ISSN 2299-0356

Filozoficzne Aspekty Genezy — **2024, t. 21, nr 2**

Philosophical Aspects of Origin s. 109–150

https://doi.org/10.53763/fag.2024.21.2.243

ARTYKUŁ ORYGINALNY / ORIGINAL ARTICLE

J.M. Fritzman

Lewis & Clark College

Nondual Panpsychism: From the Extended Mind to Universal Consciousness and Śiva

Received: August 21, 2024. Accepted: April 4, 2025. Published online: October 22, 2025.

Abstract: Descriptive metaphysics only describes the structure of thought about the world, according to P. F. Strawson, but revisionary metaphysics aims to produce a better structure. This article introduces a cross-cultural revisionary metaphysics, Nondual Panpsychism. It is cross-cultural in engaging with Indian philosophy. It is nondual in claiming that reality, although neither plural nor dual, is never One. Nondual Panpsychism is distinct from monism, dualism, and pluralism. It is a panpsychism, not maintaining that everything is conscious, but rather claiming that everything is a cognitive system. Cognition is an entity's choice of action among perceived alternatives. All entities have agency, as they choose actions. Cognition is intentional, as it is about options, and it is ubiquitous. This article has eight sections. Following an introduction, the second section recognizes that metaphysical grounding is multidirectional, reflexive, and always partial. It further explains that the One of mysticism and monism is never fully One and that reality is never wholly real. The third section argues that there is no phenomenal consciousness, no Nagelian qualia, only access consciousness and access consciousness accessed. The fourth section argues that even if phenomenal consciousness did exist, the hard problem of consciousness could be dissolved and dismissed. Panpsychism is retained by refiguring consciousness as cognitive. The fifth section hyperextends the extended mind. A social group is a cognitive system. So is the universe. Groups and their members mutually ground each other. A group is a member of larger groups, moreover, and a member, an individual, is a group. This points the way to overcoming micropsychism's combination problem and cosmopsychism's decombination

Keywords:

cosmopsychism;
extended mind;
grounding;
panpsychism;
Pratyabhijñā

problem. The sixth section argues that Nondual Panpsychism sublates — that is, simultaneously negates, preserves, and transcends — several recent versions of cosmopyschism. Engaging in cross-cultural dialogue, the seventh section shows that Nondual Panpsychism and an Indian philosophy, Kaśmir Śaivism's panentheistic *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) system, are compatible. It also discusses the limitations of recent versions of cosmopsychism which are compatible with Advaita Vedānta, another Indian philosophy. The final section has an altar call.

1. Introduction

Strawson explains that "descriptive metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure". [1] This article introduces a cross-cultural revisionary metaphysics, Nondual Panpsychism. It is cross-cultural in engaging with Indian philosophy. It is nondual in claiming that reality, although neither plural nor dual, is never One. Nondual Panpsychism is distinct from monism, dualism, and pluralism. It is a panpsychism, maintaining not that everything has phenomenal consciousness — indeed, as discussed in section three, it denies that phenomenal consciousness exists — but rather that everything is a cognitive system. "Cognition, in the sense of Atlan and Cohen, [2] most fundamentally involves choice of an action from a larger set of those available". [3] All entities have agency, as they choose actions. Cognition is intentional, as it is about options, and it is ubiquitous.

Panpsychism: what is in a name? As discussed more fully in section four, traditional panpsychism holds that the essence of the physical, or an essential feature, is mindedness, mentality, or consciousness. Here, consciousness is understood as

[1] Peter F. Strawson, **Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics**, Routledge, London 1959, p. 9.

[2] See Henri Atlan and Irun R. Cohen, "Immune Information, Self-Organization, and Meaning", *International Immunology* 1998, Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. 711–717, https://doi.org/10.1093/intimm/10.6.711.

[3] Rodrick Wallace, "A Comment on Collective Belief", *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 2020, Vol. 9, No. 7, p. 55 [55–57], https://tiny.pl/t6072_3t [22.04.2025].

phenomenal consciousness, Nagelian qualia, as the what-it-is-like to experience something and to have experience. Rejecting that notion of consciousness, Nondual Panpsychism maintains that consciousness should rather be understood as access and monitoring consciousness. It thereby refigures panpsychism by claiming that everything is cognitive, and is a constituent in a cognitive system. Nondual Panpsychism is not a version of physicalism, as that is ordinarily defined, as physicalism maintains that the physical, or what is fundamental, has no mindness, mentality, or consciousness. Most physicalists would regard the assertion that everything is cognitive, coupled with the denial of phenomenal consciousness, as a hostile amendment, not as a friendly one. They would object to referring to the metaphysics that is articulated in this paper as "physicalism." A neutral ontology, such as neutral monism, holds that the physical and the non-physical (the mental or consciousness) are grounded in and expressions of something fundamental which is neither physical nor non-physical. This presupposes, however, that the physical and non-physical can be demarcated. Attempts to demarcate them have not been successful. Idealism also presupposes such a demarcation. "Nondual Panpsychism" — instead of "Nondual", "Nondual Physicalism", "Nondual Neutral Monism", or "Nondual Idealism" — is the best term for the revisionary metaphysics that is articulated and defended in this article.

Following this introduction, the second section recognizes that metaphysical grounding is multidirectional, reflexive, and always partial. It further explains that the One of mysticism and monism is never fully One and that reality is never wholly real. The third section argues that — insofar as phenomenal consciousness is understood as qualia, as articulated by Chalmers, Nagel, and Searle — there is no phenomenal consciousness. [4] There is only access consciousness and monitoring consciousness, access consciousness accessed. The fourth section argues that even if phenomenal consciousness did exist, the hard problem of consciousness could be dissolved and dismissed. Nevertheless, panpsychism is retained by refiguring consciousness as a cognitive system. No system is fundamental, as each is grounded by all. The universal cognitive system, introduced in section five, both

[4] See David J. Chalmers, **The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory**, Oxford University Press, New York 1996; Thomas Nagel, "What Is It Like To Be a Bat?", *Philosophical Review* 1974 Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 435–456, https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914; John R. Searle, "Consciousness", *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 2000, Vol. 23, pp. 557–578, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.557.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

grounds and is grounded by its constituent cognitive systems. As argued in section two, moreover, grounding is always partial.

The fifth section hyperextends the extended mind. A social group is a cognitive system. So is the universe. Groups and their members mutually ground each other. A group is a member of larger groups, moreover, and a member, an individual, is a group. This points the way to overcoming micropsychism's combination problem and cosmopsychism's decombination problem. The sixth section argues that Nondual Panpsychism sublates — that is, simultaneously negates, preserves, and transcends — several recent versions of cosmopyschism. Engaging in cross-cultural dialogue, the seventh section shows that Nondual Panpsychism and an Indian philosophy, Kaśmir Śaivism's panentheistic *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) system, are compatible. It also discusses the limitations of several recent versions of cosmopsychism that are compatible with Advaita Vedānta, another Indian philosophy. The final section has an altar call.

This article is in the style of speculative metaphysics rather than analytic metaphysics. Its mode of the presentation is closer to Whitehead [5] than Lewis: [6] "The verification of a rationalistic scheme is to be sought in its general success, and not in the peculiar certainty, or initial clarity, of its first principles". [7] Given its ambitious scope, moreover, its propositions must be didactic and its arguments schematic.

2. Grounding and the Incompleteness of Being

Nondual Panpsychism is nondual in claiming that reality, although neither plural nor dual, is never One. Employing the conceptual resources provided by metaphysical grounding, this section argues that grounding is always partial and so reality, being, is always incomplete. [8]

[5] See Alfred North Whitehead, **Process and Reality**, Corrected Edition, David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (eds.), The Free Press, New York 1978.

[6] See David Lewis, **On the Plurality of Worlds**, Blackwell Publishers, Malden 2001.

[7] Whitehead, **Process and Reality...**, p. 8.

As Bliss notes, the proponents of grounding quickly converged on an orthodoxy: metaphysical foundationalism, committed to the view that reality is hierarchically structured and contains existents which are fundamental and contingent. So, they did not develop infinitist or coherentist versions: "To question these commitments, it has been suggested [...], is to ask illegitimate questions, to flout common sense, or to just be so absurd as to not warrant serious consideration. In a research program whose literature can, at places, appear pedantic, it is somewhat striking to observe just how poor so many of the arguments presented in defense of this view actually are". [9] Foundationalism is defended, not by compelling arguments, but instead by appeals to pre-theoretical intuitions that are shared by grounding's proponents. Through the illusory truth effect, the tendency to believe assertions after repeated exposure, their intuitions seem obvious to them.

"Intuitively, there is a distinction between full and mere partial grounding. One way to illustrate the distinction is by way of the following contrast: while, for some suitable p and q, $[p \ \& \ q]$ is merely partially grounded in $[p]$, $[p \vee q]$ is fully grounded in $[p]$". [10] However, grounding is always partial. $[p \vee q]$ is partially grounded in $[p]$ and partially grounded in a logic's axioms and rules of inference. That logic, in turn, is partially grounded through its differentiation from other logics as well as in social institutions and practices. No collection of relations, properties, or facts, or even the universe, fully grounds $[p \vee q]$ or anything else.

Paseau and Hiller recognize that grounding can be bidirectional. [11] *Pace* grounding is multidirectional and reflexive. [12] Plausibly, all things quantum entan-

[8] For a fuller discussion of grounding and being's incompleteness, see J.M. Fritzman, "Metaphysical Grounding and Being's Incompleteness", *Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts* 2024, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 329–345, http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2024/02/001.

[9] Ricki Bliss, "**Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality** by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (eds.) [Book Review]", *The Philosophical Review* 2015, Vol. 124, No. 3, p. 414 [410–415], https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2895379.

[10] Ricki Bliss and Kelly Trogdon, "Metaphysical Grounding", in: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Winter 2016 Edition, https://tiny.pl/cxptktnt [22.04.2025].

[11] See Alexander Paseau, "Defining Ultimate Ontological Basis and the Fundamental Layer", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 2010, Vol. 60, No. 238, pp. 169–175, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.642.x; Avram Hiller, "Object-Dependence", *Essays in Philosophy* 2013, Vol. 14, No. 11, pp. 33–55, http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1454.

[12] See Ross P. Cameron, "Turtles All the Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 2008, Vol. 58, No. 230, pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

gled as a result of the Big Bang. [13] Consequently, each cognitive system grounds and is grounded by every other and so each system also reflexively grounds itself in an ontological web of universal reciprocity. No system is fundamental, as each is grounded by all.

Nondual Panpsychism's metaphysics is hunky. The parts of "atomless gunk" divide infinitely, such that every part of the whole has proper parts. [14] The parts of a gunky whole all have proper parts, dividing forever into smaller parts. The converse of gunk is "junk". [15] Each thing is a proper part of something, composing forever into greater wholes. The conjunct of gunk and junk is "hunk". [16]

This metaphysics differs from that of Indian Buddhist Nāgārjuna. [17] He holds that everything is ontologically unreal or empty (*śūnyatā*), lacking reality or own-being (*svabhāva*). Something could have *svabhāva* only if it were fully grounded, its grounding did not depend on anything, and it possessed its grounding intrinsically. Nāgārjuna denies that anything has *svabhāva* or is even partially grounded. In contrast, Nondual Panpsychism maintains that everything is partially grounded. Although things are real, they are never fully real. Reality is ontologically incomplete.

Each thing is a cognitive system that grounds and is grounded by all systems. Grounding is always partial. Thus, reality is never complete, whole, or One. Parmenides asserts that being is One and there is no nothingness. Although subse-

9213.2007.509.x; Gideon Rosen, "Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction", in: Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffman (eds.), **Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology**, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, pp. 109–136, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007; Jonathan Schaffer, "Monism: The Priority of the Whole", *Philosophical Review* 2010, Vol. 119, No. 1, pp. 31–76, https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-025; Michael J. Clark and David Liggins, "Recent Work on Grounding", *Analysis* 2012, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 812–823, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans086.

