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THE PARTICIPATION AND ROLE OF THE CAESARIANS IN THE ATTEMPT ON C. IULIUS CAESAR'S LIFE (15 MARCH, 44)*

Caius Iulius Caesar lost his life around noon on March 15, 44, during the session of the Senate in Pompey's curia¹. The aim of that session was to grant Caesar the title of a king. In order not to let this happen, the senators involved in the conspiracy against Caesar murdered him soon after he appeared in the meeting hall. Around 60 politicians took part in this conspiracy², among which the most numerous were the dictator's enemies, who were acting against him already in the years 49–45, and, having received his pardon, they again became active in the political life³.

* The dates mentioned in the present article refer to the times before Christ. For a Polish version see „Wieki Stare i Nowe”, 6, 2009, 39–56.

¹ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24; Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; Suet., *Iul.* 80, 4; 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 64, 2; 66, 1; 3–7; *Brut.* 16, 1–17, 4; App., *BC* II 113, 470; 114, 476; 116, 489–117, 493; Cass. Dio XLIV 19, 1–20, 2. See also: Cic., *Att.* XIV 14, 2; 21, 3; *fam.* XI 8, 1; XII 1, 1; *Phil.* II 11, 25; E. Meyer, *Caesars Monarchie und das Principat des Pompejus*, Stuttgart–Berlin 1922, 540–543; P. Stein, *Die Senatssitzungen der Ciceronischen Zeit (68–43)*, Münster 1930, 72; J. Dickinson, *Death of a Republic. Politics and Political Thought at Rome 59–44 BC*, New York–London 1963, 243; E. Betti, *La crisi della repubblica e la genesi del principato in Roma*, Romae 1982, 454–455; M. Bonnefond-Coudry, *Le Sénat de la République romaine de la guerre d'Hannibal à Auguste*, Rome 1989, 161, 166–167, 214, 227–228; M. Jaczynowska, *Dzieje Imperium Romanum*, Warszawa 1995, 170; K. Bringmann, *Geschichte der römischen Republik*, München 2002, 370–372; A. Ziółkowski, *Historia Rzeczy, Poznań* 2004, 354.

² Suet., *Iul.* 80, 3. Nicholas of Damascus (*Vit. Caes.* 19) states that there were around 80 of them. Similar suggestions can be found in: M. Jehne, *Die Ermordung des Dictators Caesar und das Ende der römischen Republik*, [in] *Große Verschwörungen. Staatstreich und Tyrannensturz von der Antike bis zum Gegenwart*, ed. U. Schulz, München 1998, 41; E. Baltrusch, *Caesar und Pompeius*, Darmstadt 2004, 158, 160 and also in: S. L. Utzenko, *Kryzys i upadek republiki w starożytnym Rzymie*, Warszawa 1973, 386; T. Łoposzko, *Historia społeczna republikańskiego Rzymu*, Warszawa 1987, 319; M. Cary, H. H. Scullard, *Dzieje Rzymu*, t. 1, Warszawa 1992, 551.

³ Their typical representatives were M. Iunius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus who were the leaders of the conspirators (Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.*, 19; Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; Suet., *Iul.* 80, 4; Plut., *Caes.* 62, 1; 4–5; App., *BC* II 111, 462–464, 112, 469–113, 474; Flor. II 13, 93; Cass. Dio XLIV 13, 1–14, 2; M. H. Dettenhofer, *Perdita Iuventus*, München 1992 (Vestigia 44), 99–129, 192–223, 232–256, and who, just like other enemies, were treated leniently by Caesar (Caes., *BC* III 98, 2; Liv., *Per.* CX; Vell. Pat. II 52, 4–5; 56, 1; 3; Plut., *Caes.* 46, 2; 48, 2; 53, 3; 54, 2; 57, 3; 62, 2; App., *BC* II 88, 380; 111, 464; 112, 468). Concerning his policy on defeated antagonists see

Among the assassins, there were also some of the victim's close collaborators⁴.

The purpose of the present article is to elucidate the role of the latter group of the plotters in the conspiracy against Caesar and in the attempt itself.

The ancient authors treated this question in a way that was analogical to other problems related to the Ides of March discussed in the present article. In their texts, we do not find much information concerning our problem. To make matters worse, most of this information is limited to the most famous Caesarians taking part in the attempt⁵. This information concerns only the best known facts⁶. Thus, the way in which those authors handle the question that interests the present author is neither adequate nor comprehensive.

The most important is Appian's account⁷ because it singles out the Caesarians among other conspirators, and mentions various aspects of their participation in the attempt on Caesar's life. Also Suetonius's biography of Caesar must be highly appreciated⁸, as well as Plutarch's lives of Caesar and Brutus, and to a lesser extent that of Antony⁹. Many facts concerning the matter in question can be found in Cassius Dion's work¹⁰ and in the biography of Augustus by Nicholas of Damascus¹¹. Some rather insignificant details are included in the account by Velleius Paterculus and in the periochs (passages) of Livy's work¹². In Cicero's correspondence we come across several original, nowhere else repeated, pieces of information¹³. Similar ones the great orator included in his Second Philippic¹⁴.

e.g. C. C. Coulter, *Caesar's Clemency*, CJ, 26, 1931, 513–524; M. Treu, *Zur Clementia Caesaris*, MH, 5, 1948, 197–217; O. Leggewie, *Clementia Caesaris*, „Gymnasium”, 65, 1958, 17–36.

⁴ Cic., *Att.* XV 11, 2; *fam.* X 28, 1; XI 8, 1; XII 16, 4; *Phil.* II 11, 27; Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19; Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; Suet., *Iul.* 80, 4; 81, 4; 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 64; 66, 3–4; *Brut.* 12, 4–5; 15, 2–3; 17, 1–4; App., *BC* II 113, 474; Cass. Dio XLIV 14, 3–4; 18, 2; 19, 1–5; T. Rice Holmes, *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire*, vol. 3, Oxford 1923, 340; W. E. Heitland, *The Roman Republic*, vol. 3, Cambridge 1923, 365–366; L. Piotrowicz, *Dzieje rzymskie*, [in] WHP, t. 3, Warszawa 1934, 476; K. Christ, *Krise und Untergang der römischen Republik*, Darmstadt 1979, 390–392; M. Cary, H. H. Scullard, *op. cit.*, 551.

⁵ Usually it is limited to D. Brutus and C. Trebonius. Other Caesarians are mentioned much less frequently. See the sources quoted in note 4.

⁶ Particularly the facts that took place on March 15, 44, from the morning to Caesar's death. See the sources quoted in note 4.

⁷ App., *BC* II 111–120.

⁸ Suet., *Iul.* 80–83.

⁹ Plut., *Caes.* 64; 66; *Brut.* 10–17; *Ant.* 13, 1–2.

¹⁰ Cass. Dio XLIV 13–17.

¹¹ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19–24.

¹² Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3.

¹³ Cic., *Att.* XV 11, 2; *fam.* X 28, 1; XI 8, 1; XII 16, 4.

