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POLISH STRATEGIC THOUGHT IN SHAPING SECURITY POLICY

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ABSTRACT

Inquiry into the origins, essence and meaning of the term *strategy* dates back to the sixth century BC. Since then there has been an attempt to understand and explain its meaning and specify the place in the system of concepts. History shows that views have changed with the development of social relations, economic development and technological progress. Strategy in its original meaning was the field of martial arts, superior to the others and one of the oldest. Over the decades, it has become a discipline or specialty of martial science, and military science later. The term *strategy* is currently used in many areas of political, social and economic life. A particular variation is its security strategy, which includes the creation, preparation and use of state capacity to counter any threat to its existence and development.

The author analyzes the evolution of Polish strategic thought in shaping national security in turn of the XX and XXI century.

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INTRODUCTION

Political and military transformations that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of the twentieth century not only changed the balance of power in international relations, but also forced the individual countries – including Poland – to introduce an amendment of strategic documents regulating the security of the state in the new conditions.

STRATEGIC FROM THE HISTORICAL POINT OF VIEW

It is assumed that the origins of knowledge about the strategy in written form dates back to ancient Greece and Rome. There the first theoretical studies appeared, in which attempts have been made not only to describe, but first of all to determine the regularities governing the armed struggle and use them to create the rules and directives

of practical action. At that time defined tasks for strategy have not only pragmatic nature, but focused mainly on the formulation of rules for preparing an army, organization of marches or determining how to conduct battles. The strategy and connected with it strategic knowledge were therefore conceived as a form of generalship art¹.

Significant impact on the development of strategies have practical war experiences in antiquity. Strategy as a practice was shaped on the base on the experiences of the great leaders of that period:

¹ M. Kozub, *Myśleć strategicznie o bezpieczeństwie przyszłości*, Warsaw 2013, p. 70.

- Alexander III of Macedon – an outstanding strategist, one of the greatest leaders in the history of warfare²,
- Hannibal – a great leader, a master of the enemy two-leaf encirclement maneuver³,
- Scipio African the Younger – Roman leader of the Third Punic War period; thoroughly investigated the cause of victories and defeats⁴,
- Julius Caesar – Roman politician, leader, dictator, writer – the author of a study on the conduct of quick war⁵,
- Sun Tzu – the most famous Chinese military leader and theorist⁶,
- Genghis Khan – the creator and ruler of the Mongol Empire for many years⁷,
- Cyrus II the Great – a great leader and an author of the military achievements⁸.

Mainly thanks to historians we have the knowledge of strategic theory of ancient Greece. In contrast, the Roman strategic thought, is mainly due to the Greeks' written works. Among the many thinkers this period includes:

- Xenophon – Greek historian, philosopher, soldier and military theorist⁹,
- Thucydides – a Greek historian, author of *the Peloponnesian War*¹⁰,
- Vegetius¹¹ – a military writer of Roman Empire, the author of compendium of martial arts of ancient Rome¹²,
- Onosandros¹³ – the author of the work *Duties of the Chief* describing the quality of good commander,

- Ammianus Marcellinus – the author of *History* in which he presented the historical sources for understanding the strategies of the late Roman period¹⁴,
- Julius Cesar¹⁵ – the Roman politician, leader and writer.

The Middle Ages is characterized by regression and stagnation of strategic thinking and the art of war, moreover the wars conducted in this period did not play a significant role in the development of the strategy. The medieval military thought thus became very poor and consequently, there were no significant works. Only Niccolo Machiavelli, Italian lawyer, philosopher and political writer, justified the changes in the art of war and strategy. In his work *The Prince*, he has redefined the concept of state and politics, which in his opinion should be close to external security, internal peace, stability and level of prosperity¹⁶.

The modern strategic thought began to form only at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and its development was inter alia the result of increasing complexity of the art of war, the consolidation of the principalities into a single state, or for more intellectual reasons, for example, the interest of civilians in the military issues.

