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Retoryka ciała i umysłu w XXI wieku
Rhetoric of body and mind in the 21st century

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The doxastic body: Embodying ideological orientations
Ciało doksastyczne: ucieleśnienie orientacji ideologicznych

Abstract

While thoroughly theorized in rhetorical studies, the body primarily is understood as or through text. Following a literature review of the body in rhetorical scholarship, this article argues that the situated, concrete body is integral to ideological identity through its function as doxastic warrant in enthymematical argumentation. The article finally outlines a rhetorical-ethnographic orientation for investigating the points of expression for a *doxastic body* of a specific field.

Choć ciało podlega dogłębnej analizie w studiach retorycznych, rozumiane jest przede wszystkim jako tekst lub poprzez tekst. Po dokonaniu przeglądu literatury na temat ciała w badaniach retorycznych, niniejszy artykuł dowodzi, że umiejscowione, konkretne ciało jest integralną częścią tożsamości ideologicznej poprzez swoją funkcję doksastycznego dowodu w argumentacji entymematycznej. Artykuł nakreśla retoryczno-etnograficzną perspektywę w badaniu punktów ekspresji *doksastycznego ciała* w konkretnej dziedzinie.

Key words

doxastic body, ideology, fieldwork, embodiment, delivery
ciało doksastyczne, ideologia, badania terenowe, ucieleśnienie, wygłoszenie

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The doxastic body: Embodying ideological orientations

Rhetorical orientations

> [P]ower works as a mode of directionality, a way of orientating bodies in particular ways, so they are facing a certain way, heading toward a future that is given a face – Sara Ahmed (2017, 43).

> [T]he body is also directly involved in a political field; power relations have an immediate hold upon it – Michel Foucault (1982, 25).

As I enter the lobby of the Danish libertarian think tank CEPOS[1] *to take part in their spring 2023 semester academy, I leave my winter coat on a hanger and continue down the narrow hallway towards the conference room. Something changes as I get closer. The thumping of an insisting bass keeps getting more and more intense, stopping just short of being viscerally present as chest vibrations, as I reach the conference room. From the sound blasting from the speakers, I discern the fast, loud voice of a Danish rapper spouting lyrics such as "Chemicals in the blood stream, that's satisfaction / And so my mini me wants a massage.*[2]*" In the low-ceilinged room dominated by wooden panels, blue chairs, and a dull wall-to--wall carpet, the students, half-shoutingly, are engaged in vigorous conversations and debates with a fluttering of gesturing arms and eager head nods. Later, this same tension and volume is evident in the students' asking and answering questions during the lectures, as they lean forward on their chairs, brows and voices raised, gesturing directly toward the lecturer. During intermissions, both students and lecturers sometimes mockingly portray perceived political adversaries such as the "woke" political left or "the communists in Brussels [i.e., The European Union]." When undertaking this parody, they loosen their body posture and speak in a breathy voice, dragging out the vowels to obtain a low speaking tempo.*

1. CEPOS is an acronym for Center for politiske studier (En. Center for political studies). Each semester the think tank organizes a seminar, the CEPOS Academy, which consists of introductions to different areas of libertarian thinking and policy making in addition to debate courses. The Academy hosts approximately 25 students, most of them undergraduate students at Danish universities. In the spring semester of 2023, I conducted fieldwork there.
2. The music is "Op Og Dans" (En. Up and dance) with Ude af kontrol (En. Out of control). Translation from Danish to English by the author.

To put it simply, and by paraphrasing the words of Sara Ahmed above, the bodies in the academy, both the 'right' and the 'wrong' ones, are oriented. The sincere ones with high volume, tension, and pace, towards a single goal; the parodic, softer and slower, seemingly in disregard of a clear goal. In quotidian use, having an ideological orientation corresponds with a set of characteristics, implying e.g., that a person would agree with certain political arguments and values. However, thinking about a geographical orientation, the meaning of orientation shifts from that of characteristics to a spatial process, more in line with the example above, where the rhetors behind both the sincere delivery and the playful parody use their bodies and voices to orient themselves very differently in space. To quote the Oxford English Dictionary, "orientation" may be defined as "[t]he action or process of ascertaining one's position relative to the points of the compass, or other specified points." Maybe having an orientation is not about *having* at all. Following the dictionary entry and Ahmed's queer phenomenology (2006), an orientation is not so much a possession as it is a process which "involves aligning body and space" (7). In short, having an orientation implies a feeling body which experiences a position and a direction by manipulating space, that is, by moving. It would seem, then, that just as having a geographical orientation is a matter of ascertaining one's position in relation to other geographical points, so is the experience of having an ideological orientation a matter of ascertaining one's position and direction in relation to other ideological points. Thus, just as in orienteering, ascertaining one's political orientation is enacted as an on-going rhetorical process in an ever-changing landscape. Noting this processual and bodily work of orientation, this article provides a way of thinking about the body's implication for ideological identity and suggests an outline for how to study the process that molds bodies into specific orientations.