[13] See Schaffer, "Monism...".

[14] See David Lewis, **Parts of Classes**, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 1991, p. 20.

[15] See Schaffer, "Monism...", p. 64.

[16] See Einar Duenger Bohn, "An Argument Against the Necessity of Unrestricted Composition", *Analysis* 2009, Vol. 69, No. 1, p. 29 [27–31], https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ann004.

[17] See Jan Christoph Westerhoff, "Nāgārjuna", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2024 Edition, https://tiny.pl/w9x5sd6p [22.04.2025].

quent philosophers discussed nothingness, [18] few recognized that nothingness and being ground each other. It may be tempting to believe that, if grounding could be full, reality would be One. The One is variously invoked by such mystics and monists as Advaita Vedāntists, Parmenides, Neoplatonism, Spinoza, and Bradly. Some forms of mysticism maintain that there is "one eternal, absolute reality", a "oneness to all of nature", "the absolute ontological oneness of everything, free of our conceptual distinctions", and "the Oneness of all". [19] Existence monism, most recently defended by Horgan and Potrč [20] "holds that exactly one concrete object token exists (the One)". [21] Schaffer notes that an even stronger form of monism claims that exactly one entity exists.

Were reality to be One, however, it would be none. If it were fully One, the One would not appear, even to itself, and so it would not be. It would be less than nothing, with no ontological status whatsoever. Insofar as the One does appear to itself, the One which appears is nonidentical to the One to which it appears. Reality can be only through its *failure* to be One. The One is never One. Although there is no other to the One, it is other to itself. It is always already dirempted. As grounding is always partial, everything is ontologically incomplete. Reality is never completely real, nothing ever wholly exists.

Nothingness is "given in the heart of being" [22] and "nothingness is this hole in being". [23] The nothingness that is a hole in being is consciousness and for consciousness alone does existence precede essence. For Nondual Panpsychism, however, existence always precedes essence. Everything is holey. Nothingness is at the heart of being, its condition of possibility. Partial grounding is not no grounding, though. There is a hole in being, but there is being with a hole. Further, be-

[18] See Roy Sorensen, "Nothingness", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2023 Edition, https://tiny.pl/r88wdc9d [22.04.2025].

[19] Richard Jones and Jerome Gellman, "Mysticism", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2022 Edition, https://tiny.pl/z0g4hkv0 [22.04.2025].

[20] See Terry Horgan and Matjaž Potrč, "Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence", *Facta Philosophica* 2000, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 249–270, https://doi.org/10.5840/factaphil20002214.

[21] Jonathan Schaffer, "Monism", in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Winter 2018 Edition, https://tiny.pl/rf6mbxrd [22.04.2025].

[22] Jean-Paul Sartre, **Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology**, trans. Sarah Richmond, Routledge, New York 2018, p. 57.

[23] Sartre, **Being and Nothingness...**, p. 786.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

cause everything is a cognitive system and is partially grounded, everything has agency, the freedom to act, and not merely react. Things are finite; they cannot persist in their being. Yet, nothingness is another way in which being appears. When things go under, when creatures die, they do not cease to be. Rather, they become other than they were. Even the universal consciousness is always becoming other than itself, transfiguring itself.

Nondual Panpsychism's metaphysics differs from that of the Chinese Taoist text, the **Tao Te Ching**. [24] For the **Tao Te Ching**, reality includes emptiness, making reality ontologically complete. The emptiness of a pot allows it to contain water and the emptiness at a wheel's hub allows it to attach to an axle. This emptiness is not nothingness — something is empty only relative to something else — it is a plenum, filled with water, air, or space. As noted above, however, for Nondual Panpsychism reality itself is ontologically incomplete.

Its metaphysics also differs from the Platonic *erôs*, where all other beings are driven to overcome their incompleteness through striving toward the highest being, the Beautiful or the Good. [25] For Nondual Panpsychism, even the universal consciousness is incomplete. Nondual Panpsychism agrees with Hegel, Hölderlin, and Schelling that the Absolute has no other — other than itself. It becomes itself only in the moment of its diremption, as Fichte's I exists only in positing the Not-I.

That reality is fundamentally incomplete could be taken as a sign that it is a mistake, that something went horribly wrong. On the contrary, it should be read as a wholly unmerited and undeserved blessing. The Vedas teach that the primordial condition is that of owing a debt. [26] Their insight is correct but not their articulation. Rather than a debt, thanksgiving. Thanksgiving that things are and that they are not fully grounded.

---

[24] See Wang Bi and Laozi, **The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi**, trans. Richard John Lynn, Columbia University Press, New York 2004; Lao Tzu, **Tao Te Ching: The Classic Book of Integrity and the Way**, trans. Victor Mair, Bantam Books, New York 1990.

[25] See C.D.C. Reeve, "Plato on Friendship and Eros", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2023 Edition, https://tiny.pl/by98-773 [22.04.2025].

[26] See Charles Malamoud, **Cooking the World: Ritual and Thought in Ancient India**, trans. David Gordon White, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1996, p. 108.

3. Against Qualia

Standard formulations of panpsychism postulate phenomenal consciousness in everything fundamental. However, Nondual Panpsychism is a form of panpsychism because it regards everything as a cognitive system, without relying on phenomenal consciousness. It understands consciousness as access and monitoring consciousness. Nondual Panpsychism refigures panpsychism by claiming that everything is cognitive and a constituent in a cognitive system. This section argues that there is no phenomenal consciousness, where that is understood as Nagelian qualia.

Nagel asserts "that an organism has conscious experience *at all* means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism," adding that "fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to *be* that organism — something it is like *fo*r the organism". [27] Nagel explains: "The analogical form of the English expression »what it is *like*« is misleading. It does not mean »what (in our experience) it *resembles*«, but rather »how it is for the subject himself« [*sic*]". [28] Chalmers maintains that "when I think of a lion, for instance, there seems to be a whiff of leonine quality to my phenomenology: what it is like to think of a lion is subtly different from what it is like to think of the Eiffel tower". [29] And Searle claims: "There is something it is like to think that two plus two equals four. There is no way to describe it except by saying that it is the character of thinking consciously »two plus two equals four«". [30]

However, there is no phenomenal consciousness, no quale, no "how it is for the subject". There is nothing that it is like to think about a lion or the Eiffel Tower, to think that two plus two equals four, or more generally to have mental states. There is nothing that it is like to be a bat. Strawson calls the denial of phenomenal consciousness "the silliest view ever held in the history of human thought". [31] The silliest view should be vigorously endorsed. As Schwitzgebel rec-

[27] Nagel, "What Is It Like To Be a Bat…", p. 436 [emphasis in the original].

[28] Nagel, "What Is It Like To Be a Bat…", p. 440 [emphasis in the original].

[29] Chalmers, **The Conscious Mind…**, p. 10.

[30] Searle, "Consciousness…", p. 561.

[31] Galen Strawson, "A Hundred Years of Consciousness: »A Long Training in Absurdity«", *Estudios de Filosofías* 2019, Vol. 59, No. 1, p. 32 [9–43], https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n59a02.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

ognizes, any articulated metaphysics of mind will significantly depart from common sense's contradictory dogmas and so will seem crazy to common sense. [32]

Behaviorally and functionally identical to non-zombies, philosophical zombies lack phenomenal consciousness, qualia. While Chalmers uses zombies to argue against physicalism, it will be argued that zombies actually show that phenomenal consciousness does not exist. [33] Assume that there are non-zombies and zombies. First, zombies cannot know that they are zombies. No clue suggests to zombies that they lack something which non-zombies have. Zombies and non-zombies possess the same neural correlates of consciousness. Zombies are whiskey sommeliers expressing their appreciation of Laphroaig's subtle taste of iodine and perfumers approving Roja Haute Luxe.

Second, non-zombies cannot know that they are not zombies. Qualia are supposed to be properties of an individual's mental states which are ineffable, intrinsic, private, and immediately apprehensible in consciousness. [34] Non-zombies must depend on that fourth condition to discern that they are non-zombies. However, they can introspectively distinguish neither the supposed phenomenological whiff of leonine quality from the content of the thought about a lion, nor the *character* of thinking "two plus two equals four" from the *thinking* of it. Attempting to experience the former, they encounter only the latter. Non-zombies cannot know if qualia are being immediately apprehended or something else. Even if everything immediately apprehended is a quale, qualia per se lack content, as their content is shared with zombies. Sommeliers and cuppers, professional coffee tasters, have sophisticated lexicons that precisely describe and communicate the taste of wine and coffee. Those tastes are effable and so are not qualia. Rather, a quale is the supposed ineffable and contentless what it is like to taste wine or coffee.

Zombie sommeliers describe the sweet tobacco finish of an Argentinian Malbec. Non-zombies nevertheless maintain that zombies do not feel it inside and that, for zombies, there is "no light on" and "nothing insid". But these metaphors

[32] See Eric Schwitzgebel, "The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 2014, Vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 665–682, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.910675.

[33] See Chalmers, **The Conscious Mind...**.

[34] See Daniel C. Dennett, "Quining Qualia", in: A.J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), **Consciousness in Modern Science**, Oxford University Press, New York 1988, p. 47 [42–77], https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198522379.003.0003.

do not illuminate: inside what? Zombies and non-zombies alike compare the tastes of Pont-l'Évêque and Époisses de Bourgogne cheeses. The stipulation that zombies cannot *taste* cheese fails: behaviorally and functionally identical to non-zombies, zombies taste cheese. If that is still doubted, ask them. Since verbal reports and behavior are the only evidence that entities have phenomenal consciousness, it would have to be attributed to zombies. The assertion that non-zombies have a subjective dimension which zombies lack is empty. Since qualia are ineffable, it cannot be said what that subjective dimension could be. Qualia per se are *je ne sais quoi*. There is no experiential difference between qualia per se, which lack content, and no qualia.

Considerations of parsimony further militate against the assumption that there is phenomenal consciousness. The parsimony principle rejects qualia per se, since there is no experience of them. There is experience only of the content of supposed qualia per se. Qualia are not the content of experience. There are thoughts of a lion, the Eiffel tower, and that two plus two equals four. But there is nothing that it is like to think those thoughts, no whiffs of leonine, Eiffel towerish, or mathematical qualities to one's phenomenology. There is the smell of the rose, but no phenomenal quality of the smell of the rose that is experienced inside.

Block distinguishes phenomenal consciousness and access-consciousness: "Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action". [35] A state is access conscious, or cognitively accessible, [36] "if, in virtue of one's having the state, a representation of its content is (1) inferentially promiscuous, [37] that is, poised for use as a premise in reasoning, (2) poised for rational control of action, and (3) poised for rational control of speech". [38] Human and nonhuman animals possess access consciousness.

[35] Ned Block, "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 1995, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 227 [227–247], https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00038188.

[36] See Ned Block, "Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 2007, Vol. 30, No. 5–6, pp. 481–499, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X07002786.

[37] See Stephen Stich, "Beliefs and Sub-Doxastic States", *Philosophy of Science* 1978, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 499–458, https://doi.org/10.1086/288832.

[38] Block, "On a Confusion…", p. 231.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

However, there is no phenomenal consciousness. Supposed phenomenal consciousness is access consciousness and forms of access consciousness accessed, such higher order reflexive cognitive accessibility to access consciousness as "self-consciousness" and "monitoring-consciousness". [39] Although "few people, if any, think zombies actually exist", everyone is a zombie. [40] "Cut the pie any way you like, »meaning« just ain't in the head". [41] Further, "the mind — the locus of our manipulations of meanings — is not in the head either". [42] Finally, completing this trajectory, consciousness is not in the head and it is not phenomenal. There are no ghosts in machines, only the intelligent behavior of cognitive systems.

