Submitted Summaries

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Eugeniusz Żabski, What do we know about values?

An axiomatic theory of values is presented in this article. The basis of this theory is Czeżowski's idea of values.

Cezary Cieśliński, Why is truth (in)definable

The aim of this paper is to consider the question about the reasons of the indefinability of truth. We note at the start that a formula with one free variable can function as a truth predicate for a given set of sentences in two different (although related) senses: relative to a model and relative to a theory. By methods due to Alfred Tarski it can be shown that some sets of sentences are too large to admit a truth predicate (in any of the above senses); the limit case being the set of all sentences. The key question considered by us is: what does „too large" mean, i.e. which exactly sets of sentences don't have a truth predicate. We give a partial answer to this question: a set of sentences K has a truth predicate in an axiomatizable, consistent theory T iff for some natural number n, all the sentences belonging to K are equivalent (in T) to Σ_n sentences. Here the notion of a „too large" set receives a clear and definite sense. However, the case of a model-theoretic truth predicate seems to be more complicated: this second problem we leave as open, indicating only some possible directions of future research.

Mariusz Grygianiec, Edward N. Zalta's theory of abstract objects. An analysis and a critique

The paper offers a sketchy reconstruction of axiomatic foundations of Zalta's theory of abstract objects. The theory is based on Ernst Mally's distinction between two types of predication: an *exemplification* of properties and an *encoding* of properties.

The author shows how the theory in question could be used to reconstruct in a satisfying way many other metaphysical theories e.g. the theory of Platonic Forms, the theory of situations, the theory of possible worlds. The paper also provides several critical comments to some presumptions and consequences of the analyzed metaphysical doctrine.

Anna Jedynak, On the rationalisation of language

The rationalisation of language is, according to K. Ajdukiewicz, a developmental tendency of the language, which inevitably accompanies the development of empirical knowledge. It is the transformation of well-established empirical generalisations into language axioms. It is accompanied by the reinforcement of contents of notions and by enriching the meaning-relations between expressions. Rationalisation results in sharpening as well as narrowing of the cognitive perspective. Inner inconsistency of linguistic rules may then occur, and it is apparent in the new type of experiences. It is hollowed by a radical change of scientific theory; this change relates not only to statements, but also to the content of notions. The development and the change of the paradigmas in Kuhn's philosophy has similar character.

Wojciech Krysztofiak, Existentialism from the speech acts theory's point of view

The aim of the article is applying some version of phenomenological speech acts theory into the domain of philosophical (existential) discourse. There are identified various language-mechanisms of existential philosophising. Especially, locutionary (noematic) and illocutionary (noetic) aspects of acts *existentialising* are considered. The main thesis of the paper may be formulated in the following words: In acts of existential discourse, mechanisms of reference determine that an *existentialising* subject is directed to the mental entities such as illocutionary representations of fears, cares, wastes and other. The predication in such acts of philosophising is internal and also personal, temporal and sometime virtual. In the paper, there is also presented the illocutionary analysis of a fragment of Heidegger's text coming from *Sein und Zeit*.

Piotr Labenz, Some remarks about a calculus of properties

A calculus of properties due to Żabski [1982] is outlined and criticised. Some of its theorems are claimed to fail to account for the relevant onotological intuitions and some to fail to be true. The argument in its favour from co-extensional non-identical properties is challenged. In conclusion, the need for a calculus of properties in general is doubted.

Dorota Leszczyńska, What does the cognitive relativism claim? A reconstruction of the constitutive theses of relativism.

The aim of the paper is to present a reconstruction of the constitutive theses of cognitive relativism. The reconstruction is based on some examples of well-known theses and statements that are conceived to be relativistic. I distinguish three constitu-

ents of cognitive relativism: 1) the thesis of constructive character of cognition, 2) the thesis of pluralism of cognitive schemes, 3) the thesis of incommensurability of cognitive schemes.

The rest of the article aims at, first, proving that Quine's philosophical standpoint is not relativistic as it clashes with the third thesis of relativism. And, second, I try to argue that a relativist may avoid the consequence of agnosticism but, which is not surprising, he/she has to radically reject the idea of the objective truth as the purpose of our cognition.