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# Submitted Summaries

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## **Submitted Summaries**

### **Władysław Krajewski, Two concepts of the scope of a law of science**

There are two concepts of the scope of a law: 1) the set of bodies (in our world) in which the law is fulfilled, 2) the set of models of the law, or the set of possible worlds in which it is fulfilled. Their use leads to opposite answers to the question which law is broader than the other.

### **Mateusz Oleksy, From realism to arealism (III). Deflationary dissolution of the problem of realism in post–Wittgensteinian philosophy**

The purpose of this article is to distinguish the position which I call „arealism” from both semantic realism and semantic anti–realism. Arealism is based on the deflationary critique of the logico–semantic debate on realism, i.e., on the argument which undermines the foundationalist presuppositions of this debate. I attempt to draw carefully the distinction between arealist, deflationist approach to the problem of realism and the position of semantic anti–realism, which is usually framed in terms of the assertability–conditions semantics. Moreover, I argue that linguistic antirealism faces problems similar to those which haunted transcendental idealism. In the second part of the paper I demonstrate in a dialectical manner that arealism (1) is holistic in a particular Wittgensteinian sense, (2) does not support nor assume linguistic relativism, (3) should not be confused with meta–theoretical thesis of inexhaustibility of semantics, (4) involves a particular strategy of deflationary criticism, and (5) does not lead to semantic nihilism or eliminationism.

### **Piotr Bylica, Testability of intelligent design theory**

The article covers the problem of testability of intelligent design theory. The objection that intelligent design theory does not correspond to principle of methodo-

logical naturalism is discussed. I show that recognizing intelligent causes is commonly applied in science. I present the „specification–complexity” criterion, an attempt to generalize the criteria used to define the problem in particular sciences. This criterion — together with the concept of explanatory filter — is to guarantee the testability of intelligent design theory. The irreducible complexity criterion, which is to recognize design in biology, is brought forward. The problem of progressiveness of intelligent design theory is also reported. The analysis leads to the conclusion that functioning in intelligent design theory criterion of design recognition belongs to probability and complexity theory and that theory discussed is empirically testable.

**Kazimierz Jodkowski, An evolution of evolutionism from the Popperian point of view**

In this paper, I analyse the transition from gradualism to punctualism. I try to respond to the following question: Is the transition in question connected with an increase or decrease of falsifiability? My answer to that question is that from the classical Popperian point of view theory of Punctuated Equilibria is a failure because it does not satisfy the Popperian criteria of progress in the development of science. Classical Darwinism and Neodarwinism have failed in that they predict a number of transitional forms in the fossil record that have never been found. The Punctuated Equilibria theory predicts abrupt appearance of new species and a following stasis. But it is hardly any success, as far as explanatory power is concerned, because the theory in question does not predict really any new facts, it may, therefore, be viewed as an *ad hoc* proposal. Moreover, its claims are, I argue, unfalsifiable to all practical ends and purposes.

**Sławoj Oleczyk, Karl Popper: Evolution theory and situational logic**

The article aims at reconstruction of a importance of Popper’s situational logic to his analysis of an epistemological status of evolution theory. The paper consists of four parts. In the first one I present Popper’s arguments on an epistemological status of Darwinism he exposed in „The Poverty of Historicism”. In the second part I put forward Popper’s views on evolution theory in the 60-th. The third part aims at outlining of his idea of situational logic. And in the last part of this paper I consider philosophical significance of the idea to an epistemological status of Darwinism.