

# Ludwik Wciórka

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## Personalism and Evolution

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Collectanea Theologica 51/Fasciculus specialis, 137-150

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1981

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LUDWIK WCIÓRKA, POZNAŃ

## PERSONALISM AND EVOLUTION

The rough analysis of the whole contemporary literature concerning man proves, that in anthropological reflexion occurs difference between the fact of human being and the philosophical interpretation of that fact<sup>1</sup>. However, the question is discussive to what a degree the practical separation of those two, theoretically different problems, is possible. It seems to be difficult to present the human fact without its simultaneous involving in determined philosophical conceptions, being at the same time the interpretation of the mentioned fact. The problem of man as a person and connected tendencies concerning the understanding of mere person are the expression of specific interpretation of human fact. Hence, no wonder, that apprehensions of man as person may differ as much as at Maritain, Mounier, Marcel, Sartre, or Teilhard de Chardin.

Teilhard's de Chardin approach deserves special notice. In contradistinction to Maritain, apprehending the question of man as a person in categories of tomistic metaphysics, or Marcel's conception inspired conspicuously by Kierkegaard's conception and by Husserl's phenomenologic method, Teilhard de Chardin joins explicitly the idea of person with — in his own way comprehended — doctrine of evolutionism. He himself names it rather the scientific phenomenology of the world and deprecates, that opinions composing it do just generate. „They are not to be treated as commonly accepted and ultimately finished. What do I propose — he wrote — is to be rather treated more as suggestions, than as justified statement.”<sup>2</sup>

Phenomena are — in substance — the object of that scientific phenomenology of the world, that means that, what consists the domain of direct experience<sup>3</sup>, namely positively given facts and experimentally established between them relations.<sup>4</sup> But, Teilhard does not limit himself to such determination of phenomenon. He

<sup>1</sup> M. Gogacz, *Jak uprawiać egzystencjalno-tomistyczną filozofię człowieka*, in: *Aby poznać Boga i człowieka*, part 2: *O człowieku dzisiaj*, Warszawa 1974, p. 136.

<sup>2</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *La place de l'homme dans l'univers*, in: *Oeuvres de Teilhard de Charin*, vol. 3. Paris 1957, p. 306.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Le phénomène humain*, *Ibid.* *Oeuvres*, vol. 1, Paris 1955, p. 54.

tries to define more precisely the very structure of phenomenon as phenomenon, surpassing at the same time the, proper for the mere phenomenon, sphere of original, not reflexive, empirical datum. As he writes, phenomenon is, taking it most generally, any thing as much as it remains in cognitive relation to any subject.<sup>5</sup> That definition is not, in Teilhard's opinion, new. He sees in Kant the precursor of such conception and still earlier in medieval authors<sup>6</sup>, remaining under the influence of neo-platonic doctrine included in *Liber de causis*.<sup>7</sup> In modified and also differently interpreted form, that doctrine was expressed by medieval authors in, often repeated dictum: „every being accepted by other being is accepted by it in the way proper for the accepting being.”<sup>8</sup> However, trying the case on its merits, Teilhard, considering as essential for phenomenon the relation of thing to the cognizing subject, is far from medieval thinkers' apprehensions, though close to Kant's thought. He leans but to the doctrine, according to which the constitutive factor of phenomenon is not only the very thing, or process apprehended by sensitive receptors, but rather the cognizing subject, which data obtained by the way of sensitive reception, adequately transforms, so that in phenomenon there is at least as much from subject, as is in it of perceived thing in sensitive experience.<sup>9</sup> That reminds Kant's sentence from *Critique of Pure Reason*: "reason enters in that only what it creates according to its own idea."<sup>10</sup> Teilhard de Chardin finds the evidence for that statement in contemporary physics. „Reaching certain range and obtaining determined degree of precision — he writes — constructions of contemporary physics allow evidently to grasp in phenomena the intellectual factor brought into them by the very scientist. That generates the supposition that fotons, protons and electrons and other elementary material particles possess no more (or less) reality besides our thought, than colore besides our sight.”<sup>11</sup>

