
Submitted Summaries

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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

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Roman Godlewski, Does the World Exist?

Let us ask: do the objects we think that exist, really exist? Davidson concludes, from rejection of dualism of content and conceptual scheme, that most of them really exist (coherentism). Unfortunately, his reasoning is wrong, because though the rejection makes it impossible to doubt our knowledge as a whole, it is still possible to doubt all its elements one after another. The two main points of Davidson's theory are the following: (1) disquotationism (semantic terms are used only to speak about speaking) and (2) *ostensivism* (words refer to what they refer to independently of what it could be; their meanings are established as the result of the process of learning). (1) and (2) are the real reasons for Davidson's coherentism. *Ostensivism* apparently allows to avoid the problem of induction, though it only transforms the problem into the question of ostension. Moreover, consistent *ostensivism* makes analytic sentences impossible. Yet it is claimed, that *ostensivism* is wrong in general, because besides ostensives there are also categoricals (expressions, meanings of which belong to certain ontological categories) and without the latter logic and mathematics would be impossible. Davidson's coherentism is wrong because it is not true that one cannot have any beliefs without having any language. Hence, no theory of language is crucial as far as existence is concerned. It is shown considering ascription of beliefs to mute persons and learning languages by children. Coherentism lets Davidson bring down the idea of a demon that could make us see the world completely different than it is and not know if it is true.

Urszula Żegleń, The Cognitive System as a Representational System

The main thesis of the paper is very simple, namely that the cognitive system is a representational system. The cognitive system will be defined as a system which is

able to realize cognitive functions such as perception, symbolic thinking, understanding and reflection. Such a system is further characterized as: cognitively open and at the same time relatively isolated, representational, structurally complex and many-dimensional, dynamic and having functional plasticity (cognitively adaptive) and also having the capacity for self-determination. The analysis will be focused on the characterization of representation (which will be defined as a certain kind of content) and on the types of representations in the cognitive system (i.e. perceptual and conceptual representations, the representation of the body and the representation of „self“).

Adrian Kuźniar, Jan Piotrowski, On Structural Autonomy of Scientific Theories and Value Systems. A Polemic with Professor Anna Jedynak

The paper is a critique of Professor Anna Jedynak's claim, propounded in her article "The structure of scientific theories and value systems" (*Filozofia Nauki*, no. 31-32/2000, pp. 31-44), that there exist some significant analogies between scientific theories perceived from the viewpoint of various scientific methodologies and systems of normative ethics considered from the perspectives of various metaethical theories. The authors attempt to justify the thesis that principal structural similarities postulated by Professor Jedynak are questionable, thus challenging her proposition that metaethics can incorporate into its domain a number of problems which were hitherto seen as specific to the philosophy of science.

Anna Jedynak, Explanations in Science and Ethics Revisited

The paper is a reply to the polemic with my article „The Structure of Scientific Theories and Systems of Values“, which presented a number of analogies between methodological and metaethical problems. These analogies can be seen if we acknowledge the information surplus of evaluative statements in comparison to normative statements (similarly in science theories are stronger than observational statements), which is indicated by the examples of actual moral questions. The basis for the polemic is the fact that its authors deny the existence of this surplus, claiming that evaluations are equivalent to and not stronger than norms. Moreover, as they reduce metaethics to the issues of meaning, and methodology to the issues of justification, they have to deny the possibility of these two domains meeting on the ground of similar problems. The paper also illustrates the reasons for a modification of meanings of certain philosophical terms that appeared in my previous article.

Wojciech Wciórka, Mariusz Grygianiec's argument for incorectness of the definition of general object

Mariusz Grygianiec has criticized the so called „proofs of nonexistence of general objects“ as based on a wrong definition. In this paper one of his arguments is shown to depend on an unsatisfiable condition (contradictory to some basic ontological intuitions) without which, however, it is inconclusive as a *reductio ad absurdum*.

dum. Furthermore, it is suggested that even if the argument was sound, it could by no means be counted — contrary to the Author's intention — as a counterargument to Stanisław Leśniewski and Tadeusz Kotarbiński.

Mariusz Grygianiec, *Incendium Philosophiae*

The text is a rejoinder to Mr. Wciórka's critical analysis of two author's arguments against nominalistic definition of abstract objects. The author shows that although his first argument is not sound, the second still remains correct. The paper also offers a modified definition of abstract objects inspired by E. N. Zalta's metaphysical theory of objects and some critical remarks, which Mr. Wciórka aimed at the earlier papers of the author.

Adam Olszewski, *Some Remarks Concerning a Proof of Church's Thesis*

The aim of the article is to answer the four following questions concerning a proof of Church's Thesis (CT). (1) Can CT be treated as a synthetic definition? (2) How should CT not be understood? (3) How can one understand the expression *proof by CT*? (4) Is any proof of CT possible at all?

Streszczenia przejrzała Julia Krysztofiak