¹⁴ Cic., *Phil.* II 11, 25; 27.

Neither did modern historians devote much attention to the participation of the Caesarians in the attempt on the life of C. Iulius Caesar. This is particularly visible in the studies concerning the Ides of March in 44. The participation of the victim's close collaborators is emphasized only by some historians, such as H. Geremek, R. Étienne, R. H. Storch, M. Jehne¹⁵. Many others, such as J. P. V. D. Balsdon, W. Schmitthenner, H. Gugel, L. Hayne, made only a brief mention of the matter¹⁶. Usually, if the scholars took a closer look at the conspirators, they tended to write about all of them, about their leaders, or the best known among them, such as M. Iunius Brutus, or C. Cassius Longinus¹⁷. Similar tendencies can be observed in Caesar's biographies¹⁸, in studies devoted to various aspects of M. Brutus's activity¹⁹, to the crisis and downfall of the Republic in Rome²⁰, or in the works of different, for example, synthetic character²¹.

Already the Ancients did not treat the participants of the conspiracy against Caesar in a uniform way. Among the plotters they clearly singled out those who were connected with him. They were not, however, described as Caesarians or supporters of Caesar. The author of the periochs (passages) of Livy's work, while talking about the leaders of the conspiracy, emphasised, for example, that among

¹⁵ H. Geremek, *Spisek Brutusa*, „Meander”, 10, 1955, 307; R. Étienne, *Les Ides de Mars: l'assassinat de César ou la dictature?*, Paris 1973, 153–156; R. H. Storch, *Relative Deprivation and the Ides of March: Motive for Murder*, AHB, 9, 1995, 48; Jehne, *op. cit.*, 42–44.

¹⁶ J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *The Ides of March*, „Historia”, 7, 1958, 82, 85; W. Schmitthenner, *Das Attentat auf Caesar am 15 März 44 v. Chr.*, [in] *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 13, 1962, 692; H. Gugel, *Caesars Tod (Sueton, Div. Iul. 81, 4–82,3). Aspekte zur Darstellungskunst und zum Caesarbild Suetons*, „Gymnasium”, 77, 1970, 13–16; L. Hayne, *Caesar the Politician*, „Ancient History”, 25, 1995, 36.

¹⁷ This can be seen even in studies written by the historians who emphasise the role of the Caesarians in the conspiracy and in the attempt on Caesar's life. See the literature quoted in note 15. See also: P. Ribbeck, *Senatores Romani, qui fuerint Idibus Martiis a.u.c. 710*, Diss. Berlin 1899; R. E. Smith, *The Conspiracy and the Conspirators*, GR, 1957, 58–70; S. Lichański, *O Cezarze i cesarobójcach*, „Więź”, 5, 1962, 59–74.

¹⁸ M. Gelzer, *Caesar. Der Politiker und Staatsmann*, Wiesbaden 1960, 301, 304–305; J. Carcopino, *Jules César*, Paris 1968, 562–564; H. Gesche, *Caesar*, Darmstadt 1976, 172; W. Dahlheim, *Julius Cäsar*, München–Zürich 1987, 190–194; M. Jehne, *Caesar*, München 1997, 115–117; L. Canfora, *Giulio Cesare*, Roma–Bari 1999, 359–367.

¹⁹ M. Gelzer, *M. Junius Brutus, der Caesarmörder* 53, RE 10, Stuttgart 1917, 988–993; H. Bengtson, *Zur Geschichte des Brutus*, München 1970, 15–18; M. L. Clarke, *The Noblest Roman. Marcus Brutus and his Reputation*, London 1981, 37–39; E. Wistrand, *The Policy of Brutus the Tyrannicide*, Goeteborg 1981, 5ff; L. Morawiecki, *Legum ac libertatis auctor et vindex. Marek Juniusz Brutus i jego program polityczny*, Poznań 2001 (Xenia Posnaniensia 10), 9.

²⁰ Meyer, *op. cit.*, 540–543; Dickinson, *op. cit.*, 242–243; Utczenko, *op. cit.*, 386–387; Christ, *op. cit.*, 390–392.

²¹ Rice Holmes, *op. cit.*, 340–344; Heitland, *op. cit.*, 365–366; Piotrowicz, *op. cit.*, 475–476; Cary, Scullard, *op. cit.*, 551; Jaczynowska, *op. cit.*, 170; Bringmann, *op. cit.*, 370–372; Ziółkowski, *op. cit.*, 354.

them there were D. Brutus and C. Trebonius from „Caesar’s milieu”²². Velleius Paterculus stressed, on the other hand, that the two gave their support to the plans to kill Caesar, while being his „closest friends”²³. Similarly the matter was tackled by Appian, who indicated twice that among those who took part in the plot and attempt on Caesar’s life there were his friends²⁴. Plutarch emphasized this fact indirectly, for, when writing about D. Brutus, he observed that Caesar had fully trusted him²⁵. Cassius Dion described the situation in almost the same way, giving to understand that this politician was connected with Caesar²⁶. Modern scholars describe the conspirators associated with Caesar in a similar way. H. Geremek suggests they were politicians close to him. R. H. Storch shows that among the participants in the conspiracy there were politicians regarded as Caesar’s friends. M. Jehne, on his part, that they were his long-time collaborators²⁷.

As a result, some historians, e.g. H. Geremek or M. Jaczynowska, counted among the politicians who took part in the murder of Caesar, and were close to him, C. Trebonius and D. Brutus, who were, already in the 50s collaborating with the all triumvirs or with Caesar, but also M. Iunius Brutus, who, during the Second Civil War, fought against Caesar and on the side of Cn. Pompeius and the defenders of the Republic²⁸. M. Brutus entered the circle of the politicians close to Caesar as late, after the battle of Pharsalus, lost by the republicans, when the victor forgave him, just as he forgave his other defeated antagonists. Caesar started to trust him, and allowed to take part in the political life²⁹. In spite of all this, M. Brutus kept a certain distance towards Caesar, he did not reciprocate Caesar’s friendship, and remained his political antagonist³⁰. In counting M. Brutus among the senators connected with Caesar, the above mentioned scholars must have taken into account some other criteria than strictly political ones. In consequence, they did not take into consideration M. Brutus’ orientation before the battle of Pharsalus, and per-

²² Liv., *Per.* CXVI.

²³ Vell. Pat. II 56, 3.

²⁴ App., *BC* II 111, 464 – „friends”; 113, 474 – „closest friends”.

²⁵ Plut., *Caes.* 64, 1; *Brut.* 12, 4.

²⁶ Cass. Dio XLIV 18, 1; cf. 14, 4

²⁷ H. Geremek, *op. cit.*, 307; R. H. Storch, *op. cit.*, 48; M. Jehne, *op. cit.*, 42.