However, Teilhard comprehending in such a way the structure of the very phenomenon, is far from idealistic attitude implicated evidently by Kant. The view expressed by that thinker assumed the acceptance of, at least, two theses: that cognition has in substance active character, depending on constructing of cognition

<sup>5</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *L'énergie humaine*, in: *Oeuvres*, vol. 6, Paris 1962, p. 143.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Conf. *Księga o przyczynach*, transl. Zofia Brzostowska and Mieczysław Gogacz, Warszawa 1970, p. 158.

<sup>8</sup> *S. Th.* 1,75,5.

<sup>9</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

<sup>10</sup> Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Leipzig<sup>2</sup> 1932, p. 18, *cit.* according to polish trans. by Roman Ingarden, *Immanuel Kant, Krytyka czystego rozumu*, vol. 1, Warszawa 1957, p. 26.

<sup>11</sup> Teilhard de Chardin, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

object by cognizing subject, and not on its intentional reproduction in subject; and that extra-subjective reality, which is not restored in subject, is in substance for that subject — incognizable. Hence, Roman Ingarden explains correctly Kant's thought, translating in the above mentioned fragment the Kantian expression: "nach ihrem Entwürfe hervorbringt" by "according to its idea produces."

Teilhard de Chardin was conscious of these idealistic implications in, developed from Kant's inspiration, phenomenon interpretation<sup>12</sup>, but he himself was far from those interpretations. Paying but attention to the role of subjective factors in phenomenon structure, Teilhard considered one essential, in idealistically comprehended phenomenon conceptions not perceived, or underestimated, moment. Namely, without referring to subject, it is impossible to speak about making out the proper sense of experimentally accessible data. It is difficult to find out the mentioned sense by the analysis of particular phenomena, treated as closed in itself whole. But it reveals when they are interpreted as connected among themselves fragments of larger body.<sup>13</sup> That body becomes then one enormous phenomenon, the sense of which is not to be understood without its referring to subject. Teilhard de Chardin will tell in connection with that, than man as cognizing subject is not only the center of perspective in the glance on world, but finds himself in the center of the very world construction.<sup>14</sup> It does not mean that human cognition of world is marked by inevitable subjectivism. It is but not the question of certain world constructing from data of exterior experience, as comprehended Kant, but of revealing, in such integral phenomenon comprehension the inseparable bond between world as that is cognized and subject as he who cognizes. There is no world without man, as there is no man without world.<sup>15</sup> In the act of cognition world is intentionally restored in subject. However, the mentioned restoration does not mean the negation of real, extra-subjective being — on the contrary — it implies the existence of such world. Without it it would be impossible to speak about its intentional restoration in very subject. Moreover, it is not the question of single events or processes, but of the whole of factual or possible observation data, constituting the world. That whole becomes a phenomenon for the subject, the richer because comprising particular events and processes and their mutual interdependencies and links, allows the reading out of their proper sense by man. In such meaning, man as cognizing subject, is the cen-

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* Conf. also: *Le phénomène humain*, p. 26.

<sup>13</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Le phénomène humain*, p. 26.

<sup>14</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

<sup>15</sup> „Object et sujet s'enfoncent et se transportent mutuellement dans l'acte de connaissance" (*ibid.*, 26).

ter of world structure, as the proper world sense as a whole reveals to him.

