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Psychoanalysis in the Writings of Jürgen Habermas

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PSYCHOANALYSIS IN THE WRITINGS OF JÜRGEN HABERMAS

Psychoanalysis was merely a secondary theme in the works of Habermas. Freud is one of the untold number of names and authors analysed by Habermas and he is meaningfully mentioned only in four titles, namely in: *Erkenntnis und Interesse* (*Knowledge and Human Interests*)¹ – an article followed by a treatise with the same title² in *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, and then in *Universalanspruch der Hermeneutik* (*The Universal Claim of Hermeneutics*).³ Since the middle of the seventies, the thought of Freud has practically disappeared from the writings of Habermas, except for possible marginal commentaries. The author himself says about the crisis of psychoanalysis:

Es schein allerdings so zu sein, daß die Psychoalytische Forschung nicht nur in Deutschland, sondern internerterional in Stocken geraten ist, daß die intelligenten jungen Leute eher in andere Diszyplinen gehen. ... Viele Diszyplinen haben ähnliche Stagnationsphasen überlebt. Auch der Soziologie weht heute Wind ins Gesicht. (It would appear that psychoanalytical research, not only in Germany, came to a standstill [i] and young intelligent people are more prone [towards] other disci-

¹ J. Habermas, *Interesy konstytuujące poznanie*, „Colloquia Communia” 1985, 2/9, the article of Habermas with [this] title was published as *Erkenntnis und Interesse* [in:] J. Habermas, *Technik und Wissenschaft als »Ideologie«*, Frankfurt am Main 1971.

² J. Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, Frankfurt am Main 1968.

³ Idem, *Universalanspruch der Hermeneutik*; J. Habermas, *Kultur und Kritik. Verstreute Aufsätze*, Frankfurt am Main 1973, I would like to point out that in the below dissertation I will not focus on the issue of the Habermas-Gadamer dispute, in view of the necessity of capturing the very role of Freud's metapsychology in the philosophy of Habermas.

plines. Many disciplines underwent similar phases of stagnation. Also sociology has its hard time).⁴

However, it is psychoanalysis which may turn out to be some kind of a key to this complex theory. Maybe this modest commentary will facilitate the understanding of that project, being based on directing attention to those themes which constitute its bases and define it as a whole. Psychoanalysis really is an example showing this theory as a project which cannot be read in view of the theory of communicative action, deprived of the contexts of Habermas' former works. The analysis of Habermas' early works from the angle of psychoanalysis is rather a specific and rare interpretation.

However, it is this view from which one may present an attempt of critical breaking of a positivism barrier, as well as scientificity norms connected with it, understood as obstacles in the progress of enlightenment, which represent constitutive themes of Habermas' philosophy. Psychoanalysis may constitute a kind of a "window" which allows for looking into this theory.⁵ This project, as a whole, is connected with *expanding* the borders of the term of rationality to such an extent in which the borders, opposing to the ones arbitrarily defined by the type of reflection of scientific nature, correspond to the reality taking place in the world of social life (*Lebenswelt*), which consequently is to lead to combining theory and practice.

Another example of practising of this sort of philosophical reflection is constituted by treating of psychoanalysis as an equal partner in the field of science. One of the most important reasons for such state is just the expanding of borders of the rationality term in relation to analytical-empirical sciences. This trend is extended in the *Theory of communicative action*.⁶ Habermas assumes here the view of un-

⁴ J. Habermas, *Ein Interview mit der »New Right Left«* [in:] J. Habermas *Kleine politische Schriften V. Die neue Unübersichtlichkeit*, Frankfurt am Main 1985, p. 230,

⁵ Let me add that a characteristic moment in the very interpretation of psychoanalysis, which may be treated as characteristic for the so called Frankfurt school, is constituted by the fact of being interested only in the Freud writings but complete omission of the secondary literature. It is a type of interpretation exercised in Institut für Sozial Forschung. Habermas, who for the first time met across Freudism in the Adorno seminars, mentioned this problem himself. In the after-war period, psychoanalysis was not a popular theory in German universities, where it was not regarded as a serious intellectual position, especially in philosophy; its scientific status has been controversial even until now. Cf. J. Habermas, *Dialektik der Rationalisierung*, J. Habermas *Kleine politische Schriften*, op.cit., p. 168,

⁶ Cf. J. Habermas, *Teoria działania komunikacyjnego*, t. I, Warszawa 1999, pp. 454–455,

derstanding the term of communication referring to the sphere of colloquial language, accusing the solutions arisen within empiricism of one-sidedness.⁷

The size of Habermasian theory causes that, apart from the level of complexity which is carried by its multifaceted character and apart from the language of description used by the author, it does not constitute an easy area of interpretation. Freudism constitutes a view which can facilitate difficult reading of those writings to a reader. Analysing later works of Habermas: since the middle of the seventies, his interests began to turn towards the area of social studies, connected with linguistic grounds of social studies. The themes related to the theory of language, which are also the centre of analyses referring to psychoanalysis, later began to replace the theory of knowledge (*Erkenntnistheorie*), important at the turn of the sixties and seventies.