In the nineteenth century two leading, as it is believed, theorists of strategy appeared: Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz and Swiss General Henri Jomini.

C. Clausewitz in his book *On War* evaluated deeply the criticism of knowledge of theory of war, including strategies. Great value of this work arises from a thorough and scientific examination of the phenomenon of war and all its conditions. Particular emphasis was placed on the relativity of all theoretical indications and the dominant role of the psyche in the war, moreover, the political background of the war was also formulated¹⁷.

² See: P. Cartledge, *Aleksander Wielki*, Warsaw 2005; K. Bunsch, *Aleksander*, Cracow 1985.

³ See: S. Lancel, *Hannibal*, Warsaw 2001.

⁴ Polibiusz, *Dzieje*, Wrocław 1957, p. 153-154.

⁵ See: J. Boheński, *Boski Juliusz*, Warsaw 2009.

⁶ See: Sun Tsu, *Sztuka wojenna*, Warsaw 1994.

⁷ See: L. Podhorodecki, *Czyngis-chan*, Warsaw 1991.

⁸ See: S. Imhoff, A. MacShamrain, R. Killeen, *Historia świata*, Warsaw 2001.

⁹ Ksenofont, *Wspomnienia o Sokratesie*, [in:] *Pisma sokratyczne*, Warsaw 1067, p. 122-123.

¹⁰ Tukidydes, *Wojna peloponeska*, Warsaw 1988, p. 391.

¹¹ More: *Mała encyklopedia wojskowa*, vol. III, Warsaw 1970, p. 215.

¹² *Słownik wyrazów obcych PWN*, Warsaw 1991, p. 926.

¹³ More: L. Wyszczelski, *Teorie wojenne i ich twórcy na przestrzeni dziejów*, Warsaw 2009.

¹⁴ More: H. Cichocka, *Mowy i listy w „Res destan” Ammiana Marcellina*, [in:] „Meander” no 30/1975, p. 157-165.

¹⁵ More: R. Kuźniar, *Polityka i siła. Studia strategiczne – zarys problematyki*, Warsaw 2005.

¹⁶ Z. Sabak, *Strategia. Ewolucja paradygmatu. Konkluzja na XXI wiek*, Warsaw 2012, p. 13.

¹⁷ V. Galatik, A., Krásný, K. Zetocha, *Vojenská strategie*, Praha 2008, p. 30.

H. Jomini is considered to be one of the main founders of modern strategic thinking and strategy. In his work *Outline of the Art of War* the definition of strategy was presented, which he called the art of bringing the main forces of the army to the most important point of the theater of war¹⁸.

In the period preceding the First World War and its duration, there were no events noticed that had an important impact on the development and changes in strategic thinking. The Second World War was a test and verification of the number of previous plans and the strategic concepts. First of all, it was a gigantic experience, from which benefited and still are benefiting successive strategists. Strategic thought has incorporated itself into a new form of territorial expansionism, and a situation has appeared in which geopolitics began to set goals for politics, and then politics for strategies¹⁹.

During the period of the Cold War, international relations were dominated by a number of strategies for the West and the East. War strategies of the West are primarily NATO strategies, mainly based on the American strategic concepts resulting from the assessment of threats to international security. The international *communist strategy* was mainly based on the doctrine of the Soviet Union, assuming the spread of world Communism, and at the same time the crucial importance of Marxism-Leninism was confirmed as the basis of military strategy.

In such a complex politically and militarily world the lively discourses among theorists took place on the role and place of strategy in the present. Particularly active were: British military writer Basil Henry Liddell Hart²⁰ and French General Andre Beaufre²¹, whose views influenced the perception and the extension of the theory of strategy. Ongoing discussions about the strategy of the analyzed period, were also present in the Polish military thought. The flourishing of strategic thinking can be seen in the work of theorists

of the interwar period, such as Stefan Mossor²², Stanislaw Franciszek Skibinski²³ or Role-Arciszewski²⁴.