In Teilhard's de Chardin comprehension the integrally apprehended phenomenon proves very clearly defined evolutionary measure. It is impossible — he stated — to speak about world as phenomenon without considering its evolutionary development in time. Even more, it is impossible to understand the world without considering its evolutionary measure. Therefore, he wrote that the idea of evolution was not only a theory, system, or hypothesis, but something more than that, namely the general principle of thinking, to which must correspond all theories, systems, or hypotheses.<sup>16</sup> That statement is for Teilhard the basis for rather far-reaching conclusions concerning the way of proceeding in science. Science, out of its essence proves, in Teilhard's opinion, the analytical character. The explanation of more complex material structures is performed by referring to the elements constituting those structures.<sup>17</sup> Such procedure is an essential factor, but not the only in world explanation. It is also but indispensable — according to the just cited sentence about evolution as fundamental basis of interpretation of events occurring in the world — to consider the evolutionary measure of things, presenting how it came to the formation of the analyzed thing. That measure deciding about reverse than analytical proceeding in cognition process, proves the synthetic character and is the second from necessary and deciding activities in world interpreting and understanding. To comprehend the world, that means not only to find out the elements constituting that world, but to understand the mechanism of evolutionary changes forming that world. World is not only the determined structure, where to cognition analysis is indispensable, but also the genesis, the understanding of which demands synthetic proceeding. Hence, the principle of evolutionary interpretation is the basic postulate of scientific proceeding, and as such it must extend on processes connected with plant and animal world formation, on cosmos genesis, appearance of life, and even on development of social and cultural structures. Therefore, it has a very broad range of application and refers to, strictly speaking, all cognition fields. Such generality is also the basis for treating the whole world as phenomenon, in scope of which particular events and processes appear as elements, from subject's point of view, reasonable and allowing but to understand that whole.

Generality, as concerns the scope of Teilhard's idea of evolution, is one of its characteristic elements. Convergence is its succes-

<sup>16</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *op. cit.* p. 242.

<sup>17</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Science et Christe ou analyse et synthese*. in: *Oeuvres*, vol. 9, Paris 1965, p. 56.

sive trait. It implies at first, that processes of evolutionary changes are directional. They run in certain determined direction, from sets structurally simple and functionally not composed to sets structurally more and more composed and functionally more and more differentiated. However, such conception of directional inclination of evolution is not specific for Teilhard de Chardin only. The elements of in such a way comprehended evolution are to be found at Henri Bergson<sup>18</sup>, and also in marxism. It corresponds also to some degree to the determination, to which came the participants of symposium organized in the year 1959 — on the occasion of hundredth anniversary of Darwin's publication of *The Origins of Species*.<sup>19</sup> But the dissimilarity of Teilhard's apprehension depends on treating the evolutionary processes not only as directional, hence leading to sets more and more composed as concerns structure, but as processes in the result of which occurs the consciousness increase, being the phenomenon parallel to the degree of material complexity. Teilhard expressed the above statement in known and discussive law of consciousness — complexity.<sup>20</sup>

However, the appearance of such sets is not ultimate. It is only the transition stage of mere evolution. Particular developmental lines forming in the course of evolutionary changes, lead finally to their union, but not violating the structural and functional separateness of particular sets, representing exactly those lines. On that depends also the convergent character of evolution. In conjunction with generalized evolution conception it appears as process embracing the whole reality, and finally is directed towards man, in whom — as tells Teilhard de Chardin — referring at the same time to Julien Huxley<sup>21</sup>, evolution became conscious of itself.

On the grounds of, in such general way presented scientific world phenomenology, Teilhard's criticism is justified. It is adumbrated in his reflexive thinking, especially in the last years before death, in reference to Husserl's phenomenology and to representatives of contemporary phenomenology and existentialism<sup>22</sup>, developing his thought.

That is the other question to what a degree that criticism is justified. In bottom, however, Teilhard's de Chardin phenomenology

<sup>18</sup> H. Bergson, *Ewolucja twórcza*, transl. Florian Znaniecki, Warszawa 1957, p. 100; conf. also: M. Barthelemy-Madaule, *Bergson et Teilhard de Chardin*, Paris 1963, p. 285; H. de Lubac, *La pensée religieuse du Père Teilhard de Chardin*, Paris 1962, p. 231 footnote 2.

<sup>19</sup> Conf. *Evolution after Darwin*, vol. 3, Chicago 1960, p. 107.