Let me not close the question of the theory of knowledge being *replaced* with other theory of communication or it is *moved* to the layers of the theories later skipped and left with no interpretation open.⁸ However, the role of psychoanalysis is related mainly with the theory of knowledge and the role of reflection in the theory of knowledge. It is crucial that the constructions present while describing psychoanalysis are important for that theory in general, whereas they *fade away* while forming subsequent layers. If, on those grounds, one would exclude the role of the theory of knowledge in the Habermas' theories, they lose their continuity, which may be interpreted as a change of a paradigm.

My intention is to defend, firstly, a thesis that the whole of this theoretical structure, independently on the centres of author's interests which appeared in various periods, is subject to the issues of emancipation and enlightenment connected with developing of a public sphere, secondly, the belief that it should be interpreted from the angle of unity. These terms are necessary for understanding crucial goals of this theory. One cannot forget that a reader deals also with rooting of the Habermas

⁷ The contemporary works of Habermas hugely focus around the criticism of positivism, which is also expressed later in the criticism of language philosophy formulated on its grounds. One of the arguments against the influences of scientism in the humanities is constituted by a monological structure of a language excluding the reflection over the subject from the viewpoint of science, cf. J. Habermas *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, op.cit., pp. 88–115, this issue is also developed in *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, Habermas assumes that "social action constitutes itself in colloquial communication" (ibidem p. 287), the sphere of colloquial language and communication action is displaced in analytical-empirical sciences so that it could return in a form of subject's self-reflection constituted by psychoanalysis and other emancipative sciences.

⁸ Cf. Placidus, B. Haeider, *Jügen Habermas und Dieter Henrich. Neue Perspektiven auf Identität und Wirklichkeit*. München, Freiburg 1999, pp. 67–69,

theory in the German idealism; only in this view one may fully comprehend the terms he uses.⁹

The problem of psychoanalysis in the Habermas' theory is definitely connected with the problem of the theory of communicative action, its emancipative role, while the very theory of communicative action and the term of reflection may be interpreted in terms of two groups of problems, because of the theoretical construction connected with the theory of knowledge on the one hand, and practice, which has to result from that theory, crucial for shaping of the area of public sphere on the other hand.

These are constantly the only possible angles for reading the whole of Habermas' works, whereas, the same as in the case of psychoanalysis, they are the issues dealt with in the early period of his work. It should be added that omitting of the context connected with the critics of positivism and the critics of authority, resulting in directing towards psychoanalysis as an example of the science meeting the emancipative intentions.¹⁰

It is a term of reflection in which the subject undertakes the effort of critical interpretation referring to what is describable as an object and subject, and which consequently has to lead to self-reflection. Reflection, which is a dominium of philosophy, may be also realized in, including but not limited to, psychoanalysis, where it is present as therapeutic self-reflection of a subject, however, it is the self-awareness of a subject developed on the grounds of philosophy which enables protection against *objectification*.

The role of psychoanalysts and psychologists analyzing the Habermas project is to locate this project among many general interpretations of psychoanalysis, which naturally causes natural *flattening* of the view, being the property of commentaries, which, do not account for what is most important, i.e. the role of the theory of knowledge or of the movement of critics, that it does not answer the question of the reasons for interpretation of psychoanalysis as a proper, meeting the requirements of emancipative science, method of therapy and, at the same time

⁹ In the period my research concerned, it refers mainly to the notion of reflection. Habermas searches for the sources of reflection philosophy and the analysis of subject in German idealism, as through them the notion of subject can be saved. Cf. Habermas *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, op.cit., pp. 234–262,

¹⁰ B. Reimann (cf. B.W. Reiman, *Der Gesellschaftsbezug der Psychoanalyse. Zur gesellschafts- und wissenschaftstheoretischen Debatte in der Psychoanalyse*, Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1991, 79–95) focuses on the fact of combining psychoanalysis with hermeneutics in modern interpretations, Reiman emphasizes that Freud himself was aware of the meaning of the moment connected with understanding of sense in psychoanalysis, whereas Habermas regards this moment as a specific philosophical attitude. However, the problem is based on fascination of positivism, which causes that reflection may be appropriated by the language of subject's description.

the theory enabling restoring a subject back to the public sphere. In the literature of topic there is no question asked referring to the sources of recognition of psychoanalysis as a theory realizing the demands of Habermas project.