²⁸ Geremek, *op. cit.*, 307. More on D. Brutus’ and C. Trebonius’ careers and on their links with Caesar can be found on 3–4. As for M. Iunius Brutus’ links and career, see: Gelzer, *M. Junius Brutus...*, 973–1020; Bengtson, *op. cit.*; Clarke, *op. cit.*; Wistrand, *op. cit.*; Morawiecki, *op. cit.*

²⁹ Caes., *BC* III 98, 1–2; Suet., *Iul.* 75, 2–3; Plut., *Caes.* 48, 2; 53, 3; 54, 1; App., *BC* II 80, 336; Flor. II 13, 50; Cass. Dio XLI 62, 1–6. Cf. Vell. Pat. II 52, 4; Plut., *Caes.* 46, 2; 54, 2; 62, 1–2; *Brut.* 4–6; Gelzer, *M. Junius Brutus...*, 980–981.

³⁰ The best proof of this was his having organized a conspiracy against Caesar, the culmination of which was the attempt of March 15, 44: Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19–24; Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; Suet., *Iul.* 80, 3–4; Plut., *Caes.* 62; *Brut.* 10–17; App., *BC* II 111, 464; 112, 466–113, 474; Cass. Dio XLIV 13, 1–19, 5. See also the literature quoted in note 19.

haps also in the following years, when Brutus, while being in the circle of those who were close to Caesar, did not give up his efforts to preserve the Republic³¹.

The author of the present article has singled out the Caesarians among the participants in the attempt that took place in Rome on March 15, 44 on the basis of, first of all, political criteria. Only then did he take into account the fact that they were senators close to Caesar, forming his milieu. In this sense, the Caesarians are the politicians from the group which stood by Caesar in the conflicts in which their protector and leader was involved, in particular they supported him during the 49–45 civil war, and together they fought against Cn. Pompeius and the Republic's defenders, and, at the end of Caesar's life, they were his friends and collaborators. From this group the present author excludes those senators who, during the civil war, collaborated with Caesar's enemies, and who reconciled with him only after the defeats they suffered and having received his pardon, even though, like M. Brutus, they were regarded, at the end of Caesar's life, as persons close to him.

Appian looked at this matter in a similar way. While writing about the anti-Caesar conspiracy, he clearly indicated that M. Brutus and C. Cassius supported Pompey during the civil war, whereas he described D. Brutus as somebody who belonged to the circle of Caesar's closest friends³². In another passage of the text, when talking about the organization of that conspiracy and about the way M. Brutus and C. Cassius were recruiting new members for that conspiracy, he stated, very accurately, that they were looking for them among their friends, but also among the politicians belonging to Caesar's close friends³³.

In the light of the above, we should, in the first place, count D. Iunius Brutus Albinus among the Caesarians who took part in the attempt on Caesar's life³⁴. This is also what H. Geremek, R. Étienne, R. H. Storch, M. Jehne, and also H. Gugel, W. Schmitthenner or L. Hayne did³⁵. D. Brutus was connected with Caesar already in the early fifties. In 56 during the war with the Veneti he commanded his fleet in the sea battle at Quiberon³⁶. In 52, he held the post of a prefect, serving

³¹ This is emphasised particularly by ancient authors: Plut., *Brut.* 10; App., *BC* II 112, 466–113, 473.

³² App., *BC* II 111, 464.

³³ *Ibidem*, II 113, 473–474.

³⁴ The correctness of this statement is confirmed by numerous sources: Cic., *Att.* XV 11, 2; *Phil.* II 11, 26; Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19; Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; Suet., *Iul.* 80, 4; Plut., *Caes.* 64, 1; *Brut.* 12, 4–5; App., *BC* II 111, 464; 113, 474; Cass. Dio XLIV 14, 3–4.

³⁵ Geremek, *op. cit.*, 307; Étienne, *op. cit.*, 154; Storch, *op. cit.*, 48; Jehne, *Die Ermordung...*, 42; Schmitthenner, *op. cit.*, 692; Gugel, *op. cit.*, 13–14; Hayne, *op. cit.*, 36.

³⁶ Caes., *BG* III 11, 5–16, 4; Cass. Dio XXXIX 40–43; Oros. VI 8, 7–16; W. Drumann, P. Groebe, *Geschichte Roms in seinem Übergange von den republikanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung*, Bd 3, Leipzig 1906, 628, 696, 698; Bd 4, Leipzig 1908, 13; B. Szubelak, *Rzymska*

under Caesar's command in Gaul³⁷. After the outbreak of the civil war, in 49, he was a legate. He also commanded the military operations of the fleet during the siege of Massalia³⁸. In the years 48–46, presumably as a propraetor, he governed, on Caesar's behalf, Narbonese Gaul. He also commanded the troops stationed there³⁹. In 45, he probably held the post of a praetor, and in 44, as a proconsul, he governed Cisalpine Gaul⁴⁰.

There are also hardly any doubts concerning C. Trebonius, another outstanding Caesarian taking part in the conspiracy levelled against the great leader, which is unequivocally confirmed by ancient authors⁴¹. Also modern scholars, for example H. Geremek, J. P. V. D. Balsdon, H. Bengtson, R. Étienne, R. H. Storch, or M. Jehne, are unanimous on this point⁴². In 55, while holding the office of the tribune of the people, he cooperated closely with the triumvirs. At that time, he passed the law giving the Spanish provinces to Pompey for 5 years, and Syria to M. Licinius Crassus for the same period⁴³. Since 54, he served in Gaul under

a barbarzyńska flota w bitwie pod Quiberon w 56 r. p.n.e., [in] *Morze w imperium Rzymu*, ed. J. Jundziłł, Bydgoszcz 1993, 33–36.

³⁷ Caes., *BG* VII 9, 2; 87, 1; *MRR*, 2, 239; 3, 112.

³⁸ Caes., *BC* I 36, 5; 56, 1–58, 5; II 1–7; 22; Liv., *Per.* CX; Luc. III 509–762; Flor. II 13, 25; Cass. Dio XLI 19; 21, 3; B. Schleussner, *Die Legaten der römischen Republik*, München 1978, 238; *MRR*, 2, 267; 3, 112–113. A description of the military operations during the siege of Massalia is to be found in: M. Clerc, *La bataille navale de Tauroentum*, [in] *Mélanges G. Perrot*, Paris 1903, 45–51; E. Davin, *Un bimillénaire: le combat naval de Tauroentum (49 avant J.C.)*, „Bulletin de l'Assoc. G. Bude”, 1952, 70–83; I. Opelt, *Die Seeschlacht vor Massalia bei Lucan*, „Hermes”, 85, 1957, 435–445; T. Łoposzko, *Starożytne bitwy morskie*, Gdańsk 1992, 355–358; B. Szubelak, *Aspekt wojenno-morski działalności cesarian pod Massalią w 49 r. p.n.e.*, [in] *Morze w kulturze starożytnych Greków i Rzymian*, ed. J. Rostropowicz, Opole 1995, 261–265. See also N. Rogosz, *Polityczno-strategiczne aspekty działań morskich w pierwszym okresie drugiej wojny domowej (marzec–kwiecień 49 r. p.n.e.)*, [in] *Morze w kulturze starożytnych Greków i Rzymian*, ed. J. Rostropowicz, Opole 1995, 247, 253–254.