<sup>20</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *L'étoffe de l'univers*, w: *Oeuvres*, vol. 7, Paris 1963, p. 399.

<sup>21</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Le phénomène humain*, p. 244.

<sup>22</sup> Conf. P. Teilhard de Chardin, letter of 11, April, 1953 cit. by cl. D'Armagnac, *Philosophie de la nature et méthode chez le Père Teilhard de Chardin*, Archives de Philosophie 20/1957/ p. 16.

is the apprehension of extra-subjective, proper for natural sciences reality, and not-as in Husserl's case — the analysis of intentional or pure consciousness of subject. Teilhard is more interested in that what is given to the consciousness, than in the analysis of, how is given. The juxtaposition of own conceptions with Husserl's doctrine and deriving from him philosophical tendency seems not justified, the more so the critical reservations leveled against that tendency.

Besides the idea of scientific world phenomenology and conception of convergent evolution, the successive element in Teilhard's conception of person is — connected with evolution idea as its essential factor — process of spiritualization. Generally, that factor rouses most reservations towards Teilhard's de Chardin thought. Evolution was but most often interpreted as fundamental argument for materialistic conception of the world.<sup>23</sup> However, Teilhard, on the grounds of consciousness-complexification law, takes the view, that evolution as generalised and clearly convergent process, tends to greater predominance of psychical factor above the material element. Moreover, in that process, he sees the way of surpassing, the weighing heavy upon modern philosophical anthropology, dualism of spirit and matter.<sup>24</sup> Dualism, in Teilhard's de Chardin opinion, was connected with static, in substance, vision of the world. Regression from such vision makes the whole problem of "spirit-matter" report useless. Teilhard is not quite aware, that the roots of the whole problem do not inhere in the static world vision, but reach deeper, namely to the the question of ontic structure of human being, and not only — as it seems to result from scientific world phenomenology — to temporal correlation of phenomena. Indeed, the comprised in those last categories problem of psycho-physical unity of man seems to vanish at all. Teilhard de Chardin in discussing that matter, does not keep consistently the phenomenological sphere, but bases on determined philosophical pre-conceptions, which he does not clearly explicate.

To those but belongs the, used by him, idea of matter.<sup>25</sup> Matter, in Teilhard's de Chardin opinion, that is, before all, not matter in physical sense, but matter in meaning of stuff, being the ground

<sup>23</sup> B. de Solages, *Teilhard de Chardin*, Toulouse 1967, p. 91, conf, also also H. Prosch, *The Genesis of Twentieth Century Philosophy*, Garden City, New York 1966, p. 331—332; R. le Senne, *Introduction à la Philosophie*, Paris 1958, p. 107.

<sup>24</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Le Phénomène humain*, p. 57; also: *Le Phénomène spirituel*, in: *Oeuvres*, vol. 6, p. 127.

<sup>25</sup> Strictly speaking one should perform the more precise analysis of the meaning of that idea, playing such important role in Teilhard's de Chardin thought. Trials of ordering those meaning — conf. Cl. Cuenot, *Nouveau Lexique Teilhard de Chardin*, Paris 1968, p. 117—121.

of evolutionary transformations. It possesses as if two faces.<sup>26</sup> One of them is the psychical factor, the other — the material one. That last, treated as exterior manifestation of cosmic stuff, reveals in dispersion, in plurality.<sup>27</sup> But the psychical, interior part reveals in the course of evolution as the expression of proceeding organization and corpuscularization of that original dispersion.<sup>28</sup>

Evolution is the consolidating process running from the original dispersion state of stuff to its more and more greater, but differentiated unity<sup>29</sup>, hence, gradually during that process must take place the transition from material to spiritual factor. Therefore, evolution may and must be comprehended as the process of increasing world spiritualization.