To Ahmed, the way in which bodies are situated in space, their orientation, is not arbitrary, it is directed (2006, 15). From a rhetorical perspective, part of such a direction may be understood as the power of experiential space, like words, to "hail bodies, interpellating them as concrete subjects" (Dickinson, Ott, and Aoki 2019, 135). The claim that spaces and affect (see e.g., Gruber 2014), in addition to symbols, hold constitutive[3] and therefore persuasive power is a fundamental claim in rhetorical new materialisms. As such, this article is informed by Brian L. Ott and Greg Dickinson's *thing-symbol model* to capture also the "[c]arnal knowledge," or, "that which is known at a visceral level […] the stirrings, movements, and *orientation* of the body in space generated by sensory experience but not yet

3. The wording here (interpellation, constitutive) refers to Louis Althusser's process of interpellation in ideology (2001) and Maurice Charland's utilization of that process for his constitutive rhetoric (1987), respectively.

catalogued, classified, and codified into meaning" (Ott and Dickinson 2019, 80, emphasis added). In order to account for such *carnal knowledge* in ideology formation and expression, and in line with an attention to the environment or spatial premises of rhetoric (see e.g., Dickinson and Aiello 2016; Rickert 2013) and the resulting need for rhetorical fieldwork (see e.g., McKinnon et al. 2016b), I outline a methodological orientation centered on ethnographic fieldwork to understand and critique the role of the body in the identity of political communities.

To put it simply, I argue that the oriented body is an integral part of ideological identity through its function as doxastic material in enthymematical argumentation, specifically acting as warrant. In other words, I agree with Sharon Crowley, when in Jack Selzer's and her groundbreaking book *Rhetorical Bodies*, she contends that "no body is disinterested," and "that is why this work [on the body] is central to rhetorical studies, which has always taken the study of partisanship as its province" (1999, 363). With Crowley, rhetoric scholars since at least the 1990s have sought to understand the body beyond a mere medium for verbal rhetoric, however, as I will show in the next section, this effort often has overlooked the role of the body's movements as a sense of meaning-making, that is, the orientation described above. In short, in rhetorical scholarship the body often is understood two-dimensionally, with a surface acting as an empty canvas onto which symbols can be inscribed, ignoring the sensed, affective way in which bodies move and are moved. Therefore, with the framework presented in this paper, I hope to contribute to the field of rhetoric studies with a three dimensional way of understanding the body and its movements as an ideological co-creator of identity formation in political communities.

In what follows, my argument unfolds in three sections. The first section consists of a review of rhetorical scholarship on the body, recounting how the body is often theorized as or through text. The second section establishes a connection between the concrete, oriented body and ideological identity by adding a morphological dimension to Michael C. McGee's *ideograph* (1980), resulting in the concept of the *ideomorph*[4]. The function of such an ideomorph is then explored though the lens of the enthymeme. The third section outlines a methodological orientation for studying ideomorphs through the concept of the *doxastic body* of a specific ideological community. This section starts out by arguing that ideomorphs must be studied *in situ*, recalling rhetorical studies' recent turn towards the field and how fieldwork methods usually investigate bodies. The remainder of the section draws on brief observations from my fieldwork at the CEPOS Academy[5] to establish the

4. Here I use "morph" as in the Latin noun, meaning "form" (as in morphology), and not as in the English verb meaning "to change."

5. This move is not meant to exhaust my observations at the academy, nor will it act as a complete analysis (hopefully both will feature in forthcoming work of mine).

three instantiations of the doxastic body, that is the environment, the orientation of bodies, and body representations of the community. Finally, the article concludes by reflecting on bodies and power in rhetoric, suggesting future applications for the concept of the doxastic body.

Bodies in- and outside the text

With the rhetorical tradition rooted in, as one "melancholy Dane" would put it, "words, words, words," seeing the body as a kind of text seems almost natural. This section argues through a literature review of the conception of bodies in rhetorical scholarship, that the body often is understood as or through text. In the end of this section, the conception of bodies in the work of Kenneth Burke and Debra Hawhee is presented as a means of understanding the body on nontextual premises.