³⁹ Liv., *Per.* CXIV; App., *BC* II 48, 197; Drumann, Groebe, *op. cit.*, Bd 3, 1906, 698; Bd 4, 14; W. Feemster Jashemski, *The Origins and History of the Proconsular and the Proprietarian Imperium to 27 BC*, Chicago 1950, 144; *MRR*, 2, 281, 291, 301; 3, 112–113. According to M. Crawford (RRC I, 466–467, no 450–451) he was in 48 in Rome, and he governed Narbonese Gaul in the years 47–46.

⁴⁰ *MRR*, 2, 307, 328–329; 3, 113. See also: Drumann, Groebe, *op. cit.*, Bd 3, 698; Bd 4, 14; Feemster Jashemski, *op. cit.*, 150; Étienne, *op. cit.*, 154.

⁴¹ Cic., *fam.* XII 16, 4; *Phil.* II 11, 27; Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; Plut., *Brut.* 17, 1; App., *BC* II 113, 474; Cass. Dio XLIV 14, 3–4.

⁴² Geremek, *op. cit.*, 307; Balsdon, *op. cit.*, 82; Bengtson, *op. cit.*, 17; Étienne, *op. cit.*, 154–156; Storch, *op. cit.*, 48; Jehne, *Die Ermordung...*, 42, see also: Clarke, *op. cit.*, 39.

⁴³ Cic., *Att.* IV 9, 1; Liv., *Per.* CV; Vell. Pat. II 46, 2; Plut., *Pomp.* 52, 3; *Crass.* 15, 5; *Cat. Min.* 43, 1; Cass. Dio XXXIX 33, 36; *MRR*, 2, 217; 3, 207. On Trebonius: F. Münzer, *C. Trebonius* 6, [in] *RE* II 12 (1937), 2274–2282. The basis data concerning his tribunate are in G. Niccolini, *I fasti dei tribuni della plebe*, Milan 1934, 309–310; P. J. J. Vanderbroeck, *Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior in the Late Roman Republic (ca 80 – 50 BC)*, Amsterdam 1987, 207; L. Thommen, *Das Volkstribunat der späten römischen Republik*, Stuttgart 1989 (Historia Einzelschriften 59), 101–102; N. Rogosz, *Polityczna rola senatu w Republice Rzymskiej w latach 59–55*, Katowice

Caesar's command, as a legate⁴⁴. After the outbreak of the civil war in 49, he commanded the siege of Massalia⁴⁵. In the next year, he held the post of the urban praetor in Rome⁴⁶, and, in the years 47–46, he governed, on Caesar's behalf, the province of Hispania Ulterior. In the years 46–45, he again fulfilled the duties of his legate⁴⁷. In the last year (45), he became a deputy consul⁴⁸.

Also another conspirator, L. Minutius Basilius, was linked with Caesar. Appian confirms it, and so do many modern scholars, e.g. H. Geremek, R. Étienne, S. L. Utczenko, R. H. Storch, or M. Jehne⁴⁹. In 55, he probably obtained the post of a quaestor. In 53, he became Caesar's legate, which he continued to be until 48, when Caesar honoured him with the post of a camp prefect⁵⁰. In 45, he became a praetor⁵¹.

It is possible that another Caesarian, who participated in the conspiracy, namely L. Tillius Cimber, also took up this post. He is counted among the conspirators by ancient authors and modern historians, such as H. Geremek, R. Étienne, S. L. Utczenko or R. H. Storch⁵².

Also C. Servilius Casca, another conspirator known for his participation in the events that took place in Pompey's Curia on the Ides of March, was, according to ancient historians, and modern scholars, such as H. Geremek, J. P. V. D. Baldson, H. Gugel, H. Bengtson and S. L. Utczenko, a Caesarian. In 44, however, he only reached the rank of the tribune of the people⁵³. In comparison with the

2004, 300–302. On the subject of lex Trebonia read G. Rotondi, *Leges publicae populi Romani*, Hildesheim 1962, 408.

⁴⁴ Cic., *Q. fr.* III 1, 9; Caes., *BG* V 17, 2; 24, 3; VI 33; 40, 4; VII 11, 2; 81, 6; Hirt., *BG* VIII 6, 1; 11, 1; 14, 1; 46, 4; 54, 4; B. Bartsch, *Die Legaten der römischen Republik vom Tode Sullas bis zum Ausbruche des zweiten Bürgerkrieges*, Breslau 1908, 48–49; *MRR*, 2, 226, 232, 239, 245, 253; Schleussner, *op. cit.*, 236.

⁴⁵ Cic., *Att.* VIII 3, 7; Caes., *BC* I 36, 4; II 1–16; 22; Liv., *Per.* CX; Cass. Dio XLI 19, 3; Oros. VI 15, 6; *MRR*, 2, 269–270. See the literature quoted in note 38.

⁴⁶ *MRR*, 2, 273–274.

⁴⁷ Cic., *fam.* XV 20; 21; *Phil.* II 14, 34; Inc. Auct., *Bell. Alex.* 64, 2; *Bell. Hisp.* 7, 4; 12, 2; Plut., *Ant.* 13, 1–2; Cass. Dio XLIII 29, 3; Bartsch, *op. cit.*, 49; Feemster Jashemski, *op. cit.*, 127; *MRR*, 2, 289–299; Schleussner, *op. cit.*, 236.

⁴⁸ Cic., *Phil.* XI 2, 5; Vell. Pat. II 69, 1; Suet., *Iul.* 76, 2; Cass. Dio XLIII 46, 2; *MRR*, 2, 305.

⁴⁹ App., *BC* II 113, 474; Geremek, *op. cit.*, 307; Étienne, *op. cit.*, 153–154; Utczenko, *op. cit.*, 387; Storch, *op. cit.*, 48; Jehne, *Die Ermordung...*, 38.

⁵⁰ Bartsch, *op. cit.*, 56; *MRR*, 2, 217, 231, 239, 244, 253, 268, 282, 592; 3, 143.

⁵¹ *MRR*, 2, 307; 3, 143.

⁵² Cic., *Phil.* II 11, 27; Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24; Suet., *Iul.* 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 66, 3–4; *Brut.* 17, 2; App., *BC* II 113, 474; 117, 491; Geremek, *op. cit.*, 307; Gugel, *op. cit.*, 15–16; Étienne, *op. cit.*, 156; Utczenko, *op. cit.*, 387; Storch, *op. cit.*, 48. The data concerning the Cimber's possible praetorship in 45 are in F. Münzer, *L. Tillius Cimber* 5, [in] *RE* II 11 (1936), 1039; *MRR*, 2, 307; 3, 205.

⁵³ Cic., *Phil.* II 11, 27; Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24; Suet., *Iul.* 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 66, 4; *Brut.* 17, 2–3; App., *BC* II 17, 492; Geremek, *op. cit.*, 307; Baldson, *op. cit.*, 85; Gugel, *op. cit.*, 16; Bengtson, *op. cit.*, 15; Étienne, *op. cit.*, 156; Utczenko, 387. Basic facts concerning his tribunate are provided by Niccolini, *op. cit.*, 346ff; *MRR*, 2, 325; 3, 194–195; Thommen, *op. cit.*, 262.

already mentioned supporters of the murdered dictator, he belonged to a younger generation of politicians. The same is true of his brother, P. Servilius Casca, who did not hold this post until the year 43⁵⁴.