Just on that ground starts to appear the Teilhard's conception of person, and his thought begins to acquire clear features, not as much a system, but rather of personalistic program.<sup>30</sup> The complexification law, or — as Teilhard names it sometimes — law of "consciousness-complexity" proclaims namely, that human person as the product of universal, convergent evolution process, has but the determined structure; it is composed of elements differentiated in themselves, but as much as they are included in determined structure, they are inseparably united among themselves. Here recurs the thought of above mentioned differentiated unity. The structure, however, developed during evolutionary changes, is not a simple aggregate, but the interior connection of elements, which, in such a way, form the closest synthesis, being not subjected to decomposition,<sup>31</sup> as long as the direction of time lapse does not avert. Hence, structure does not mean the possibility of disintegration.

The increase of interior structure is but followed by — again according to the law consciousness-complexity — the increase of spiritual factor in evolving world. It corresponds with the above mentioned process of increasing spiritualization, where the material structure is the exteriorly palpable expression. But because that structure reached in man its perfection, as it placed him as the center and fiducial point not only in the sphere of cognitive

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<sup>26</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Le phénomène humain*, p. 53, also: *Le phénomène spirituel*, p. 122.

<sup>27</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Les nomes de la matière*, in: *Ecrits du temps de la guerre*, Paris 1965, p. 421.

<sup>28</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *La lutte contre la multitude*, in: *Ecrits du temps de la guerre*, p. 115.

<sup>29</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *La Centrologie*, in: *Oeuvres*, vol. 7, p. 122.

<sup>30</sup> Conf. P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Esquisse d'un Univers Personnel*, in: *Oeuvres*, vol. 6, p. 69—114; *La centrologie*, *Oeuvres*, vol. 7, p. 103—134.

<sup>31</sup> Conf. P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Esquisse d'un Univers Personnel*, *Oeuvres*, vol. 6, p. 75.



world apprehension, but as specific "key" to the whole world structure, hence also the spiritual factor reaches in man the culminating point of the whole biological evolution. The expression of that is the reflexive consciousness, of which man is the carrier and which is the basis of man's liberty.<sup>32</sup>

Therefore, that what decides, according to contemporary and modern philosophy, about person's dignity and what constitutes that dignity, namely consciousness and liberty, is the parallel phenomenon to the obtained in evolution process corpuscularization level and interior being union, at its simultaneous separation from other beings.

Not by chance, Teilhard de Chardin, speaking about human person, speaks about *Incommunicabilitas* as of its essential, constitutive feature, and that as person it is the being in itself. That being is not and can not be — as much as it remains a person — the part of another being. Furthermore, Teilhard de Chardin will stress, that "...man by the very act of own individualization seems to be a being incapable to communicate and incognizable for others, who surround him".<sup>33</sup> Hence, one can tell, that in being order, man as person represents the closed in itself whole, and in cognition order he does not submit to conceptual cognition. The sense of the above statement, however as concerns its first part, is different. Teilhard but speaking about person's "*incommunicabilitas*" does not apprehend it in metaphysical categories, but only in categories of his scientific world phenomenology. Nevertheless, he seems to refer by that denomination to medieval thinkers' conception, for whom "*Incommunicabilitas*" was also the specific feature of personal being.<sup>34</sup> Returning to person's conception as being, which can not communicate anything of its being a person, Teilhard stressed only its unique character. With that character of personal being as personal is also connected its incognizableness. It does not however mean, that man in his personal character can not be cognized at all. It is rather the question of impossibility of his conceptual cognition. Being but the person, he can not — as the person — be treated as the class element, or kind of being. Each idea is but the substitutional sign of the whole class, or kind of the same beings and therefore it can not be referred to its referents otherwise, than to the whole class of the given elements. But person as a person cannot be the element of class. Hence, treating it as class element or kind of being must necessarily lead to specific "loss" of that what is peculiar for person as

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<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Conf. S. Th.* 1,29,3 ad 4; 1,30,4.

a person. Therefore, the conceptual apprehension of person as person escapes man's cognitive endeavours.