POLISH SECURITY STRATEGIES

After World War II, Poland was in the Soviet sphere of influence, and therefore in the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Polish security concepts from the years 1945-1990 can be seen in military doctrine of Polish People's Republic, often referred to as the defensive doctrine. It was developed as a set of views on the military threat of the country, the nature of a possible war and the rules regarding the preparation of the state, the armed forces and the public for its conduct, expressed in concrete projects of a military and non-military character carried out in time of peace and a possible war²⁵. In terms of political and ideological view it was almost the same as was the doctrine of the Warsaw Pact.

From the beginning of the political transformation in Poland, one of the most urgent task was to search for a new concept of national security, corresponding to the introduced changes. *Defensive Doctrine of Polish Republic*²⁶ adopted by the Committee of Defense on 21 February, 1990 became officially in force. In the post-war Polish history this was the first, open document specifying and declaring in public for their own nation, allies and the international community the basic elements of the national defense strategy of the Republic of Poland and at the same time it charted the general policies applying for state defense force, government agencies, businesses,

¹⁸ H. Jomini, *Zarys sztuki wojennej*, Warsaw 1966, p. 247.

¹⁹ R. Kuźniar, *Polityka i siła...*, op. cit., p. 79.

²⁰ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategia. Działania pośrednie*, Warsaw 1959, p. 433.

²¹ A. Beaufre, *Wstęp do strategii. Odstraszenie i strategia*, Warsaw 1968, p. 259-260.

²² S. Mossor, *Sztuka wojenna w warunkach nowoczesnej wojny*, Warsaw 1986, p. 203.

²³ J. Pawłowski (edited), *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego*, Warsaw 2002, p. 132.

²⁴ S. Rola-Arciszewski, *Sztuka dowodzenia na zachodzie Europy*, Warsaw 1934, p. 45.

²⁵ More: B. Chocha, J. Kaczmarek, *Wojna i doktryny wojenne*, Warsaw 1980; B. Chocha, *Wybrane zagadnienia doktryny obronności PRL*, „Myśl Wojskowa” 1968, no 10; F. Skibiński, *Wojna*, „Myśl Wojskowa” 1968, no 12; J. Pawłowski (edited), *Słownik terminów z zakresu bezpieczeństwa ...*, op. cit.; A. Falkowski, *Pecunia nervus belli. Kształtowanie budżetu obronnego Polski*, Warsaw 1998; F. Puchala, *Sekrety Sztabu Generalnego pojałtańskiej Polski*, Warsaw 2011.

²⁶ See: M. P. no 9, item 66 from 1990.

community and professional organizations and every citizen. *The Doctrine* states that the overall Polish goal is the survival of state and nation. Furthermore, security policy was to be implemented on the basis of full sovereignty and territorial integrity.

As a result of major events in Europe, on 2 November 1992 the National Defense Committee adopted two more documents important for security policy: *Assumptions of Polish Security Policy* and *Polish Republic Security Policy and Defense Strategy*.

Assumptions of Polish Security Policy defined the basic principles of our country's policy in the field of internal and external security. It was considered that the Atlantic Alliance remains an essential factor for political stability and peace in Europe, and Poland supports the presence of American troops on the continent. The strategic Polish goal was to become a member of NATO and the Western European Union as a fundamental pillar of the European system of collective security. In the field of internal security the problem of the growth of internal threats (political and socio-economic) was undertaken as it significantly weakens the structure of the state and increases its vulnerability to external pressures²⁷. The document was dealing with an issue of threats characterization indicating their political, socio-economic and ecological background, which weakens the state and increases its sensibility to external pressures and infiltration. The primary means of countering these threats is the maximum stimulation of the transition process and shortening the transition period.

Polish Republic Security Policy and Defense Strategy adopted in 2000 focuses on establishing the basics of Polish security policy, risks and challenges assessment and identification of the types of activity and instruments for the implementation of this policy. It also defines the base of the defense strategy, which has been further developed in a separate document. *The Strategy* sets out the strategic objectives of Polish security policy, including among them:

- ensuring the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the state,
- ensuring the protection of democratic constitutional order,
- establishing the best conditions for a comprehensive and sustainable social and economic development of the country,
- contributing to building a sustainable, just and peaceful order in Europe and in the world.