4. Dissolving and Dismissing the Hard Problem of Consciousness

Many believers in phenomenal consciousness agree that "even after we have explained the functional, dynamical, and structural properties of the conscious mind, we can still meaningfully ask the question, *Why is it conscious?*". [43] While physicalism maintains that everything is physical, "there seems to be an unbridgeable *explanatory gap* between the physical world and consciousness". [44] Bridging that gap is "the hard problem of consciousness". [45] Nondual Panpsychism circumvents the hard problem by maintaining that there are only cognitive systems and

[39] Block, "On a Confusion…", p. 235.

[40] Robert Kirk, "Zombies", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2023 Edition, https://tiny.pl/r9_yyq95 [24.04.2025].

[41] Hilary Putnam, **Philosophical Papers, Volume 2: Mind, Language and Reality**, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1975, p. 227.

[42] John McDowell, "Putnam on Mind and Meaning", *Philosophical Topics* 1992, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 35–48, https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19922012.

[43] Josh Weisberg, "The Hard Problem of Consciousness", *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (n.d.), https://tiny.pl/2h1mw7qt [30.04.2025] [emphasis in the original].

[44] Weisberg, "The Hard Problem…" [emphasis in the original].

[45] See David J. Chalmers, "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness", *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 1995, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 200–219, https://tiny.pl/mz9ccf84 [30.04.2025]; Chalmers, **The Conscious Mind...**

processes. Even if phenomenal consciousness did exist, the hard problem of bridging the explanatory gap between the physical and consciousness could be dissolved and dismissed, as the physical cannot be demarcated from the nonphysical.

Hempel presents a dilemma for theory-based physicalism. [46] First, physicalism is false if it is defined in terms of contemporary science, as science is quickly superseded. Consciousness is an object of cognitive science and so consciousness is physical if physicalism is defined in terms of contemporary science. Second, physicalism is trivial if it is defined in terms of future science, as it cannot be known now what a future science will be. Since the physical cannot be demarcated from the nonphysical in general, or from consciousness in particular, the hard problem dissolves. This does not result in idealism. Both physicalism and idealism presuppose that the physical and the nonphysical can be demarcated.

Object-based physicalism proposes that "a property is physical iff it is the sort of property had by paradigmatic physical objects and their constituents". [47] In his discussion, Stoljar regards rocks and planets as paradigmatic physical objects. However, black holes, dark energy, and dark matter are not paradigmatic physical objects. If they remain excluded from object-based physicalism, the hard problem of consciousness is also the hard problem of black holes and company. If object-based physicalism expands its conception of paradigmatic physical objects to include them, then consciousness can be excluded only by gerrymandering.

Spurrett and Papineau, and Montero and Papineau defend a *via negativa* interpretation of "physics," which defines the physical as what is non-mental. [48] However, this presupposes the demarcation of the non-mental (defined as the physical) from the mental.

Attitude-based physicalism is expressed by the oath "I hereby swear to go in

---

[46] See Carl Hempel, "Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets", in: Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton Gabriel White (eds.), **Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel**, St Martin's Press, New York 1969, pp. 179–199.

[47] Daniel Stoljar, "Physicalism", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2024 Edition, https://tiny.pl/55995jjp [24.04.2025].

[48] See David Spurrett and David Papineau, "A Note on the Completeness of »Physics«", *Analysis* 1999, Vol. 59, No. 261, pp. 25–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/59.1.25; Barbara Montero and David Papineau, "A Defence of the *Via Negativa* Argument for Physicalism", *Analysis* 2005, Vol. 65, No. 287, pp. 233–237, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/65.3.233.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

my ontology everywhere and only where physics leads me". [49] However, this formulation of the oath assumes that all other sciences are reducible to physics. Until that occurs, its ontology is only that of physics. Reformulating the oath avoids this difficulty: "I hereby swear to go in my ontology everywhere and only where science leads me". Attitude-based physicalism would then include consciousness in its ontology, however, since cognitive science studies consciousness. This would dissolve the hard problem of consciousness.

Proponents of attitude-based physicalism's reformulated oath might resist the conclusion that consciousness is physical because it is studied by cognitive science. An anonymous reviewer suggests that it is still unclear if consciousness should be included in a physicalist ontology. Whether a science *studies* something neither determines nor clarifies its ontological status, as opposed to what science *discovers* about something. Even though science studies consciousness, it might nevertheless discover that consciousness is not physical.

This response does not succeed for two reasons. First, physicalists would have to employ an alternative definition of the physical, other than the reformulated oath of attitude-based physicalism, to allow that an object of scientific inquiry might not be physical. Attitude-based physicalists would insist that any scientific discovery is, ontologically and eo ipso, a physical discovery. And they would deny that a non-scientific discovery, such as finding a coin in a shoe, could alter the ontology of attitude-based physicalism. Second, the response implicitly rejects attitude-based physicalism by allowing that, in principle, it could be discovered that an object of science is not physical. The reformulated oath of attitude-based physicalism would then have to be reformulated a second time: "I hereby swear to go in *my* ontology everywhere and only where science leads, but I nevertheless acknowledge that ontology might be more extensive than where science leads". This would undermine attitude-based physicalism, which purports to provide a complete, not restricted, ontology.

Biologists leave "life" undefined. Colin argues that cognitive scientists should leave "cognition" undefined. [50] Physicalists will encounter the first horn of

[49] Alyssa Ney, "Physicalism as an Attitude", *Philosophical Studies* 2008, Vol. 138, No. 1, p. 11 [1–15], https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-0006-4.

[50] Allen Colin, "On (Not) Defining Cognition", *Synthese* 2017, Vol. 194, No. 11, pp. 4233–4249, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1454-4.

Hempel's dilemma if they leave "physical" undefined, however, as they will implicitly understand the physical in terms of contemporary science.

The physical cannot be demarcated from the nonphysical, as required by both physicalism and idealism. This might seem to also obviate the turn to panpsychism, which claims that consciousness is an aspect — or, more radically, the intrinsic nature or essence — of the physical. However, panpsychism can be retained by refiguring consciousness. If everything is a cognitive system and if cognitive systems exemplify consciousness, as Nondual Panpsychism claims, then panpsychism can be reaffirmed.

There are two types of panpsychism: micropsychism and cosmopsychism. According to micropsychism, fundamental entities or ultimates (subatomic particles or quantum fields) have experience (proto-consciousness, mentality, mindedness). Ultimates have (or are) minds. Macrolevel consciousness is grounded in the complex structures of microlevel consciousness. Micropsychism faces the "combination problem"[51] of explaining how microlevel consciousness grounds macrolevel consciousness. Responding to micropsychism's combination problem, cosmopsychism holds that the universe is conscious. Cosmopsychism faces the "decombination problem"[52] of explaining how the universal consciousness grounds finite consciousness.

Nondual Panpsychism affirms both micropsychism and cosmopsychism. It overcomes the combination and decombination problems by holding that grounding is multidirectional. Microlevel systems ground macrolevel systems. Macrolevel systems ground microlevel system. Systems at the same level ground each other. The universal system grounds finite (microlevel and macrolevel) systems and finite systems ground the universal system and each other. And, as argued in section two, grounding is always partial.

[51] William E. Seager, "Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism", *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 1995, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 280 [272–288], https://tiny.pl/xy2b489g [30.04.2025].

[52] Miri Albahari, "Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am: How the World Might be Grounded in Universal »Advaitic« Consciousness", in: William E. Seager (ed.), **The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism**, Routledge, New York 2020, p. 121 [119–130], https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717708-11.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

5. The Hyperextended Mind

This section hyperextends the mind to groups and then to the universal cognitive system. The extended mind hypothesis developed in four partially overlapping waves. The first invokes the parity principle: processes external to the organism are cognitive when they are functionally equivalent to internal cognitive processes. [53] Critics reply that external processes are not cognitive because they are substantially dissimilar to internal processes. [54]

The second wave appeals to the complementarity principle: "internal and external vehicles and processes are integrated in the completion of cognitive tasks", [55] such that they ground a cognitive system. [56]

The third wave maintains that internal cognitive processes can become external and external processes internal. [57] Social practices change the brain's patterns

[53] See Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, "The Extended Mind", *Analysis* 1998, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 10–23, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/58.1.7.

[54] See Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, "The Bounds of Cognition", *Philosophical Psychology* 2001, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 43–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080120033571; Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa, "Defending the Bounds of Cognition", in: Richard Menary (ed.), **The Extended Mind**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 67–80; Terry Darnall, "Does the World Leak Into the Mind? Active Externalism, »Internalism« and Epistemology", *Cognitive Science* 2005, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 135–143, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6; Robert D. Rupert, "Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition", *Journal of Philosophy* 2004, Vol. 101, No. 8, pp. 389–428, https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2004101826.

[55] Richard Menary, **Cognitive Integration: Attacking the Bounds of Cognition**, Palgrave-Macmillan, New York 2007, p. 63.

[56] See Richard Menary, "Cognitive Integration and the Extended Mind," in: Richard Menary (ed.), **The Extended Mind**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 227–243, https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/8535.003.0010; John Sutton, "Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process", in: Richard Menary (ed.), **The Extended Mind**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 189–225, https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0009.

[57] See Eric Arnau, Anna Estany, Rafael González del Solar, and Thomas Sturm, "The Extended Cognition Thesis: Its Significance for the Philosophy of (Cognitive) Science", *Philosophical Psychology* 2013, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.836081; Mason Cash, "Cognition without Borders: »Third Wave« Socially Distributed Cognition and Relational Autonomy", *Cognitive Systems Research* 2013, Vol. 25–26, pp. 61–71, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.007; Sutton, "Exograms and Interdisciplinarity...", in: Richard Menary (ed.), **The Extended Mind...**, pp. 189–225; Michela Bassolino, Andrea Serino, Silvia Ubaldi, and Elisabetta Làdavas, "Everyday Use of the Computer Mouse Extends Peripersonal Space Representation", *Neuropsychologia* 2010, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 803–811, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.11.009;

of neural activity. [58] Minds are cognitive systems grounded through the dynamic interactions between individuals and their environments.

The fourth wave further claims that socially distributed group cognition occurs when cognitive processes are holistically distributed among individuals and groups. [59] The cognitions of groups and members mutually ground each other. A group's members ground its socially distributed cognition, but they are not absorbed into that cognitive system, losing their distinct identities. They retain quasi-independence. Members think *through*, *with*, and *against* groups, and vice versa; groups and members are co-constituting. A group is an extended mind. It is a cognitive agent which is not reducible to its members. [60] A group has mental states — such as beliefs, desires, goals, and intentions — and it can accept responsibility. [61] Its mental states are frequently conflicted, for example about its goals or

Shaun Gallagher, "The Socially Extended Mind", *Cognitive Systems Research* 2013, Vol. 25–26, pp. 4–12, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.008; Michael David Kirchhoff, "Extended Cognition and Fixed Properties: Steps to a Third-Wave Version of Extended Cognition", *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 2012, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 287–308, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9237-8; Michael David Kirchhoff, "Composition and Transactive Memory Systems", *Philosophical Explorations* 2016, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 59–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2016.1085593; Andreas Roepstorff, Jörg Niewöhner, and Stefan Beck, "Enculturing Brains through Patterned Practices", *Neural Networks* 2010, Vol. 23, No. 8–9, pp. 1051–1059, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2010.08.002.

[58] See Eleanor A. Maguire, David G. Gadian, Ingrid S. Johnsrude, Catriona D. Good, John Ashburner, Richard S.J. Frackowiak, and Christopher D. Frith, "Navigation-Related Structural Change in the Hippocampi of Taxi Drivers", *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 2000, Vol. 97, No. 8, pp. 4398–4403, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.070039597.