Through Karma Chávez' conception of the "(foreign) body-as-text," (2009, 24) the process in which immigration officials quite literally *read* certain bodily traits to translate them into the migrant subject (or object) is illuminated. This way of understanding the body, as a canvas onto which symbols can be inscribed, is very useful as it illuminates how bodies are rendered legible in reductive readings, as it pertains to e.g., race and gender (see e.g., Butler 2006; LeMesurier 2022; Happe 2013; see also Chávez 2018). However, it also to some extent takes the *body* out of the equation when converting it to a symbol, as much rhetorical scholarship does. In two oft-quoted articles on the rhetorical function of the body, Amos Kiewe argues that Franklin D. Roosevelt's "body became symbolic of his fitness" (1999, 99), and Kevin Michael DeLuca lays out his methodology as that of "close readings of […] bodies" (1999, 10; see also Fisker 2022, 63 for a similar approach).

More recently, Jennifer Lin LeMesurier (2014) understands the body's "functional, inventional" and "ideological" aspects (363) through attention to somatic metaphors; Gabrijela Kišiček (2018) translates from delivery to Aristotelian appeals; and Marie Gelang and Waldemar Petermann view delivery as embodied Burkean attitudes (2017). For these scholars, the critical view translates from body to symbol. Such a translation is neatly summed up by Susan Wells in her chapter in *Rhetorical Bodies*, in which she states, that "[i]t is possible that […] I have repeated the most reductive structuralist (and poststructuralist) trope, in which an activity is found to be 'a language' or 'about language'" (1999, 69). How to account for the body as body and not as text?

In trying to account for the affective, non-symbolic, element of the relation between speaker and listener, some rhetorical scholars analyze the reception of rhetors' delivery in media coverage (Bedsole 2018; Gunn 2010; Landau and Keeley--Jonker 2018). While the methodological approach of these scholars differs, they

are similar in their understanding of the body not as, but *through* text, an aspect I will return to in the third section of this paper. Notably, some rhetoricians do try to understand the body through various nontextual theoretical frameworks (see e.g., Chevrette and Hess 2019; Edbauer [Rice] 2004; Hawhee 2004; 2009; Hoff--Clausen 2022; Landau 2016; Rand 2014), of which I will return to the work of Debra Hawhee shortly. However, as I hope to have made clear in this review, a primary lens for understanding the rhetoricity of bodies is that of the text. Such a reading, the body-as-text, poses a limit as to how we may understand it.

To put it reversely, I, like Burke, conceive of the body as "dogmatic," and as "a generator of belief" (cited in Hawhee 2009, 21). While Burke may be famous for his dichotomy between non-symbolic *motion* and symbolic *action* (1978), somehow suggesting that (bodily) movement becomes potent only through conversion into the symbolic, Hawhee (2009) recaptures a much more sophisticated perspective on the body in Burke's thinking. In other words, Burke would probably agree that there is plenty of action in (bodily) movement. The quote above is taken from Burke's view of art as having the power to disrupt this bodily dogma, as "society might well be benefited by the corrective of a disintegrating art, which converts each simplicity into a complexity" (cited in Hawhee 2009, 20). For Burke, there's something simple, yet immensely powerful in this bodily dogma, which is put forward through the fact that the protagonists in his early short stories have all sorts of bodily ailments (Hawhee 2009, 20–22). Hawhee, in earlier work, presents another way for understanding the body's role in rhetoric by illuminating how, in Athenian antiquity, "mind and body moved and thought together" through the concept of *hexis* as bodily comportment and its interwoven relationship with *aretē*[6] (Hawhee 2004, 4; see also Johnstone 2001). There are (at least) two important points in Burke's and Hawhee's thinking. Firstly, to Burke, it seems that the body is at least as much a constructor of belief as it is a construct of belief. Secondly, to Hawhee, even Hellenistic rhetoricians could not have believed that the body was a simple instrument for delivery. Following Ahmed's conception of the orientation of the body in the opening paragraphs of this paper, I suggest a way out of the text by looking for the body not in textual (re-)constructions or receptions of a body and not as manifestations of mental attitudes, but through the orientations of actual bodies-in-space.

Embodied doxa: The ideomorph and enthymematic corporeality

In this section I explore the connection between the body and ideology through the lens of doxa and the 70s and 80s rhetorical scholarship on ideology.

6. Here understood as general virtuosity and not (only) moral virtuosity.

Through an embodied understanding of doxa, I add a morphological dimension to McGee's ideograph (1980), resulting in the concept of the ideomorph. Lastly, I explore the function of such a concept through the lens of the enthymeme.