The problem of psychoanalysis is connected with the term of interest which is construed by Habermas in the discussion with the German idealism taking place around the concept of mind. In the Kant construction (to which Habermas refers to as the point of departure), the mind has a *right* to the interest, whereas in the Hegelian philosophy, the mind is *created around* the term of interest. As a consequence, the interest becomes a factor governing the knowledge instead of being subject to knowledge. It is the theme Habermas based on his other studies at that time, mainly the studies of positivistic nature, called here as the analytical-empirical ones, the development of which is based on instrumental action.

They are guided by an imperative of gaining control over the reality, manipulating it, which in turn translates into the movement of appropriating of terms used also by hermeneutic sciences, including, first of all, the term of knowledge.¹¹

The division of sciences conditioned by the interest causes a strong distinguishing aiming at extracting what is specific for the liberal arts, and which cannot be replaced with a positivistic project, no matter how effective it would be. Habermas divides the sciences into those which are governed by instrumental actions, and those based on communicative action, i.e. historical-hermeneutical type of sciences. Those two types are accompanied by a type of science which constitutes around the emancipative interest.¹²

The inquiries devoted to psychoanalysis are placed in the background of the criticism of positivism, as well as the criticism of liberal sociology and hermeneutics, which results from the discussion with MacIntyre from the time of *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*¹³. The consequence of describing psychoanalysis as *hermeneutics of the depth* is the Habermas – Gadamer dispute, which, yet, will not be developed here.

One of the key terms around which the deliberations referring to psychoanalysis are carried on is the *criticism*, which is corresponded by the unity of knowledge and interest. *Erkenntnis und Interesse* is devoted to the criticism of the theory of science (*Wissenschaftstheorie*), which by appropriating the theory of knowledge (*Erkenntnistheorie*) makes them identical. Such a stance is subject to criticism and

¹¹ Cf. J. Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, op.cit. pp. 235–262,

¹² Habermas first formulates the division of sciences in the *Interests constituting knowledge*, and then develops in *Erkenntnis und Interesse*. Later, the division, similarly to psychoanalysis, was no longer the base for research, which started to shift towards universal pragmatics.

¹³ Cf. J. Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, op.cit., pp. 184–285,

is interpreted as an attempt, occurring historically in the development process, of limiting reflection and scientificity to the type of empirical-analytical sciences. Positivistic theories cannot claim the right to being a universal nature theory. Such a movement may be visible, for instance, in an attitude towards the notion of *mind's interests* (*Vernunftinteressen*), which cannot be understood in the psychological view as such interpretation automatically imposes a viewpoint on the positivism's perspective.¹⁴ The problem is crucial for psychoanalysis because of its interpretation opposing positivism oriented psychology, only its moulding is regarded by Habermas as the birth of psychology.¹⁵

Another reason for removing of Wundt psychology from the horizon of deliberations is consequent defending of the reflection or interpretation as the sources of psychoanalysis which should be cleaned from any kind of automatism and instrumentalism which accompany empirical-analytical sciences.

Psychoanalysis is a type of science which developed mainly in connection with a therapy. "Freud was... not a philosopher. A methodical attempt of [forming] of some science on neurosis led him to a separate kind of theory".¹⁶ According to Habermas, psychoanalysis is the only available example of "methodical self-reflection, making the use of science."¹⁷ The very therapeutic process is regarded as the self-reflection movement, based on reminding, repeating, and developing, thus psychoanalysis is in no case a natural process.¹⁸

On the other hand, it has a deeply hidden, unexploited potential, which got calmed down by the Freud's positivistic involvement, which is called by Habermas as "scientistic misunderstanding of psychoanalysis",¹⁹ while here it means the lack of understanding of the potential carried by psychoanalysis by its creator himself. Reading it in a view of reflection results in its implementation, as a specific type of interpretation, to the language of philosophy, and in case of Habermas, reading it from the angle, but not psychology, which is the core element of this interpretation of psychoanalysis when one puts emphasis on the criticism of positivism formed by Habermas at that time.