[59] See J.M. Fritzman and Kristin Thornburg, "»I Is Someone Else«: Constituting the Extended Mind's Fourth Wave, with Hegel", *Essays in Philosophy* 2016, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 156–190, https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1560; Shaun Gallagher and Anthony Crisafi, "Mental Institutions", *Topoi* 2009, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 45–51, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9045-0; Shaun Gallagher, "The Overextended Mind", *Versus* 2011, Vol. 112–113, pp. 57–68; Gallagher, "The Socially Extended Mind…", pp. 4–12; Georg Theiner and Timothy O'Connor, "The Emergence of Group Cognition", in: Antonella Corradini and Timothy O'Connor (eds.), **Emergence in Science and Philosophy**, Routledge, New York 2010, pp. 78–117; Georg Theiner, "Group-Sized Distributive Cognitive Systems", in: Marija Jankovic and Kirk Ludwig (eds.), **The Routledge Handbook of Cognitive Intentionality**, Routledge, New York 2020, pp. 233–248.

[60] See Georg Theiner and John Sutton, "The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 2014, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 277–278, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X13003051.

[61] See Michael G. Bruno and J.M. Fritzman, "Collective Belief Defended", *Social Epistemology* 2021, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 48–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2020.1761479.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

how those goals should be pursued. Consensus is usually a temporary moment, seldom a defining characteristic.

Groups and members are co-constituting, as noted above, and a human subject is akin to a group and its beliefs. In humans, as Pradeu explains, "symbiotic bacteria play indispensable roles, in particular in digestion and immunity, but also in development" [62] and "development is always co-development, that is, it results from the co-construction of living things belonging to distinct species". [63] Gut microbes affect human brain development, cognitive functions, personality traits, and behavior that includes social interaction and stress management. [64]

Further, there is scientific evidence corroborating the theory that the holobiont with its hologenome — the genomes of a host organism and its microbial symbionts — is a level of evolutionary selection. [65] Bacteria are cognitive organisms which integrate and communicate information, as well as exhibit intentional behavior and perhaps social intelligence. [66] Extrapolating from such scientific

[62] Thomas Pradeu, "A Mixed Self: The Role of Symbiosis in Development", *Biological Theory* 2011, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 83 [80–88], https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-011-0011-5.

[63] Pradeu, "A Mixed Self...", p. 86.

[64] See Timothy G. Dinana, Roman M. Stillinga, Catherine Stanton, and John F. Cryan, "Collective Unconscious: How Gut Microbes Shape Human Behavior", *Journal of Psychiatric Research* 2015, Vol. 63, pp. 1–9, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2015.02.021; Katerina V.-A. Johnson, "Gut Microbiome Composition and Diversity are Related to Human Personality Traits", *Human Microbiome Journal* 2020, Vol. 15, pp. 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.humic.2019.100069; Gun-Ha Kim and Jung-Ok Shim, "Gut Microbiota Affects Brain Development and Behavior", *Clinical and Experimental Pediatrics* 2023, Vol. 66, No. 7, pp. 274–280, https://doi.org/10.3345/cep.2021.01550.

[65] See Scott F. Gilbert, Eugene Rosenberg, and Ilana Zilber-Rosenberg, "The Holobiont with Its Hologenome Is a Level of Selection in Evolution", in: Snait Gissis, Ehud Lamm, and Ayelet Shavit (eds.), **Landscapes of Collectivity in the Life Sciences**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2018, pp. 305–324, https://tiny.pl/g74fvhgd [28.04.2025]; Joan Roughgarden, "Holobiont Evolution: Mathematical Model with Vertical vs. Horizontal Microbiome Transmission", *Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology* 2020, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 1–24, https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0012.002.

[66] See Eshel Ben Jacob, Israela Becker, Yoash Shapira, and Herbert Levine, "Bacterial Linguistic Communication and Social Intelligence", *Trends in Microbiology* 2004, Vol. 12, No. 8, pp. 366–372, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tim.2004.06.006; Pamela Lyon, "The Cognitive Cell: Bacterial Behavior Reconsidered", *Frontiers in Microbiology* 2015, Vol. 16, pp. 1–18, https://doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2015.00264; Lynn Margulis, "The Conscious Cell", *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 2001, Vol. 929, No. 1, pp. 55– 70, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05707.x; Daniela Pinto and Thorsten Mascher, "(Actino)Bacterial »Intelligence«: Using Comparative Genomics to Unravel the Information Processing Capacities of Microbes", *Current Genetics* 2016, Vol. 62, pp. 487–498, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00294-016-0569-3; Michael Steinert, "Pathogen Intelligence", *Fron-*

studies, Vana proposes that "our consciousness is our emergent property caused by the bidirectional communication between the brain and the gut microbiota". [67] Vana's proposal is supported by recent studies extending cognition to the gut. [68]

Rejecting the radical version of the extended mind, which claims that both cognitive processes and mental states are extended, Shani argues that cognitive processes may be extended but mental states are only in the head. [69] A mental state is an instantiative vehicle of content, "any causal structure which instantiates intrinsic content at the most direct level of instantiation". [70] On the one hand, intrinsic content is content that is intrinsically meaningful to a subject: "my own ordinary beliefs need not, as a general rule, be interpreted by myself; they are intrinsically meaningful to me". [71] On the other hand, extrinsic or derived content,

tiers in Cellular and Infection Microbiology 2014, Vol. 4, No. 8, pp. 1–7, https://doi.org/10.3389/fcimb.2014.00008.

[67] Radek Vana, "The Brain, Gut and Consciousness: Microbiology of Our Mind", *Inquiries* 2020, Vol. 12, No. 12, https://tiny.pl/d597_4kh [30.04.2025].

[68] See Anna Castells-Nobau, Jordi Mayneris-Perxachs, and José Manuel Fernández-Real, "Unlocking the Mind-Gut Connection: Impact of Human Microbiome on Cognition", *Cell Host & Microbe* 2024, Vol. 32, No. 8, pp. 1248–1263, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chom.2024.07.019; Muddsar Hameed, Fatima Noor, Hamza Hussain, Raja Gohar Khan, Shahbaz Khattak Haroon Ur Rashid, Spogmaye Haroon Ur Rashid, Alina Atiq, Hassan Ali, Seerat E. Rida, and Mahrukh Anwar Abbasi, "Gut-Brain Axis: Investigating the Effects of Gut Health on Cognitive Functioning in Adults", *Cureus* 2024, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.64286; Maria Kossowska, Sylwia Olejniczak, Marcelina Karbowiak, Wioletta Mosiej, Dorota Zielińska, and Aneta Brzezicka, "The Interplay between Gut Microbiota and Cognitive Functioning in the Healthy Aging Population: A Systematic Review", *Nutrients* 2024, Vol. 16, No. 6, pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.3390/nu16060852; Kaijie Lin, Feng Peng, Kunyang He, Zhengyu Qian, Xuan Mei, Zhikun Su, Yilihamujiang Wujimaiti, Xun Xia, and Tianyao Zhang, "Research Progress on Intestinal Microbiota Regulating Cognitive Function through the Gut-Brain Axis", *Neurological Sciences* 2024, Vol. 45, No. 8, pp. 3711–3721, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10072-024-07525-5; Kolade Oluwagbemigun, Maike E. Schnermann, Matthias Schmid, John F. Cryan, and Ute Nöthlings, "A Prospective Investigation into the Association between the Gut Microbiome Composition and Cognitive Performance among Healthy Young Adults", *Gut Pathogens* 2022, Vol. 14, No. 15, pp. 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13099-022-00487-z; Federico Boem, Gregor P. Greslehner, Jan Pieter Konsman, and Lynn Chiu, "Minding the Gut: Extending Embodied Cognition and Perception to the Gut Complex", *Frontiers in Neuroscience* 2023, Vol. 17, pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2023.1172783.

[69] See Itay Shani, "Making It Mental: In Search for the Golden Mean of the Extended Cognition Controversy", *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 2013, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9273-z.

[70] Shani, "Making It Mental…", p. 17.

[71] Shani, "Making It Mental…", p. 14.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

such as texts, must be animated with meaning by a person. Thus, instantiative vehicles remain in the head. By contrast, "transformative vehicles of content act as operators which transform the flow and the quality of the instantiative vehicles of content enjoyed by a cognitive agent". [72] Transformative vehicles can extend.

However, content is neither intrinsic nor extrinsic. Content is instead holistically distributed across individuals, groups, and their environments. That mental states are not only in the head is evidenced by group mental states. A group's mental state need not coincide with that of any of its members and so is not in anyone's head. A selection committee using preferential voting could believe that a job offer should be extended to a specific candidate, for example, even though none of its members believe that. Intrinsic content can be outside of the head and extrinsic content can be in the head. Texts seldom need interpretation by people intimate with the relevant languages. People usually do not animate a text with meaning; rather, its meaning is immediately disclosed. Moreover, persons sometimes must interpret their own beliefs: they can be shocked to find themselves thinking that migrants should be deported without due process or astonished to discover that they believe in God.

Micropsychism and cosmopsychism can be reaffirmed and the combination and decombination problems can be overcome. As discussed above, the extended mind's fourth wave maintains that the cognition of groups and members mutually ground each other. Micropsychism's combination problem is overcome by recognizing that the cognitions of individuals ground group cognition while still retaining their individual cognitions, as in the example of the selection committee which believes that a job offer should be extended to a specific candidate although its members do not believe that. Cosmopsychism's decombination problem is overcome by recognizing that group cognition grounds individual cognition, as when members believe claims because their group believes it. There is no in principle objection to microlevel cognition grounding macrolevel cognition or to macrolevel cognition grounding microlevel cognition.

Critics might object that the above considerations fail to address the combination and individuation problems. The combination problem concerns the logical coherence of deriving a macro-consciousness from many micro-consciousnesses, while the individuation problem concerns the logical coherence of deriving indi-

[72] Shani, "Making It Mental...", p. 17.

vidual consciousnesses from the universal consciousness. Merely demonstrating that micro-consciousnesses ground macro-consciousnesses and that the universal consciousness grounds individual consciousnesses does not establish the logical coherence of those groundings.

However, those objections mistakenly presuppose that questions of logical coherence override demonstrations of actuality. Proving that something is actual also demonstrates, eo ipso, that its possibility is logically coherent. A dry-stack stone wall demonstrates the logical coherence of a macro-object that is constituted by micro-objects which retain their distinct existences, for example, and whirlpools demonstrate the logical coherence of micro-entities which derive from a macro-entity that retains its distinct existence. Insofar as there remains a question of logical coherence, this is a question about which logic — classical, fuzzy, or paraconsistent — adequately models the phenomenon.

Clark rejects ubiquitous cognition as "cognitive bloat". [73] However, this presupposes that the cognition's boundaries are established and that alternatives are insufficiently austere. Nondual Panpsychism maintains that cognitive systems are ubiquitous. Things are, and are constituents of, cognitive systems. Cognitive systems are not the same and useful distinctions can be made among them. While Chemero confines affordances to biological systems and their environments, affordances include what environments offer nonbiological systems, according to Nondual Panpsychism, and those systems are affordances for other systems. [74] This preserves the complementarity of agent-environment dynamics but expands the notion of agent. Instead of only supersizing the mind, [75] Nondual Panpsychism superdupersizes the mind. [76]

Anything can be a constituent of a cognitive system. Giere gives the example of a cognitive system whose constituents include the massive galaxy cluster Abell 1689 that is 2.2 billion light-years away from Earth and the Hubble Space Telescope's Advanced Camera for Surveys, which uses Abell 1689 as a gravitational

[73] Andy Clark, **Supersizing the Mind**, Oxford University Press, New York 2008, p. 80.

[74] See Anthony Chemero, **Radical Embodied Cognitive Science**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2009.