As Freya Thimsen recounts (2015), doxa, as the realm of a community's collective warrants, is generally theorized in two different ways in rhetorical studies. While doxa, in the Aristotelian tradition and in the view of thinkers like Paul Ricœur, can be seen as an essential resource for effecting constructive and emancipatory change, critical theorists from Raymie McKerrow to Pierre Bourdieu perceive of doxa as the foundation for implicit hegemony and therefore the very object of critique (Thimsen 2015, 490–492). In other words, in the first view, doxa is a resource for dealing with oppression; in the second view doxa *is* oppression. Especially true for the latter, Thimsen suggests that doxa can be productively thought of as "the unexamined appearance of things" (2015, 486; see also Hariman 1986, 48–50), and as the product of cultural sedimentation, existing "... at deeply embedded levels of embodied subjective practices rather than representations and consciously held opinion" (Thimsen 2015, 492, drawing on Pierre Bourdieau). As Thimsen herself notes, such a view of doxa "is actually fairly close to ideology" (2015, 492; see also Wander 1983, 78). As Jamie Landau and Bethany Keeley-Jonker show (2018), to think of the body and its movements in relation to rhetoric is also another way of stating that affect has political consequences, or, put more sharply, that politics is inherently affective. In their close attention to body movements and voice use, these scholars illuminate how affect, through the body, can de directed for political purposes. In other words, Lauren Berlant is right to contend that affect theory is "another phase in the history of ideology theory" (cited in Butler et al. 2021).

Looking, then, for ideological clues exclusively in the text as suggested in the approaches of the 70s and 80s US rhetorical scholarship on the matter (e.g., Black 1970; McGee 1980; Wander 1984) lacks the later appreciation of bodily and affective dimensions. Michael C. McGee put forth the *ideograph* as "[a] link between rhetoric and ideology" (1980, 1), however, the ideograph, I contend, functions only as a link between *text* and ideology. Conversely, I suggest the *ideomorph* as a link between the body and ideology. This term combines the Latin (originating from the Greek) root words for *idea* and *form*, where the ideograph combines those of *idea* and *writing*. The materiality invoked here fits well with the conception of ideology put forth by Dana Cloud and Joshua Gunn in their 2011-review article, drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek to console differing views on ideology in rhetorical studies: "[I]deology is […] what we do first and assign meaning to later" (2011, 416). Furthering the simile, McGee (1980) defines the ideograph as "an ordinary-language term found in political discourse," (15) and in itself an empty signifier, (8-10) invested with specific meaning through its uses

in specific groups. Similarly, I suggest the ideomorph as an ordinary movement of the body-in-space, which is invested with a specific meaning through its use in a specific (political/ideological) community. The important difference is that the critic searches for ideomorphs not in texts but in bodies, and, perhaps even more importantly, that the empty signifier of bodies are invested with meaning not only through symbolic use but through the affective-bodily materiality of e.g., tension and pace. In other words, *how* an action is performed is at least as important as *what* it is (Gelang 2021, 115–16; Gelang and Petermann 2017, 12).

McGee defines the ideograph as

> […] a high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal. It warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belief which might otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable (1980, 15).

Similarly, I would define the ideomorph as a bodily disposition (not unlike Hawhee's *hexis* described in the above) and orientation in space through the means of direction, tension, volume, and pace. This disposition, which is invested with meaning materially-discursively, enacts, to use McGee's words from above, a "high-order abstraction representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal" and thereby "warrants the use of power." With the ideograph functioning solely though language, ideas in this framework is made manifest in verbal, symbolic forms. What the ideomorph as a concept contributes to rhetorical studies is a theoretical orientation to study the connection between ideas and the body, a way to think about the affective-bodily part of ideology which presents itself as "a gut sense," (Chaput 2010, 8) that which we know because we feel in and with our bodies that it is right. Put simply, where the body-as-text framework sees the body as a two-dimensional canvas onto which symbols is inscribed, the body-in-space framework sees the body as an at least three-dimensional form invested with movement (see McKerrow 1998 for a similar argument). McGee identifies as ideographs terms such as "property," "freedom of speech," and "liberty," whereas an ideomorph could be, as I touched upon in the introduction of this paper, a body oriented mono-directionally—and with a rather high volume, tension, and pace—toward an "ill-defined normative goal." Much similarly, Rudolf Laban contends that all movement "is the result of the striving after an object deemed valuable, or of a state of mind" (2011, 2). Antithetical to this directness, the other ideomorph presented in the introduction is that of a body oriented multi-directionally, softer and slower, directed toward many goals or no goal in particular[7]. The difference between these two ideomorphs could easily be

7. Such multi-directional body and object (and their corresponding ideomorph) may be called "queer," whereas the mono-directional one might be called straight (see e.g., Ahmed 2006, 16; Johnson 2001, 2).

described with Laban's movement notations along the lines of the opposite poles in *weight* (firm/fine touch), *time* (sudden/sustained), *space* (direct/flexible), and *flow* (bound/free), respectively (2011, 71–81; see also 1975). However, exactly what these two ideomorphs imply, could not be decided without a proper analysis of their use in a specific community.

