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The proofs of God's existence are one of the most important philosophical problems. But it seems that the crucial issue concerns the possibility of proving existence of God.

The problem of demonstrability of God's existence is analyzed by St. Thomas Aquinas in *Summa contra gentiles* and *Summa theologiae*. Both works are translated into many languages (English and Polish are among them) and are well known to the medievalists. Similar analysis is present in *Summa theologiae* of St. Albert the Great, but this work is not translated yet. What is more, I have found only one item in secondary literature which touches the problem of demonstrability and proofs of God's existence in this *summa*, namely: a book *Albertus Magnus* by Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg[1]. However, it contains rather presentation of these proofs and – as far as the problem of demonstrability is concerned – only a short record with Albert's main solution.

I think that it is worth to present precisely the approach to this problem of Albert of Lauingen – one of the greatest thinkers of 13ᵗʰ century. What is more a good idea is to compare his approach with Thomas Aquinas' account. It may

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[1] I. Craemer-Ruegenberg, *Albertus Magnus*, ed. H. Anzulewicz, Leipzig 2005, Benno Verlag, s. 61–68 (caption: *Gottesbeweise*). Let us note that the topic of demonstrability of God's existence in Albert's writings was not analyzed even in volumes published on the occasion of 800 annuary of Albert's death: *Albertus Magnus – Doctor Universalis 1280–1980*, ed. G. Meyer, A. Zimmerman, Mainz 1980; *Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays*, ed. J.A. Weisheipl, Toronto 1980.

facilitate to identify some common points and original solutions of these contemporary thinkers, which is interesting especially when we keep in mind that they belonged to the same Dominican order and that Thomas was at first Albert's disciple and later – his assistant. Recently a similar task was undertaken by Gregory L. LaNave, who analyzed arguments for the existence of God in Bonaventure to compare it with an approach of Aquinas[2].

In order to see what model of demonstrability a given thinker accepts, it is worth to analyze also his arguments. The attitude to a given proof may reveal which way of proving is reliable and which is not.

Thus, in this article I intend to analyze Albert's answer to the problem of demonstrability of God's existence and his presentation of the proofs of God's existence in *Summa theologiae* with references to his *Commentary to the Sentences of Peter Lombard* and to the theological works of Thomas Aquinas, especially his *Summa theologiae*.

1. Context

Albert the Great takes the issue of God's existence (hereinafter: GE) in treatise 3 of his *Summa theologiae* (hereinafter: *ST*)[3]. At this stage we should note that the *summa* is his late and not finished work, written after Aquinas' death in 1274. However – according to Ferdinand van Steenberghen[4] – Albert does not take *Summa theologiae* of Aquinas (hereinafter: ST_{TA})[5] into account. Apart from much earlier work *Commentary to the Sentences of Peter Lombard* (hereinafter: *Super Sent.*)[6], this is the only Albert's work intended to cover whole problems of theology and not only some of them.

Treatise 3 of *ST* is titled *De cognoscibilitate, nominibilitate et demonstrabilitate Dei*. It is preceded by tr. 1 *De scientia theologiae* and the tr. 2 *De frui, et uti, et utentibus et fruentibus* and followed by treatises about God's attributes and next about Saint Trinity. While the tr. 1 (on scientific status of revealed theology and its methods) responses to the q. 1 of ST_{TA}, the topic of the tr. 2 is absent in

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2 G.F. LaNave, *Bonaventure's arguments for the existence of God and the "independent" De Deo uno*, "The Thomist" 74 (2010), s. 57-84, esp. 81–84. At the beginning he notes that "it has been customary and indeed almost inevitable, for Bonaventure to be read in comparison with his Dominican contemporary Thomas Aquinas" (s. 57).

3 *Albert the Great, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia dei*. I use the text of *editio Coloniensis* in: *Alberti Magni Opera Omnia*, t. 34, part 1, ed. D. Siedler et. al., Münster 1978. Because this work is crucial here, in this case I will give the numbers of pages and verses of quoted passages.

4 F. van Steenbergen, *Philosophie au XIIIe s.*, Paris 1966, in the Polish edition: *Filozofia w wieku XIII*, trans. I. Zieliński, Lublin 2005, s. 236.

5 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*. I use: *textum Leoninum*, Rome 1888.

6 *Albert the Great, Super IV libros Sententiarum,* in: *Opera omnia*, t. 25–30, ed. A. Borgnet, Paris, 1893–1894.

ST_{TA} and displays some influence of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*, which first book begins with the Augustine's idea of *utendum et fruendum*. In the tr. 3, which contains questions 13–18, the problem of demonstrability of GE and proofs of GE are placed in the end (q. 17 and q. 18), after the problems of possibility to know God (qq. 13–15) and to name Him (q. 16): so otherwise than in ST_{TA}, where the question about GE (q. 2) is the first one after a methodological q. 1 and precedes questions about God's essence (qq. 3–11), knowing Him (q. 12) and His names (q. 13).