[75] See Clark, **Supersizing the Mind...**

[76] See Sean Allen-Hermanson, "Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition and the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat", *Philosophical Studies* 2013, Vol. 164, No. 3, pp. 791–806, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9914-7.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

lens to photograph an image of the universe as it existed 13 billion years ago. [77] Nevertheless, this does not go far enough and so Nondual Panpsychism posits that the universe itself is a cognitive system. There is a universal consciousness that is the substrate of all other systems. The universal cognitive system is the horizon of all horizons against which all objects appear.

The universe is not the totality of objects, as Merleau-Ponty recognizes, but instead the "background against which objects make themselves manifest". [78] Merleau-Ponty infers that the universe can never be an object because it is the unsurpassable horizon and so he "denies the possibility of thinking of the world as a totality". [79] The universe can be thought of as a totality, however, as the object that appears against itself as its own horizon. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty thinks of the universe as a totality when he describes it as the horizon of all horizons. A forest is perceivable from within the forest, by analogy, although it is perceived differently from the clearing which it encompasses. [80] The forest is not simultaneously perceivable from all perspectives in its absolute density. Yet, it is perceived. Likewise, it is possible to think of the world as a totality. Further, it is an object which grounds and is grounded by its constituents. Objects at all levels, both within and across levels, objects multidirectionally ground and are ground by each other. And grounding is always partial.

6. Nondual Panpsychism and Cosmopsychism

As noted in the fourth section's concluding paragraph, Nondual Panpsychism affirms micropsychism and cosmopsychism. This section argues that Nondual Panpsychism sublates — that is, simultaneously negates, preserves, and transcends — several recent versions of cosmopyschism.

---

[77] See Ronald N. Giere, **Scientific Perspectivism**, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2006, p. 112.

[78] Henry Somers-Hall, "Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Kant's Transcendental Idealism", *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 2019, Vol. 51, No. 1, p. 127 [103–131], https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12313.

[79] Somers-Hall, "Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Kant's Transcendental Idealism...", p. 129.

[80] See Martin Heidegger, **Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)**, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2012.

Schaffer argues for priority monism: the whole is ontologically prior to, and fully grounds, its parts. [81] Nondual Panpsychism maintains that neither the universal cognitive system nor its finite systems has priority; they partially ground each other. Horgan and Potrč defend existence monism: there is only one object, the blobject. [82] Nondual Panpsychism claims that there is only one substance, a dirempted substance: the universal cognitive system and its finite systems. Finally, Kantian monism maintains that "the world decomposes into parts insofar as an ideal subject under ideal conditions would divide it into parts". [83] However, Kantian monism presupposes what it would explain. Although neither subject nor conditions exist prior to the world's decomposition, Kantian monism invokes both to explain that decomposition.

Kastrup, Shani, Mathews, and Shani and Keppler propose complementary versions of cosmopsychism. [84] Kastrup explains the emergence of finite consciousness by analogy to dissociative identity disorder. As a person's consciousness can supposedly dissociate, producing distinct consciousnesses, so finite consciousnesses (alters) result from the dissociation of the universal consciousness.

The universal consciousness is inherently pulsating and dynamic, for Shani, such that it generates finite centers of experience. Quasi-independent patterns are embedded in this expanse, like soliton waves or vortices on an oceanic plenum. Some vortices are subjects of experience, as localized interference patterns. The absolute itself has sentience and perspectivality. The contents of the subjects' conscious fields are hidden from the absolute, although those are embedded within its field of consciousness. As patterns within the universal consciousness, alters

[81] See Schaffer, "Monism: The Priority of the Whole…".

[82] See Horgan and Potrč, "Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence…".

[83] Uriah Kriegel, "Kantian Monism", *Philosophical Papers* 2012, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 23 [23–56], https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2012.662806.

[84] See Bernardo Kastrup, **The Idea of the World: A Multi-Disciplinary Argument for the Mental Nature of Reality**, Iff Books, Hampshire 2019; Itay Shani, "Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience", *Philosophical Papers* 2015, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 389–437, https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2015.1106709; Freye Mathews, "Pansychism as Paradigm", in: Michael Blamauer (ed.), **The Mental as Fundamental: New Perspectives on Panpsychism**, Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm 2011, pp. 141–156, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110319859.141; Itay Shani and Joachim Keppler, "Beyond Combination: How Cosmic Consciousness Grounds Ordinary Experience", *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 2018, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 390–410, https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.30.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

and vortices show how finite centers of consciousness can be within the universal consciousness and still have quasi-independence. It is their substance and substrate but they are distinct aspects of it. Mathews has a similar view.

Albahari objects that Shani construes "perspectivality as fundamental to both our own minds and universal consciousness" and so "his model lacks the essential non-dual underpinning that could enable the barrier to break down". [85] However, this imputation is inaccurate, as Shani asserts: "There are *non-ordinary conditions* under which this epistemic barrier breaks down, opening a gate to the realization that one's own self is not as separate an entity as one would imagine. Yet, even this need not be interpreted as the annihilation of one's individual self but, rather, as the affirmation of the underlying unity which binds oneself to the rest of reality". [86]

Shani and Keppler maintain that the universal consciousness is the quantum zero point field. Finite consciousness emerges through a selective restriction of the zero point field, when dynamically stable systems achieve sufficient quantum coherence. Finite consciousnesses are the distinct frequency vibrations in that field, while the universal consciousness is the backdrop against which they appear. All experiences are virtually contained within the universal consciousness. It is the bearer of pure consciousness and pure subjectivity.

Albahari turns to Advaita Vedānta. The universal consciousness is nonintentional. It has no thoughts, experiences, or objects of consciousness. It is not in space-time. It fully grounds reality. Finite centers of consciousness are subjects. Objects are the images through which subjects represent themselves to each other. Every object appears to at least one subject. The distinction between subjects and objects is phenomenological, not ontological: objects are subjects, as they appear to other subjects; none is mind-independent. Although the universal consciousness does not dream, "the cognisensory imagery that frames each subjective perspective will emanate from the non-dual conscious ground that can be considered its material cause" as a dream arises from a dreamer but seems other than the dreamer. [87] There is only the universal consciousness — which, inexplicably, emanates subjects.

[85] Albahari, "Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am...", p. 129.

[86] Shani, "Cosmopsychism...", p. 427 [emphasis in the original].

[87] Albahari, "Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am...", p. 126.

To illustrate the idea of nonintentional consciousness which Albahari associates with the experience of the universal consciousness, she imagines a "cognisensory deprivation tank". [88] While a subject in a sensory deprivation tank does not experience external sensations, a subject in a cognisensory deprivation tank would also not experience internal sensations and, most crucially, would not have intentional conscious experience. There, a subject would have no thought, sensation, mental state or content, experience, feeling, emotion, or aboutness relation. A subject would become an unstructured and nonintentional witness-consciousness which experiences the universal consciousness. The "witness" in "witness-consciousness" is infelicitous, as it misleadingly suggests that witness-consciousness witnesses something, such that witness-consciousness is a form of intentional consciousness and has a subject-object structure. Witness-consciousness is wholly nonintentional and it has no structure.

However, a subject's consciousness is necessarily intentional, according to Albahari, and so it never has nonintentional experience and can never become witness-consciousness (*sākṣin*). Q*ua* subject, it is a nonempty perspective and so it must have an object as its viewpoint. It cannot nonintentionally experience the universal consciousness. There would be no consciousness in a cognisensory deprivation tank. [89]

It is insufficient to respond that witness-consciousness is self-illuminating (*svaprakāśa*) as it would be "a bloodless Absolute dark with the excess of light". [90] Light luminates only if there is an object to be illuminated. Absent that, there is only darkness. Darkness cannot reveal a mirror and the wholly transparent **Invisible Man** would be blind. [91] In order to illuminate itself, the luminating self must

[88] See Miri Albahari, "The Mystic and the Metaphysician: Clarifying the Role of Meditation in the Search for Ultimate Reality", *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 2019, Vol. 26, No. 7–8, pp. 12–36, https://tiny.pl/3n56yd17 [30.04.2025]; Albahari, "Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am…"; Miri Albahari, "Is Universal Consciousness Fit for Ground?", in: Uriah Kriegel (ed.), **Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind: Volume 4**, Oxford University Press, New York 2024, pp. 3–45, https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198924159.003.0001.

[89] For similar criticisms of Albahari's position, see Swami Medhananda, **Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism**, Oxford University Press, New York 2022, pp. 363–370, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197624463.001.0001.

[90] Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, **Indian Philosophy, Volume 2, Second Edition: With an Introduction by J. N. Mohanty**, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2008, p. 616.

[91] See H.G. Wells, **The Invisible Man: A Grotesque Romance**, Modern Library, New York 2002.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

be nonidentical to the illuminated self. If witness-consciousness luminates itself, it is actually a subject which takes itself as its intentional object.

Albahari objects that Goff [92] "proposes that the fundamental cosmic subject contains within its unified conscious field each of our perspectives and their conscious experiences as its abstractable parts, just as our own conscious field contains various sensory experiences as parts". [93] This is incoherent, she claims, appealing to the epistemic and perspective problems. The epistemic problem urges that allowing that the Absolute has first-person perspectives requires ascribing to it such contradictory beliefs and identities as "»there is only one life«, »there is more than one life«, »I am Fiona«, »I am Fred«". [94] The perspective problem, articulated by Coleman, asks how the absolute can have its own perspective and those of finite consciousnesses. [95]

Addressing those problems, Shani invokes the "lateral duality principle": [96] the absolute's subjective interiority is a concealed dynamic and sentient sea of consciousness, an "endo-phenomenological expanse", [97] while its creative activity is revealed in the physical environment. Albahari responds that if a person's conscious perspectives were in the Absolute, then their contents would be revealed to the Absolute. She further charges that Kastrup "falls prey to subject/object dualism insofar as the fundamental universal consciousness (»That Which Experiences«) forms a subjective perspective harbouring a »stream of inner experiences« as objects". [98]

Kastrup compares the relation of the universal consciousness and its disassociated alters to that of a database and its unindexed entries. [99] Further developing

[92] See Philip Goff, **Consciousness and Fundamental Reality**, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190677015.001.0001.

[93] Albahari, "Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am…", p. 121.

[94] Albahari, "Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am…", p. 122.

[95] See Sam Coleman, "The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence", *Erkenntnis* 2014, Vol. 79, No. 1, pp. 19–44, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9431-x.

[96] Shani, "Cosmopsychism…", p. 410.

[97] Shani, "Cosmopsychism…", p. 413.

[98] Albahari, "Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am…", p. 129.

[99] See Kastrup, **The Idea of the World**, pp. 68–69.

his analogy overcomes the epistemic and perspective problems. While the subjective perspectives of unindexed entries exist in the database, their contents are not accessible to the database. If the entries and their database could speak, *per impossibile*, the third entry could say: "I am entry 3. I exist between entries 2 and 3". The database could say: "I am the database. I am the substrate within which those entries exist". Allowing that the database has a first-person perspective does not require ascribing to it the beliefs and identities of its entries, thereby resolving the epistemic problem. The database and its entries have their distinct perspectives, simultaneously and without contradiction, resolving the perspective problem. There is *perspectival* dualism, as the database and each entry regards itself as a subject while considering others as objects. There is no *metaphysical* dualism, however, as the entries are aspects of the database. Recognizing that the universal consciousness has a first-person perspective does not require ascribing to it the beliefs and identities of finite consciousnesses. And the universal consciousness and finite consciousnesses have their distinct perspectives.

As previously discussed, Nondual Panpsychism understands consciousness in cognitive terms. What systems are, what they think, is what they do. Since they appear to the universal cognitive system, it has partial access to their cognitions as those are behaviorally expressed. Systems are the manifestations of the universal cognitive system, they appear to themselves and to each other, and so they have partial access to the universal cognitive system. All that is required is their recognition that, as each piece of gold is gold, each system is a fragment of the universal consciousness.