In McGee's words from the above, ideomorphs warrant power use, thereby functioning enthymematically, enacting an implicit premise of the truncated syllogism. The body has been theorized enthymematically by rhetorical scholars, notably in Sara Newman's "gestural enthymeme," (2009) and Joshua D. Prenosil's "embodied enthymeme" (2012). However, Newman deals with visual rhetoric, as she shows how the gestural enthymeme enables a perception of movement in historical chronophotographs, while Prenosil's embodied enthymeme is not so much of the concrete body as it is comprised of "inarticulate material with surfaces that emerge according to currents of interactivity" (2012, 299). While it would seem an enthymeme of the concrete body is not yet developed, the very conception of the enthymeme as a syllogism with an unspoken premise has recently been challenged (Fredal 2018). James Fredal's argument builds on close analysis of actual enthymemes deployed in ancient forensic oratory and dismisses the process of an audience-provided premise. Referencing Aristotle, Fredal characterizes the enthymeme as involving "a kind of reasoning (logos)," which is "best described not as a deduction, much less a syllogism, but as a kind of narrative inference" (2018, 35). Or, even simpler: "To create an enthymeme, you don't write a syllogism and elide a premise; you tell a story and highlight a significant fact" (2018, 37).

What I'm developing in this article is not so much a body enthymeme as it is a conception of the body—the ideomorph—that *functions* enthymematically (see Lloyd 2013, 746–47 for a similar distinction). While I do argue ideomorphs provide pre-argumentative gut senses, they may function akin to Fredal's "significant fact" that is highlighted inside a general narrative which, in the case of the CEPOS Academy, is the rationalistic, economic storyline. Put simply, the CEPOS Academy (and its students) tells a story of a rational world governed by economic laws and highlights the right bodily disposition that goes with such a narrative. What is inferred is the appropriateness of the monodirectional body and the inappropriateness of other, looser comportments, as shown in the above.

The doxastic body

This section initially argues that ideomorphs must be studied *in situ*, and that the ecological framework of the doxastic body is well-suited for that task. Following that initial argument, the three instantiations of the doxastic body are explored through brief analyses of observations from my fieldwork at the CEPOS Academy.

With their reliance on bodies-in-space, ideomorphs need to be studied *in situ*, along with other artefacts which do not reveal themselves to critics through already recorded texts (McKinnon et al. 2016b). While fieldwork often is stressed as an ethical means of studying marginalized groups whose vernacular rhetoric often is not recorded, it also works as a means of studying "body knowledge" in general (McKinnon et al. 2016a, 3) and features a "focus on rhetoric's doxastic dimensions" (Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres 2011, 389). However, while fieldwork orientations, such as "participatory critical rhetoric," takes as a starting point the critic's own body in its becoming part of a community, this practice remains "concerned with how *symbolic practices* articulate disparate identities, ideas, values, beliefs, images, meanings, bodies, and communities" (Middleton et al. 2015, xvii, my emphasis). In borrowing a term from my previous section on Burke and Hawhee, one might say that the focus here is on the body as a construct, not constructor, of belief. Similarly, rhetorical fieldwork is described as attending to "how messages are spoken *through* and circulate *on* and *with* bodies" (Middleton, Senda-Cook, and Endres 2011, 394, my emphases). While I do not disagree with the rigor or usefulness in the methodological orientations mentioned here, I do believe there is a case to be made for attending to the function of the bodies and their movements in the field, in addition to how they act as mediums or canvases for symbols. Notably, Roberta Chevrette and Aaron Hess (2019) investigate the movement of bodies in activism and deal, as do I, with the "behind-the-scenes" (416) training of bodies, more so than their public appearances. I will return to the work of Chevrette and Hess in the conclusion.

