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Obronność - Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Zarządzania i Dowodzenia Akademii Obrony Narodowej nr 1(13), 144-147

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2015

Artykuł został opracowany do udostępnienia w internecie przez Muzeum Historii Polski w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł jest umieszczony w kolekcji cyfrowej [bazhum.muzhp.pl](http://bazhum.muzhp.pl), gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych.

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## **HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF MOBILE GROUPS, OPERATING AWAY FROM THE MAIN FORCES**

Changes in tasks, composition and structure of the Army, occurring at present time, necessitate to conduct great research in the field of military theory, including theory of operational art and tactics [1, p. 46].

The detachment of troops from the main forces is understood as independent actions of the troops, as a rule, in the operational depth of the defending enemy without any contact with its troops and neighbors.

Historical experience shows that with the help of offensive it is possible to defeat the enemy and liberate the territory.

The major phases of offense consist of the penetration of defense and development of its success. In the initial stage, the operation (combat) of troops ensures creating gaps in the defense of the enemy, disrupting its stability and the relationship between the individual elements of its operational formation (order of battle).

The final defeat of defending, especially if the troops are sufficiently mobile and have modern weapons, can only be achieved due to active operations of troops, advancing from the front, combined with decisive actions of paratroopers landed at a depth of the enemy defense, and forces breaking through the rear of the main grouping. In this case, you can defeat him in a more short time. This conclusion is confirmed by the experience of World War II, in particular the action of mobile groups (MG), fronts and armies [2, p. 16].

Mobile groups (MGs) were widely used in World War II. As a rule, they consisted of mobile rifle and tank formations, reinforced air assault, artillery and other special forces units. As a rule, they were put into effect under the conditions of broken forth of the front, but sometimes they could be used before the penetration [3]. In general, mobile groups acted independently, looking up from its troops and breaking to a considerable depth in operating open spaces of the enemy.

At all times, the opposing sides were trying to deceive each other, mislead, get the flank and rear, and with the decisive offense to crush the enemy.

In the 70 years in the Soviet Army it was hypothesized that due to the high mobility of military branches the need for tank armies disappears, the

creation of mobile groups was intended for the development of successful offense in the main directions. But it did not take into account two important circumstances.

Firstly, at the very high mobility of forces generally in the interest of the rapid development of the offense in depth, and always in the flanks it is necessary to have formations that would be more mobile and have more passable equipment. It is impossible to equip equally all the troops with the newest military equipment. Primarily, units of formations should be equipped with assets designed to solve exactly such tasks.

Secondly, more rapid advancement of mobile groups or other groups in offensive operations is achieved not only by equipping them with more advanced technology, but also through the creation of more favorable conditions for rapid action by directions for their support of the main forces such as aviation, artillery, airborne and engineering troops and other means of strengthening.

Instead of mobile groups, used during World War II, it was decided to create the operational maneuver group (OMG). The main difference from their previous mobile groups lies in the fact that not only tank armies and divisions are used, but also specifically created to act as the operational-mobile groups of separated army corps of special organization, where armored, mechanized infantry, artillery and other units were united and equipped with the latest tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, as well as self-propelled artillery. Moreover, for the first time in the composition of these corps, Air Assault Regiment and Army Aviation were included. If in the US Army and other NATO armies there are forces capable of conducting air-land operations, but the Soviet Army established troops specifically designed for the action on the point of these operations.

Unfortunately, in recent years, along with the Soviet armed forces, corps designed to act as operational and mobile groups were eliminated. But they were impossible to eliminate on operational – tactical level, as due to the development of technical ideas and therefore the further perfection of the organizational structure of troops, they apparently were used in that or other form [4].

OMG is an element of operational order in the offensive operation, intended for the rapid increasing power of impact and conducting operational, raid operations in isolation from the main forces envisaged in the operational order of troops in the 70-80s.

The prototype of mobile groups were fronts (armies) in offensive operations in the Great Patriotic War.

OMG tasks are:

- to defeat means of nuclear attack;
- to capture important frontiers and areas;

- to strike on retractable reserves;
- to upset troops management and work of the operational logistics;
- to disorganize and frustrate the mobilization activities and others.

Combat experience shows the rate of advance of up to 100 km per day and the gap from the main forces of up to 200 km.

In the second half of the 80s, the acceptance of the defensive military doctrine in the USSR led to changes in the methods of preparation and conducting operations, including the exclusion of such an operational formation of troops element, as OMG. Army Corps OMG were redirected to other tasks, and most of them in the early 90s, in connection with the collapse of the Armed Forces of the USSR were disbanded [5].

We say that in modern war there is not rigid, positional defense, questions of defensive battle will be solved by the highly maneuverable fighting, in association with equipment of mobile and great firepower of combat equipment, apart from the basic forces what is also confirmed by the experience of the troops in Operation *Desert Fox*, where the United States of America applied precisely maneuverable, mobile units, combined armored, motorized, artillery and other units, equipped with the latest technology and self-propelled artillery.

Moreover, special attention was paid to the aerial phase of operations with conducted ground operations.

Ground forces were used to capture and retain vital important objects of the state. Their speed and maneuverability were a bright example of conducting effective military operations in the absence of the frontline and in isolation from their troops.

## **Conclusions**

Firstly, an analysis of the military-political situation and military conflicts of recent decades shows that security questions of the State are one of the most important.

Secondly, rejection mobile, well-equipped troops, trained for combat operations in the rear of the enemy is impractical, therefore it is necessary to instruct the troops to prepare to such actions.

Thirdly, the troops destined for action in isolation from their forces must be prepared in advance while defining their areas and zones of action, which is not tied to specific frontiers and objects.

Thus, the experience of local wars and armed conflicts of the recent decades suggests that in modern combat the usage of MG and OMG will occupy an important place and their usage will be widely used by the confrontation sides.

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