Albahari and Kastrup maintain that subjects (alters, for Kastrup) appear to others as objects. What must be resisted, however, is the suggestion that there is an ultimate metaphysical distinction between reality and appearance. Although it cannot be argued for here, Nondual Panpsychism maintains that to be is to appear. A subject appears as an object because it is an object to other subjects. In addition, subjects do not have privileged first-person access to their own mental content. Persons might not know their own intentions and beliefs, which may be obvious to others. While it might seem to them that they have no prejudices regarding ethnicity or gender, for example, their actions may reveal that they do. [100]

[100] See Michael Brownstein, "Implicit Bias", in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2019 Edition, https://tiny.pl/chhj1w0z [30.04.2025].

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

Kastrup, Shani, Mathews, Shani and Keppler, and Albahari do not explain why finite centers of consciousness (subjects, vortices, alters) emerge from the universal consciousness. As noted above, Nondual Panpsychism claims that to be is to appear. Expressed in terms of causal relations, in order to be, a thing must be able to affect at least itself, if not also other things, and be able to be affected. An alter must emerge in order for the universal consciousness to appear and so to be. Even prior to the emergence of alters, there is a diremption within the universal consciousness which allows it to appear to itself and so to be. Hence, it is its own alter. As the universal system appears to itself, the division that produces alters is already underway. A fissure rips through it, tearing asunder the system that appears (object) from the system to which it appears (subject). Appearing to itself, it is always already dirempted, one-becoming-two. In its self-consciousness, the consciousness that appears is nonidentical to the consciousness to which it appears and the consciousness to which it appears does not appear to itself. As it becomes increasingly clear to itself, by appearing to itself from multiple perspectives through the emergence of alters, it becomes ever more distinct from itself. Nonduality pertains both to the nonidentity between universal consciousness and its alters, and to the nonidentity within universal consciousness itself.

The universal consciousness encompasses itself as well as its alters and their perspectives, while maintaining its distinct perspective. It is the identity of identity and difference, sublating identity and difference. Alters are the universal cognitive system, estranged from itself. Few recognize that they are it and it seldom realizes that it is they. Although alters may wish to be reabsorbed within it, they would thereby cease to be. They exist because of their estrangement from it and it continues through its self-alienation from them. Diremption is necessary but misrecognition is not: alters can come to recognize that they are the universal cognitive system, dirempted from itself. The goal is neither reunification nor absorption, but mutual recognition — they are it, it is they — of what was always the case. Still, this changes everything. Like knight-errants who search for the royal family, only to discover that they are them.

7. A Cross-Cultural Perspective: Nondual Panpsychism and the Pratyabhijñā

This section shows that Nondual Panpsychism and an Indian philosophy, Kaśmir Śaivism's panentheistic *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) system, are compatible. It further discusses the limitations of several recent versions of cosmopsychism that are compatible with Advaita Vedānta, another Indian philosophy.

Albahari, [101] Gasparri, [102] and Vaidya [103] discern connections between cosmopsychism and the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara. [104] According to Śaṅkara, ultimate reality (*parā ṣattā*) is *nirguṇa* Brahman, that is, Brahman without change, form (*nirākāra*), qualities, or attributes (*nirviśeṣa cinmatram*). Śaṅkara maintains that any description of *nirguṇa* Brahman is finally inadequate. Yet, it is said to be wholly and only real, complete being and truth, and unchanging (*niṣkriya*), undifferentiated, and pure (*śuddha*) — that is, nonintentional — consciousness (*cit*). *Saguṇa* Brahman, Brahman with qualities, is the personal God (*Īśvara*) who creates the world (*jagat*). From the standpoint of conventional reality (*jagat*, *vyāvahārika sattā*), *saguṇa* Brahman, the world, and individual souls (*jīvas*) are real. From the perspective of ultimate reality, they are not real.

Articulating cosmopsychism's universal consciousness in terms of *nirguṇa* Brahman, risks inheriting Advaita Vedānta's denial of the reality of conventional reality and its associating the universal consciousness with an undifferentiated and static reality. [105] Nondual Panpsychism instead looks to Kaśmir Śaivism — specifically, the *pratyabhijñā* (recognition) system [106] — which holds that everything is Śiva, who is *cit*. While that Sanskrit word is frequently translated as "con-

[101] See Albahari, "Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am…".

[102] See Luca Gasparri, "Priority Cosmopsychism and Advaita Vedānta", *Philosophy East and West* 2019, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 130–142, https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2019.0002.

[103] See Anand Jayprakash Vaidya, "A New Debate on Consciousness: Bringing Classical and Modern Vedānta into Dialogue with Contemporary Analytic Panpsychism", in: Ayon Maharaj (ed.), **The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Vedanta**, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2020, pp. 393–422, https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350063266.ch-014.

[104] Neil Dalal, "Śaṅkara", in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Winter 2021 Edition, https://tiny.pl/d-stfxy2 [30.04.2025].

[105] See Gasparri, "Priority Cosmopsychism and Advaita Vedānta…".

[106] See J.M. Fritzman, Sarah Ann Lowenstein, and Meredith Margaret Nelson, "Kaśmir to Prussia, Round Trip: Monistic Śaivism and Hegel", *Philosophy East and West* 2016, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp. 371–393, https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2016.0028.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

sciousness", this is misleading. [107] Nondual Panpsychism instead reads *cit* as "cognition". The Pratyabhijñā maintains that both ultimate reality and conventional reality are real. It further claims that ultimate reality manifests as conventional reality. The universe is Śiva's manifestation (Śakti), ontologically real, and quasi-independent. Śiva is continually pulsating with dynamic and energetic waves. Initially, there is negative interference and the waves seemingly cancel each other. Their subsequent constructive interference manifests the universe through a series of emanations, as they positively interfere with each other. Each subsequent emanation increases diversity, fragmentation, particularization, with a greater forgetfulness that it is Śiva.

Anuttara (Supreme) is the moment when Śiva seems to be an unmanifest and undifferentiated singularity with complete negative interference among Śiva's waves. Even then, there is imperceptible motion (*kiṃciccalana*) whereby Śiva is manifesting and differentiating. There is never a moment, temporal or logical, when Śiva is not always already becoming manifest, differentiated, dirempted, nondual, one-emanating-two, one-becoming-two, one-as-two: "Even as it remains the One... the use of »*anuttara*« as the idea of the supreme also carries with it the implication of two because the very form of the word is the comparative… This comparative form in the word »*anuttara*« indicates the presence of the other, since the very form by virtue of comparison inherently implicates the presence of a second, to whom the first is compared... The grammatical form of the word »*anuttara*« implicates both the idea of the One and of Two". [108]

Hence, *Anuttara* as a nonnumerical One is a retrospective and nostalgic posit. Śiva is always already dirempted. [109] Śiva's manifestations, alters, depend on Śiva, have Śiva as their ground, since they *are* Śiva — Śiva is the only substance. Śiva is also grounded in Śiva's alters: it is only through them that Śiva can appear and so be. As rationally reconstructed by Berger et al., the Pratyabhijñā claims that Śiva is

[107] See Ernst Fürlinger, **The Touch of Śakti: A Study of Non-Dualistic Trika Śaivism of Kashmir**, D.K. Printworld Ltd., New Delhi 2009, pp. 40–53.

[108] Lorilial Biernacki, "Abhinavagupta's Theogrammatical Topography of the One and the Many", in: Chris Boesel and S. Wesley Ariarajah (eds.), **Divine Multiplicity: Trinities, Diversities, and the Nature of Relation**, Fordham University Press, New York 2014, p. 96 [85–105], https://doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823253951.003.0005.

[109] See Don Handelman and David Shulman, **God Inside Out: Śiva's Game of Dice**, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997.

intentional and differentiated *cit*. [110] There is nothing other than Śiva; but Śiva is always already othered. Śiva manifests as the universe; the universe is Śiva manifested. This is a panentheism in which, as with Meister Eckhart, "God transcends creation because he [*sic*] is immanent to all creatures". [111]

The Pratyabhijñā is consistent with Nondual Panpsychism's cognitive systems approach. From this perspective, Śiva is the universal cognitive system (*cit*) and everything is a cognitive system within this cognitive system. The universal system and finite systems ground each other. Finite systems also ground each other.

That there is no phenomenal consciousness might seem to result in disenchantment (*Entzauberung*). However, Nondual Panpsychism discerns the ubiquity of cognitive processes, intelligent behavior in an event as mundane as rain falling on stones. As the gravity of raindrops is infinitesimal but a black hole folds space and bends light, so their cognition is minuscule compared to animals. Yet, there is a vanishingly small choice of an action in when and how raindrops fall, and how they and the stones interact. And raindrops become constituents in extended minds, possibly affecting human memory, [112] cognitive skills, [113] and cognitive decline. [114] Nondual Panpsychism acknowledges that everything is the universal cognitive system's manifestation. The self-understanding of persons as bounded individuals is one-sided and limited. They are moments of the self, Ātman, which is the ultimate reality, Brahman. Not Advaita Vedānta's static *nirguṇa* Brahman but

[110] See Sari L. Berger, J.M. Fritzman, and Brandon J. Vance, "Thinking With, Against, and Beyond the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy — and Back Again", *Asian Philosophy* 2018, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2018.1432281.

[111] Bernard McGinn, "Meister Eckhart on God as Absolute Unity", in: Dominic J. O'Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought, SUNY Press, Albany 1982, p. 133 [128–139].

[112] See Joseph P. Forgas, Liz Goldenberg, and Christian Unkelbach, "Can Bad Weather Improve Your Memory? An Unobtrusive Field Study of Natural Mood Effects on Real-Life Memory", *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 2009, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 254–257, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.08.014.

[113] See Nicolás Pazos, Marta Favara, Alan Sánchez, Douglas Scott, and Jere Behrman, "Long-Term Effects of Early Life Rainfall Shocks on Foundational Cognitive Skills: Evidence from Peru", *Economics & Human Biology* 2024, Vol. 54, A101407, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2024.101407.

[114] See Jessica Finlay, Anam Khan, Carina Gronlund, Ketlyne Sol, Joy Jang, Robert Melendez, Suzanne Judd, and Philippa Clarke, "Weather Woes? Exploring Potential Links between Precipitation and Age-Related Cognitive Decline", *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 2020, Vol. 17, No. 23, A9011, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17239011.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

rather the Pratyabhijñā's dynamic Śiva. Śiva is as close to people as they are to themselves.

Seeing God involves no more than looking in a mirror? Looking in: at eyes that look back. Looking out too: at the mirror, the wall it hangs on, the room, other persons, the world — all of which look back.

8. An Altar Call for Alters

Is it indubitable that "whether or not it is clear to you, no doubt the universe is unfolding as it should"? [115] No. Although we may seem inconsequential in the grand scheme of things, our actions are consequential at the local level, which is important to us and to those affected by us. Whether the universe unfolds as it should partially depends on us. Get to it!

Are we inconsequential? [116] rightly objects to "ontological smallism", which asserts that reality's important aspects are small. Ontological largism should be avoided too. We are neither as small as atoms nor as large as stars. Nevertheless, since the Big Bang, the universe has been busy to manifest us. Looking at ourselves in mirrors, the universe partially sees its reflection. Smile!

Acknowledgements

Samantha Park Alibrando, Susanne Beiweis, Michael G. Bruno, the late Malcolm J. Campbell, Per Milam, Jay Odenbaugh, William A. Rottschaefer, Itay Shani, Don E. Wayne, and Kirke Wolfe are thanked for comments. Miguel D. Guerrero and Emma S. Moorhead are thanked for discussions about grounding. Grzegorz Malec, Vice Editor-in-Chief of *Philosophical Aspects of Origin*, is thanked for help and encouragement. An anonymous reviewer is thanked for multiple suggestions

[115] Bertha Ehrmann (ed.), **The Poems of Max Ehrmann**, Bruce Humphries, Inc., Boston 1948, p. 165.