The topic of the q. 17 of *ST* is as follows: if it is demonstrable or self-evident (known *per se*) that God exists. Let us note that both these problems are considered in ST_{TA} (q. 2 a. 1 and a. 2), but in the reverse order, and in *Summa contra gentiles* (hereinafter: *SCG*)[7] (cc. 10–12), where the question is: if the demonstrability and the self-evidence of GE are mutually exclusive and if the demonstrability of GE should be excluded, as it is a revealed truth. For both thinkers it is very important to resolve the problems of the demonstrability and self-evidence of GE together. This is a consequence of Aristotelian theory of science which they have accepted and which they applied to revealed theology. According to this theory, in science, apart from definitions, we deal with: 1) self-evident first principles and 2) statements which are obtained deductively. Thus, it seems natural for them to examine if the statement about GE belongs to the first or the second group and if one option excludes another.

The q. 18 of *ST* is devoted to the topic of knowing God by natural reason and divided into three chapters. The first one contains the proofs of GE. The topics of the following chapters are: if one person may know God better than another and is it possible to know Him by comprehension. In comparison with ST_{TA} it may seem that in Aquinas' work the problem of GE is much more exposed as a first problem concerning God, while in *ST* this is just one of the problems of knowledge about God and – what is more – placed together with two other in question concerning the natural cognition of God, which concludes the treatise. Nonetheless Albert's composition of tr. 3 may be regarded as reasonable: at first he considers what we can know about who is God; and when we already know who is He – Albert analyzes before all if we can prove GE.

However, it should be stressed that in *ST* Albert poses the problem of GE clearly and explicitly, while he did not do it in *Super Sent*. Lombard's *Sentences* have some proofs of GE in the distinction 3 of the book 1. But the problem of GE is mixed there with more general issue of knowing God, and especially the issue of God's uniqueness. This may explain why Albert in his commentary considers many issues, but he does not pose the problem of GE separately, neither demonstrability, nor proofs of GE. In the preface to this distinction he says that Peter Lombard presents four *rationes* to prove that God exists and that He is unique; in the first *ratio* Lombard proves GE, and in the following – that

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[7] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*. I use: *Textum Leoninum*, Torino 1961.

God is incorporeal and immutable and that He is the highest Good and *species omnium specierum*[8]. Then, in the a. 1 Albert considers whether philosophers knew that God is one, and in the a. 2: what they knew about Him; the problem of GE and arguments for GE are present in these two articles, but they do not seem to be crucial here. In the following articles he formulates problems in the background of *rationes* presented by Lombard, but – as he marked in the preface to d. 3 – they prove rather some other truths about God, so the issue of GE is rather marginal. Whereas in *ST* Albert: plans separate chapter for the proofs of GE, precedes it by the question of demonstrability or self-evidence of GE and even presents Lombards *rationes* which in *Super Sent.* he does not treat as arguments for GE but for something else – as proofs of GE.

Finally, let us add that also Aquinas does not pose a problem of the demonstrability of GE in his *Commentary to the Sentences* (hereinafter: *Super Sent.$_{TA}$*)[9]. He considers only problem of the possibility to know God and the problem of self-evidence of GE there. His solutions can be reduced to the question of capabilities of human intellect in relation to God's essence and existence[10].

2. Against demonstrability of God's existence

It should not be surprising that according to Albert GE is demonstrable. But the main question is as follows: how is it possible to prove GE. In order to understand it, it is very important to analyze precisely the objections which Albert collected in the q. 17. He presents three arguments against demonstrability of GE there.

The first one is very short: "God exists" is an article of faith; article of faith is something beyond the reason (*supra rationem*); but to be a subject of demonstration something must be under the reason (*sub ratione*); so GE is not a subject of demonstration[11]. Similar arguments are presented in *ST$_{TA}$* (q. 2, a. 2, arg. 1)[12] and in *SCG* (c. 12, n. 1)[13]. Their common appearance reveals that this is a basic problem in the context of demonstrability of GE and maybe even a theological commonplace. However the same

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[8] *Super Sent.*, I, d. 3, 90b. In the text of the *Sentences* Lombard concludes then that on this basis God is also: *conditor aeternus*, *omnipotens*, *sapiens* and *bonus*, and adds that all these prove that God is one ; Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiarum libri quattuor*, PL, lib. I, d. 3, c. 5.

[9] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis*. I use the edition: Parma 1856.

[10] *Super Sent.$_{TA}$*, lib. 1, d. 3, q. 1, aa. 1–2.

[11] „Deum enim esse articulus est fidei; articulus autem supra rationem est; quod autem demonstratur, sub ratione est; ergo deum esse non demonstratur" (*ST*, q. 17, arg. 1, p. 83, v. 71–73).

[12] „(...) Deum enim esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt demonstrabilia, quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non apparentibus est, ut patet per apostolum, ad Hebr. XI. Ergo Deum esse non est demonstrabile".

