
Abstracts

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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

Abstracts

Piotr Brykczyński, Aiming at Truth. Part I

In scientific practice theories are allowed to posit objects believed to be fictitious. Some philosophers undermine the legitimacy of scientific practice in this respect, which leads to a philosophical problem. Various solutions have been advanced. The paper argues for a certain version of fictionalism. Since the objections against positing fiction are objections against the practical wisdom of science and are neither compelling nor easily answerable, it is suggested in the paper that if there is a way out, it is mainly a way of revealing hidden motivations by looking anew at the scientific practice from the historical perspective, one of the hopes being that it will enable us to reveal some hidden burdens of history. This suggestion determines the main line of argumentation.

Keywords: aims of science, truth, explanation, representation, fiction, belief imitation

Adam Grobler, Paradoxes of Confirmation and the *Ceteris Paribus* Clause

Well-known paradoxes of confirmation put the validity of inductive reasoning of any kind into question. Nevertheless, the proponents of hypothetical-deductive or abductive method make some use of inductivist motifs. If Popper is careful enough to distinguish between corroboration and confirmation, Lakatos quite straightforwardly maintains that falsification of one hypothesis is a confirmation of another. Next, Harman's reintroduction of abductivism long after Peirce's invention is, in fact, an attempt at grounding the inductive method in the principle of inference to the best explanation. In the paper, I claim that paradoxes of confirmation arise because of excessively formal analysis of scientific reasoning. It is commonly neglected that scientific hypotheses inevitably assume the *ceteris paribus* clause. Taking this into

account gives the required solution to the paradoxes and sheds new light on the nature of inductive reasoning and its place in the scientific method.

Keywords: inductive reasoning, instant confirmation, *ceteris paribus* clause

Katarzyna Patro, Wojciech Krysztofiak, Mental Number Lines. SNARC Effect. Philosophical Aspects

The aim of the article is to propose a formal model of a representational system underlying the core numerical knowledge which is usually manifested in psychological experiments as the SNARC effect, size and distance effects, and the effect of numerical scale. Starting with the assumption that all the effects can be explained by a metaphor of a mental number line, we based our model on a hierarchical structure composed of three numerical axes characterized by different levels of representational efficiency: (i) a summation-accumulator axis, (ii) a point-place axis, and (iii) an exact point-based axis. The model predicts that a mature exact number line, in a form as it is observed in most of experiments with adults, arises as an effect of certain transformation processes occurring within first two primary, pre-existing axes. The paradigm underlying the theoretic construction may be interpreted philosophically as a neo-Kantian approach to modelling mind's representational structures.

Keywords: number line, number representation, SNARC, cognitive arithmetic, accumulator mental number line, point-place number line

Tomasz Rzepiński, Functional-Causal Explanation and Its Role in Designing Pharmacological Cardioprotective Therapies

The purpose of the paper is to determine the structure of the functional explanations given in the process of designing pharmacological therapies in biological and medical sciences. The article shows that neither the classical models of functional explanation (presented by Hempel and Nagel) nor Cummins's functional analysis provide an adequate account. A brief discussion of these models becomes the point of departure for suggesting a functional-causal explanatory model (FP). The model is put to use in a reconstruction of the pharmacological cardioprotective therapy project.

Keywords: functional explanation, Cummins' functional analysis, functional-causal explanatory model

Piotr Dehnel, The Saying/Showing Distinction in the Light of Early Wittgenstein's Criticism of Russell and Frege

I argue that the saying/showing distinction was a leitmotiv of Wittgenstein's early criticism of some logical theories of Russell and Frege, although ascribing to Wittgenstein the general theory of ineffable truths on the basis of that distinction is at odds with his intentions in the *Tractatus*. Three points are noticed here. First, the saying/showing distinction functions effectively, and in fact is intelligible, only in the context of Wittgenstein's critique of Russell's theory of types; the consequences of this critique primarily concern his accounts of formal concepts as well as of logic

that should look after itself. Second, Wittgenstein's aim in the *Tractatus* was to gain an insight into the functioning of our language, into how a proposition expresses its sense. This insight is attainable only from the inside of the language itself. This is what Wittgenstein could have meant when he said that the proposition shows its sense. Thirdly, in order to see something, one must previously know something. The claim that the propositions $p \rightarrow q$, p , and q , combined with one another in the form " $(p \rightarrow q) \cdot p \rightarrow q$ ", yield tautology shows that q follows from p and $p \rightarrow q$ (*Tractatus*, 6.1201). But to see this, one must know something, e.g. what p , q , and \rightarrow mean, what implication, conjunction, or tautology are. Because one cannot know these things independently from other laws of logic, it is legitimate to say that also 'seeing' already presupposes the knowledge of logical rules.

Keywords: language, logic, saying, showing, proposition, meaning

Agnieszka Dębska, Experimental Philosophy on Intentionality of Actions

Recent studies concerning folk concept of intentional action reveal interesting asymmetry: people have tendency to claim that an action is intentional when the side effect is harmful, and as unintentional when the side effect is beneficial. Based on this research, some experimental philosophers claim that our judgments about intentionality of action are affected by moral considerations. The goal of this paper is to show a series of empirical data which refer to asymmetry in assessing the intentionality and to analyze various theories and their interpretations of the above phenomenon. In particular, the article presents a theoretically promising hypothesis that explains asymmetry by appealing to the responsibility of agents.

Keywords: Knobe's effect, side-effect effect, intentional action, theory of responsibility

Joanna Komorowska-Mach, Negative Program of Experimental Philosophy and Appealing to Intuition in Philosophical Argumentation

The aim of this paper is to undermine one of the main assumptions of the negative program of experimental philosophy. Experimental philosophers claim that it is possible to verify the validity of some classical philosophical arguments which appeal to intuitions by empirically testing whether those intuitions are in fact commonly shared. I argue that experimental philosophers wrongly identify the function that appealing to intuition plays in such arguments. By analyzing several classical philosophical arguments quoted by experimental philosophers, I show that declaring that something is intuitive does not play a role of a premise in an argument. My claim is that its purpose is rather to set common ground between the author of the argument and her audience. Therefore questioning the commonness of intuitions does not lead to the falsification of such arguments.

Keywords: experimental philosophy, intuitions, philosophical argumentation