[116] See Robert A. Wilson, **Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences**, Cambridge University Press, New York 2004, pp. 22–24.

that led to useful revisions. Lewis & Clark College provided a Sabbatical Leave in 2019.

J.M. Fritzman

References

1. Adams Fred and Aizawa Ken, "Defending the Bounds of Cognition", in: Richard Menary (ed.), **The Extended Mind**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 67–80.
2. Adams Fred and Aizawa Ken, "The Bounds of Cognition", *Philosophical Psychology* 2001, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 43–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/09515080120033571.
3. Albahari Miri, "Beyond Cosmopsychism and the Great I Am: How the World Might be Grounded in Universal »Advaitic« Consciousness", in: William E. Seager (ed.), **The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism**, Routledge, New York 2020, pp. 119–130, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315717708-11.
4. Albahari Miri, "Is Universal Consciousness Fit for Ground?", in: Uriah Kriegel (ed.), **Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind: Volume 4**, Oxford University Press, New York 2024, pp. 3–45, https://doi.org/10.1093/9780198924159.003.0001.
5. Albahari Miri, "The Mystic and the Metaphysician: Clarifying the Role of Meditation in the Search for Ultimate Reality", *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 2019, Vol. 26, No. 7–8, pp. 12–36, https://tiny.pl/3n56yd17 [30.04.2025].
6. Allen-Hermanson Sean, "Superdupersizing the Mind: Extended Cognition and the Persistence of Cognitive Bloat", *Philosophical Studies* 2013, Vol. 164, No. 3, pp. 791–806, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-9914-7.
7. Arnau Eric, Estany Anna, del Solar Rafael González, and Sturm Thomas, "The Extended Cognition Thesis: Its Significance for the Philosophy of (Cognitive) Science", *Philosophical Psychology* 2013, Vol. 27, No. 1, pp. 1–18, https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.836081.
8. Atlan Henri and Cohen Irun R., "Immune Information, Self-Organization, and Meaning", *International Immunology* 1998, Vol. 10, No. 6, pp. 711–717, https://doi.org/10.1093/intimm/10.6.711.
9. Bassolino Michela, Serino Andrea, Ubaldi Silvia, and Làdavas Elisabetta, "Everyday Use of the Computer Mouse Extends Peripersonal Space Representation", *Neuropsychologia* 2010, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 803–811, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.11.009.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

10. Berger Sari L., Fritzman J.M., and Vance Brandon J., "Thinking With, Against, and Beyond the Pratyabhijñā Philosophy — and Back Again", *Asian Philosophy* 2018, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1080/09552367.2018.1432281.

11. Biernacki Lorilial, "Abhinavagupta's Theogrammatical Topography of the One and the Many", in: Chris Boesel and S. Wesley Ariarajah (eds.), **Divine Multiplicity: Trinities, Diversities, and the Nature of Relation**, Fordham University Press, New York 2014, pp. 85–105, https://doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823253951.003.0005.

12. Bliss Ricki and Trogdon Kelly, "Metaphysical Grounding", in: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Winter 2016 Edition, https://tiny.pl/cxptktnt [22.04.2025].

13. Bliss Ricki, "**Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality** by Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (eds.) [Book Review]", *The Philosophical Review* 2015, Vol. 124, No. 3, pp. 410–415, https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2895379.

14. Block Ned, "Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh between Psychology and Neuroscience", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 2007, Vol. 30, No. 5–6, pp. 481–499, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X07002786.

15. Block Ned, "On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 1995, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 227–247, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00038188.

16. Boem Federico, Greslehner Gregor P., Konsman Jan Pieter, and Chiu Lynn, "Minding the Gut: Extending Embodied Cognition and Perception to the Gut Complex", *Frontiers in Neuroscience* 2023, Vol. 17, pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2023.1172783.

17. Bohn Einar Duenger, "An Argument Against the Necessity of Unrestricted Composition", *Analysis* 2009, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 27–31, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ann004.

18. Brownstein Michael, "Implicit Bias", in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2019 Edition, https://tiny.pl/chhj1w0z [30.04.2025].

19. Bruno Michael G. and Fritzman J.M., "Collective Belief Defended", *Social Epistemology* 2021, Vol. 35, No. 1, pp. 48–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2020.1761479.

20. Cameron Ross P., "Turtles All the Way Down: Regress, Priority and Fundamentality", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 2008, Vol. 58, No. 230, pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.509.x.

21. Cash Mason, “Cognition without Borders: »Third Wave« Socially Distributed Cognition and Relational Autonomy”, *Cognitive Systems Research* 2013, Vol. 25–26, pp. 61–71, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.007.

22. Castells-Nobau Anna, Mayneris-Perxachs Jordi, and Fernández-Real José Manuel, “Unlocking the Mind-Gut Connection: Impact of Human Microbiome on Cognition”, *Cell Host & Microbe* 2024, Vol. 32, No. 8, pp. 1248–1263, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chom.2024.07.019.

23. Chalmers David J., “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness”, *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 1995, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 200–219, https://tiny.pl/mz9ccf84 [30.04.2025].

24. Chalmers David J., **The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory**, Oxford University Press, New York 1996.

25. Chemero Anthony, **Radical Embodied Cognitive Science**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2009.

26. Clark Andy and Chalmers David J., “The Extended Mind”, *Analysis* 1998, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 10–23, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/58.1.7.

27. Clark Andy, **Supersizing the Mind**, Oxford University Press, New York 2008.

28. Clark Michael J. and Liggins David, “Recent Work on Grounding”, *Analysis* 2012, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 812–823, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/ans086.

29. Coleman Sam, “The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence”, *Erkenntnis* 2014, Vol. 79, No. 1, pp. 19–44, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9431-x.

30. Colin Allen, “On (Not) Defining Cognition”, *Synthese* 2017, Vol. 194, No. 11, pp. 4233–4249, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1454-4.

31. Dalal Neil, “Śaṅkara”, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Winter 2021 Edition, https://tiny.pl/d-stfxy2 [30.04.2025].

32. Darnall Terry, “Does the World Leak Into the Mind? Active Externalism, »Internalism« and Epistemology”, *Cognitive Science* 2005, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 135–143, https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2901_6.

33. Dennett Daniel C., “Quining Qualia”, in: A.J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), *Consciousness in Modern Science*, Oxford University Press, New York 1988, pp. 42–77, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198522379.003.0003.

34. Dinana Timothy G., Stillinga Roman M., Stanton Catherine, and Cryan John F., “Collective Unconscious: How Gut Microbes Shape Human Behavior”, *Journal of Psychiatric Research* 2015, Vol. 63, pp. 1–9, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpsychires.2015.02.021.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

35. Ehrmann Bertha (ed.), **The Poems of Max Ehrmann**, Bruce Humphries, Inc., Boston 1948.

36. Finlay Jessica, Khan Anam, Gronlund Carina, Sol Ketlyne, Jang Joy, Melendez Robert, Judd Suzanne, and Clarke Philippa, "Weather Woes? Exploring Potential Links between Precipitation and Age-Related Cognitive Decline", *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 2020, Vol. 17, No. 23, A9011, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph17239011.

37. Forgas Joseph P., Goldenberg Liz, and Unkelbach Christian, "Can Bad Weather Improve Your Memory? An Unobtrusive Field Study of Natural Mood Effects on Real-Life Memory", *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 2009, Vol. 45, No. 1, pp. 254–257, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2008.08.014.

38. Fritzman J.M. and Thornburg Kristin, "»I Is Someone Else«: Constituting the Extended Mind's Fourth Wave, with Hegel", *Essays in Philosophy* 2016, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 156–190, https://doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1560.

39. Fritzman J.M., "Metaphysical Grounding and Being's Incompleteness", *Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind and the Arts* 2024, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 329–345, http://doi.org/10.30687/Jolma/2723-9640/2024/02/001.

40. Fritzman J.M., Lowenstein Sarah Ann, and Nelson Meredith Margaret, "Kaśmir to Prussia, Round Trip: Monistic Śaivism and Hegel", *Philosophy East and West* 2016, Vol. 66, No. 2, pp. 371–393, https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2016.0028.

41. Fürlinger Ernst, **The Touch of Śakti: A Study of Non-Dualistic Trika Śaivism of Kashmir**, D.K. Printworld Ltd., New Delhi 2009.

42. Gallagher Shaun and Crisafi Anthony, "Mental Institutions", *Topoi* 2009, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 45–51, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9045-0.

43. Gallagher Shaun, "The Overextended Mind", *Versus* 2011, Vol. 112–113, pp. 57–68.

44. Gallagher Shaun, "The Socially Extended Mind", *Cognitive Systems Research* 2013, Vol. 25–26, pp. 4–12, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2013.03.008.

45. Gasparri Luca, "Priority Cosmopsychism and Advaita Vedānta", *Philosophy East and West* 2019, Vol. 69, No. 1, pp. 130–142, https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2019.0002.

46. Giere Ronald N., **Scientific Perspectivism**, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 2006.

47. Gilbert Scott F., Rosenberg Eugene, and Zilber-Rosenberg Ilana, "The Holobiont with Its Hologenome Is a Level of Selection in Evolution", in: Snait Gissis, Ehud Lamm, and Ayelet Shavit (eds.), **Landscapes of Collectivity in the Life Sciences**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2018, pp. 305–324, https://tiny.pl/g74fvhgd [28.04.2025].

48. Goff Philip, **Consciousness and Fundamental Reality**, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2017, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190677015.001.0001.

49. Hameed Muddsar, Noor Fatima, Hussain Hamza, Khan Raja Gohar, Haroon Ur Rashid Shahbaz Khattak, Haroon Ur Rashid Spogmaye, Atiq Alina, Ali Hassan, Rida Seerat E., and Abbasi Mahrukh Anwar, "Gut-Brain Axis: Investigating the Effects of Gut Health on Cognitive Functioning in Adults", *Cureus* 2024, Vol. 16, No. 7, pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.7759/cureus.64286.

50. Handelman Don and Shulman David, **God Inside Out: Śiva's Game of Dice**, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997.

51. Heidegger Martin, **Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)**, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu, Indiana University Press, Bloomington 2012.

52. Hempel Carl, "Reduction: Ontological and Linguistic Facets", in: Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes, and Morton Gabriel White (eds.), *Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel*, St Martin's Press, New York 1969, pp. 179–199.

53. Hiller Avram, "Object-Dependence", *Essays in Philosophy* 2013, Vol. 14, No. 11, pp. 33–55, http://dx.doi.org/10.7710/1526-0569.1454.

54. Horgan Terry and Potrč Matjaž, "Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence", *Facta Philosophica* 2000, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 249–270, https://doi.org/10.5840/factaphil20002214.

55. Jacob Eshel Ben, Becker Israela, Shapira Yoash, and Levine Herbert, "Bacterial Linguistic Communication and Social Intelligence", *Trends in Microbiology* 2004, Vol. 12, No. 8, pp. 366–372, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tim.2004.06.006.

56. Johnson Katerina V.-A., "Gut Microbiome Composition and Diversity are Related to Human Personality Traits", *Human Microbiome Journal* 2020, Vol. 15, pp. 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.humic.2019.100069.

57. Jones Richard and Gellman Jerome, "Mysticism", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2022 Edition, https://tiny.pl/z0g4hkv0 [22.04.2025].

58. Kastrup Bernardo, **The Idea of the World: A Multi-Disciplinary Argument for the Mental Nature of Reality**, Iff Books, Hampshire 2019.

59. Kim Gun-Ha and Shim Jung-Ok, "Gut Microbiota Affects Brain Development and Behavior", *Clinical and Experimental Pediatrics* 2023, Vol. 66, No. 7, pp. 274–280, https://doi.org/10.3345/cep.2021.01550.