[13] „(...) Dicunt enim quod Deum esse non potest per rationem inveniri, sed per solam viam fidei et revelationis est acceptum".

idea is formulated three times in other words, what leads to a conclusion that there was no stiff and commonly accepted formula, which Albert and Thomas might have only copied.

The second argument has a similar nature. Everything, which is a subject of demonstration, is perfectly comprehended by the intellect; but GE is not perfectly comprehended by the intellect, so it is not a subject of demonstration[14]. The second premise is based on a passage from the commentary of St. Gregory to Job 11, 7: "In futuro reperietur omnipotens per speciem, sed non ad perfectum, quia essentia eius a nullo plene videbitur". It may seem that a similar argument we find in ST_{TA} (q. 2, a. 2, arg. 2), and again there is the same idea, but differently expressed[15]. But this time, it is not true. Albert says that we cannot comprehend that God exists (*deum esse*), whereas Aquinas says that we do not know God's essence (*quid est*), so we have no medium term to build a demonstration (which is often a syllogism, in which there must be a medium term, usually

a definition). Thus, in this case the argument presented by Albert may pretend to be original.

The third argument is much more longer and complex[16]. Albert discusses here some types of demonstrations to argue that none of them is capable to prove GE. At the beginning Albert notes that the best demonstration is based on the definition, that defines: what is something (*quid*) or: by what cause (*propter quid*). In both cases it is impossible to apply such demonstration to God, because we cannot say neither who God is nor point out his cause (which – let us add – does not exist) and neither what is GE, nor point its cause.

Next, Albert agrees that, apart from the demonstration *propter quid*, there is a demonstration *quia*, which has two kinds: 1) by a remote cause or 2) by an effect convertible with its cause. He refutes the first case, because there is no such a cause for God. If such a remote cause were reduced to the close one, this would mean that God is not the first cause (what is false). With regard to the

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[14] „Adhuc, omne quod demonstratur perfecto intellectu comprehenditur; deum esse perfecto intellectu non comprehenditur; ergo non demonstratur" (*ST*, q. 17, arg. 2, s. 83, v. 74–76).

[15] „Praeterea, medium demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire quid est, sed solum quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non possumus demonstrare Deum esse".

[16] This argument may be interpreted as three separate arguments, but I prefer to treat it as one, although triple. *ST*, q. 17, arg. 3, s. 84, v. 3–36. The chosen passages: „Adhuc, medium in demonstratione potissima dicit ,quid' et ,propter quid'; ,quid' autem et ,propter quid' nec habet deus nec habere potest… (…) Si enim demonstraretur esse de deo, oportet, quod esset medium diffinite dicens ,quid' et ,propter quid' vel esse divini vel dei, secundum duas opiniones… (…). Neutrum autem in deo diffinibile est diffinitione dicente ,quid' et ,propter quid'. (…) Demonstratio ,quia' non fit nisi duobus modis, scilicet per causam remotam vel per effectum convertibilem. Per causam enim remotam non potest demonstrari, quia talem non habet; causa enim remota per coartationem fit proxima; et si deus vel esse dei talem causam haberet, sequeretur, quod ipse non esset causa prima, quod falsum est. Similiter per effectum non potest demonstrari; nullum habet effectum convertibilem et essentialem. (…) Demonstratio per signum, si debeat certificare sicut vera demonstratio, oportet quod fiat per signum convertibile cum causa; nullum tale signum est in effectibus dei. (...)".

second case, Albert says that no effect is convertible and essential, which means that we cannot necessarily conclude about the cause from the effect.

Finally, he takes a demonstration by sign (*per signum*) into account, because St. Augustine said: "omnia opera sua significationis suae sparsit indicia" (*De civitate Dei*, lib. 11, 24). But to accept such a demonstration, we must be sure that a given sign is convertible with its cause (like in the case of an effect) and there is no such a sign, so we cannot use this kind of demonstration.

We will not find such a complex argument in ST_{TA}. However, Thomas also formulates an argument pointed at demonstrating from effects (q. 2, a. 2, arg. 3): GE may be demonstrated only from its effects, but they are not proportional to their cause (they are finite, but their cause is infinite); cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect which is not proportional to it, so GE is not demonstrable.

Having formulated these three arguments, Albert adds that we can imagine that someone asserts that GE is not demonstrable, because it is self-evident. In order to confirm self-evidence of GE he gives four arguments. 1. He quotes opinion of John of Damascus: "notitia existendi deum omnibus per naturam inserta est". 2. Then he refers to the Boethius' definition of axiom – namely: some common truth, accepted by everybody who hear it, because if he knows the meaning of terms used in such a sentence, he just knows it; and everybody who knows what "God" and "to exist" mean, knows