The main thing I would like to point out in the Habermas' interpretation of psychoanalysis is the notion of *reflection*, which is also a source of unity for the interpretation uniting such a wide range of philosophical writings, from the Ger-

¹⁴ *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, op.cit., p. 234.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 301.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 262.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 306.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 263.

man idealism, through classical theories shaping contemporary form of philosophy, sociology, law, to theories completely contemporary for Habermas. Implementation of reflection to theory is a natural result of the interests of German idealism. Habermas refers here to Kant, Hegel, and Fichte. Not mentioned so often but also very important is the person of Schelling.²⁰

However, this topic will only be mentioned here. What is important is the Habermas' research into the problems which are essential for his theory, in a view of German idealism, as it happens to the notion of reflection.

Reflection, or more specifically, self-reflection, is a key notion in Habermas interpretation of psychoanalysis. The implementation of psychoanalysis into science resulted in automatic arising of criticism. Criticism results in recognition of interests constituting the grounds for science. There is a threat, already mentioned here, that this whole process will be interpreted in the spirit of psychologism. However, in the reflection a clear "discourse" appears (although the notion of "discourse" is not used by Habermas). Habermas refers to the sphere of communication in the background of which the public sphere is always placed. Besides, from the very beginning he prefers communication to the notions such as *dialogue*, *discourse*, and *narration*.

Another stage which is relevant, maybe as a theme close to Habermas, is a fact of a theory being formed by practice, which, after all is the self-reflection.²¹ After all, reflection allows for understanding of the interests shaping of science. The process of reflection in empirical-analytical sciences took place because of Peirce, the turn in liberal arts because of the Diltheyan hermeneutics. These two moments are connected with the criticism of the areas in those sciences which gained their identity through excluding the sphere of reflection over the subject.²²

What is more, the Habermasian criticism, in line with its purpose, is connected with the *trans-assignment* of the area, into which it is joined as reflection. This phenomenon takes place in the case of both sociology currents, which, as it seems, could meet the demands of the Habermasian theory, and traditional hermeneutics.²³ At that time, psychoanalysis constituted a model of criticism and one of

²⁰ Schelling is quoted in *Erkenntnis und Interesse* only twice, *ibid.* p. 62, 105, it seems that it is the Schelling's notion of nature which may be significant as the view for reading of criticism of positivism.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 307.

²² Habermas writes about "flattening of subjectivity" in positivism, which manifests in analyzing only two aspects of a subject which may be presented in an objective way, with the omission of the reflexive Me, cf. *ibidem*, pp. 104–115.

²³ Cf. J. Habermas, *Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften*, *op.cit.*

the forms of answering the question of performing of including a wider sphere of communication into the area of science, and that could not be done without destroying the traditional model of science itself. This constitutes a point of departure for introducing psychoanalysis to the Habermasian theory. The purpose is to achieve an *unbiased* picture of a subject, which could occur, provided solely its part being considered, especially only that one connected with the language of subject's description.

This state of affairs takes place in the field of radical positivism, the latter is characterized by manipulative and objectifying attitude to reality, this movement is carried out without any reflection on a subject, therefore the inquiries made on ground of positivism finally hit at a subject, a partner of an *interaction*. Habermas, while criticizing empirical-analytical sciences, is against this trend. The negative consequences of the attempts of subduing psychoanalysis to a model of positive sciences were not clear to Freud; on the contrary, they were regarded as the consequence of the development of psychoanalysis.

According to Habermas, Freud did not realize the possibilities given by interpretation of psychoanalysis which focuses on a specific model of hermeneutics carried by psychoanalysis as a moment specific for it. On the contrary, the process of interpretation was to be a provisional construction, which was to be abolished in the course of development of researches into neurology and pharmacology.²⁴ It is a glaring example of the power of positivistic thinking, which, through its effectiveness, appropriates and excludes the type of inquiries demanding the efforts of the reflective nature, thus not so *reliable* and *effective*.

Such criteria cannot be applied as the most important measure inside liberal arts, emancipative sciences. Apart from the fact that psychoanalysis constitutes an anchorage for the criticism of universalistic claim of positivism, inside which an unnoticed, deprived of reflection authority is hiding, it is against traditional hermeneutics, in *Erkenntnis und Interesse* too narrow range of interpretation is ascribed to it, in the dispute with Gadamer,²⁵ in the background of hermeneutic deliberations one may find an authority, the same as in positivism. The notion of authority poses a threat to reflection, and it is also a threat to the freedom of argumentation in the public sphere.