Still, looking exclusively at the movement of bodies would impose a reductionist view ignorant of the perspectives of ecology (see e.g., Druschke 2019; Edbauer [Rice] 2005; Ehrenfeld 2020) and the critique of the autonomous agency of the orator-subject (see e.g., Gunn and Cloud 2010; Lundberg and Gunn 2005). In other words, while I consider the movements of concrete bodies paramount to studies of ideology and to field work methodologies, they cannot stand alone. While the body is central to me, I perceive it as but one element in an ecological whole not unlike Félix Guattari's three ecologies (2014). What Guattari suggests is a radical rethinking of ecology through three interwoven ecologies of "subjectivity," the "socius," and the "environment" (2014, 47). While the social ecology (the socius) may seem a long way from the body, Guattari notes it as concerning "the development of affective and pragmatic cathexis [*investissement*] in human groups" (2014, 40, translator's brackets), not unlike Ahmed's orientation described in the above. In addition, the resulting "ecosophy" of working with these three ecologies "will lead us to reinvent the relation of the subject to the body" (Guattari 2014, 22). Similar to Guattari's distinctions, I propose studying bodily implications

on ideology through an ecological complex of material-discursive elements in the environment, movement of bodies (ideomorphs), and body representations (similar, at least in part, to Guattari's ecology of subjectivity). This three-fold orientation, and the construct that it produces, I name the *doxastic body* of a specific field. Included in the perspective of this orientation is material-discursive elements, such as atmospheres, material objects, pictures on walls and slide shows, words and the body movements of human rhetors. Importantly, though, for me, a rhetor may be silent. Seeing as it is the movement and orientation of bodies which interest me, silent bodies are as important to me as speaking ones.

In what follows, I will expand on each instantiation of the doxastic body, opening each section with a fieldwork epigraph to explicate its function.

Environment of the body

The restrooms in the CEPOS premises look and feel somewhat like restrooms one would typically find in public institutions in Denmark, like the local library. While in working order and without the graffiti, they are slightly dirty, bathed in yellowish light, and featuring thin toilet paper and rust on the old metal bins. Also, one finds cheap razor blades and shaving foam in the closets. Contrary to the restrooms of some private companies with soft light, scented soap and hand lotion, and complimentary hygiene products, these restrooms are not comfortable, and if intended for rest, do not deliver their promise. To put it plainly, these restrooms are for business only.

A rhetorical account of concrete bodies not rooted in the physical environment of such bodies would be similar to a rhetorical critique of a text without paying close attention to the communicative situation of that text. To account for the function of the environment, I take as a starting point my own body and its sensations to get at what one might call the "affective weather" (Slaby 2020; Schmitz, Müllan, and Slaby 2011) of the environment. As such, I felt slightly uncomfortable at the CEPOS restrooms, or slightly tense, noting how I wanted to get out of there as soon as I could (this is coming from an over-stimulated ethnographer who would have loved to use the restrooms for a little social break). Following Ahmed's conception of comfortability as a "sinking" feeling of unresisting encounters (2010, 148), the encounter between my body and the restrooms were decidedly not. Even as the Danish word for restroom does not include "rest" (we simply call them toilets), the feeling of bodily unrest was prominent for me in these "toilets." In this privileging my own body as a source of critical engagement I draw on Jamie Landau and Bethany Keeley-Jonker, who have argued for "writing the bodies of rhetorical scholars into criticism" (2018, 166). The writers draw on the

critical approach in Landau's *feeling rhetorical critics* (2016), which argues for the inclusion of affective-emotional aspects in critical fieldwork through an attention to the body of the critic and its emotional reactions to the events observed. As Landau argues, much has been done in (rhetorical) scholarship to strip critical approaches of engaged feelings (2016, 73–76), much in line with a Cartesian dichotomy privileging mind over body in general. As is argued in the embodied mind model of contemporary neuroscience, the brain is an ecological, relational organ fully dependent on its situated embodiment in a physical body and that body's situated embeddedness in a physical environment (see e.g., Fuchs 2022, 67 and 136). Seeing as our brains and the way they work are inseparably intertwined with our bodies and their environment, the environment comprises the matrix of the doxastic body (much like the *chōra* in Rickert 2013, 41–73).

Put differently, I argue that the business-only restrooms, the extremely thick and heavy textbook for the course, the thumping bass of the music I described in the opening of this article, and the rest of the physical and affective environment at the CEPOS Academy, play an active role in the embodied doxa as a co-conditioning matrix for movement of the bodies of rhetors at the CEPOS Academy. As for the music part, Hawhee notes how classical and modern scholars alike suggest using music as part of education due to "music's direct, bodily delivery" and its "capacity for dispositional transformation" (Hawhee 2004, 140). In every situation, the material-discursive environment may be thought of as a suggestive infrastructure, providing avenues to go by and ways of moving along the way. Put even simpler, as Rudolf Laban notes, "[m]ovement may be influenced by the environment of the mover" (2011, 2).

