking to ap-

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<sup>28</sup> V. Felbab-Brown, *Blood and Hope in Afghanistan: A June 2015 Update*, <<http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2015/05/26-isis-taliban-afghanistan-felbabbrown>> (30.06.2018).

<sup>29</sup> Ch. C. Harmon, A. N. Pratt, S. Gorka, *Toward a Grand Strategy Against Terrorism*, New York 2011, p. 239.

proach the borders of the Central Asian region, and then simultaneously expand into the South and North Caucasus areas and hence the Caspian, in order to complete its mission – to establish a true “Caliphate Statehood” at global level. However, it is possible that the DAESH with local vilayat “Khorasan” and “Taliban” could forget their rivalry and enmity and undertake common missions, as they share a common ideological base, Salafism, despite the DAESH adherence to the Wahhabism version and the “Taliban’s” preference for the Deoband variety of ultra-radical trend, in some case labeled as “un-Islamic”<sup>30</sup>. Moreover, the “Taliban” adapters and warriors (fighters) are products of religious madrassas in Pakistan whose roots go back to the Dar-ul-Uloom seminary in Deoband, India<sup>31</sup>. The Jihadist entities have in common fierce battle against West and notable in Afghanistan, post-ISAB NATO led and the American military forces together with local Afghanistan national government. Moreover, in Afghanistan and in Pakistan Tribal Belt there is a practice among the local tribes reaching so-called “temporary union” when ones are in rival and having considered “temporary union opportunity between DAESH and “Taliban” structures against the NATO-led and national governmental forces to achieve common missions at national level. By the way, in 2014 namely the “Taliban” leadership proposed to DAESH leadership such type of rapprochement against Western coalition in the Middle East<sup>32</sup>;

- The “Taliban” is looking to expand from a regional into a global force. This would enable it to compete for leadership of the coalition of Islamic radical organizations and thus subvert DAESH and its leadership. The “globalization” phenomenon for the “Taliban” determined by the interactions with the leadership of the movement by the global power centres – the USA and Russia and partially recognition as an important non-state actor for negotiation party<sup>33</sup>. Moreover, the “Taliban” movement engages in world-wide drug and arms smuggling operations that

<sup>30</sup> S. H. Akhlaq, *Taliban and Salafism: a historical and theological exploration*, <<https://www.opendemocracy.net/sayed-hassan-akhlaq/taliban-and-salafism-historical-and-theological-exploration>> (30.06.2018).

<sup>31</sup> *Deobandi Islam: The Religion and Taliban*, <[https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/Deobandi\\_Islam.pdf](https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2001/Deobandi_Islam.pdf)> (30.06.2018).

<sup>32</sup> “Taliban” predlozhl voyenny soyuz “Islamskomugosudarstvu”, “Politike” <<https://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/10/2014/5430d4fbcbb20f0df1822e49>> (30.06.2018).

<sup>33</sup> S. Ramani, *Why Has Russia Invited the Taliban to Moscow – the proposed “Moscow-format” talks advance Russia’s interests in Afghanistan*, “The Diplomat”, <<https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/why-has-russia-invited-the-taliban-to-moscow/>> (30.06.2018).

also makes it position as a global non-state religious political actor in “black transaction” geopolitics.

In that volatile situation in Afghanistan is to be considered how long the Georgian peacekeepers in aegis of the ISAF should be staying and in time when “Taliban” and IC reinforce its positions in the country and could directly threat to the Georgian contingent whether is possible at least to downsize the Georgian presence in the country. This is to be decided by the incumbent government of Georgia. Here is concluded a chart based on “Taliban” case-study demonstrate how Jihadist Military Doctrine operates:

*Fig. 1: Jihadist Military Doctrine – conceptual framework.*



Source: own work.

### **Georgia and “Islamic Caliphate” Challenge – From New “Jihadist” Drug Smuggling Perspective**

As it is known, the word “Jihad” as a political jargon with its full geopolitical content with massive understanding to public audience, has entered into common usage in the USA in the wake of September 11, 2001. Politicians use it to conjure up terrifying images of irrational foreigners coming to destroy