that God exists. 3. Next, he quotes *De caelo et mundo*: everybody agrees that God is in heaven; if He is somewhere, He does exist. 4. Finally, Albert says that if God is *principium intellegendi* (what was said before), everybody who understands something intellectually, accepts that God exists. And the objection to these four arguments is that – according do Ps. 14(13), 1 – "the foolish man has said in his heart: there is no God"[17]. Let us note that most of these arguments we find in works of Aquinas. The first one – almost identical – in ST_{TA} (q. 2, a. 1, arg. 1) and *Super Sent.$_{TA}$* (lib. 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 1), and the second one – very similar – in ST_{TA} (q. 2, a. 1, arg. 2) and in *SCG* (lib. 1, c. 10, n. 4). Whereas the fourth one we can find in *SCG* (lib. 1, c. 10, n. 6) and *Super Sent.$_{TA}$* (lib. 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 2). *In contrarium* to these arguments is the same in ST_{TA} (q. 2, a. 1, s.c.) and *Super Sent.$_{TA}$* (lib. 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, s.c. 1). It may mean, that apart from the third one, Albert collected rather commonly known arguments for the discussed thesis. We may also point out that in Thomas' writings there are at least three other arguments: from existence of truth, which is God Himself (*ST$_{TA}$*, q. 2, a. 1, arg. 3), from the thesis that every human tends to God (*SCG*, lib. 1, c. 10, n. 5), and the famous ontological proof of Anselm of Canterbury (*SCG*, lib. 1, c. 10, n. 3; *Super Sent.$_{TA}$*, lib. 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, arg. 2). And in *Super Sent.$_{TA}$* there is an original *sed contra*, that even philosophers demonstrated GE, so it is not self-evident (lib. 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, s.c. 2).

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[17] Tamże, v. 42–74.

All objections presented in the above arguments reveal some important worries about the demonstrability of GE. Let us sum them up:

1. It may be impossible to demonstrate GE, because human reason and intellect are not capable to comprehend God and His existence, while it is necessary if we want to make them subjects of demonstration.

2. None of possible kinds of demonstration is capable to be used as a proof of GE.

3. I seems that GE is self-evident, so it is not demonstrable.

The third problem is not very troublesome; it seems that self-evidence does not necessarily exclude demonstrability, although this would be some some *superfluum*, as noted Aquinas in SCG (lib. 1, c. 10, n. 1). Whereas the first and especially the second are really serious.

The most important in the analyzed fragments is that Albert presents main kinds of demonstration to check if some of them can be used to prove GE. In this way he shows that such a proof must meet a very high standard of demonstration and produce a conclusion which is necessary.

3. God's existence is demonstrable

Although the demonstrability of GE is a topic of the q. 17 of *ST*, Albert reveals some important information in this matter earlier – in the c. 1 of the q. 14. He states there that from natural things we can positively know about God only that He exists. But who He is – we could know only infinitely, which is impossible[18]. But we can know who He is not, so on the way of negation or privation (*privativo*). The opinion that by the natural reason we can know that God exists, but we cannot comprehend Him, was common in 13th century. However, Albert strengthens it by the authority of John of Damascus, who said: "Quoniam igitur est quidem deus, manifestum est; quid vero est secundum substantiam et naturam, incomprehensibile est hoc omnino et ignotum". Then Albert re-

cords that according to Cicero Aristotle proved GE and presents the first proof of GE (taken from Cicero's *De natura deorum*, l. 2, c. 6, n. 17). It is based on the analogy with a beautiful empty house which – as everybody rightly assumes – must have had an architect. The conclusion is that nothing in the world can be a cause of the world, but the world needs someone wise, whose virtues exceed every world's virtue; in this way it is possible to know God from the natural things. Finally, he says that this is the meaning of the passage from Rom. 1, 20: "Invisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur"[19].

To sum up, Albert does not use here a term *demonstratio*, but he accepts that we can know that God exists on the basis of created world. He records: 1) an

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[18] Por. *Super Sent.*$_{TA}$, lib. 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, arg. 4.
[19] *ST*, tr. 3, q. 14, c. 1, s. 51, v. 17–71.

opinion of John of Damascus, who asserts that GE is obvious or clear (*manifestum*), 2) a proof or an argument and 3) a passage from Holy Scripture which confirms the accepted thesis. On this bases he does not judge yet, if GE is *per se notum* or *demonstrabile*.

This problem is finally resolved in the q. 17. Having presented objections, Albert confronts them with the passage from Rom. 1, 20 and concludes that GE is demonstrable *per effectum*. And in he solution he shows that we can discern such kinds of demonstration:

1) in a large or common way (*large sive communiter*) – when we use any proof (*ostensio*), by internal or external premises (*sive in se sive in alio*);

2) in a strict or proper way (*stricte sive proprie*) – a syllogism in which we conclude by essential and convertible medium term, no matter if this medium term is a cause, an effect or any other equivalent, as for example a sign; it has two kinds:

    2.1) *demonstratio ostensiva*,

    2.2) *demonstratio ad impossibile.*

Albert states that in the case of *demonstratio ostensiva* (2.1) it is impossible to demonstrate GE, and he confirms the strongest objection – arg. 3. This means that we cannot use a strict syllogism to prove GE *per effectum*. As far as other cases are concerned, Albert allows to demonstrate GE. In the case of *ostensio* (1) he even says that such a demonstration is easy. And to illustrate how we can demonstrate GE *ad impossibile* (2.2) he says that – according to Aristotle's positions against Heraclitus in book IV of *Metaphysics* – if we assumed that God does not exist, there would result many impossible conclusions[20].