Bodies in movement and orientation

In a presentation on eternal growth, one lecturer surprises the students with facts about the supposedly thriving global climate situation. After one student points out an error in one of his claims about a previously endangered species (the species is, in fact, still endangered), other students start asking critical questions on several issues. Even though the lecturer initially encouraged the students to ask questions, he now breaks them off mid-sentence. On the role of bees in ecosystems he answers, "we don't need nature," and on the matter of grave climate and biodiversity reports from the UN: "no, no, no." With each response he can be seen mincing back and forth on the stage. Also, his voice gets louder and louder in nearly yelling phrases like: "No! It's because you don't understand it. […] It's [just] something you believe," and "it's the media telling you lies!" At this point, the atmosphere is tense, with the initial critical student waving her hands in front

of her face, dismissing his voice and the message it conveys. Later, she crosses her arms in front of her, looking sad.

While there's definitely something to be said about the atmosphere this behavior produces, the movement in the lecturer's frantic dismissals is what interests me most in this situation. During the semester, lecturers and students on several occasions contend that feelings and personal sentiments are inferior to economic rationality. This argument is mirrored theoretically in Catherine Chaput's work on neoliberalism (2010). To Chaput, neoliberalism seemingly enacts rational interventions in perceived irrational practice, while at the same time it "governs our everyday activities through an embodied habituation" (2010, 4). With the students calmly asking questions, the lecturer in the above seems the one who is behaving irrationally. The inquiries that go along with the second instantiation of the doxastic body is how the bodies of rhetors move, what they are oriented towards, and how they approach it. For the lecturer, it seems that something about the students' questions disorients him, or, rather, presents alternatives to his course, which he dismisses. Such commitment, in Ahmed's words

> might suggest that it is too late to turn back […] If we are already committed to a bodily action (such as a specific stroke in tennis), then the body is already ''behind'' the action. To commit may then also be a way of describing how it is that we become directed toward specific goals, aims, and aspirations through what we ''do'' with our bodies (2006, 17).

In the case of the lecturer, more than not being able to turn "back," it seems more a matter of refusing to turn sideways or being provoked by the mere suggestion of doing so. There was something forceful about the lecturer's delivery, standing on the stage in front of the seated students, creating a tense "bad atmosphere," in the words of students I talked with afterwords. The effect on the critical students of the lecturer's delivery, is also evident toward the end of the situation described above, as at least one student waves off his voice and later crosses her arms. As Michael Butterworth contends, embodying a contrast to the dominant body ideals of a community often is met with harsh resistance (2008, 261)[8]. By investigating the concrete bodies in the field, the critic may discover the default modes of movement, and, conversely, the modes that are resisted, ultimately discerning the movement valorization of the field.

Symbols: The body represented

One slide show presentation features as a background graphic on all slides an illustration of a male track running athlete, crouched in a tense position,

8. In line with this argument, some of the students afterwards blamed not the lecturer, but the students who asked the questions, for the "bad atmosphere."

awaiting the sound of the starting pistol. In a section on threats to democracy, the presentation deals with the alleged totalitarianism enacted by "nice, soft, alternative [politicians]." As a visualization of such a politician, one presentation slide features a photograph of Danish politician Uffe Elbæk, former leader of the left-wing, green political party, Alternativet (En. The Alternative). Elbæk is depicted wearing a thin neon green ballet skirt, feet in the fourth position of a ballet dancer, arms spread out to the sides, open palms, broad chest, head slightly tilted upwards and to the side. On the same presentation slide, the tense-bodied male athlete is preparing to run towards the finish line.

In attending to representations of bodies in the field I am inspired methodologically by the approaches of rhetorical scholars who analyze concrete bodies and voices (e.g., Bedsole 2018; Gunn 2010; Landau and Keeley-Jonker 2018). The critical approach of these scholars consists of investigating symbolic--affective dimensions in the orator's body/voice alongside third-party descriptions of it. As Gunn contends, "[t]here is also much rhetorical insight to be gleaned from analyzing how *others* affix adjectives—and by extension, nouns—to the sounds of someone's voice; therein is where we can locate the (re)establishment of a binary and the movement of ideology" (2010, 188, emphasis in the original). Similarly, in my fieldwork, subtle atmospheric sensations, difficult to grasp or describe meaningfully, sometimes are summed up in perfect clarity in by-passing utterances or depictions on a presentation slide as in the above.

