
Submitted Summaries

Filozofia Nauki 13/3, 127-129

2005

Artykuł został opracowany do udostępnienia w internecie przez Muzeum Historii Polski w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł jest umieszczony w kolekcji cyfrowej bazhum.muzhp.pl, gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych.

Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

Submitted Summaries

Joanna Gęgotek, Charles Lyell's Geological Ideas and Their Sources

The aim of the article is presentation of some opinions of historians and philosophers of science about scientific doctrines of Charles Lyell (1797-1875) and the sources of these doctrines. Three main themes are discussed: 1. What was the real meaning of Lyell's uniformitarianism and which doctrine (catastrophism or directionalism) it was opposed to? 2. Which method of geological research was used and recommended by Lyell? 3. What relation connected Lyell's scientific doctrine with his religious and theological views?

Jacek Golbiak, Marek Szydłowski, The Problems Of Classical Cosmology Motivation For The Quantum Gravity Theory

In this paper it is investigated the standard problems of relativistic cosmology like: singularity problem, flatness problem, horizon problem, acceleration problem and problem of structure origin. We discuss nature of these difficulties and we suggest existence of some analogies to the problems of Newtonian cosmology. We argue that the existence of serious problems of relativistic cosmology is strictly related with our understanding of space – time. The overcome of these problems means the exit beyond the standard model. We pointed out that the loop quantum gravity seems to be correct step toward to overcome problems of relativistic cosmology.

Mariusz Grygianiec, In defence of mereological essentialism

The paper is an attempt to defend the Chisholm's metaphysical doctrine called mereological essentialism. The main thesis of mereological essentialism states that *for any objects x and y – if x is ever a part of y , then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y* , i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists).

This radical theory gives a categorisation of all objects via *entia per se* and *entia successiva*. The paper contains a critical survey of the theory of mereological essentialism: it deals with some important arguments against it and answers as well. The author tries to show that in defence of the theory and the categorisation in question the applicability of the doctrine of mereological essentialism must be somehow limited. He suggests that the best way in doing so is to restrict theses of mereological essentialism either only to objects *qua occurrents* or only to objects *qua continuants* or only to persons.

Tadeusz Pabjan, Extra-physical time in the philosophy of Henry Mehlberg

This paper presents some ideas of Henry Mehlberg on the problem of temporal localizability of psychological states belonging to a human being. There are three kinds of extra-physical time, referred to in Mehlberg's philosophy as psychological, inter-psychological, and psychophysical. The first one determines temporal order of psychological states belonging to the same self; the second one concerns psychological states of different selves; the third one describes temporal relations between physical and psychological events. Physical time and all three kinds of extra-physical time together form a single universal time. This article includes short characterisation of these temporal concepts and discusses some methods of psychophysical synchronisation.

Karol Polcyn, The conceivability argument and the phenomenal concept strategy

According to the conceivability argument, physicalism is false since it is conceivable and hence possible that the physical truth do not entail the phenomenal truth. The influential way of responding to the conceivability argument is to claim that our conceivability intuitions can be accounted for in purely psychological terms, by appealing to some cognitive and functional differences between phenomenal and physical concepts, and that therefore what is conceivable does not entail what is possible. On this account, the entailment from the physical to the phenomenal that physicalism is committed to can be necessary and a posteriori. I argue that this way of responding to the conceivability argument cannot work. The conceivability argument depends on an assumption which implies that the psychophysical entailment cannot be necessary and a posteriori and appealing to the differences between phenomenal and physical concepts has no force against that assumption.

Maciej Witek, Correspondence with reality. Remarks on Jacek J. Jadacki's theory of truth

The author starts with the assumption that a popular idea, according to which a true sentence corresponds with reality, is adequate. Therefore, any adequate theory of truth has to account for it. It turns out, however, that it is the epistemic conception, not the correspondence one, that meets such a demand. In order to justify his claim, the author discusses Jacek J. Jadacki's theory of truth. Roughly speaking, the theory

in question states that if a given sentence refers to a certain state of affairs – that function as the sentence's semantic value – then the sentence is true if and only if the relevant state of affairs holds. In short, the theory defines the truth of a given sentence in terms of the holding of the state of affairs to which the sentence refers. It remains to be explained, therefore, what it is, for a given state of affairs to hold. The author considers three possible accounts of the holding of the state of affairs. According to the first one, the sentence's semantic value is either a mental representation or an ideal entity grasped in the subjective episode of understanding. Such a mental or ideal state of affairs holds if it has its real counterpart. The second account is based on the idea that real states of affairs constitutes a subclass of all describeable states of affairs. A given state of affairs holds if and only if it belongs to this special class. According to the third interpretation, a holding state of affairs is the semantic value of a true sentence. The author argues that the first account gives rise to the suspect question on the nature of either the relation of mental representation or the relation of exemplification. The second account, in turn, seems to require a controversial assumption that existence is a property. Taking into account those and similar problems, we have no alternative but to embrace the third option, according to which a given state of affairs holds because it is the semantic value of a true sentence. The truth of a sentence, in turn, has to be conceived as its rational acceptability.