Hence, the outcome is:

Kind of demonstration		Demonstrability of GE
Demonstration in the common way (*ostensio*) (1)		+
Demonstration in the proper way	*demonstratio ostensiva* (2.1)	–
	demonstratio ad impossibile (2.2)	+

In this light let us see the answers to the objections. According to Albert the sentence "God exists" is not properly an article of faith, but rather an antecedent to every article (similarly in ST_{TA}, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1). The second argument is

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[20] *ST*, tr. 3, q. 17, s. 84, v. 75 – s. 85, v. 3. The chosen fragments: „(...) Communiter demonstratur, quod quacumque ostensione ostenditur, sive in se sive in alio. Et hoc modo demonstrabile est deum esse. (…) Et hoco modo facile demonstratur deum esse. Stricte autem vel proprie dicitur demonstratio syllogismus, per medium essentiale et convertibile concludens, sive hoc medium sit causa sive effectus sive alteri alteri illorum aequivalens ut signum convertibile. Et heac demonstratio duplex est, ostensiva scilicet et ad impossibile. Dicimus ergo, quod demonstratione ostensiva non est demonstrabile deum esse, sicut bene probatum est obiciendo. Sed demonstratione ad impossibile demonstrabile est deum esse... (…)".

accepted – because the perfect comprehension is impossible, GE is not demonstrable *ostensive* (2.1). Also the third argument is accepted. However, Albert stresses that from the objections recorded in this argument does not follow that GE is not demonstrable in another way and he admits that there is such a way. With regard to signs, they cannot be a basis for a demonstration, but it is possible to use them in a "sufficient persuasion"[21]. And as far as the contrary argument, in which Albert quotes the passage from Rom. 1, 20, is concerned, those "invisible things of God" can be seen through "what had been made", but not by *demonstratio ostensiva*, but by *ostensio* "sufficient for persuasion"[22]. Finally, Albert resolves the problem of self-evidence. He makes some distinctions and in majority of cases states that they do not disturb to demonstrate GE[23]. However, it is interesting that he seems to accept almost all arguments for self-evidence of GE (except the last one). This problem is resolved completely differently by Aquinas, who states that GE is self-evident

secundum se, but for us (*quoad nos*) it is not, so it needs a demonstration (ST_{TA}, q. 2, a. 1, co.; similarly *SCG*, lib. 1, c. 11, n. 1, and *Super Sent.$_{TA}$*, lib. 1, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, co.).

The most important information given by Albert in his solution and his answers are:

1. that GE is demonstrable,

2. that strict syllogistic demonstration of GE *per effectum* is refuted,

3. that the way shown in Rom. 1, 20 is sufficient only for persuasion.

The second information may seem contrary to what Aquinas has written in ST_{TA}. In the corpus of q. 2 a. 2 Thomas discerns two kinds of demonstration: *propter quid*, which is by what is objectively prior (*per priora simpliciter*), and *quia*, which is *per effectum*, so by this what is prior only for us (*quoad nos*). Next, he states that from any effect we can demonstrate that its cause exists, because if an effect depends on some cause and we assume that there is the effect, it is necessary that there was its cause. And he concludes that GE is demonstrable *per effectum*[24]. If Thomas says here about the

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[21] *ST*, tr. 3, q. 17, s. 85, vv. 4–32.

[22] *ST*, tr. 3, q. 17, s. 85, vv. 33–37: „Ad id quod obicitur in contrarium, dicendum quod, invisibili dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur conspectione ostensionis sufficientis ad persuasionem et non conspectione demonstrationis ostensive".

[23] Albert discerns self-evidence: 1) *ex parte noscentis*, 2) *ex parte noscibilis* and 3) *propositio* which is know when we know its terms, and this third kind has also three kinds: a) known by anybody who hears it, b) known by all wise men, c) known by wise men who know who is God, what is *esse* and that God is a principle and source of *esse*. In the cases 1 and 2 Albert points that from self-evidence does not follow that there cannot be some rational proof, and in the case and 3b he says that a wise man proofs a self-evident truth. Por. *ST*, tr. 3, q. 17, s. 85, vv. 38–68.

[24] „Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae sunt priora quoad nos, cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem causae. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam causam eius esse (si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad nos), quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est per se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos".

demonstration which Albert calls *demonstratio ostensiva*, it means that their opinions are contrary. A possible explanation is that in some cases (like GE) Thomas accepts that an effect may be convertible with an existence of its cause.