While the first instantiation of the doxastic body (the environment), functions as a matrix for the second (the movements and orientations of bodies), the third instantiation often functions like a mirror, crystallizing by reflection the body ideals of the field. As such, the insights gleaned in the presentation slide above contribute not so much with new information into the orientations of the field as much as they crystallize them. As such, the analysis of the symbolic representations of bodies in the field act much like Gunn's analysis of "how *others* affix adjectives," and thus how he "locate[s] the (re)establishment of a binary" (Gunn 2010, 188, emphasis in the original). On the presentation slide, Elbæk's body, in addition to its effeminate depiction with the green skirt, is decidedly multi-directional in that his feet, arms, chest and head all point in different directions without a clear bodily path for him to follow. The athlete, on the other hand, with his bodily activities and iconic disposition (see Hawhee 2004, 152–53) functions here as the perfect contrast, and the binary, in Gunn's words, is (re)established.

Conclusion

Reinstating the body in Burke's thinking, Hawhee updates the original Burkean mantra "literature," or rhetoric, "as equipment for living" (Burke 1973) to the more

corporeal "bodies as equipment for moving" (Hawhee 2009, 12). While such a distinction seemingly mirrors Burke's distinction between motion and (privileged) action mentioned in the above,[9] if one conceives of movement as I argue in this paper, as a co-constitutive ideological force, one realizes the immense power of the body as equipment for that process. In this sense, getting to the *bodies* of audiences or voters, maybe even more so than getting to their minds, would be of importance to anyone who wishes to suade them this direction or that. In other words, with every *politic* one might imagine a corresponding *body politic*,[10] which may be worked upon by actors, human and not, molded gently into strategic comportments and oriented in likewise directions. Recognizing the ontological weight of the felt body, Chevrette and Hess (2019) investigate this molding of individual and collective bodies of activists in the feminist group FEMEN. Since, as they argue, "agency is […] gestural in character," (2019, 421) Chevrette and Hess investigate how the "gestural routine" of the activist workshops effectuates an altered perception of individual and collective agency in activists. In the words of Michel Foucault, this molding is

> a question not of treating the body, *en masse*, "wholesale," as if it were an indissociable unity, but of working it "retail," individually; of exercising upon it a subtle coercion, of obtaining holds upon it at the level of the mechanism itself – movements, gestures, attitudes, rapidity: an infinitesimal power over the active body (1982, 137, emphasis in the original).

In Foucault's critique of power, the body is the clay of subtle, yet very concrete, control which can be molded into a "political anatomy" (Foucault 1982, 138). But this moldability of bodies is in itself a product, as "discipline produces subjected and practised [sic] bodies, 'docile' bodies" (1982, 138). The doxastic body as a methodological orientation functions as a means to study this discipline and how it exerts power over bodies. By focusing on the "movements, gestures, attitudes, [and] rapidity," the doxastic body framework is attending to the subtlety and individuality of the control of bodies described by Foucault in the above. However, a note of agential caution might be in place here: While the CEPOS Academy surely disciplines bodies, as any other (political) community does, I am by no means suggesting that it is the singular result of intentional effort by the organizers, as the students, the yellowish light in the restrooms, the music, and a myriad of other human and non-human actors in- and outside of the Academy partake in the ecology that molds and moves bodies. What I have laid out in this paper is a way of thinking about the body's implications for ideological identity and a corresponding outline of a methodological orientation towards investigating the process in which bodies are molded in a specific community, or, in Crowley's words from the introduction, how they become "interested."

9. A distinction of which he is even doubtful himself (Burke 1966, 53).
10. Not unlike Michel Foucault's biopolitics (1990, 139–40).

In deepening the doxastic body methodology, one might develop an agonistic and genealogical approach, or what McGee calls the "horizontal" and "vertical" perspectives of the ideograph (1980, 10–14). Through an analysis of competing contemporary ideographs, the critic discovers the horizontal organization of them. Similarly, through an analysis of the historical usage of the word, one can ascertain the development of the vertical connotations of an ideographic term in different time periods. This vertical analysis, obviously, is very much in line with Foucault's genealogical approach (see e.g., Foucault 2021). In what comes rather close to such a genealogical approach to bodies, Kelly Happe (2013) investigates race as a performative ideology. However, while Happe may be concerned with the materiality of tissue such as that of breasts and breast tumors, she still describes the racialized "[b]odily ontologies," which is central to her analysis, as a product of "discursive iterations" (2013, 149). Again, the body is translated into (for Happe it is a product of) a symbol to conduct the analysis. Expanding the doxastic body to include genealogical analyses of historical video material for example, would help situate contemporary ideomorphs in a historical context and show development. Finally, an analysis of the "horizontal," agonistic perspective, hopefully, will feature in forthcoming work of my own as I will analyze ideomorphs of opposing ideological fields and thereby thicken what is presented here only as a methodological outline.

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