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# Summaries

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Filozofia Nauki 5/2, 167-168

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1997

Artykuł został zdigitalizowany i opracowany do udostępnienia w internecie przez **Muzeum Historii Polski** w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł jest umieszczony w kolekcji cyfrowej [bazhum.muzhp.pl](http://bazhum.muzhp.pl), gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych.

Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

## Summaries

Ryszard Wójcicki

### **The veristic and heuristic theory in science**

The central claim of this paper is the following. There are two different types of notions applied in science, and in fact in any discourse whatsoever. Some of the notions are *veristic*, i.e. they refer to some specific fairly well defined entities (individual objects, species, relations, systems, regularities, etc.). But there are also *heuristic* notions that serve the users to call attention to the fact that a specific situation can be accounted for, or even less — there is a chance that it can be accounted for, in a certain way known already from some earlier applications of similar ideas.

On numerous occasions we argue by analogy. Now, to argue by analogy means to treat the situation accounted for as „similar” to some other already familiar situations. The similarity in question can amount to some fairly explicitly stated expectations, which go beyond the available evidence. The heuristic notions can be characterized as the notions in terms of which such expectations are stated. Since the right interpretation of those expectations should be defined anew any time when an argument by analogy is applied, also the concepts they involve share this characteristic.

Thus while the veristic concepts have some fixed references, the reference of a heuristic concept should be defined anew every time when the concept is used.

A theory which involves any heuristic notions is called *heuristic*. A theory is said to be *veristic* if all the descriptive notions it involves are veristic. The notion of truth can be in a straightforward way applied to veristic theories only.

Eugeniusz Żabski

### **There is something which does not exist, or an attempt to solve the riddle of being**

In the article the formalization of a certain fragment of ontology is presented. The axiomatic definition of property and a few definitions of the notion of existence are given. The opinion about two kinds of existence is asserted.

Piotr Brykczyński

**The dispositional predicates and partial definitions**

In the paper the methodological status of the partial definitions of dispositional predicates is considered. The problem of conservativeness, analyticity and of a pragmatic role of such definitions is analyzed.

Grzegorz Nowak

**Biologist as the subject and object of cognition**

It is specific for biology that the scientist himself is an integral part of his subject of study. In the article the problem of the cognitive limitations of the scientist (as a representative of a certain species belonging to the biosphere) is considered.

Marian Grabowski

**The ideal of truth between triviality and significance**

The hypothesis that there are connections between the „visibility of the ideal of truth” and the quality of scientific knowledge, is defended in this article. Deep and important scientific results are associated with „truth as *manifestatio*” and — on the other hand — trivial, inessential discoveries are associated with the coherence theory of truth.

Artur Rojszczak

**From propositions to sentences. Truth-bearers and the objectivity of knowledge**

In the article a historical and systematical presentation of pros and cons of different theories of truth-bearers is contained. Different definitions of truth-bearers are presented. In author’s opinion, in the Brentanian tradition metaphysical rather than epistemological arguments for the objectivity of truth are typical.

Renata Ziemińska

**Truth and certainty**

In the article Chisholm’s conception of truth is considered. In author’s opinion Chisholm defends the possibility of certain knowledge by modifying the concept of „certainty”. Contrary to the philosophical tradition, in Chisholm’s view the certainty of knowledge does not imply its truth.