Psychoanalysis is free from authority, which becomes visible through analysis of a therapeutic situation itself. Habermas, while analyzing the type of communication between a therapist and patient, emphasizes a supporting role of a therapist.

²⁴ Cf. J. Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, op.cit. p. 263.

²⁵ Cf. J. Habermas, *Universalanspruch...*, op.cit. p. 298–301.

Analysis is a role and work of a patient. Also here the opposition between psychoanalysis and positivism appears, traces of which are in a method of language encapsulation. Analytical-empirical sciences are characterized by *monological* interpretation of language. The language of colloquial communication is used for creating of a precise tool of an accurate system nature, which is cleansed of errors and ambiguities.

Traditional, philological hermeneutics has also another task of *cleansing of errors*, it may be said that its work field is different that it is in case of positivism as it includes, in a constitutive way, communication. Positivism creates its binding field somehow.²⁶ Traditional hermeneutics finds in the area of its work a subject instead of object, yet, because of some aspects, it is an insufficient form of reflection for Habermas as it does not reach any deeper layers of communication.

Both systems, i.e. both empirical-analytical sciences and hermeneutics have a tendency for appropriating of the whole area which they may potentially deserve. Consequences of such a state of affairs run in a layer of political consequences, as even if finally, in a layer of justifications, both types of science have to refer to authority, the consequences turn out to be contrary to the goal of communication, i.e. reciprocal understanding, which is (as an intention) necessary for functioning of a public sphere. Psychoanalysis, however, serves for construing of a subject which will correctly develop in a communication sphere, i.e., as a result, in a public sphere.

It is the public sphere deprived of an authority which may be the grounds of democracy. A public sphere, in an open discourse which is a basis for democracy, excludes introducing a structure originally based on an authority. A discourse into which psychoanalysis is involved relates to the terms of rationality and communication, and it aims at obtaining a position for such a subject structure where the subject is not ruled by an authority, irrespective if it is a tradition authority or a science one. Critical reflection frees a subject from such a threat.²⁷

Psychoanalysis is a type of science directed towards a subject and reflecting its experience structures. It is not a field based on an authority, a norm in its area is a linguistic norm, a norm related to reciprocal understanding. A subject has to be able to communicate with themselves; only then their communication with others will proceed in a way which creates an opportunity for reciprocal understanding.

²⁶ Positivism is a condition for surviving of a species not aware of an interest which drives it, cf. J. Habermas *Interesy konstytuujące poznanie*, op.cit. p. 163.

²⁷ Cf. J. Habermas, *Technik und Wissenschaft als »Ideologie«* [in:] J. Habermas, *Technik und Wissenschaft als »Ideologie«*, op.cit.

Besides, psychoanalysis may be developed only and solely in a sphere of a democratic society.

Psychoanalysis shows a union of knowledge and subject, as well as its nature. Experience may be recognized only and solely in the view of a subject and language, especially a language of experience description. The type of science based on a monological use of a language falls into instrumentalism.²⁸

A public sphere, within which psychoanalysis may be developed and which it serves, is an area functioning in a colloquial speech, which means that a subject acting in it is equipped with a communication competence broader, but also less stable than a model subject which *acts* in a positivistic pattern. Moreover, instrumental action is not a type conforming to *telos* of a public sphere, which is constituted by communication; it even threatens communication and destroys it, to some extent.

In the area of psychoanalysis, one may find a notion of a *norm*, due to it, psychoanalytical practice takes place. According to Habermas, the centre of psychoanalytical *norm* is a structure of a subject, which is equipped with a competence of self-communication, which is a condition for taking communication with others. It is a moment differentiating classical hermeneutics from hermeneutics of depth, the notion of *norm*, which can be linked to communication and also constitutes a point of departure for criticism.

A subject, that has no power over the symbols it uses, can neither make a proper use of them. Such a subject does not understand the meaning of symbols which have to be determined by its biography. Such violated, splintered symbols refer only and solely to the subject themselves, which is contrary to the universal function of symbol. A symbol the meaning of which may be understood only by a subject and their individual biography impairs their communication and excludes them from a public sphere. Psychoanalysis is a road “into the inner self”, it is a criticism connected with reflection and its movement natural result. Habermas links the notion of reflection with the notion of mind:

Die Erfahrung der Reflexion artikuliert sich inhaltlich im Begriff des Bildungsprozess, methodisch führt sie zu einem Standpunkt, von dem aus die Identität der Vernunft zwanglos sich ergibt. In der Selbstreflexion gelangt eine Erkenntnis um der Erkenntnis willen mit dem Interesse an Mündigkeit zur Deckung; denn der Vollzug der Reflexion weiß sich als Bewegung der Emanzipation. Vernunft steht zugleich unter dem Interesse an Vernunft. Wir können sagen, dass sie einem emen-