Servius Sulpicius Galba, yet another participant in the Ides of March in 44, was not regarded by Appian as one of the Caesarians, but rather as a member of the group of politicians gathered around M. Iunius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus. He is, however, associated with Caesar by modern historians, such as R. Étienne, S. L. Utczenko, or L. Hayne⁵⁵. He was indeed connected with Caesar for a long time. In the years 58–56, he held the post of a legate. In 54, he took up the rank of the praetor⁵⁶. He ran even, as Caesar's protégé, for the consulate for year 49, but without success⁵⁷. Later their paths diverged, so that he even became connected with the circles of politicians formed around the best known of Caesar's murderers.

We do not know any other Caesarians taking part in the conspiracy against him. It cannot be excluded that there were more of them⁵⁸, but they were not recorded in the ancient texts.

An important, but also controversial, problem is what could induce the Caesarians to participate in the murder of their protector.

It is assumed that they put an end to Caesar's life because they thought this was the only way to prevent him from accepting the royal title, and thus to protect Rome from the liquidation of the Republic⁵⁹. Even if this explanation sounds

⁵⁴ Cic., *Phil.* II 11, 27; Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24; Suet., *Iul.* 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 66, 4; Étienne, *op. cit.*, 156; Utczenko, *op. cit.*, 387; Storch, *op. cit.*, 48. On his tribunate read in Niccolini, *op. cit.*, 354ff; *MRR*, 2, 340; 3, 194–195; Thommen, *op. cit.*, 262.

⁵⁵ App., *BC* II 113, 474. Other ancient authors do not mention Galba in connection with the Ides of March, 44. As for the opinions of modern authors, see Étienne, *op. cit.*, 156; Utczenko, *op. cit.*, 387; Hayne, *op. cit.*, 36.

⁵⁶ Bartsch, *op. cit.*, 44–45; Schleussner, *op. cit.*, 237; *MRR*, 2, 199, 205, 212; 3, 201; F. C. Brennan, *The Praetorship in the Roman Republic*, vol. 1–2, Oxford 2000, 755.

⁵⁷ Hirt., *BG* VIII 50, 4; A. Neuendorff, *Die römischen Consulwahlen von 78–49 v. Chr.*, Breslau 1913, 77–78; J. Linderski, *Rzymskie zgromadzenie wyborcze od Sulli do Cezara*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1966, 154; A. Yakobson, *Elections and Electionnering in Rome. A Study in the Political System of the Late Republic*, Stuttgart 1999 (*Historia Einzelschriften* 128), 176. See also N. Rogosz, *Geneza wojny domowej lat 49–48 a jej ujęcie w relacji Aulusa Hircjusza*, „*Historia i Współczesność*”, 6, ed. A. Kunisz, Katowice 1982, 11, 18–19.

⁵⁸ Such a conclusion can be drawn from the fact that the number of the conspirators is estimated at 60 (Suet., *Iul.* 80, 3), or even 80 (Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19) persons. Appian's account (*BC* II 113, 474–114, 475), on the other hand, may lead to the suggestion that there need not have been more Caesarians among them. See also: Utczenko, *op. cit.*, 386–387; Gesche, *op. cit.*, 172; Christ, *op. cit.*, 390–392; Cary, Scullard, *op. cit.*, 551; Baltrusch, *op. cit.*, 158, 160.

⁵⁹ This opinion is based on the information provided by relatively numerous sources: Cic., *Att.* XIV 14, 2; *fam.* XI 8, 1; XII 1, 1; *Phil.* II 11, 26–27; Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 20–21; Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Suet., *Iul.* 79; Plut., *Caes.* 60, 1–61, 5; App., *BC* II 107, 444–447; 108–110; 113; Cass. Dio XLIV 1–11. For somewhat different suggestions of the ancient authors on this point read: Cic.,

convincing with regard to the conspirators who were not connected with Caesar, such as M. Iunius Brutus or C. Cassius Longinus, it can hardly be accepted in relation to his collaborators and the motives that induced them to murder Caesar. The question arises whether the Caesarians who took part in the plot wanted to save the Republic, why then they accepted and supported him for quite a few years, making it easier for him to consolidate his position in the state, to start the civil war in 49, and, later, to establish the autocratic rule? It can, naturally, be assumed that they supported Caesar as long as he did not overstep a certain limit. When it became clear that he intended to overthrow the republican form of government, they decided to turn against him. This is also the opinion that, for example, L. Piotrowicz and A. Ziółkowski endorse⁶⁰.

This line of thinking is hardly acceptable, however. We would have then to assume that the Caesarians, who took part in the plot against Caesar, were idealists who acted to their own detriment, for, having turned against their protector, they put at risk everything they gained owing to their links with him. The information we have does not confirm such a hypothesis. On the contrary, we know that they derived many real, particularly political, benefits from their cooperation with Caesar, and they counted on more⁶¹. By analogy with the above, we can suggest that, in deciding to turn against him, they had new profits in view, perhaps greater ones than those which they had enjoyed so far. Such a motive could affect their behaviour especially if they thought that Caesar had disappointed their hopes⁶².

There are certain facts which confirm our doubts concerning the motives of the Caesarians participating in the conspiracy against Caesar. For example, in 45, C. Trebonius tried to win round M. Antonius and make him join the conspiracy,

fam. XI 2, 3; Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; 57, 1; Suet., *Iul.* 76–78; Plut., *Caes.* 57, 2–3; App., *BC* II 106. Cf. Meyer, *op. cit.*, 444–472; Piotrowicz, *op. cit.*, 475; Utczenko, *op. cit.*, 377–386; Jaczynowska, *op. cit.*, 170; Ziółkowski, *op. cit.*, 354. M. Cary and H. H. Scullard (*op. cit.*, 549–550) deny Caesar's intention to accept the king's title. See also M. E. Deutsch, *I am Caesar, not Rex*, CPh, 23, 1928, 394–398; W. Allen, *Caesar's Regnum* (*Suet., Iul.* 9, 2), TAPhA, 84, 1953, 227–236; D. Schlinkert, *Den Sieger ehren. Der Diktator Caesar und der Senat nach Pharsalos*, [in] *Althistorisches Kolloquium aus Anlaß des 70. Geburtstages von J. Bleicken 29–30 November 1996 in Göttingen*, ed. T. Hantos, G. A. Lehmann, Stuttgart 1998, 153–186.

⁶⁰ Piotrowicz, *op. cit.*, 475; Ziółkowski, *op. cit.*, 354. Other scholars, e.g. M. Cary and H. H. Scullard (*op. cit.*, 551), or M. Jaczynowska (*op. cit.*, 170), see this matter differently.