"Incommunicabilitas" and "Incomprehensibilitas" connect Teilhard's conception of person with medieval thinkers' opinions, but — on the other hand — his stressing of self-consciousness role, or in other words — consciousness of the "second degree"<sup>35</sup>, resulting from evolution conception as a process tending to develop maximum consciousness in the ground subjected to that process, approximates Teilhard's ideas to contemporary personalistic apprehensions. The reflexive consciousness, characteristic for human person, connects but with liberty conception.<sup>36</sup> Due to that conception, human person, having cognized the exterior towards it determinisms, may subdue them and use for own, chosen by itself purposes. Here, the liberty determination is — as we see — linked with consciousness conception, which implies the reference of subject, bestowed with that consciousness, to itself and to that what is exterior. It is not beforehand, in indispensable way, determined. Its source is the very subject referring creatively to itself, or to that, what constitutes the exterior reality. Hence, for subject, it is connected with the possibility of choice and with autodetermination of own interior and exterior activity. Liberty comprehended in such a way assumes the possibility of world formation, existing independently from man. There by it also emphasizes the existence of limits of its actualizing, dictated by properties of the world constituting the contact of the subject conscious of itself and its activity. Furthermore, Teilhard de Chardin treats liberty not only in static way, as the possibility of choice of constant, in unchangeable world potentially included values, but rather as the task of world humanization by man, as subject holding in that world the superior position, Man, in the scope of such liberty conception, reveals as being immanent to that world, but evidently to that world transcendent. Hence, liberty does not constitute — as even in Sartre's comprehension — the way of being beforehand doomed to fail. Here it is the dynamic liberty. In its actualization man enriches constantly himself, developing through it his own dignity and position in the world. It is not the liberty limited to human individual, for which everything what differs from it, is the unavoidable threat, but it is the open liberty, in the scope of which world is comprehended as field of activity, potentially given to man, and as sphere of tasks, the performance of which is the element of man's development as a man.

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<sup>35</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *La Place de l'Homme dans la Nature*, in: *Oeuvres*, vol. 8, Paris 1958, p. 91.

<sup>36</sup> Conf. F. Copleston, *Osoba ludzka w filozofii współczesnej*, *Znak* 115/1963/ p. 1283.

The conception of in such a way comprehended liberty is therefore closely connected with the just mentioned human person feature, namely as "Incommunicabile" as being, which can not communicate. Hence, in reference to the world *sensu stricto*, person, as reality towards it superior, maintains its distinctness by the, obtained during evolutionary transformations process, degree of interior union of its composing elements. Hence, finally, it can not be subject to annihilation process. On the contrary, endowed with consciousness of "second degree", in reflexive consciousness, it may just cognize its own distinctness in relation to world, and the more enrich itself. The mentioned phenomenon occurs in the higher degree, where it is the question of relation to the other person. If Sartre saw in the "other" the threat of own personal being, Teilhard — the other way round — just in relation to the the other person, perceived the factor mutually enriching those persons. They have to develop unity of higher rank, not to fortunately determined by him as "super-person",<sup>37</sup> on the grounds of the just mentioned principle of differentiating union.<sup>38</sup>

However, that "super-person" does not mean anything, what would cancel out the inviolable character of particular persons. According to Teilhard two factors appeal to above statement. The first of them is, the just above discussed "Incommunicabilitas" of particular human persons. Person can not but, as much as it is person, become the part of another being, even if that being had also personal character.

The second essential element of Teilhard's conception of person, excluding the possibility of specific downfall of particular persons for the sake of any superior towards them "super-person", in relation to which, they would be only its composing parts, is that what Teilhard names the irreversibility of unifying evolution process. The basic trait of in such a way comprehended evolution is its ascending character, clearly marked in the fact that it passes from simple, not differentiated sets to sets differentiated from the point of view of structure and functions proper to particular elements of that structure. Annihilation of such sets would mean the crossing out of the obtained, on the evolution basis, more and more higher degrees of inner organization and thereby would also contradict the most common tendency met in material world and would mean the acknowledgement of evolution as, in substance, reversible process.

