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# Abstracts

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Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach dozwolonego użytku.

## **Abstracts**

### **Tomasz A. Puczyłowski, A Remark on Luminosity**

Timothy Williamson defines a property of luminosity in the following manner: a condition (or a mental state of a given subject) is luminous if and only if “whenever it obtains (and one is in a position to wonder whether it does), one is in a position to know that it obtains”. Williamson claims that “for virtually no mental state S is the condition that one is in S luminous”. But Wai-hung Wong observes that Williamson’s argumentation for non-luminosity of mental states is dangerously similar in its form to the reasoning underlying the sorites paradox. The observation lead him to the question: is it possible to prove the non-luminosity of some mental states without appeal to a reasoning analogous to the one underlying the sorites paradox? In the paper I present an argument in favour of the claim that Wong’s problem expressed in the question can be resolved. I present a method of determining whether a given state is luminous. However, the proposed test is fragmentary in the sense that it allows us to identify non-luminous states only within the set of propositional attitudes that fulfil certain conditions specified in the paper.

*Keywords:* luminosity, sorites paradox, Wong’s problem, knowledge, belief, mental states

### **Anna Wójtowicz, Is the Notion of Rationality of Inference Normative or Descriptive?**

Defeasible inferences can be formalized and evaluated in many different ways. It is tempting to make a choice between them by using the argument “from people”. According to this line of thought, inferences should be described and evaluated in the same way as this would be done by people. In the article I identify the principles on which the argument from people is based, what its applications are, and where its

main weaknesses lie. The central claim of the paper is that the argument should be used with extreme caution, because of its fundamental methodological shortcomings.

*Keywords:* defeasible inferences, argument “from people”, rational reasoning, Bayes theorem

### **Tomasz Żuradzki, The Third Kind of Normativity — the Requirement of Reason-Responsiveness**

In the article I demonstrate that the distinction between the genuine normativity and the normativity of the requirements of rationality is not exhaustive. It omits an important class of requirements, namely reason-responsiveness. On the one hand, this kind of requirements does not resemble the normative requirements in the genuine sense; on the other, there are important differences between rationality as coherence and the requirements of reason-responsiveness. I conclude that reason-responsiveness should be treated as a third kind of normative requirements.

*Keywords:* normativity, rationality, reasons, reason-responsiveness, Broome, Kolodny, Parfit

### **Andrzej Indrzejczak, The Origins and Development of Sequent Calculi**

In 1934 Gentzen developed sequent calculus as a technical device for the study of natural deduction. Soon it turned out to be one of the most important tools of modern proof theory. In this survey paper we characterize the general idea of sequent calculi and some of their important features, in particular cut elimination and its consequences. We also briefly characterize some recent results, such as the generalized sequent calculi and the development of substructural logics.

*Keywords:* sequent calculus, proof theory, decidability

### **Katarzyna Paprzycka, Lowe’s Thesis in Light of Lowe’s Semantics**

Lowe’s thesis (essential for his argument against identity theory) is the claim that if not all neurons had behaved the way they actually did, the arm would have risen anyway. Lowe’s argument for the thesis depends on a controversial delimitation of the class of the closest possible worlds (on Lewis’ semantics). I show how one could use Lowe’s semantics in the evaluation of Lowe’s thesis. I demonstrate that a weaker version of the principle of the simplification of disjunctive antecedents holds on this semantics. One can use the principle to argue for or against Lowe’s thesis. On Lowe’s semantics, the debate between defenders and opponents of Lowe’s thesis in fact mimics the standstill concerning the question which possible worlds are the closest to the actual world on Lewis’ semantics. However, Lowe’s semantics offers a way out of the impasse. I argue that the opponents of Lowe’s thesis are ultimately at an advantage.

*Keywords:* counterfactuals, closeness, disjunctive antecedents, identity theory, Lowe, Lewis, possible worlds

### **Maciej Sendlak, Modal Realism and Counterpossibles**

According to the standard analysis of conditionals, any counterfactual with an impossible antecedent (so-called counterpossibles) is vacuously true. The way we use this kind of counterfactuals shows that it should not be so: some of them are regarded as true, and others as false. To solve the problem of counterpossibles, many philosophers have argued that one needs to invoke impossible worlds. This extension of the ontology of modality should save the analysis of counterfactuals from being insensitive to the problem of counterpossibles. Since theories of impossible worlds are extensions of original accounts of modalities, it is worth stressing that a proper analysis of counterpossibles should not weaken the latter. In this paper I argue that the theories of impossible worlds which are based on Lewis' modal realism — Extended Modal Realism and Hybrid Modal Realism — might be considered as either unattractive to modal realists or insufficient for analyzing counterpossibles.

*Keywords:* modal realism, counterfactuals, counterpossibles, possible worlds, impossible worlds, David Lewis, Takashi Yagisawa, Francesco Berto

### **Marek Piwowarczyk, A Critique of Immanent Realism — the Separation Argument**

In the article I formulate a version of the separation argument against immanent realism. The argument has been known since Plato's *Parmenides*. Its gist consists in the thesis that if universals were immanent (wholly present) in individuals, universals would be separated from themselves, which is absurd.

The argument is underestimated nowadays, because separation is usually conceived in spatial terms. Immanent realists treat universals as properties of objects and point to the fact that properties exist in space in a different way than objects do. This peculiarity of properties is supposed to allow them to be separated from themselves. I try to show that separation should be regarded as a special form of ontological independence, and in that case the argument cannot be refuted. This kind of dependence is called "inseparability" and was introduced into ontological discourse by Roman Ingarden.

An object  $x$  is inseparable from an object  $y$  iff it belongs to the essence of  $x$  that  $x$  exists with  $y$  within an absolute whole. I do not define the notion of absolute whole but try to explicate it by pointing to the difference between wholes such as subjects modified by their properties and wholes composed of interdependent subjects of properties. A subject and its properties make up an absolute whole, whereas ontologically interdependent subjects of properties make up only higher-order wholes. It seems very plausible that every object is inseparable from itself (inseparability is reflexive) — every object must make up an absolute whole with itself. But if a universal is immanent in different objects, then either it must be separated from itself, or these objects are inseparable. Both consequences are unacceptable. We cannot refute this version of the separation argument by appealing to a specific spatial

status of properties, because no spatial concepts are involved in the theory of inseparability.

*Keywords:* universals, properties, inseparability, immanent realism, separation argument

### **Katarzyna Barska, Negative States of Affairs in Ingarden's Ontology**

The paper offers an ontological analysis of negative states of affairs in Ingarden's ontology. The debate about negative states of affairs has revolved around establishing their existential status, in particular whether they are heteronomous or autonomous. On the one hand, Ingarden is often perceived as a reductionist who claims that negative states of affairs enjoy a very weak mode of being: they are purely intentional entities. On the other hand, according to Ingarden, they are ontologically dependent on positive states of affairs, which are autonomous. While Ingarden's position is vague, it is hard to accept the idea that negative states of affairs should have both heteronomous and autonomous aspects. Those problems arise when Ingarden moves from ontological to epistemological domain. I maintain that the understanding of negative states of affairs as purely intentional is simply a result of following the epistemological way of thinking and is in conflict with some of his ontological statements.

*Keywords:* ontology, existential moment, state of affairs, negative state of affairs, mode of being, individual object, intentional object, Ingarden, Meinong