Summaries

MUZEUM HISTORII POLSKI

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Paweł Grabarczyk, Could Kripke be a phenomenologist?

In this article I am trying to compare the methods of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Such a general comparison is of course impossible in a small article. In order to make it possible I am comparing selected authors. Phenomenology is thus represented by Husserl and Ingarden, analytic philosophy by Putnam and Kripke (they are chosen because of their realism and essentialism). I am trying to analyze the way the authors describe their methods. First I am analyzing analytic philosophy from the phenomeneological point of view, then phenomenology from the point of view of analytic philosopher. I'm. pointing out that Kripke and Putnam often say about intuition, and that they do not understand it as any kind of linguistic intuition. Then I'm. pointing out that phenomenologists often refer to the way w describe things, although they are convinced that their experience is always prior to any linguistic form. I am suggesting that even if we agree that the practice of both schools is similar, and that the description of methods could be translated, there is no chance of a real agreement between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. My thesis is that neither the practice nor the description of the way we obtain our philosophical goals is important. What really is important is all the philosophical background (ontology, philosophical assumptions and the like). In this particular situation considered in my article, the most important factor is the answer for the following question: Can we think without the language? Phenomenologist can not answer 'no' to this question. If he did he would admit that his philosophy isn't free of assumptions. Analytic philosopher can not answer 'yes' to this question. If he did he would admit that he is interested only in some kind of 'package for thought'. The answer itself depends on some kind of philosophical faith. Thus, the answer for the main question of my article depends only on Kripke's will of changing his declaration of faith.

Anna Jedynak, The Classification of Reasonings and the Theory of Questions

The aim of the paper is to show the value of the reasonings guided by questions based on uncertain assumptions. The notion of a properly asked question is being redefined to include questions based on uncertain assumptions. As a result, the classification of simple reasonings, originally set up by K. Ajdukiewicz, is presented as more detailed. Moreover, the paper sets up the classification of complex reasonings.

Mateusz Oleksy, From realism to arealism (II). Epistemological realism through linguistic peephole

In this article I demonstrate that philosophy illuminated by the Linguistic Turn is no better suited to solve the epistemological problem of realism than was transcendental epistemology. The bulk of this paper concerns a polemic with Hintikka's vision of the relation between model-theoretic semantics and the epistemological problem of realism. In this polemic I argue for three points: (1) Hintikka's assumption that there is a fundamental opposition between two visions of language, the view of language as a medium of communication and the view of it as a calculus, is mistaken. I demonstrate that the latter vision of language presupposes the former one, (2) Hintikka's argument for the thesis that the view of language as a medium of communication constitutes the common source of the troublesome thesis of ineffability of semantics and semantic universalism is faulty. I demonstrate that the source of both beliefs lies in the unwarranted assumption that logical semantics against Hintikka is that logical semantics should not be interpreted as a new tool for solving the old epistemological problem.

Tadeusz Skalski, The Perfect Theory of Professor Prognosis

Professor Prognosis is a fictional character. His name — *Prognosis* — is meaningful and refers to a wonderful theory. Using his theory Professor is able to predict the behaviour of a human being with stunning accuracy; its predictive power is much greater than any other scientific theory. As for its predictive power the theory in question is so great that it seems impossible. We are inclined to think that it cannot be a theory. It must be something else. But what else could it be? The mystery has a simple solution. It turns out that the 'theory' applies only to one man and the man is Professor Prognosis himself. Now everything seems crystal clear. Professor Prognosis has deceived us. There is neither theory, nor predictions. As a matter of fact he does not predict but uses his power to control his behaviour. Every human being can do it. It is obvious. So what is the problem? The problem is that this solution is very traditional. It involves *agency* and *free will*. The main point of the paper was to make it look obvious.