⁶¹ This conclusion is strongly confirmed by the facts concerning the careers of some of them, e.g. D. Brutus, or C. Trebonius. They were to derive further benefits from the posts to which they were appointed for the coming years (D. Brutus): *MRR*, 2, 576, 627; 3, 112–113, 207.

⁶² We have no information concerning their hopes for any benefits resulting from their joining the conspiracy. The possibility, however, that Caesar might have disappointed the expectations of some of his collaborators is indicated by Nicholas of Damascus (*Vit. Caes.* 19). There is a similar case concerning, however, M. Brutus and C. Cassius. See, in this light Vell. Pat. II 56, 3 and App., *BC* II 112, 466–467.

but without success⁶³. This shows that some of them intended to get rid of Caesar even before it became clear that he was going to accept the royal title. Thus it can hardly be assumed that the republican ideals were the only reason that could induce the Caesarians to turn against their leader. Our line of thinking is confirmed by yet other pieces of information which show the motives of the conspirators in a different light.

For example, Serv. Sulpicius Galba, who at the end of the fifties belonged to Caesar's most trusted collaborators⁶⁴, was claimed by Suetonius that he joined the conspiracy organized by M. Iunius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus because he bore a grudge to his protector for having failed to support him vigorously enough when he tried to get the office of the consul for 49. As a result he lost the consular election in the year 50⁶⁵. L. Tillius Cimber, on his part, had an exiled brother⁶⁶, and it cannot be excluded that he felt deep resentment towards Caesar for his having sustained the guilty verdict, and for having failed to allow the exile's return.

The reason why some of the Caesarians joined the conspirators could be unfulfilled political ambitions⁶⁷. The benefits they received for supporting Caesar and collaborating with him may have fallen far short of their expectations. As a result, some of them could have drawn the conclusion that their careers were developing too slowly. Some of Caesar's collaborators may have grown increasingly bitter seeing that they had lost the competition for various posts and ranks⁶⁸. All this could have fed their feeling of having been subject to unfair treatment, and aroused their desire to get even with their protector, whom they no doubt held responsible for this state of affairs.

Also Caesar's personnel policy, particularly his decisions concerning the filling of the government posts with his collaborators, could affect the conspirators' determination to take part in the attempt against Caesar's life. It is well known that, in the last years of his life, he had great influence over these matters⁶⁹. As

⁶³ Cic., *Phil.* II 14, 34; Plut., *Ant.* 13, 1–2; Balsdon, *op. cit.*, 82; J. F. C. Fuller, *Julius Caesar. Man, Soldier and Tyrant*, London 1965, 303; Bengtson, *op. cit.*, 15.

⁶⁴ This is borne out by Caesar's appointing him as a candidate for the consulate in 49: Hirt., *BG VIII* 50, 4. See also the literature quoted in note 57.

⁶⁵ Suet., *Galb.* 3, 2; Étienne, *op. cit.*, 156. See also Neudendorff, *op. cit.*, 77–78; Linderski, *op. cit.*, 154; Jakobson, *op. cit.*, 176.

⁶⁶ Suet., *Iul.* 82, 1. See also Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24.

⁶⁷ See, in this light, the information provided by Nicholas of Damascus: *Vit. Caes.* 19.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*. This opinion is also confirmed by the data included in Velleius Paterculus' account (II 56, 3) concerning M. Brutus and C. Cassius after Caesar's decision to appoint the former to the consulate, and the delay of the latter's appointment.

⁶⁹ Suet., *Iul.* 41, 2; 79, 1–3; Plut., *Caes.* 57, 3; 58, 1; 62, 1–2. See also: Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; App., *BC II* 107, 447–448; 112, 466–467; Gelzer, *Caesar...*, 286–288; Carcopino, *op. cit.*, 482–485; Dahlheim, *op. cit.*, 161, 163, 169–170.

a result, hardly anything happened in Rome without his knowledge and connivance. This meant that he decided also about the course of the careers of the politicians collaborating with him. Unfortunately, his priorities in filling the important posts not always corresponded to their expectations and ambitions⁷⁰. This could have bred, among the Caesarians, conflicts, friction, and dissatisfaction with Caesar's policy. In some cases, this could have been enough to make them join the conspiracy.

Similar results could have been brought about by other factors. While analysing Caesar's milieu in the last years of his life, we notice that among the politicians that were the closest to him there were some who started to cooperate with him relatively late. For example, M. Antonius showed himself as an active collaborator only at the end of the year 50, when he took up the post of the tribune of the people⁷¹, while M. Aemilius Lepidus made himself known only at the time of the civil war⁷². In spite of this, they both held key offices in the state towards the end of the dictator's life. At the same time, C. Trebonius and D. Brutus, who joined up with Caesar much earlier, were not promoted to such high ranks⁷³. Naturally, also they were appointed by Caesar to various posts, but of smaller importance. In comparison with M. Antonius and M. Lepidus, they were pushed into the background⁷⁴, and this situation could have been the source of tension and disaffection especially because C. Trebonius and D. Brutus belonged to the so called „old guard". It is probable that this was the reason why they both joined the conspiracy, even though we can have no certainty on this point.

Following Velleius Paterculus, we may suggest that the motive that could push some of the Caesarians to cooperation with the conspirators was ingratitude⁷⁵. It cannot be excluded that C. Trebonius, and perhaps also other Caesarians who turned against their protector, were motivated, at least in a certain degree, by a desire to

⁷⁰ Indirectly this is confirmed by the information provided by Velleius Paterculus (II 56, 3) and Appian (*BC* II 112, 466–467) referring, however, to M. Brutus and C. Cassius, who also were dissatisfied with Caesar's decisions concerning these matters.

⁷¹ Hirt., *BG* VIII 50, 1–4; Caes., *BC* I 1, 1; 2, 7–8; 5, 1–5; 7, 2–5; 8, 1; Liv., *Per.* CX; Suet., *Iul.* 31, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 30, 2; App., *BC* II 33, 130–133; Cass. Dio XLI 1, 2–3; 2, 3; *MRR*, 2, 258; 3, 20. See also: Nicolini, *op. cit.*, 329–335; Vanderbroeck, *op. cit.*, 199–200; Thommen, *op. cit.*, 126, 171, 178, 205, 215. More extensive comments in Rogosz, *Geneza...*, 11, 19, 22; Idem, *Stanowisko senatu wobec rywalizacji Pompejusza z Cezarem (I XII 50 r. – II I 49 r. p.n.e.)*, [in] *Rzym antyczny. Polityka i pieniądz*, t. 2, red. A. Kunisz, Katowice 1997, 16–18, 24–36.

⁷² Basic information on this subject in *MRR*, 2, 257, 275, 288, 293–295, 300, 318–319; 3, 7–8.

⁷³ See the data concerning the careers of M. Antonius, M. Aemilius Lepidus, C. Trebonius, and D. Brutus: *MRR*, 2, 527, 531, 576, 627.

⁷⁴ This is borne out, for instance, by a comparison of their careers with the achievements of Antonius and Lepidus during the last years of Caesar's life, for example, from 49 to 44 inclusive. See also the literature quoted in n.73.