60. Kirchhoff Michael David, "Composition and Transactive Memory Systems", *Philosophical Explorations* 2016, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 59–77, https://doi.org/10.1080/13869795.2016.1085593.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

61. Kirchhoff Michael David, "Extended Cognition and Fixed Properties: Steps to a Third-Wave Version of Extended Cognition", *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 2012, Vol. 11, No. 2, pp. 287–308, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-011-9237-8.

62. Kirk Robert, "Zombies", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall 2023 Edition, https://tiny.pl/r9_yyq95 [24.04.2025].

63. Kossowska Maria, Olejniczak Sylwia, Karbowiak Marcelina, Mosiej Wioletta, Zielińska Dorota, and Brzezicka Aneta, "The Interplay between Gut Microbiota and Cognitive Functioning in the Healthy Aging Population: A Systematic Review", *Nutrients* 2024, Vol. 16, No. 6, pp. 1–14, https://doi.org/10.3390/nu16060852.

64. Kriegel Uriah, "Kantian Monism", *Philosophical Papers* 2012, Vol. 41, No. 1, pp. 23–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2012.662806.

65. Lao Tzu, **Tao Te Ching: The Classic Book of Integrity and the Way**, trans. Victor Mair, Bantam Books, New York 1990.

66. Lewis David, **On the Plurality of Worlds**, Blackwell Publishers, Malden 2001.

67. Lewis David, **Parts of Classes**, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford 1991.

68. Lin Kaijie, Peng Feng, He Kunyang, Qian Zhengyu, Mei Xuan, Su Zhikun, Wujimaiti Yilihamujiang, Xia Xun, and Zhang Tianyao, "Research Progress on Intestinal Microbiota Regulating Cognitive Function through the Gut-Brain Axis", *Neurological Sciences* 2024, Vol. 45, No. 8, pp. 3711–3721, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10072-024-07525-5.

69. Lyon Pamela, "The Cognitive Cell: Bacterial Behavior Reconsidered", *Frontiers in Microbiology* 2015, Vol. 16, pp. 1–18, https://doi.org/10.3389/fmicb.2015.00264.

70. Maguire Eleanor A., Gadian David G., Johnsrude Ingrid S., Good Catriona D., Ashburner John, Frackowiak Richard S.J., and Frith Christopher D., "Navigation-Related Structural Change in the Hippocampi of Taxi Drivers", *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 2000, Vol. 97, No. 8, pp. 4398–4403, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.070039597.

71. Malamoud Charles, **Cooking the World: Ritual and Thought in Ancient India**, trans. David Gordon White, Oxford University Press, Delhi 1996.

72. Margulis Lynn, "The Conscious Cell", *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences* 2001, Vol. 929, No. 1, pp. 55–70, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2001.tb05707.x.

73. Mathews Freye, "Pansychism as Paradigm", in: Michael Blamauer (ed.), **The Mental as Fundamental: New Perspectives on Panpsychism**, Ontos Verlag, Heusenstamm 2011, pp. 141–156, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110319859.141.

74. McDowell John, "Putnam on Mind and Meaning", *Philosophical Topics* 1992, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 35–48, https://doi.org/10.5840/philtopics19922012.

75. McGinn Bernard, "Meister Eckhart on God as Absolute Unity", in: Dominic J. O'Meara (ed.), **Neoplatonism and Christian Thought**, SUNY Press, Albany 1982, pp. 128–139.

76. Medhananda Swami, **Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism**, Oxford University Press, New York 2022, pp. 363–370, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197624463.001.0001.

77. Menary Richard, "Cognitive Integration and the Extended Mind," in: Richard Menary (ed.), **The Extended Mind**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 227–243, https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/8535.003.0010.

78. Menary Richard, **Cognitive Integration: Attacking the Bounds of Cognition**, Palgrave-Macmillan, New York 2007.

79. Montero Barbara and Papineau David, "A Defence of the *Via Negativa* Argument for Physicalism", *Analysis* 2005, Vol. 65, No. 287, pp. 233–237, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/65.3.233.

80. Nagel Thomas, "What Is It Like To Be a Bat?", *Philosophical Review* 1974 Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 435–456, https://doi.org/10.2307/2183914.

81. Ney Alyssa, "Physicalism as an Attitude", *Philosophical Studies* 2008, Vol. 138, No. 1, pp. 1–15, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-0006-4.

82. Oluwagbemigun Kolade, Schnermann Maike E., Schmid Matthias, Cryan John F., and Nöthlings Ute, "A Prospective Investigation into the Association between the Gut Microbiome Composition and Cognitive Performance among Healthy Young Adults", *Gut Pathogens* 2022, Vol. 14, No. 15, pp. 1–12, https://doi.org/10.1186/s13099-022-00487-z.

83. Paseau Alexander, "Defining Ultimate Ontological Basis and the Fundamental Layer", *The Philosophical Quarterly* 2010, Vol. 60, No. 238, pp. 169–175, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.642.x.

84. Pazos Nicolás, Favara Marta, Sánchez Alan, Scott Douglas, and Behrman Jere, "Long-Term Effects of Early Life Rainfall Shocks on Foundational Cognitive Skills: Evidence from Peru", *Economics & Human Biology* 2024, Vol. 54, A101407, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ehb.2024.101407.

85. Pinto Daniela and Mascher Thorsten, "(Actino)Bacterial »Intelligence«: Using Comparative Genomics to Unravel the Information Processing Capacities of Microbes", *Current Genetics* 2016, Vol. 62, pp. 487–498, https://doi.org/10.1007/s00294-016-0569-3.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

86. Pradeu Thomas, "A Mixed Self: The Role of Symbiosis in Development", *Biological Theory* 2011, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 80–88, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-011-0011-5.

87. Putnam Hilary, *Philosophical Papers, Volume 2: Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1975.

88. Radhakrishnan Sarvepalli, **Indian Philosophy, Volume 2, Second Edition: With an Introduction by J. N. Mohanty**, Oxford University Press, New Delhi 2008.

89. Reeve C.D.C., "Plato on Friendship and Eros", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2023 Edition, https://tiny.pl/by98-773 [22.04.2025].

90. Roepstorff Andreas, Niewöhner Jörg, and Beck Stefan, "Enculturing Brains through Patterned Practices", *Neural Networks* 2010, Vol. 23, No. 8–9, pp. 1051–1059, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2010.08.002.

91. Rosen Gideon, "Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction", in: Bob Hale and Aviv Hoffman (eds.), **Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology**, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, pp. 109–136, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199565818.003.0007.

92. Roughgarden Joan, "Holobiont Evolution: Mathematical Model with Vertical vs. Horizontal Microbiome Transmission", *Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology* 2020, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 1–24, https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.16039257.0012.002.

93. Rupert Robert D., "Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition", *Journal of Philosophy* 2004, Vol. 101, No. 8, pp. 389–428, https://doi.org/10.5840/jphil2004101826.

94. Sartre Jean-Paul, **Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology**, trans. Sarah Richmond, Routledge, New York 2018.

95. Schaffer Jonathan, "Monism: The Priority of the Whole", *Philosophical Review* 2010, Vol. 119, No. 1, pp. 31–76, https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2009-025.

96. Schaffer Jonathan, "Monism", in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Winter 2018 Edition, https://tiny.pl/rf6mbxrd [22.04.2025].

97. Schwitzgebel Eric, "The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 2014, Vol. 92, No. 4, pp. 665–682, https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2014.910675.

98. Seager William E., "Consciousness, Information, and Panpsychism", *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 1995, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 272–288, https://tiny.pl/xy2b489g [30.04.2025].

99. Searle John R., "Consciousness", *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 2000, Vol. 23, pp. 557–578, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.557.

100. Shani Itay and Keppler Joachim, "Beyond Combination: How Cosmic Consciousness Grounds Ordinary Experience", *Journal of the American Philosophical Association* 2018, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 390–410, https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.30.

101. Shani Itay, "Cosmopsychism: A Holistic Approach to the Metaphysics of Experience", *Philosophical Papers* 2015, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 389–437, https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2015.1106709.

102. Shani Itay, "Making It Mental: In Search for the Golden Mean of the Extended Cognition Controversy", *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 2013, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 1–26, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9273-z.

103. Somers-Hall Henry, "Merleau-Ponty's Reading of Kant's Transcendental Idealism", *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 2019, Vol. 51, No. 1, pp. 103–131, https://doi.org/10.1111/sjp.12313.

104. Sorensen Roy, "Nothingness", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2023 Edition, https://tiny.pl/r88wdc9d [22.04.2025].

105. Spurrett David and Papineau David, "A Note on the Completeness of »Physics«", *Analysis* 1999, Vol. 59, No. 261, pp. 25–29, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/59.1.25.

106. Steinert Michael, "Pathogen Intelligence", *Frontiers in Cellular and Infection Microbiology* 2014, Vol. 4, No. 8, pp. 1–7, https://doi.org/10.3389/fcimb.2014.00008.

107. Stich Stephen, "Beliefs and Sub-Doxastic States", *Philosophy of Science* 1978, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp. 499–458, https://doi.org/10.1086/288832.

108. Stoljar Daniel, "Physicalism", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Spring 2024 Edition, https://tiny.pl/55995jjp [24.04.2025].

109. Strawson Galen, "A Hundred Years of Consciousness: »A Long Training in Absurdity«", *Estudios de Filosofías* 2019, Vol. 59, No. 1, pp. 9–43], https://doi.org/10.17533/udea.ef.n59a02.

110. Strawson Peter F., **Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics**, Routledge, London 1959.

111. Sutton John, "Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process", in: Richard Menary (ed.), **The Extended Mind**, MIT Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 189–225, https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262014038.003.0009.

Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0)

112. Theiner Georg and O'Connor Timothy, "The Emergence of Group Cognition", in: Antonella Corradini and Timothy O'Connor (eds.), **Emergence in Science and Philosophy**, Routledge, New York 2010, pp. 78–117.

113. Theiner Georg and Sutton John, "The Collaborative Emergence of Group Cognition", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 2014, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 277–278, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X13003051.

114. Theiner Georg, "Group-Sized Distributive Cognitive Systems", in: Marija Jankovic and Kirk Ludwig (eds.), **The Routledge Handbook of Cognitive Intentionality**, Routledge, New York 2020, pp. 233–248.

115. Vaidya Anand Jayprakash, "A New Debate on Consciousness: Bringing Classical and Modern Vedānta into Dialogue with Contemporary Analytic Panpsychism", in: Ayon Maharaj (ed.), **The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Vedanta**, Bloomsbury Academic, London 2020, pp. 393–422, https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350063266.ch-014.

116. Vana Radek, "The Brain, Gut and Consciousness: Microbiology of Our Mind", *Inquiries* 2020, Vol. 12, No. 12, https://tiny.pl/d597_4kh [30.04.2025].

117. Wallace Rodrick, "A Comment on Collective Belief", *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 2020, Vol. 9, No. 7, pp. 55–57, https://tiny.pl/t6072_3t [22.04.2025].

118. Wang Bi and Laozi, **The Classic of the Way and Virtue: A New Translation of the Tao-Te Ching of Laozi as Interpreted by Wang Bi**, trans. Richard John Lynn, Columbia University Press, New York 2004.

119. Weisberg Josh, "The Hard Problem of Consciousness", *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (n.d.), https://tiny.pl/2h1mw7qt [30.04.2025].

120. Wells H.G., **The Invisible Man: A Grotesque Romance**, Modern Library, New York 2002.

121. Westerhoff Jan Christoph, "Nāgārjuna", in: Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (eds.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Summer 2024 Edition, https://tiny.pl/w9x5sd6p [22.04.2025].

122. Whitehead Alfred North, **Process and Reality**, Corrected Edition, David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (eds.), The Free Press, New York 1978.

123. Wilson Robert A., **Boundaries of the Mind: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences**, Cambridge University Press, New York 2004.