According to these objectives the basic principles of Polish security policy are clarified as follows:

- regarding safety as a complex of variety political, military, economic, social, environmental, energy and other factors,
- fulfilling security policy in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and OSCE documents,
- directing according to the values, ideals and principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and the European Treaties,
- implementing national security interests in the framework of the North Atlantic alliance system of cooperation and solidarity,
- using force in the international arena only as the fulfilment of the right to defense, enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations²⁸.

In the section devoted to threats there are: the existence of an excessive concentration of military capabilities in certain regions, the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, economic risks (energy security issues), the danger of new divisions in Europe, uncontrolled cross-border migration, environmental hazards, terrorism and organized crime, information security issues and the activity of foreign special services.

Implementation of Polish security policy is included in strategy as four types of activities which are national actions, integration with Western security structures, involvement in internation-

²⁷ More: S. Koziej, *Założenia polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa oraz polityka bezpieczeństwa i strategia obronna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Internet course book, Warszawa/Ursynów 2008, www.koziej.pl, access: 18.IX.2014.

²⁸ Ibidem.

al activities to resolve a dangerous situation by active participation in international security processes carried out by the UN, the OSCE, cooperation with other international entities to strengthen international stability and security²⁹.

At the beginning of the XXI century security environment has fundamentally changed in the world. Security threats have undergone a significant reassessment and new, dangerous varieties appeared. A terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 became a spectacular event, which forced the majority of countries, including Poland, to redefine their security strategy. The need to adopt a new security strategy resulted not only from the large scale and dynamics of changes in the international situation after 2001. There have always been new challenges and threats, as well as changes in security conditions.

The new document, *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, was adopted at a meeting of the Council of Ministers on 22 July 2003, and the President signed it on 8 September 2003.

The new *Strategy* treats national security as a category covering all aspects and areas of national security: external and internal, military and civilian. This is the appropriate response to the changes that have taken place in the security environment in the recent years. Undoubtedly, the most characteristic feature of security is the blurring of sharp boundaries and merging of various phenomena in the sphere of security³⁰.

National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland confirmed the basic objectives of national security policy adopted in previous policy documents, emphasizing that they are invariably connected with the protection of the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Poland, maintaining the inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of the country. The *Strategy* assumed that state policy should serve to ensure the safety of Polish citizens, human rights and fundamental freedoms, democratic order in the country, crea-

tion of undisturbed conditions for civilization and economic development of Poland and the prosperity of its citizens, the protection of national heritage and national identity, the implementation of alliance commitments, as well as defending and promoting the interests of the Polish state. Such an understanding of national security policy was to provide appropriate levels of security, based inter alia on NATO guarantees³¹.

The Strategy points to new threats, particularly dangerous for the international system as well as the Polish *raison d'etat*. They are: organized international terrorism, uncontrolled proliferation of mass destruction weapons and their means of delivery, unpredictable politics of authoritarian regimes, international organized crime, increasing potential threat that foreign special services, as well as terrorist groups or extremist may attempt to gain unauthorized access to classified information, the risks in the area of IT communication, economic, energy, environmental and demographic risks.

In the scope of countering new threats to the security of the state *Strategy* determines the list of tasks for state services, including the armed forces and the intelligence services. It emphasizes the growing importance of the sphere of internal security, which is created by all public authorities and other social and economic players, performing tasks in the field of security and defense.

National Security Strategy of 2003 was an important and necessary document. However, it should be noted that at the strategic and theoretical dimension were almost full implementation of the EU's perception of the threat to Polish security strategy³².