American freedoms and whole the Western ones<sup>34</sup>. Lately interesting information was disseminated about emergence of rivalry trend between Afghani “Taliban” movement and Arabic “Islamic Caliphate” leadership, derived from personal mistreatment and confrontation. Mainly having common ideology background rested on Salafiyyah religious indoctrination – “Taliban” oriented on Deobandism trend of the Salafiyyah doctrine and “Islamic Caliphate” is on Wahhabism trend. However, the one of the disagreement issues between strategic allies - pursuing common mission – domination of Islamic Shariah (the term refers to God’s law in its divine and revealed sense. This is related to FIQH, which is the human process of understanding and implementing the law) principles and norms among the Muslim community – could be considered differences in committing Global Jihad and controlling most important territories where heroin plantation are cultivated. As it is known, the drug transit and smuggling is also sought to be a crucial part of the Global Jihad against Crusaders and Jews how the Salafysts claim to declare from consideration of biological asymmetric warfare strategy aiming to destroy enemy’s society with “non-lethal-heroin consumption” capabilities. Hence, Drug trafficking, having not only mission to gain much financial revenue flows to successfully attain Jihad strategic goals, implies to reach concrete ideological and political subversive goals in culturally and morally destroy enemy will. This is presumable could be considered as one of the reasons why ‘Taliban’ and ‘Islamic Caliphate’ interests intercrossed and clashed toward each other’s. Based on some information, “Islamic Caliphate” controlled combat groups have infiltrated into Afghanistan territories, mainly in south and south-eastern provinces of the country controlled by the “Taliban” movement and mainly known as most famous by its heroin cultivation crop areas from where annually ‘Taliban’ and its allied drug cartel clans do earn more than roughly \$5-8 billion pure net revenues. For sure, appearance of the regions, the DAESH combat units came from Iranian Khorasan Region and consisted mainly the North Caucasian fighters without advance notification the ‘Taliban’ representatives, could be a substantial reason for conflict inspiration scenario development. Moreover, after reinforcement of its presence at the North and South Caucasus regions, the DAESH is seeking to get under its control not only the regions where heroin is cultivating but also the regions where it is transited.

As it is known, ‘Taliban’ intensively used the drug transit routes crossing by the whole Caucasus area, including the Georgian territory. Quite recently the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia has disseminated interest-

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<sup>34</sup> D. Cook, *Understanding Jihad*, Berkley and Los Angeles 2005, p. 1.


ing information leaflets, saying that - "2.79 tons of liquid heroines was seized from a cargo truck that entered into Georgia from Azerbaijan, the Georgian Interior Ministry said on July 11. The seizure represents the biggest ever drug hauls in Georgia, according to the Interior Ministry. It said that two citizens of Georgia were arrested. The truck, according to the Interior Ministry, was carrying 30-litre 92 plastic barrels filled with illegal substance containing 80% of heroin. Drugs, worth of "hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars", was intended for international transit and was en-route to Turkey, the Georgian Interior Ministry said.<sup>35</sup>" As it is known, The DAESH has elaborated a "Caucasian Strategy for Wedging Jihad". This was drawn up between July and October 2014 and is coordinated by a specific warlord, most probably the well-known North Caucasus jihadist "Black Ahmad", who is very well known in Georgia. A Key Mentor (Amir Supyan, another very well-known North Caucasus warlord), coordinates the pursuit of this strategy and its accompanying action plan at regional level. Approximately \$50-70 million has been allocated for this purpose by the DAESH authorities<sup>36</sup>.

Very soon it has been evident fact that the drug transit belonged to the Afghani "Taliban" movement that had forced to use the "northern transit route" (see the above map) and picked up the most shortest route to ship out original liquid heroine in order to get a large amount of money to reinforce its military capability (hire more mercenaries, purchase armaments, etc.) to intensify military operations at regional and national levels, in conjunction with Pakistani "Taliban" and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) when the NATO ISAF completes its mission at the end of 2014. The route probably comprises the following: Afghanistan-Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey with last destination spot probable in the Southern European country where it would be manufactured at a special underground laboratory into final product (in Afghanistan the sodden liquid heroin flowering period of time ended in June of 2014).

<sup>35</sup> See in <[http://www.civil.ge/eng\\_old/article.php?id=27473](http://www.civil.ge/eng_old/article.php?id=27473)> (30.06.2018).

<sup>36</sup> V. Maisaia, *Neo-Wahhabism as a Military Threat to the Caucasus Regional Security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, "Nowy Prometeusz", II/2018, Warsaw, p. 17.

Map 1. Northern transit route.



Source: own work.