Hence, speaking about "super-person", Teilhard de Chardin did not hold the opinion, that "super-person" had to create a certain

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<sup>37</sup> Conf. P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Esquisse d'un Univers Personnel, Oeuvres*, vol. 6, p. 84 and the next.

<sup>38</sup> Conf. footnote 26.

higher, superior towards world of human persons reality. Reality, in the scope of which, those particular persons would lose their "Incommunicabilitas", their personal distinctness and become the elements of new structure. Hence, Teilhard using that rather unusual term comprehended simply the human community and, following its origin and functioning, social consciousness, and not a certain super-individual, super-human organism. In substance, it means also a certain stage of convergent type evolution, but evolution running on just another level, than biological evolution, because on social basis. The law — as calls it Teilhard — of consciousness — complexity concerns also, analogically talking, social evolution. The proceeding forward, and being the expression of that social evolution, organization of human community, exteriorly expressed in science and technics development and connected with them social organization, is nothing else than creating of "differentiated unity". But that unity means, on one hand the proceeding autonomy of elements composing that unity, and on the other hand — their more and more greater consolidation, hence it can not mean out of itself the threat of personal value of particular human individuals. However, the process of social changes may run in the way not controlled by man, or directed by him not properly; man instead of commanding them may become their slave. Hence, processes of social transformations can not be taken as expression of automatically actualizing evolution of convergent type, as real from its substance prolongation of biological evolution process. They are but not the processes, in scope of which evolution is uniformly determined way proceeds to consciousness increase, and deepening in parallel — man's liberty. In other words, the progress of science and technics and of social organization may have and has in reality — an ambiguous character. Uncontrolled by man, it may turn against him and lead to functionalization of his role in the described process.

Manifestations of such transformations are but rather the expression of social evolution deformation and, in Teilhard's belief, it is difficult to treat them as tendency to deepen the man's authentic consciousness and liberty. In his opinion, the authentic process of social evolution is the process which constitutes the phenomenon occurring on another social level, and therefore it should be recognized as prolongation of biological evolution. But it is not synonymous with imputed sometimes to Teilhard "biologization" of social phenomena. They are of different character than biological phenomena. However, they actualize also according to the consciousness-complexity law and tend to unify that, what in the starting point is plurality. But the mentioned unification does not occur in consequence of action of factors exterior towards man, on which he has no influence. On the contrary, as it is a process, in

the scope of which man is active as being endowed in „second degree” consciousness, in reflexive consciousness, able to direct the exterior factors — due to their cognition — hence, that process may be only actualized in the way controlled by man and by him directed. Man but fills in it the superior position.

Together with man comprehended as person, appears but in that process a quite new factor, namely love.<sup>39</sup> It is that factor, which uniting particular men, and more precisely — particular human persons, does not lower proper to them *Incommunicabilitas*.<sup>40</sup> The idea of love, which occurs at Teilhard de Chardin in context of personalistic deliberations, demands at least a few explanations, considering the typical ambiguity of that idea in colloquial language. Love, according to Marguerite Barthelemy-Madaule<sup>41</sup> may be determined as union of at least two subjects, which however mutually to themselves referred and joined, preserve among themselves autonomy and independence in existence and action. Hence, two essential moments are to be considered in determination of love: at first mere subjects referred to themselves and next the very character of that reference. As concerns the first moment, namely the referred factors — in Teilhard's de Chardin opinion — those are, in proper meaning, only persons.<sup>42</sup> Hence, love is the report — to use that expression — of at least two persons to themselves. As persons they must prove single and unrepeatable character in existence and action, hence love joining them must also preserve in its essence something of those traits of prolongation in action of proper for persons way of existence.