But it is possible that Aquinas does not have in mind such a strict syllogistic demonstration here. Let us add that according to Albert's description, such a demonstration is limited to the categorical syllogism (because it has to have a medium term), but it cannot have a form of hypothetical syllogism. If these assumptions are right, we could admit that Aquinas thinks about a kind of demonstration which Albert called *ostensio*, and then they agree.

To resolve this problem we need to see the examples of proofs of GE which Albert accepted and compare them with those presented by Thomas.

Finally, the third of these most important information may raise serious doubts. Albert says that the thesis from Rom. 1, 20 is about what we see by *ostensio* which is "sufficient for persuasion". Does it mean that he admits that some of proofs of GE may have such a status and do not meet the standard of demonstration? I am afraid that if Albert does not point that a given argument is a demonstration, such a doubt is justified. However, we may assume something opposite – that he considered the question of demonstrability of GE so precisely that he will point it, if some argument or proof will have – in his opinion – a lower status, like *ostensio* which is sufficient for persuasion. Also in this case, in order to be convinced of this, we should analyze the examples of proofs of GE collected by Albert.

4. Demonstrability and seven proofs

In the q. 18 c. 1 of *ST* Albert presents proofs of GE. He calls them "the ways (*viae*) by which natural philosophers by the means of reason had known that God exists" (proem.). Five (or six) of these proofs are based on the text of the d. 3 of Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and come from St. Ambrose or St. Augustine. Next, Albert adds a proof taken from Aristotle and the last one – from Boethius. Afterwards, in the same chapter, he also adds two ways to know God's unity and trinity, which seems strange in the context of the topic of this chapter.

It is interesting that Albert, without any comment, decides to present proofs

taken from the *Sentences*. As it was already said, Albert states clearly the problem of GE in this question, whereas – as was also already said – Peter Lombard refers to the question of GE only in the first proof and the other proofs concern God's attributes. This may mean that Albert reworked these proofs to use them in the context of GE, however, it unfortunately seems that he did not succeed in every case.

The first proof, taken from St. Ambrose, is based on the notion of efficient cause and is similar to this presented by Albert in the q. 14. After quoting Lombard Albert tries to build his own argu-

mentation: 1) in all parts is made this, what must be made in the whole; 2) nothing is its own maker (*factiva sui*) (otherwise: *potentia = actum*, and: there is something and there is not at once); hence: 3) as a part has a particular efficient cause, the whole has a universal efficient cause, but it is not a maker of itself; 4) so no creature can be a maker of the world (*factor mundi*), hence such a maker is not a creature; 5) so he is creator (*creator*), so: God. Albert records here a similar proof of Augustine and John Chrysostom about *verbum* which is *principium*[25].

The second proof is attributed to Augustine (*De Civitate Dei*). Albert rather only paraphrases what he has found in Lombard's version and does not add much. The main argumentation may look similar to the Aristotelian proof from movement: 1) everything changes, it changes location or it starts to be, 2) and everything is in *potentia* to this, what changes or moves it; 3) but *universaliter motivum* and *universaliter activum* can be only God[26]. However, it is not clear if this proof is intended to prove GE or rather to show, what we know about God due to the operation of "ablation".

The third proof also comes from Augustine and again concerns the notion of efficient cause, so it is similar to the first one. However it seems extremely weak: 1) *universaliter factivum* cannot be made by something else; 2) everyone as-

sumes that God is *universaliter factivum*; 3) so He is not made by anything else, but He makes everything. Albert admits that this "way" certifies only that there is some maker of everything and this is God[27].

The fourth proof (also from Augustine) is rather intended to show, who God is, than to prove His existence. The conclusion of this proof is: He is *substantia intelligibilis intelligens* and the cause of every intelligence, which makes everything by intellect[28].

The fifth and the last proof taken from Lombard bases on the passage from Rom. 1, 20 and some Augustine's comments. But again it does not seem to prove GE, but some God's attributes by which He is super-eminent in comparison to creatures[29].

The sixth proof Albert borrows from Aristotle – this is the famous proof from movement, taken from book VIII of *Physics*. In short: 1) first mover (*motor primus*) cannot be moved by anything else; 2) what is a mover cannot move or be moved unless by first mover; 3) if first mover stops moving, everything stops; 4) we see that nothing stops and many things move, so: 5) it is necessary that there is a first mover, which is a moving and immobile act[30].

The seventh and the last proof comes from Boethius' *De hebdomadibus*. In short: 1) it is self-evident that everything what has existence (*esse*) and what is *this*

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[25] *ST*, tr. 3, q. 18, s. 86, vv. 12–44.
[26] Tamże, s. 86, vv. 45–63.
[27] Tamże, s. 86, vv. 64–70.
[28] Tamże, s. 87, vv. 1–23.
[29] Tamże, s. 87, vv. 24–57.
[30] Tamże, s. 87, vv. 58–81.