⁷⁵ Vell. Pat. II 57, 1. Cf. II 56, 3; Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19; App., *BC* II 112, 469.

achieve fame, the fame of tyrannicides, who liberated Rome from a tyrant, from a royal power, and granted the Romans freedom⁷⁶.

A matter that deserves particular attention is the role of the Caesarians in the plot organised against Caesar, and particularly in the attempt on March 15, 44. On the basis of some information provided by ancient historians, we may conclude that there were the senators who had close links with the murdered dictator, and who greatly influenced the course of events decisively contributing to the conspirators' success⁷⁷. We may look at various aspects of their contribution. Appian, for example, indicates that the organizers of the conspiracy, that is M. Iunius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus were looking for courageous politicians among the Caesarians. From his further line of argument, and from the facts gleaned from other ancient authors, it follows that they were looking in this group for allies with a strong position, and thus capable of influencing Caesar's decision and behaviour⁷⁸. They sought then to win over such individuals who might prove, in various ways, useful during the attempt. The best, from their point of view, candidates for cooperation were the closest collaborators of the dictator⁷⁹, that is people who had free access to him. Thus it seems that the two inspirators of the attempt were looking, among the Caesarians, for the politicians who could provide the necessary information needed to organize the whole undertaking, and to carry out some essential tasks, such as guiding the conspirators, and leading them up to Caesar without attracting the attention of the people around. If these suggestions are correct, the chosen Caesarians were supposed to guarantee the success of the venture.

This hypothesis is compatible with some other facts included in ancient texts. For example, the author of the periochs (passages) of Livy's work, apart from M. Brutus, and C. Cassius, enumerated, among the leaders of the plot against Caesar, also D. Brutus and C. Trebonius⁸⁰. Also Suetonius ascribed to D. Brutus

⁷⁶ Cic., *fam.* XII 16, 4. See also in this context *Att.* XIV 14, 2; 21, 3; *fam.* XI 2, 3; 8, 1; XII 1, 1; *Phil.* II 11, 27.

⁷⁷ App., *BC* II 113, 473–474. Cf. Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; Suet., *Iul.* 80, 4; 81, 4; 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 64, 1–4; 66, 3–4; *Brut.* 17, 1; App., *BC* II 111, 464; 115, 481; 117, 490–492; Cass. Dio XLIV 18–19; Gugel, *op. cit.*, 13–16; Clarke, *op. cit.*, 38–39; Jehne, *Die Ermordung...*, 43–44; Baltrusch, *op. cit.*, 166–169.

⁷⁸ See in this light Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; App., *BC* II 113, 473; 115, 481. See also Suet., *Iul.* 81, 4; Plut., *Caes.* 64, 1–4. This was also, for example, a characteristic of D. Brutus. See in this context Fuller, *op. cit.*, 304–305; Gugel, *op. cit.*, 13–14; Bengtson, *op. cit.*, 16; Clarke, *op. cit.*, 38–39; Jehne, *Die Ermordung...*, 43–44; Baltrusch, *op. cit.*, 166–169.

⁷⁹ App., *BC* II 111, 473–474. Cf. Liv., *Per.* CXVI; Vell. Pat. II 56, 3; Suet., *Iul.* 83, 2; Plut., *Caes.* 64, 1.

⁸⁰ Liv., *Per.* CXVI. Their role among the conspirators has also been perceived in a similar way by M. Cary and H. H. Scullard (*op. cit.*, 551).

a similar role among the conspirators⁸¹. Velleius Paterculus, on the other hand, while writing about the Caesarians taking part in the plot, emphasised that they were Caesar's friends elevated to the top of the state's hierarchy⁸². He probably had in mind D. Brutus and C. Trebonius, as they both in 44 took up relatively high ranks⁸³. Owing to their links with the dictator and their social position and influence, they had a wide range of possibilities. Of no small importance was the fact that Caesar trusted them. It is very telling that he counted D. Brutus among the inheritors⁸⁴. Such allies were particularly appreciated by the organizers of the conspiracy. That this opinion is not exaggerated is showed by the intense activity of D. Brutus, C. Trebonius, and the other Caesarians cooperating with them, both before and during the attempt against Caesar.

D. Brutus, for example, prepared a unit of gladiators and placed them near the planned place of the attempt, in Pompey's theatre, where celebrations were then taking place in honour of Anna Perenna⁸⁵. According to D. Słapek, those gladiators were an asset that helped to draw D. Brutus into the conspiracy against Caesar. Apparently they were supposed to guarantee safety of the conspirators should the events fail to unfold as expected. This suggestion seems to be confirmed by the fact that the gladiators were used exactly in this capacity after the murder of Caesar (which T. Łoposzko notices), when, as a result of the crowd's inimical disposition, the conspirators were forced to retreat to Capitol⁸⁶. Thus, it cannot be excluded that D. Brutus was charged with the task of guaranteeing the conspirators the necessary protection.

It is owing to D. Brutus that the attempt against Caesar could at all take place. It is well known that, having observed many unpropitious portents, the dictator, under the influence of his wife, intended to stay at home on March 15, 44. The session of the Senate called for that day he ordered to cancel⁸⁷. If these decisions were maintained the conspirators' intentions might never become a reality. It was then D. Brutus' great „merit” (as both ancient authors and modern scholars emphasise, e.g. H. Gugel, M. L. Clarke, or E. Baltrusch) that he managed to make

⁸¹ Suet., *Iul.* 80, 4. Also E. Baltrusch takes a similar view on the position of D. Brutus among the conspirators (*op. cit.*, 166–167).

⁸² Vell. Pat. II 56, 3. See also: Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 19.

⁸³ *MRR*, 2, 576, 627. In this respect they were second only to Antonius and Lepidus. See the text on pp. 3–4 and the note 73.

⁸⁴ Suet., *Iul.* 83, 2; Plut., *Caes.* 64, 1. Cf. Vell. Pat. II 56, 3.

⁸⁵ Plut., *Brut.* 12, 4–5; App., *BC* II 115, 481. More on this question can be found in D. Słapek, *Gladiatorzy i polityka. Igrzyska w okresie późnej Republiki Rzymskiej*, Wrocław 1995, 98, 174–175.

⁸⁶ App., *BC* II 120, 503; Łoposzko, *Historia...*, 319–320; Słapek, *op. cit.*, 175.

⁸⁷ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 23; Suet., *Iul.* 81, 1–4; Plut., *Caes.* 63, 1–7; App., *BC* II 115, 480–481; Cass. Dio XLIV 17, 1–18, 1.

Caesar change the already given orders, and join the senators waiting for him in Pompey's Curia⁸⁸. Caesar's coming to the venue of the Senate's sessions, as a result of D. Brutus' intervention, made it possible then for the conspirators to realise their intentions, albeit with a delay.