²⁸ J. Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, op.cit., pp. 236–237.

zipatorischen Erkenntnisinteresse folgt, das auf den Vollzug der Reflexion als solchen zielt. (Experience of reflection is articulated in the notion of the process of education, and it directs methodically to a viewpoint which results in an unaffected identity of mind. In self-reflection, the knowledge understands that it wants to coincide with the interest related to coming of age; as exercising self-reflection is recognized as an emancipation movement. At the same time, mind is under the interest of mind. One may say that mind results from emancipative cognitive interest, which aims at exercising reflection as such).²⁹

In this respect, also psychoanalysis results from a tendency of mind to self-reflection. The notion of mind includes an element of will. It means that emancipation does not *become* automatically. Thus, psychoanalysis is primarily an effort of critical interpretation which carries therapy. At the same, Habermas combines the notion of interpretation (understanding), theory, emancipation, and therapy.

The interpretative work of a psychoanalyst is compared with the translation work of a philologist, and this comparison also includes differentiation. Habermas divides hermeneutics into the two areas: classical Diltheyan one and hermeneutics present in the area of psychoanalysis, being the basis and core element of the work of a psychoanalyst at all. Common research scope for both areas is constituted by a biography. However, the methods of meaning analysis in the Diltheyan hermeneutics are definitely distinguished from the methods of work in philological hermeneutics.

In the former, an objective meaning is searched for, by deleting contradictions and errors which may be found in a text. In depth hermeneutics, the primary role is played by the meanings hidden for a subject. For Dilthey, a biography, a text in general, constitutes a field of making corrections and eliminating potential errors. Errors, as such, result from a subjective point of view of a subject. An example is constituted by a work of a historian who restructures relations between elements present in a text. The meaning of traditional hermeneutics is to exclude an error and restoring cohesion of a text, cohesion of a historical message.

Reconstruction carried out by a psychoanalyst looks different:

Die Psychoanalytische Deutung ... richtet sich nicht auf Sinnzusammenhänge in der Dimension des bewußt Intendierten; ihre kritische Arbeit besichtigt nicht akzidentelle Mangel. Die Auslassungen die sie behebt, haben einen systematischen Stellenwert, denn die symbolischen Zusammenhänge, die Psychoanalyse zu be-

²⁹ *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, p. 244.

greifen sucht, sind durch *interne Einwirkungen* verderbt. (Psychoanalytical interpretation directs meaning groups in a consciously intended dimension; its critical work does not reflect accidental deficiencies. The omissions deleted by psychoanalysis have some systematic weight as symbolic groups, which it tries to comprehend, are distorted by internal influences).³⁰

A psychoanalyst's task is to trace their own errors in a text as they are the ones directing us to the sources of disorders visible in an external symbolic layer. Neurotic behaviours happen on three levels, on the level of language expressions (*Zwangsvorstellungen*), actions (*Wiederholungszwänge*) by a sphere of expressions related to a body (*hysterische Körpersymptome*),³¹ and they send us to the area to which a subject themselves remains hidden. An error, a moment unclear for a patient themselves at one of these levels, behaviour which is unclear for them is a sign of neurotic grounds.

These disorders are a thing which an analyst reaches. Their grounds may be found in a sphere of symbols of primitive nature, or paleosymbols.³² A text of a dream, undergoing an analysis as the first one is a type of narration which may lead to the "kingdom of subconsciousness" undistorted by the influence of consciousness, subject to supervision to a lesser extent, undistorted to such an extent as a language of colloquial communication.

Freudism becomes defined by Habermas as self-reflection expressed in a form of science. A need for joining the system of sciences which accounts for the sciences based on communication actions of another type of reflection results from the fact that psychoanalysis, as the only one, is driven by cognitive motivations connected with a therapy based on self-reflective movement of inquiries. The two types of hermeneutics analyzed by Habermas develop on account of other cognitive motivations. Both of them are linked by the notion of *interpretation*. Interpretation, as understood by Dilthey, is deletion of contradictions, i.e. in some ways it is correcting the coherence of knowledge system within the humanities.

As a result, finding an error means its correction, the reasons for doing errors are not analyzed as the themes related to text analysis in direct relation to an author are omitted, in traditional hermeneutic there is no moment of reference to hidden layers of culture. This reflection operates in the area of the *conscious*. Owing to this, the power of criticism in hermeneutics gets weakened; it does not reach even to

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 266.