The Council of Ministers adopted a new *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* on 5 November 2007, and the President signed this document on 13 November 2007. At the beginning of the document a new approach

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ More: S. Koziej, *Strategie bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z 2003 i 2007 roku*, Internet course book, Warsaw/Ursynów 2008, www.koziej.pl, access: 21.IX.2014.

³¹ M. Kulisz, *Analiza procesu planowania strategicznego bezpieczeństwa Polski w latach 1990-2007*, „DOCTRINA Studia Społeczno-Polityczne”, no 5, 2008, p. 6.

³² More: A. Podolski, *Polska Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego jako praktyczna implementacja Europejskiej Strategii Bezpieczeństwa – między teorią a praktyką*, „Raporty i Analizy”, no 1/05, Warsaw 2005.

to the issues of national security may be noticed. It defines national interests and formulates strategic objectives in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. At the same time it ensures that *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* is correlated with allied strategies: Strategic Concept of NATO and the European Security Strategy³³.

In the first chapter national interests that arise from the fundamental and unchanging Polish values are formulated. Their implementation is for the state and its citizens paramount need. They are presented in three groups:

- vested interests of the Republic of Poland – determining the guarantee of the survival of the state and its citizens,
- important interests of the Republic of Poland – ensuring sustainable and balanced economic and civilization development of the country,
- essential interest of the Republic of Poland – associated with the desire to ensure the strong international position of the state³⁴.

Special attention deserves a catalog of strategic objectives, arising from the security interests of the Republic of Poland. It contains the following objectives: to ensure the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Poland, to create conditions for economic and civilization development, to ensure the constitutional freedoms of human beings and citizens, to develop actively the relations in the international environment, to ensure the safety, protection and care of Polish citizens outside the country, the protection of the spiritual and material heritage, environmental protection, to ensure wide access to information, to raise the level of national education³⁵.

The second chapter analyses the characteristic features of national security pointing out that on the security of Poland is influenced mainly by phenomena and processes in region, Europe, and in the frame of Euro-Atlantic Community. The challenges for security were listed:

- demographic changes in Poland,
- increasing differences in prosperity and living standards of citizens,
- the necessity to complete the transformation of the Polish legal system,
- the weakness of Polish infrastructure,
- lack of diversification of energy supplies³⁶.

In the third chapter of the *Strategy* it is claimed that the condition for the achievement of strategic objectives is the use of entire range of available instruments and activities of political, economic, military and diplomatic character, and maximum opportunities of Polish membership in NATO and the European Union and the partnership with the United States.

The fourth chapter of the *Strategy* is devoted to national security system. It was considered to be an urgent task to build an efficient, effective and well-organized system of national security of Poland as fully integrated, coherent and ordered totality³⁷. It should include all the entities responsible for security according to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and relevant laws, authorities and institutions belonging to the legislative, executive and judicial authorities, including Parliament, the President of the Republic of Poland, the Council of Ministers and central government bodies. Important elements of the national security system are the armed forces and the departments and government agencies committed to preventing and countering external threats, ensuring public safety, salvage and protection of people and property in emergency situations, as well as local authorities and other legal entities, including entrepreneurs creating industrial and defense potential.

According to the *Strategy* National Security System is composed of:

- management subsystem – specialized in the field of security forces and measures of the state (diplomatic, military, intelligence, counter-intelligence, police, fire-fighters, border guards, emergency services etc.)

³³ See: *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Warsaw 2007.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ Ibidem.

³⁶ Ibidem.

³⁷ Ibidem.

- executive subsystems – the remaining elements of the state structure.

National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland is the first document of such importance, which integrates national security in a substantive way. A shortcoming of *the Strategy* may be the concept of document: criteria for the allocation of security and the relationship between different areas.

New problems that could quickly become a threat to the proper functioning of states and societies began to appear with the passage of time, both in the world and in the Polish surrounding. In order to take into account the potential risks and challenges, an effort was undertaken to develop a new concept of security. In 2009 the new rules of development of policy were adopted by the Council of Ministers and allowed for the change in the current approach to national security policy and the connection of it to the politics of socio-economic development.