(*hoc*) – has it from another *this*; 2) everything that is in the world has existence and has that is *this*, so it has it from some another *this*; 3) from a determined cause it has that it is *this*; 4) so it has not its essence from the same cause; 5) every second cause is determined; 6) so it has that it is *this* from no second cause; 7) there is some cause of existence in made beings; 8) it may be only a first or a second cause; 9) so it must be that caused existence is from the first cause and we call it God[31].

This set of proofs or "ways" differs much from the famous five ways of Aquinas (ST_{TA}, q. 2, a. 3, co.). Albert wanted only to report the common proofs without an attempt to formulate some original and really strong proof, while Thomas – although he based on the whole philosophical tradition – tried in ST_{TA} to choose really strong and order them well. Moreover, it seems that Albert in ST is still under strong influence of Lombard's *Sentences*; he is not able to leave some of the Lombard's proofs or correct some of them in his own way. The result is that, despite the task stated in *proemium*, some of these proofs does not prove GE and other are really weak. Only the Aristotelian and Boethian have some strength, however they are not perfectly ordered. Four of them are similar to those presented by Aquinas: two from efficient cause, Aristotelian (first mover) and the one concerning gradation which leads to perfection. But they are far from well-ordered and clear proofs from ST_{TA}. We should note that in ST there is no proof con-cerning possibility or necessity, what is present in ST_{TA}. There is also no onto-logical proof. Here Albert is of the same opinion as Thomas, and consequently accepts only proofs based on sensual observation – *per effectum*.

What is most important, Albert's presentation unfortunately left many doubts arisen on the basis of q. 17. The cause lies in the weakness of these proofs and in the fact that the fifth proof uses the passage from Rom 1, 20 which – according to Albert – concerns *ostensio* sufficient for persuasion. Thus, what status have these proofs? Are they kinds of demonstration or just a persuasive argument? If they were constructed like in ST_{TA}, we could argue that Albert really conducts demonstration and the presented ways are really proofs. However, the first, the sixth and the seventh still may pretend to be examples of demonstration and not only a persuasive argument.

If we remember that a proof from the first mover is present also in ST_{TA} and if we assume that at least this proof is a kind of demonstration, then we have a basis to say that for sure Albert would recognize Aquinas' arguments as a demonstration, but not as *demonstratio ostensiva*, but as *ostensio*. If so, although Thomas accepts *demonstratio 'quia'* to prove GE *per effectum*, both Dominicans agree.

Finally, we should remind that Albert noted that one of strict kinds of demonstration is *demonstratio ad impossibile* and said that this was a certain way to prove GE. However he did not present any proof of this kind in *ST*. It is not clear why he did not do it.

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[31] Tamże, s. 87, v. 82 – s. 88, v. 13.

5. Conclusions

The above analysis allows the following conclusions.

1. Albert in *ST* states and resolves the problem of demonstrability of GE.

2. He states there that GE is demonstrable, but not in every form of demonstration. It is impossible to demonstrate GE ostensively in a "strict" way which he calls *demonstratione ostensiva*, so through the syllogism (perhaps he has in mind only categorical syllogism) in which we conclude by essential and convertible medium term (which can be a cause, an effect or any other equivalent, as for example a sign). It is possible to demonstrate GE: 1) in the form of demonstration in a "larger" or "common" way, which Albert calls just *ostensio*, so any logically correct proof, or 2) in the form of kind of demonstration in the strict way which is *demonstratio ad impossibile*. Albert admits that by *ostensio* it is even "easy" to prove GE.

3. According to Albert GE is in the same time self-evident, but it does not mean that GE should not be demonstrated.

4. Albert states in *ST* that GE is not perfectly comprehensible for human intellect, so we cannot use it as a medium term in syllogisms. He also sketches there the highest standards for necessary demonstration (*demonstratio ostensiva*).

5. Although we may find some arguments and objections from *ST* in Aquinas' writings, in many points the solutions of Albert and Thomas differ very much. This may indicate their independence and originality, but at this stage this is only a hypothesis. There is a great difference in solutions concerning the question of self-evidence of GE and demonstrability of GE. However, the analysis of proofs of GE, presented by Albert, gives a basis to argue that in this last case their views are coherent.

6. Albert recognize in *ST* the main argument for demonstrability of GE: "Invisibilia dei per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciuntur" (Rom. 1, 20) as *ostensio* "sufficient for persuasion". On this basis arises a doubt, which proofs or arguments meet the standard of demonstration and thus provide necessary conclusions, and which have only a persuasive significance.

7. Albert in *ST* poses independently the problem of GE and in this context he provides seven proofs. These are "ways by which natural philosophers by the means of reason had known that God exists", so they do not tend to be original. Five of them come from the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, where they do not prove GE except the first one, but rather they prove God's attributes. Although Albert in ST states clearly the question of GE, it seems that he remains under the influence of *Sentences* and fails in presenting well-ordered proofs of GE. Only one of them and two additional (Aristotelian and Boethian) pretend to be correct demonstrations. The rest has definitely lower status and should not be regarded as examples of demonstration.

