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PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN LEGAL REGULATIONS AIMING TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PROTECTION OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY COMPANIES

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ABSTRACT

Paper treats about the possibilities for cooperation of the Police and other state security services with the private security sector in providing public security. A model of such cooperation is analyzed, based on a experiences of one of the higher officers of the Polish Police, as an example. Author also shows the positive perspective for increasing of the public security that can be achieved by broadening the legal authorization for using coercion means and weapons by the security companies' employees.

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The author as Vice-President of the Polish Employers' Association "Protection", Branch of Malopolska (Polski Związek Pracodawców „Ochrona”) has a constant opportunity to observe the cooperation of Government's security subsystem with the protection of persons and property companies. These everyday observations point serious dysfunctions in this area and prompted author to carry out in-depth research. Its aim was to identify solutions for increasing the degree of participation of the protection of persons and property companies in state system of public security¹.

In the course of this study, assumed hypothesis have been confirmed and on basis of actual knowledge, being a result of an analysis of the functioning and potential offered by the protec-

tion of persons and property companies in the area of security, as well as heuristic and empirical research results, some possible solutions for increasing the role of the protection of persons and property companies in the state system of public security can be proposed.

Currently the only legal act regulating cooperation of the protection companies with the State services responsible for public security is the Regulation of the Minister of Interior and Administration of 18 December 1998 on the detailed arrangements for cooperation of SUFO with the Police, fire protections units, civil defense and municipal police². § 2 of the quoted Regulation says that the manager of the object³ under obligatory protection is to be a partner

1 Zob. A. Czop, *Udział firm ochrony osób i mienia w zapewnianiu bezpieczeństwa publicznego w Polsce*, Katowice 2014.

2 Dz.U. nr 161 poz. 1108.

3 Art. 2 pkt 1 Ustawy z dnia 22 sierpnia 1997 r. O ochronie osób i mienia, Dz.U. 2014 poz. 1099.

for providing necessary cooperation. Managing person usually does not have proper specialist preparation in the area of security, so realistically, she/he cannot be a professional partner cooperating with the Police.

Because of that, basic cooperation, especially in the area of determination of conditions and assumptions protection plan, should be held by a member of the company responsible for security. That person has the knowledge and experience and knows the requirements⁴ for physical protection, technical security and also knows tactics of service at posts or in intervention groups. She or he also knows how to distribute forces and resources necessary for protection of objects under company's responsibility. If these issues are to be decided by manager of the object, the protection company will be left out of the crucial process of protection. In addition to reconciling the protection plan⁵, following issues are also important:

- information about the risks for security of persons and property and disruption of peace and public order,
- interoperability in order to keep the peace and public order during assemblies, artistic and sport events,
- interoperability by securing places of crime commitment and misdemeanors in the protected objects,
- consultations for perfecting methods of cooperation.

As we know from the results of research, agreement in the terms of the protection plan is the final moment of working contact with the Police and later they show no interest how the realization of assumptions in this document look like. The Police should, after all, on a regular basis, provide such data as:

- the degree of crime site of particular area,
- type of occurrence in recent times, the nature of which may be related to the security of the protected area,
- the methods and means of action of individuals or groups which might compromise the security of the protected area,
- place, time and circumstances of the grouping of these people,
- emerging sources of disturbance of the peace and order,
- planned events, event risk that may have an impact on the security of the protected area,
- preventive action and assistance undertaken in the immediate vicinity by the Police.

The police do not also propose taking specific preventive measures⁶, which could be carried out by the protection company alone or jointly with the officers. This formation is responsible for the safety of widely understood and so should not assist protection companies particularly those providing supervision for mandatory protected objects.

Mostly protection company managers gain the information they need in relation to the protected object exclusively by private and informal contacts which in the literature are referred to as "blue drain", or "oldboy's network"⁷. This is eased when a person representing private sector of protection has previously served in a variety of national security services and can benefit from acquaintanceship. However, this solution is not sufficient for the system of information and offers inappropriate quality.

The lack of legal regulations defining the cooperation possibilities of protection companies and other formations in securing objects under mandatory protection is a serious drawback in the system of public security and, according to the author,

4 W. Bejgier, B. Stanejko, *Ochrona osób i mienia*, Warszawa 2010, p. 168–169.

5 Art. 7 ust. 1 Ustawy z dnia 6 kwietnia 1990 r. o Policji Dz.U. 2011 nr 287 poz. 1687 z późn. zm.

6 Ibidem, art. 1 ust. 2 pkt. 3.

7 K. Boon, *La fonction d'enquete dans le secteur prive*, [in:] „Deviance et societe”, red. H. S. Becker, Berkeley 1999, p. 196.

needs a change. This can be ensured by the novelization of the cited MIA Regulation.

