
Submitted Summaries

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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

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Marian Przełęcki, Empirical knowledge and religion faith

Referring to the session „Science and religion” (Filozofia Nauki 1/2006) — esp. to Jan Woleński’s contribution article „Return to the theory of double truth” — the author presents two ways of interpreting the meaning of religion statements. According to one of them, the statements may be shown to possess some kind of empirical content, due to their definitional connection with empirical terms of everyday language, and, in consequence, may bear logical relations to empirical statements. According to the other way of interpreting religion statements, they appear to be devoid of any empirical content and — as Woleński claims — cannot be supported or threatened by any empirical data.

Jerzy Bobryk, Anti-psychologism, provincialism and cognitive science

The article is devoted to an evaluation of contemporary cognitive psychology which draws inspirations from current naturalistic epistemology. The author’s conclusion is that the philosophical background of some modern psychological theories and conceptions is in midway position between naturalistic and non-naturalistic (anti-psychologistic) epistemology.

Mariusz Grygianiec, Principles of mereological essentialism

Mereological essentialism is a metaphysical doctrine formulated and defended originally by Roderick M. Chisholm. The main principle of mereological essentialism states all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time in which y exists). In the paper this doctrine is reconstructed and analysed. Some its consequences as well as many variants of it are examined in order to make this radical doctrine more acceptable.

Aleksandra Horecka, The subject of aesthetics, its tasks, method and place among the sciences

The aim of the paper is to present views and opinions of the representatives of Lvov-Warsaw School upon subject, tasks, methods of aesthetics and its place among others sciences. Although writings on aesthetical problems appeared in the Lvov-Warsaw School relatively late, many scholars from that scientific circle contributed very much to the development of aesthetics — among others — Stanisław Ossowski, Mieczysław Wallis, Leopold Blaustein, Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Stefan Baley, Władysław Witwicki and Tadeusz Witwicki. The opinions of these philosophers and psychologists (and also other representatives of Lvov-Warsaw School which were not interested in particular aesthetical problems) upon subject of aesthetics and its place among sciences are varied, but they agree that aesthetics is a philosophical science and that the concepts and thesis of aesthetics should be clear and well constructed, whereas incorrectly posted problems – eliminated.

Anna Jedynak, On the predictive power of hypotheses

Predictiveness (or testability) can be ascribed to empirical hypotheses in different degrees. Seven reasons why predictiveness is gradable are outlined. They are reflected in seven ways in which hypotheses can be compared according to the degree of their predictiveness. Hence additional specifications are required to accept predictiveness as a criterion of whether given hypotheses are scientific. Generally speaking a new hypothesis has little, if any, predictive power. Its predictive power will increase as science progresses. Specific problems arise when the predictive power is expected from social sciences.

Wojciech Krysztofiak, Frege, Husserl, Leśniewski and Heidegger. Being in analytic perspective

The main aim of the paper is paraphrasing Heidegger's category of being in the theoretic framework of Fregean phenomenological semantics. The choice of Fregean phenomenological semantics as the tool of the paraphrase is justified by the fact that philosophy articulated in *Sein und Zeit* may be interpreted as the modification of Husserl's project of phenomenology which is treated, in turn, as generalisation of Frege's theory of sense and nominatum. So in the paper it is defended that Heidegger's category of being stems from Frege's considerations devoted to basic semantic questions. In the first chapter there are specified in existentialistic language ten principles clarifying the notion of being. In the second part the principles are paraphrased in the phenomenological theory of noema (this category is understood in spirit of the so called Californian interpretation). This move allows us to show how the conception of being is the modification of Frege's and Husserl's semantics. In the last chapters there is re-constructed Heidegger's model of acts of reference. The formal tool of the reconstruction is Leśniewski's formal language (enriched by Ajdukiewicz) with indexes designating ways of existence and referential backgrounds.

Adriana Schetz, Representationalism and the problem of perception

In various philosophical explanations of perceptual experiences two ideas are usually invoked: the idea of intrinsic quality of experience (perceptual quale) and the idea of representation. I argue that the former may be eliminated and replaced by the latter. While discussing the traditional position known as „the sense-data theory” I emphasize the tension between the environment-dependent content of visual experience and its inner or narrow content. I conclude that one cannot find adequate support for the claim that perceptual qualia exist. One should rather admit that perceptual experiences can be fully accounted for in terms of mental representations of apparent features of external objects.

Robert Trypuz, Pawel Garbacz, Bits and Entities — On an unnoticed application of ontology

In this paper we are focused on the relation between an *Ontology* (with the capital „O”) qua philosophical discipline and an *ontology* (with the lowercase „o”) qua branch of Computer Science. In our view „Ontology” refers to all philosophical groups or schools which take some position on the reality. The meaning of ‘ontology’ in the second case is not that easy to grasp because of the variety of artefacts which are called ‘ontologies’ and many activities — aiming at creating the ontologies — called *ontological engineering*. In general we could state that an ontology is something what is called „ontology” beyond Philosophy, mostly in the Knowledge Management, Artificial Intelligence, Conceptual Modelling or Ontological Engineering and what refers to an *engineering artefact* describing certain aspect of reality. So understood ontology is always tied to certain language (preferably a logical one) or more precisely to the set of the sentences of this language. It is said that these sentences constitute an ontology and specify the intended meaning of the terms used in these sentences. The *ontologists* usually focus on describing their *conceptualization* of the relevant *for them* aspects of reality. In their ontologies only these properties of reality are taken into account, which are considered as important for the sake of the application. In this sense ontological engineering may ignore Ontologically essential properties, i.e. the ones important from the purely philosophical perspective.

The simplest ontologies are *catalogues* — the list of terms or numbers denoting certain object, *glossaries* — containing additionally the definitions of the terms, *thesauri* — the glossaries in which the hierarchy of the terms appear and *taxonomies* — in which the primitives are hierarchically structured in order to enabling the properties' inheritance. The most sophisticated ontologies are called *formal ontologies* and they are logical theories fully axiomatized. Ontologies are also divided on the *top-level ontologies* concerning very general and mostly abstract entities (e.g. property, agent, time) and the *domain ontologies* dealing with some small domains (e.g. car's parts). For a better understanding of the wide variety of ontologies we give an exam-

ple of three ontologies: *WordNet* (thesaurus-like ontology), *Cyc* (top-level, formal ontology) and *Enterprise Ontology* (domain ontology).

The Ontology plays an important role in ontological engineering. We notice that the ontological engineers more and more often rely on the philosophical literature looking for the solutions of the ontological problems. It is especially visible in the top-ontologies where many Ontological distinctions have been directly adopted. On the other hand we must sadly stress that philosophers seem to be not interested in the ontological engineering at all. We'd like to introduce ontology to the philosophers and encourage them to reflect on it.