³¹ Cf. ibidem, 269.

³² J. Habermas *Universalanspruch...*, op.cit., p. 286.

an extra-formal dimension of having authority over someone,³³ which causes that its emancipative effect is limited. Hermeneutics in its philological dimension turns out to be one of the sources of keeping the authority.

Habermas emphasizes a critical potential of psychoanalysis for the reason that Freud did not become a critic of positivism, psychoanalysis as described by Freud is also criticized by Habermas. The former of psychoanalysis himself claimed that after making some discoveries in the area of physiology, there would be no need for conducting a therapy as it would be replaced with pharmacology.³⁴ This is an expression of underestimating on the potential of psychoanalysis on behalf of a pattern developed in positivistic sciences.

The concept of psychoanalysis can be found within the frames of a transcendental project. It means reflecting the bases of philosophy. The research process of each of these areas is based on transcendental frames, which means reading the semantic relationship in case of a communication action as necessary connections with possible preserving of inter-subjectivity of reciprocal understanding. Communication becomes part of sense's structure as a prerequisite for reading the sense at all. Positivistic sciences are based on transcendental frames of instrumental action, the nature manifests itself in them as an object of knowledge in a view of possible technical disposal. The interest is defined by Habermas in the following way:

Interessen nenne ich die Grundorientierungen, die an bestimmten fundamentalen Bedingungen der möglichen Reproduktion und Selbstkonstituierung der Menschengattung, nämlich an Arbeit und Interaktion haften. (For me, the interests are the basic orientations which are linked with fundamental conditions of possible reproduction and self-constitution of mankind, namely with work and interaction).³⁵

³³ Habermas' interpretation heads in this direction. From him, emancipative interpretation is opposed to power relations, psychoanalysis is a movement opposed to *distortions* of socialization, thus it translates into reconstruction of identity and is a step for changing even the most intimate relations. Even the very term of notion enforces on psychoanalysis definition of the notion of norm during a therapy, which directs psychoanalysis towards social theory; it is an unavoidable result activated in the process of therapeutic self-reflection. Habermas describes the theory of socialization in *Notizen zur Erkenntnistheorie (ein Nachwort)* [in:] J. Habermas, *Kultur und Kritik. Verstreute Aufsätze*, Frankfurt am Main 1973.

³⁴ J. Habermas *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, op.cit., p. 301.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 242, and cf. J. Habermas *Arbeit und Interaktion. Bemerkungen zu Hegels Jenser »Philosophie des Geistes«* [in:] J. Habermas *Erkenntnis Technik und Wissenschaft...*, op. cit.

According to Habermas, the relationship of knowledge and interest may be restructured and subject to criticism only through self-reflection as its structures on the way of socialization are acquired by a subject and remain in those types of sciences from which the possibility of return to subjectivity may be guaranteed only by the types of sciences filling the type of criticism approved by Habermas. In such a case, psychoanalysis becomes the model for emancipation science, within its frames the research is also a process of self-research.

The conditions of a therapeutic process are as much transcendental as they are fundamental for a therapeutic process, and are objective to extent to which they “actually make a process of social ills phenomena possible”.³⁶ Transferring a transcendental viewpoint onto objective things and interests constituting the knowledge becomes unnecessary at that moment, as the way of solving a problem of communication distorted by psychoanalysis is both theory and practice.

„Erst wenn, am Typus der kritischen Wissenschaft diese Einheit von Erkenntnis und Interesse durchschaut ist, kann auch die Zuordnung von forschungstranszendentalen Gesichtspunkten und Erkenntnisleitenden Interessen als notwendig angesehen werden.“ (Only when the unity of knowledge and interest is observed in a type of critical science, assignment of transcendental-research points and interests directing the knowledge may be also recognized as necessary).

The arising questions referring to Habermasian interpretation of psychoanalysis relate to underestimating hermeneutics by the creator of the new science himself.³⁷ Habermas, in the criticism of psychoanalysis, assigns it with positivistic *bias*, the author himself is naturally recognized as belonging to the line of theorists interpreting psychoanalysis in a hermeneutic pattern, others being Paul Ricouert and Alfred Lorenzer, whereas the Habermasian interpretation is closest to the Lorenzer’s proposal.³⁸ On the other hand, also associations with Max Adler’s proposal come to one’s mind.³⁹

³⁶ J. Habermas, *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, op.cit., p. 348.