Also Plutarch, in his life of Caesar, made D. Brutus responsible for retaining M. Antonius in front of the Senate hall⁸⁹. Consequently, the dictator entered Pompey's Curia without his closest, and the most important at that time, collaborator⁹⁰, which made the conspirators' task much easier. In fact, however, this mission was probably entrusted not to D. Brutus, but rather to C. Trebonius, as Plutarch informs us in his biography of M. Brutus⁹¹. This is also confirmed by Appian and Cassius Dion⁹². It is possible that Trebonius himself made an allusion to this deed in his letter written to M. Tullius Cicero, where he expressed his hope that the latter would appropriately evaluate his role in the attempt against Caesar in a dialogue referring to that important and well-known event⁹³.

It follows from the ancient sources that the Caesarians taking part in the conspiracy enabled their colleagues to approach Caesar in the hall of the sessions⁹⁴. Owing to the connections between the senators belonging to the conspiracy and Caesar, their approaching him looked as if they intended to form a honorary procession around Caesar. They made it also easier for the conspirators to get into a direct contact with the dictator. As many modern historians note, e.g. H. Gugel, M. Jehne or E. Baltrusch, they took advantage of the fact that one of the Caesarians, L. Tillius Cimber, had an exiled brother and wanted to ask for that brother's reprieve⁹⁵. The circumstance then that the senators accompanying the supplicant approached Caesar did not awake suspicion, and probably was interpreted as an attempt to add weight to Cimber's request, or to exert a pressure on the dictator.

L. Tillius Cimber gave also the word to his accomplices to attack Caesar, which the ancient authors and modern researchers unanimously accentuate, when, after

⁸⁸ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 23; Suet., *Iul.* 81, 4; Plut., *Caes.* 64, 1–4; App., *BC II* 115, 481; Cass. Dio XLIV 18, 2; Gugel, *op. cit.*, 13–14; Clarke, *op. cit.*, 38; Baltrusch, *op. cit.*, 168–169.

⁸⁹ Plut., *Caes.* 66, 3.

⁹⁰ This is borne out by the offices taken up by Antonius, with Caesar's approval, in the last years of the latter's life (*MRR*, 2, 258, 260, 272, 286–287, 295, 315–316, 531) and particularly Antonius' role in the dictator's, very important from his point of view, efforts to attain the king title and the power connected with it: Suet., *Iul.* 79, 3; Plut., *Caes.* 61, 1–4; *Ant.* 8; 12.

⁹¹ Plut., *Brut.* 17, 1.

⁹² App., *BC II* 117, 490; Cass. Dio XLIV 19, 1; 3; Balsdon, *op. cit.*, 82; Fuller, *op. cit.*, 305; Jehne, *Die Ermordung...*, 44.

⁹³ Cic., *fam.* XII 16, 4.

⁹⁴ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24; Suet., *Iul.* 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 66, 3; App., *BC II* 117, 490.

⁹⁵ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24; Suet., *Iul.* 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 66, 3; *Brut.* 17, 2; App., *BC II* 117, 490; Cass. Dio XLIV 19, 4. Cf. Gugel, *op. cit.*, 15–16; Jehne, *Die Ermordung...*, 44; Baltrusch, *op. cit.*, 169.

Caesar's refusal, he made the gesture, previously agreed upon with the other plotters, of pulling down the dictator's toga⁹⁶. This was the signal to another Caesarian, P. Servilius Casca, to give Caesar, in keeping with the previously established plan of the attempt, the first blow with a dagger⁹⁷. After that blow, others, delivered by the other assassins, followed, which led to taking Caesar's life⁹⁸. It may be suggested that the Caesarians taking part in the plot, of course together with the other assassins, caused panic among the senators gathered in the hall. What happened in front of Pompey's monument, where Caesar was murdered, looked like a blood feud between the dictator and his closest collaborators, and made most of the participants in the session flee from the place⁹⁹. As a result, the conspirators, but, above all, the Caesarians among them, prevented M. Iunius Brutus from delivering a speech to the politicians gathered there, and from obtaining a support of the senate for the accomplished deed¹⁰⁰. This led to the situation in the capital slipping out of control. Consequently, the assassins had to rely once again on the services of D. Brutus, who, thanks to the gladiators gathered in Pompey's theatre, enabled the assassins to leave safely the place of the attempt and to move to Capitol¹⁰¹.

The sources used in the present article indicate that the ancient authors, writing about the attempt on Caesar's life on March 15, highlighted, apart from the main organisers, that is, M. Iunius Brutus and C. Cassius Longinus, also those among the participants who were supporters and, at the same time, close collaborators of the murdered personality, that is, the Caesarians. Consequently, we know practically nothing, apart from the names of some of them, about the actions of other conspirators. This state of affairs is not accidental, for the Caesarians were the most active members of the conspiracy. In this respect, they were superior to the other plotters, even though – as can be supposed – they were clearly a minority among them¹⁰². Some of those Caesarians played, in the course

⁹⁶ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24; Suet., *Iul.* 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 66, 3–4; *Brut.* 17, 2; App., *BC* II 117, 490–491; Cass. Dio XLIV 19, 4–5. See the literature quoted in note 95.

⁹⁷ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24; Suet., *Iul.* 82, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 66, 3–4; *Brut.* 17, 2; App., *BC* II 117, 492; Cass. Dio XLIV 19, 5.

⁹⁸ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 24; Liv., *Per.* XCVI; Suet., *Iul.* 82, 2; Plut., *Caes.* 66, 5; *Brut.* 17, 3–4; App., *BC* II 117, 493; Cass. Dio XLIV 19, 5.

⁹⁹ Nic. Dam., *Vit. Caes.* 25; Suet., *Iul.* 82, 3; Plut., *Caes.* 66, 5; App., *BC* II 118, 494; Cass. Dio XLIV 20.

¹⁰⁰ Plut., *Caes.* 67, 1; *Brut.* 18,1. Cf. App., *BC* II 119, 499.

¹⁰¹ Vell. Pat. II 58, 1; Plut., *Caes.* 67, 2; App., *BC* II 120, 503; Cass. Dio XLIV 21,1–2; Łoposzko, *Historia...*, 320.

¹⁰² We know seven of them (cf. above). However, it is assumed that there were about ten (Suet., *Iul.* 80, 3), to twelve times more (Nic. Dam. *Vit. Caes.* 19) senators who participated in the conspiracy aimed at Caesar. See, for example Jehne, *Die Ermordung...*, 41; Baltrusch, *op. cit.*, 158, 160. Some historians, however, (e.g. Utczenko, *op. cit.*, 386–387; Cary, Scullard, *op. cit.*, 551) suggest that the Caesarians constituted a majority among the conspirators, even though they do not mention any others apart from the ones already mentioned in the present article and in the studies quoted here.

of the attempt, and in the preparations to it, important, or even crucial, roles. In the light of the above, the supporters of the murdered dictator taking part in the Ides of March, as described in the present study, must be perceived as the most important participants in these events. The ancient authors' interest in them and their actions was also caused by the fact that the participation of the Caesarians in the whole affair was a sensation of the first degree. It meant that those who contributed the most to Caesar's murder were his friends, and also close political collaborators.