As concerns the second factor in love determination, namely the character of mutual persons' reference to themselves, essential role in its actualization plays consciousness and liberty. The reference subjects deciding about love are persons, that means beings conscious and free in action, hence their reference to themselves must be not only conscious, but also in free way accepted. Hence, there where two persons refer to themselves, but they are not conscious of that reference and do not accept it consciously, there is no place for speaking about love. Acceptation factor is but particularly important, as it gives to love the character of something, what is not only given, but also of a task. In such but apprehension love becomes the element of person's enrichment, of increase of interior inter-human relations and of responsibility for their more and more universal development.

<sup>39</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *L'énergie humaine, Oeuvres*, vol. 6, p. 181.

<sup>40</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Esquisse d'un Univers Personnel, Oeuvres*, vol. 6, p. 92.

<sup>41</sup> M. Barthelemy-Madaule, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

<sup>42</sup> P. Teilhard de Chardin, *op. cit.*, 82.

Posing the question in such a way, Teilhard de Chardin joined at once the problem of man as a person with the question of human action, with morality question. Speaking about it, Teilhard considered morality apprehended, before all, in normative way, namely morality as set of norms determining the way of man's behaviour as a man.<sup>43</sup> It was for him not only — as it often occurs in contemporary morality apprehensions — the description of accepted in determined circles rules of behaviour and ways of human deeds evaluation.

In Teilhard's de Chardin apprehension the normative character of morality proves a certain peculiar trait.

If however the previous moral norms proved — as he believed — to legalistic character, determining in static way the duties and laws ruling the man's behaviour, in case of considering the evolutionary measure of man's phenomenon, those norms had to acquire more dynamic traits. It is not however the question of replacing the up till now accepted moral norms by new ones. It is rather the problem of more intensive revealing the dynamic character in the up till now accepted moral laws and not of changing their fundamental contents. The moral law commanding, for example, the respect for own and others life, expressed in short commandment "do not kill", can not be reduced to the postulate of respect for biological and spiritual integrity of the other man, at simultaneous determination of limits, in the scope of which the preservation of that integrity is necessary, and besides which their encroachment is intolerable. Accepting those aspects of the mentioned moral law one gives to them to static character. But more dynamic comprehension of that law is not limited to secure the present state, but concerns the care for continuous increase of health conditions and spiritual development, both of human individual and of the whole human community. In such a way comprehended morality conception grows from love, as fundamental measure of man's existence, as manifestation of consciously actualized personal being of man, and mere moral norms stop to be the limiting factor — as one sometimes thinks — of man, but the element of his truly human development.

It is difficult to find in Teilhard's apprehensions some elaborated, integral morality conception. Those are rather suggestions, more signaled than systematically elaborated on the margin of reflexions on man, his place and dignity in the world subjected to evolutionary transformations. In the world for which man is responsible, and with the transformations of which — more and more

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<sup>43</sup> Conf. P. Teilhard de Chardin, *Le phénomène spirituel, Oeuvres*, vol. 6, p. 132.

complex — he has to direct with constantly increasing consciousness.

That increase implies the authentic, founded on love, unity of particular human individuals as personal beings. In that unity particular human persons, remaining themselves, constantly grow richer, as that unity not violating the personal autonomy, is the expression of their mutual community, to plenitude of which forces the unifying process. It is but not the process actualizing in authentic way. Authentic community of persons is but a community built by conscious and free effort of man. That last moment in Teilhard's de Chardin opinions was by him not always sufficiently clearly accentuated. Hence, Teilhard de Chardin was often the object of critical attacks. That is but comprehensible. Fascinated by the idea of evolutionary interpretation of the world, Teilhard especially that moment stressed in his works, not sufficiently clearly bringing out those doctrinal factors, which in his conviction, with the evolution idea in his understanding, are not connected. But he was aware of that one-sidedness, as he warned against interpretation of his thought as a finished whole, modestly reserving that those are just bearing thoughts and hence not fully developed and imperfect.