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# Summaries

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Filozofia Nauki 8/3/4, 181-184

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2000

Artykuł został zdigitalizowany i opracowany do udostępnienia w internecie przez **Muzeum Historii Polski** w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł jest umieszczony w kolekcji cyfrowej [bazhum.muzhp.pl](http://bazhum.muzhp.pl), gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych.

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## Summaries

Barry Smith & Achille C. Varzi

### **The Niche**

The concept of niche (setting, context, habitat, environment) has been little studied by ontologists, in spite of its wide application in a variety of disciplines from evolutionary biology to economics. What follows is a first formal theory of this concept, a theory of the relations between objects and their niches. The theory builds upon existing work on mereology, topology, and the theory of spatial location as tools of formal ontology. It is illustrated above all by means of simple biological examples, but the concept of niche should be understood as being, like concepts such as part, boundary, and location, a structural concept that is applicable in principle to a wide range of different domains.

Anna Jedynak

### **Scientific Theories and Axiological Systems**

Usually axiological systems and scientific theories are contrasted with each other. Significant differences between them are stressed: scientific theories purport to describe the world, while axiological systems do not. There is no common agreement as to what the values are and where one can find them. Scientific theories can be justified by experience, whereas axiological systems cannot and theorists differ as to how they should be justified. Scientific theories are to be true and useful, but it is not clear how axiological systems should be evaluated. As far as scientific theories are concerned, commonly accepted procedures of their formulation, verification and evaluation have been established, whereas there are no such procedures for axiological systems. All this is taken to show that scientific theories are much better off than axiological systems.

Although there is no denying that scientific theories and axiological systems can be contrasted with each other, there are also some important similarities between them, which are rarely mentioned, however. The author demonstrates far reaching analogies between the structure of scientific theories and the structure of axiological systems.

Bożena Czarnecka

### **The Law of Excluded Middle and Intuitionistic Logic**

The paper deals with the question of the validity of the Law of Excluded Middle in intuitionistic logic. Because of a different interpretation of the logical connectives, intuitionists reject the intuitionistic (constructive) counterpart of the Law of Excluded Middle. In the intuitionistic approach the meta-linguistic Law of Excluded Middle is not valid, which results in a replacement of a classical definition of truth with an «epistemic» definition, which sees the essence of truth in the relation of a sentence to the result of a certain cognitive efforts. A true sentence is a sentence which satisfies the criterion of truth, i.e. is (constructively) provable. Thus, a dispute between classical logic and intuitionistic logic can be described as a dispute between the «logic of truth» and the «logic of the criteria of truth».

Jan Woleński

### **Was Leśniewski a Philosopher?**

The answer to the title question will be different depending on the weight attributed to the particular criteria of being a philosopher. So-called true philosophers will think for sure that the data presented in the text do not suffice to count Leśniewski as one of them, since he did not make a study of the «depth of being». The author's opinion is entirely different. Leśniewski was a philosopher, because he graduated in Philosophy, he was interested in philosophy and has expressed those interests for whole his life; he worked within the institutional framework of philosophy, had original philosophical ideas, has influenced the development of philosophy and has been regarded as a philosopher.

Józef Andrzej Stuchliński

### **Leśniewski's Deductive Systems — the Foundations of Philosophy and Mathematics**

The systems built by Leśniewski have a twofold function: mathematical and philosophical. The author explains with the help of examples in what this function consists. It turns out that in Leśniewski's approach the new account of the basis of traditional philosophy is of primary importance, for it is on this account that the new account of the foundations of mathematics is based. In this way we come closer to the realisation of the idea of the unity of the *Aristotelian* «theoretical philosophy», whose basis and starting point is the «first philosophy» (metaphysics) and whose final stage of development is mathematics.

Leśniewski's deductive systems are entirely adequate as methodological tools (*organon*) of the final grounding of both philosophy (in its main theoretical branches: i.e. in ontology and epistemology) and mathematics (in its main theoretical branches: i.e. in arithmetic and geometry). However, to this aim the relevant elements of these deductive systems should be fully developed; they should be much more precise and complex than the initial assumptions in this range.

Mariusz Gryganiec

### **Leśniewski Against Universals**

The author contrasts two arguments against the existence of universal objects formulated by Stanisław Leśniewski and indicates the possible directions for the critique of these arguments. The paper contains also some historical and bibliographical remarks which throw new light on the role that Leśniewski played in the controversy over universals in the Lvov-Warsaw School.

The paper has the following structure. The first part is a historical outline which pictures Leśniewski against the background of the above mentioned controversy. The second part is devoted to the first Leśniewski's argument against universals (1911) and to the critical analysis of this argument. The third part deals with the proof against the existence of universals formulated by Leśniewski in 1927 and to the limitations of this proof.

Adam Nowaczyk

### **To Avoid Misunderstandings**

This is a reply to Ryszard Wójcicki's polemics against the view expressed in the author's paper „Ajdukiewicz's Theory of Meaning Many Years Later” which have been published together in the previous issue of *Filozofia Nauki*. Contrary to Ryszard Wójcicki, the author is of the opinion that Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning is pragmatic, and more exactly *syntactico-pragmatic*. The reason for this claim is the indisputable fact that while formulating the meaning-directives and the definition of synonymy and meaning, Ajdukiewicz has used merely syntactical and pragmatological notions (the notion of *meaning*, which *could* have semantic implications, was the subject of explication). Since (for obvious reasons) Ajdukiewicz did not want to make use of the semantic notions as primitive notions, he had no other option.

Jan Czerniawski

### **Analytical Philosophy and the Phenomenological Method**

This paper is a reply to Jan Woleński's polemics (*Filozofia Nauki* 1/2000) against the author's essay „On the Epistemic Impotence of Analytical Philosophy” (*Filozofia Nauki* 3–4/1998). The author expresses his conviction that it is in analytical philosophy that the most interesting — and at the same time well-established — cognitive results have been reached, but many of these results have been obtained, not thanks to the declared semantic method, but thanks to the phenomenological method, which

have been used at least unconsciously. Therefore the gap between phenomenology and analytical philosophy is not so huge as it might seem at first glance.

Jan Štěpán

**Three Remarks on Post-analytical Philosophy**

The main assumption of analytical philosophy is very straightforward: the analysis of language in philosophy and in science is the only starting point which guarantees the solution to all the problems. In the so-called post-analytical philosophy this assumption becomes even more radical: substantial problems do not exist and even if they existed, their essence would vanish if one attempted to formulate them in language. The author tries to justify the view that these simple and attractive theses are not only demagogic and decadent, but also destructive.