8. It seems strange that, first, Albert lists *demonstratio ad impossible* as a way to prove GE, but next – he does not present any such a proof, although it would bring a necessary conclusion.

The demonstrability of God's existence in *Summa theologiae* of Albert the Great on the background of writings of Thomas Aquinas

Demonstrability of God's existence is one of most important philosophical problems. It was discussed by Albert the Great in his *Summa theologiae*. However I did not find any work which analyzed how he did it and only one work which mentioned this problem. This topic seems crucial in philosophy, because it opens the way for proving God's existence. It was obvious for Thomas Aquinas – also in his *Summa theologia* the issue of demonstrability of God's existence precedes the famous "five ways". This is why in this paper I analyze Albert's discussion about demonstrability of God's existence in his most mature, not finished work *Summa theologiae*. At every step I compare it with parallel passages from theological works of Thomas Aquinas to trace down common points and original solutions of both thinkers.

The outcome of this analysis is to some extend surprising. Although Albert and Thomas sometimes formulate similar arguments, it happens that their answers are completely different. For example Albert states that God's existence is generally self-evident, whereas Thomas – that for us (*quoad nos*) it is not. What is more, Aquinas says that we can demonstrate God's existence from the effect (*per effectum*), while Albert, who distinguish three kinds of demonstration, seems to refute such a possibility and allows only demonstration *ad impossibile* and less strict demonstrations. Although it is possible to agree their views in this case, we finally do not know if they really would agree. Some more information concerning the discussed problem we obtain from Alberts' presentation of proofs of God's existence. However it differs a lot from Aquinas' presentation in his *Summa theologiae*. Moreover, on the background of Albert's earlier statements it is doubtful if he treats all collected proofs as correct demonstrations which provide necessary conclusions.

Albert's discussion about demonstrability of God's existence leave many questions. However it seems interesting, inspiring and leads to rethink again Thomas' positions.

Możliwość dowiedzenia istnienia Boga w *Summie teologii* Alberta Wielkiego na tle pism Tomasza z Akwinu

Słowa kluczowe: istnienie Boga, dowodliwość, Albert Wielki, Tomasz z Akwinu, historia filozofii średniowiecznej.

Możliwość dowiedzenia istnienia Boga jest jednym z najważniejszych problemów filozoficznych. Została ona rozważona przez Alberta Wielkiego w jego *Summie teologii*. Nie znalazłem jednak żadnej pracy, w której przeanalizowanoby, jak to zrobił, i tylko jedną pracę, w której o tym wspominano. Temat ten wydaje się niezwykle istotny dla filozofii, ponieważ otwiera drogę do dowodzenia istnienia Boga. Było to oczywiste dla Tomasza z Akwinu – również w jego *Summie teologii* zagadnienie możliwości dowiedzenia istnienia Boga poprzedza słynne „pięć dróg". Z tych powodów w artykule tym analizuję rozważania Alberta na temat dowodliwości istnienia Boga w jego najdojrzalszym, nie dokończonym dziele pt. *Summa teologii*. Na każdym etapie porównuję je z paralelnymi fragmentami pism Tomasza z Akwinu, by wyśledzić pewne miejsca wspólne oraz oryginalne rozwiązania obu myślicieli.

Wynik tej analizy jest w pewnym stopniu zaskakujący. Choć Albert i Tomasz formułują czasem podobne argumenty, zdarza się, że ich odpowiedzi są zupełnie różne. Na przykład Albert stwierdza, że istnienie Boga jest, ogólnie rzecz biorąc, oczywiste samo przez się, podczas gdy Tomasz – że dla nas (*quoad nos*) – wcale tak nie jest. Ponadto, Akwinata twierdzi, że możemy dowieść istnienia Boga na podstawie skutku (*per effectum*), natomiast Albert, który wyróżnia trzy rodzaje dowodzenia, wydaje się odrzucać taką możliwość i dopuszcza jedynie dowodzenie *ad impossibile* oraz mniej ścisłe rodzaje dowodzenia. Chociaż możliwe jest uzgodnienie ich stanowisk w tej sprawie, to jednak ostatecznie nie ma pewności, czy myśliciele ci rzeczywiście osiągnęliby konsensus. Dodatkowe informacje dotyczące dyskutowanego zagadnienia uzyskujemy z Albertowej prezentacji dowodów istnienia Boga. Prezentacja ta różni się jednak od Tomaszowej prezentacji z *Summy teologii*. Co więcej, na tle wcześniejszych stwierdzeń Alberta wątpliwe jest, czy wszystkie te dowody traktuje on jako poprawnie przeprowadzone dowodzenie, dzięki któremu otrzymuje się konieczne wnioski.

Albertowa dyskusja na temat możliwości dowodzenia istnienia Boga pozostawia wiele pytań. Wydaje się jednak ciekawa, inspirująca i skłania do ponownego przemyślenia stanowisk Tomasza.