The “Jihadist Drug” – labelled as “Allah’s Tears” - is another source of threat emanation in a way of possible retaliation of the forces stood behind of the transaction. Notable it could be comprised of narco-cartels (for example, Kandahar or Karachi “drug-mafia” with annual illegal profit of \$2-3 billion) and cooperated very closely with local “Taliban” warlords. By the way, in June of 2013 when the Georgian peacekeepers were assaulted in Helmand province with heavy casualties on the Georgian side with high probability had been performed by the “Karachi narco-mafia” militant groups in support of the “Taliban” special intelligence service “Mukhabarat” in order to provide safe deliver of the heroine freight from Helmand province to Karachi sea port. A combination of the two events has sparked a logical conclusion of possible threat development organized from the forces. The forces are very serious ones and their linkage with internationally acted radical Islamic-Jihadist network is evident. In its turn, the network has been formed and created in the following chart manner:

The “Allah’s Tears” was “know-how” of the leader of so-called “Kandahar’s Grouping – Clan” of “Taliban” Mulla Bashir (Jami Bashir Nurzai). From



50 kg is elaborated 1 litre of liquid heroin. It is possible to be smuggled in way of tea and sugar or even liquid soap<sup>37</sup>.

By and large, soon the “Taliban” and “Islamic Caliphate” could reach consensus and make a deal on the topic and with the perspective it could be too difficult to confront with “Jihad Drug” smuggling problem at the regional level. Hence, the “Georgian Jihadist Black Transit” case-study could be converted in possible scenario developments not only “Jihadist” transit but also “Jihadist Drug” transit problem too. Generally, the “Black Jihadist Transit” reality is to be treated as a real scenario when well-known Jihadist warlord Akhmed Chatayev and his two lieutenants from DAESH command security structures raided Georgia and killed by the Georgian Anti-Terrorist Center Commando units on 22 November 2017<sup>38</sup>.

### Summary

Due to transformation of military strategy modalities into modern realities where new dimension of Fourth Warfare Generation plays very important provision. In aegis of the military conception, Asymmetric warfare is being reserved central-pillar consideration. Namely, all processes linked with recent geostrategic implications and certainly Jihadist Asymmetric warfare doctrine is to be sought to be very decisive factor for further analyzing and forecasting in right way events taking place in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan with shadow-shed toward Caucasus region. Herewith is pretty difficult to forecast, based on these latest events, including massive operational attrition in Helmand province, how western “happy end” scenario in Afghanistan is to be realized. Suffice it to say, the NATO ISAF mission actually was over when in Pakistani city Karachi was killed “Al-Qaida” leader Osama Bin Laden and all “Al-Qaida” network left the country and moved to Pakistani regions that are not under the control of the Pakistani government. At large, when the “Al-Qaeda” problem has been dissolved, Taliban could not be seen as a challenge to the coalition forces and to the western society at all. Hence, a time has reaped to launch a dialogue with Taliban regarding future political development in Afghanistan when the NATO ISAF forces leave the country and use a cohabitation strategy, at least backed

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<sup>37</sup> See: M. Arunova, Z. Nabiev, *Afghanistan: Problem of Terrorism*, [in:] *Terrorism – Threat to Mankind in 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Moscow 2003.

<sup>38</sup> *Georgian authorities confirm Akhmed Chatayev died in November 22 Tbilisi siege*, “Democracy and Freedom Watch”, <<https://dfwatch.net/authorities-confirm-akhmed-chatayev-died-siege-49539>> (30.06.2018).

on the Georgian case-study in order to promote stability and peaceful resolution of the internal problems in the country. However, the situation in Afghanistan is still stalemate and is boiling with a perspective of “Taliban” military forces full scaled warfare activation all over the country territories. Afghanistan problem remains in a tray not to step into security dilemma geopolitical dialectics. In that respect is worthy to note that in contemporary international politics emerged new entities – non-state political actors vastly growing their role in the international system<sup>39</sup>. In another way, inside of the actors are identified also special type sub-actors that are known as non-state religious actors, including “Al-Qaida”, “Lashkar-e-Taiba” and “Tablighi Jamaat” – have sought to develop their transnational links and have had, as a result, significant impacts on international relations<sup>40</sup>. The actors that are not linked with state and are quasi-military entities are tailoring and exploiting their own version of military strategy – labelled as Jihadist military strategy that is part of the Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW).

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<sup>39</sup> P. Hough, S. Malik, A. Moran, B. Pilbeam, *International Security Studies: Theory and Practice*, New York 2015, p. 441.

<sup>40</sup> J. Haynes, *An Introduction to International Relations and Religion*, London 2013, pp. 94-96.

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