³⁷ These doubts are developed by B.W. Reiman in *Der Gesellschaftsbezug...*, op.cit., pp. 79–80.

³⁸ *Kritik des Psychoanalytischen Symbolbegriffs* by Alfred Lorenzer is cited by Habermas in *Universalansptuch*, op.cit., p. 286, and cf. *Erkenntnis und Interesse*, op.cit., pp. 10, 295, and 310 and while clarification of the notion of depth hermeneutics, as well as of psychoanalytical structure of symbols.

³⁹ Cf. K.H. Pabst, *Transzendente Erkenntnis und Gesellschaft. Zur Kritik transzendentaler Begründungsversuche der Gesellschaftstheorie bei Max Adler, Jürgen Habermas und Theodor W. Adorno*, Frankfurt am Main 1992, p. 95, both Adler and Habermas chose for their points of departure the Kant

Yet, it was reading of the then unpublished *Sprachzerstörung und Rekonstruktion* contributed to paying attention to the problem of communication in which the core of psychoanalytical therapy is realized, and especially to the specific nature of communication within its frames, Lorenzer writes about logical and psychological *Verstehen*, whereas the former is connected with understanding of what is spoken, and the latter with understanding of the speaking one, for Habermas, the situation of therapy is not a type of communication action as the purpose, apart from reciprocal understanding, is constituted by therapy.⁴⁰

Another issue is the problem of *scientificity* of psychoanalysis. This issue has been the subject of discourse from the angle of theory of analytical nature, but not exclusively,⁴¹ if one tries regarding it as scientific and nomothetic, a naturally born question appears whether psychoanalysis suits this model. Habermas answers this question in a different way, skipping the issue of scientificity of psychoanalysis, calling it as a science from the very beginning. It is typical for him to broaden the borders and scientificity as limiting them to sciences of positivistic type is connected with a limitation of the consequences which are suffered by a subject limited by positivism.

In this case, the problem is constituted by Freud's positivism itself – whether the founder of psychoanalysis did not quite realize its hermeneutic potential and the extent to which his approval of positivistic motives may be criticized become the subjects of discourse.⁴² The criticism of Habermas' positivism from the angle of psychoanalysis is evaluated as ineffective since *reflection* and *understanding* are not warranty for relevant explanation.⁴³ According to Habermas, psychoanalysis is not a science which can prove its effective results:

Mein Freund Mitscherlich hat seine Erfahrungen als psychoanalytischer Arzt einmal so zusammengefaßt: die Therapie erreichte »oft nicht mehr als die Verwand-

theory of knowledge, although Habermas, while debating with German idealism, departs not only from Kant transcendentalism, which happens in the purest form in case of Adler.

⁴⁰ Cf. J. Habermas, *Ein Interview...*, op.cit., p. 231,

⁴¹ Cf. K.R. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutation. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, London 1963, pp. 37–38, “And as for Freud's epic of the Ego, the Super-ego, and the Id, no substantially stronger claim to scientific status can be made for it than for Homer's collected stories from Olympus.” *ibidem*, p. 38 is a typical way of criticizing psychoanalysis, cf. Hans Albert; he also criticizes critical psychology, built around the notion of emancipation, cf. Hans Albert *Bemerkungen zu Holzkamps dialektischer Überwindung der modernen Wissenschaftslehre* [in:] H. Albert, H. Keuth (Hrsg.), *Kritik der kritischen Psychologie*, Hamburg 1973, also in A. Grünbaum, *Foundation of Psychoanalysis. A Philosophical Critique*, Berkeley–London–Los Angeles, pp. 7–47.

⁴² Cf. Ch. Nichols, *Wissenschaft oder Reflexion: Habermas über Freud* [in:] *Materialien zu Habermas' »Erkenntnis und Interesse«* Hrsg. W. Dallmayr, Frankfurt am Main 1974, pp. 409–411,

⁴³ Cf. M. Perrez, *Ist die Psychoanalyse eine Wissenschaft*, Bern–Stuttgart–Wien 1979, pp. 40–41.

lung von Krankheit in Leid, das den Rang des homo sapiens erhöht, weil es seine freiheit nicht vernichtet.« (Some time ago, my friend Mittscherlich summed up his experience of a psychoanalyst: it was often the case that a therapy did not achieve anything more than transforming an illness into suffering, which often elevates the Homo sapiens since it does not destroy their freedom).⁴⁴

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⁴⁴ J. Habermas *Ein Interview mit...*, op. it. p. 230,