The Resolution of the Council of Ministers on 9 April 2013 adopted a new *Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022*³⁸, which results from *Strategic Review of National Security*³⁹ and the proposals contained in the White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland⁴⁰ of 2013. The document consists of five framework chapters describing: a diagnosis of the national security system, the challenges, the development trends and the vision of development of the national security system of the Republic of Poland, goals of strategies and directions for intervention, the system implementation strategy and financial framework of strategy.

It also includes an introduction, a bibliography and a list of abbreviations, while annex presents a report on the public consultation of draft strategy. The *Strategy* was correlated with key strategic documents of NATO and the Euro-

pean Union in the field of security – Strategic Concept of NATO and the European Security Strategy⁴¹. It was developed in connection with socio-economic policies of the country and based on the methodology for implementation of contained plans.

The first chapter presents the diagnosis of the national security system by focusing on internal and external conditions. Polish security environment was evaluated with the emphasis on the proper use of the opportunities arising from our membership in international organizations.

Challenges, development trends and the vision of the national security system of the Republic of Poland constitute the second chapter of the *Strategy*. It is expected that the optimization of power and national security measures would mean the effective use of the potential present in the defense system of the state and crisis management system. The vision of the security system development assumes that by 2022 Poland will be a country with a high level of security, actively creating the foreign policy and with modern national defense and effective special services at its disposal⁴².

The third chapter of the *Strategy* refers to the objectives and directions of intervention. The main objective is to strengthen the effectiveness and coherence of national security system, which should be able to identify and eliminate the sources, manifestations and consequences of threats to national security. Effectiveness is achieved by increasing the efficiency of the essential elements of the national security system, consistency – by increasing integration between public policies and security policy and the strengthening of cooperation and coordination, and finally achieving the integration within the national security system.

The fourth chapter discusses the system of implementation of assumptions included in the *Strategy*. The task areas are specified as well

³⁸ See: *Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022*, BBN, Warsaw 2013.

³⁹ *Strategiczny Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego. Główne wnioski i rekomendacje dla Polski*, BBN, Warsaw 2012.

⁴⁰ *White Book on National security of the Republic of Poland*, BBN, Warsaw 2013.

⁴¹ *Koncepcja strategiczna NATO* (adopted at the NATO summit in Lisbon on 19 November, 2010), *Bezpieczna Europa w lepszym świecie. Europejska Strategia Bezpieczeństwa* (adopted at a meeting of the heads of government in Brussels on 12 December, 2003).

⁴² See: *Strategia rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022*, op. cit.

as the main bodies responsible for their implementation. The basis of monitoring the implementation of the objectives is the system of indicators that will serve the analytical and evaluative activities. The strategy will be periodically updated, at least once every four years. The coordinator of the implementation of the *Strategy* is the Minister of National Defense⁴³.

The fifth chapter is the financial framework of the *Strategy* reflecting the scope of public funds allocated to the stated objectives. Financing in the area of defense will be realized through the use of funds from the state budget.

It is estimated that the *Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022* was written in a positive spirit⁴⁴. However, the financial crisis of recent years has meant that some assumptions will have to be postponed.

SUMMARY

Changes in the Polish political – military environment forced the need to amend the design and security strategy. The need for the adoption of new, more appropriate strategies resulted not only from the large scale dynamics and the evolution of international situation of the turn of the century. There were always new challenges and threats, changing also safety conditions. A new context for Polish policy has created entry to the European Union. NATO expanded and change itself developing at the same time the cooperation with our Eastern neighbors – Russia and Ukraine. Important lessons for international and national security have also arisen with the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts and other international crises. All this has led to the adoption of a new security strategy in 2003, then in 2007 and forced another amendment in 2013.

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⁴³ Ibidem.

⁴⁴ See: P. Soloch, *Uwagi do diagnozy systemu bezpieczeństwa zawartej w „Strategii rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022” (SRSBN RP)*, Instytut Sobieskiego, no 58, 25 October 2013.

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