In the Regulation of the Minister of Interior and Administration of 18 December 1998 on the detailed arrangements for cooperation of SUFO with the Police, firefighters units, civil defense and municipal police⁸ only cooperation with specified part of the private security companies sector, which is armed protective formations, is announced. There are 1084 companies of these type, out of a total number 5200 of the protection of persons and property companies. Hence it follows that legal framework does not include 4116 companies of this sector, and which carry out their tasks in areas with no mandatory protection. Many of these places are open-ended and constitutes a public space. Patrols and security personnel posts are there deployed, which in addition to ensuring a rapid response to criminal events, have also preventive function.

Hence, according to the author, cited Ministry of Interior Regulation should in its scope include all of the companies providing protection of persons and property.

The potential of private security sector should not be underestimated. The security staff are uniformed, equipped with direct coercive measures and, above all, visible and easily available for people in need of assistance. They usually take first intervention in the protected area, often resulting in recognition of the perpetrators of such crimes as theft, burglary or battery. They also secure location until the arrival of the Police or give first aid to injured persons. Their efficiency and proper often operation determine later investigation, including gathering relevant evidence and punishing the perpetrators. Special role here is played by intervention groups⁹, which crew consist of the best trained, licensed security guards, who run marked vehicles and have not only the measures of communication

and coercion, but also a firearms or high-powered electric stuns. According to the results of research¹⁰, these people hold regular training, both theoretical and practical, allowing them to provide professional response in emergency situations. Their advantage lays in high mobility and the possibility for frequent movement in the urban area. The main task of the intervention groups is a quick reaction to the event. They hold the service in a specific sector, waiting for signal from the monitoring station dispatcher¹¹, who receives information from the alarm system and, if necessary, orders them to make a check or intervention in the specified object. They also provide support for other security workers, if the situation requires so. There are more intervention groups' vehicles in the streets than the Police cars. They are often stationed at specified places, waiting for the call for intervention. Currently, the Police does not make use of the potential of security staff. As a result of research – commandants of the Police units¹² do not see legal basis for this, treating the protection companies as any other business operators. However, it is hard not to notice the specifics of their business, which is providing security. Certainly, the information about potential risks in areas protected by the security companies, would be important in organizing the protection activities. The Police has the estate reconnaissance, knows the geography and the dynamics of such risks¹³.

The Police do not share with protection companies the information about people missing, wanted dangerous criminals, stolen vehicles, or persons, for which pursuit is carried out. Such information cannot be classified as confiden-

8 Dz.U. nr 161, poz. 1108.

9 A. Palczewski, W. Stach, *Ochrona osób i mienia*, Warszawa 1999, p. 158.

10 A. Czop, *Udział firm ochrony...*, p. 199–227.

11 W. Seruga, *Techniczne środki w ochronie mienia*, [in:] C. Grzeszyk, *Vademecum agenta ochrony i detektywa*, Warszawa 1996, p. 515.

12 Art. 6 ust. 1 pkt 1, 2, 3 Ustawy z dnia 6 kwietnia 1990 r. o Policji Dz.U. 2011 nr 287, poz. 1687, z późn. zm.

13 Zob. T. Szopa, *Niezawodność i bezpieczeństwo*, Warszawa 2009.

tial¹⁴ as it is published in the media or on Police websites. Considering the number of sites under the companies' protection, it is highly probable that the effectiveness of the Police actions would be greater. According to the studies, security staff are not informed about the places specifically vulnerable to crime, on which they could draw attention. Managers of the protection companies do not see obstacles in taking into account the suggestions of the Police in placing intervention groups' cars. This could ensure the prevention as well as rapid transfer of information to the Police about threat that appeared. As previously noted – the crew of security companies' cars are mobile, and therefore can see many situations relevant for public security, or requiring a reaction from the Police.

It has been shown that there are opportunities for effective cooperation of the protection of persons and property companies and the Police. There are no regulations that exclude it, though most of the Police commandants consider that since the frame for cooperation has not been legally defined, there is no obligation to perform specific actions. There is also a large dose of mistrust of security companies, fear of the information transfer or engage them outside their protected zone. It is, unfortunately, with a loss for providing security of the objects and people.

One of the experts¹⁵ presented cooperation of the Police unit under his command with local security companies. The intervention groups every day are given information from local Police duty officer about vulnerable spots, missing persons or things that need to be paid extra at-

tention to. Once a month in the Police unit coordination meeting is held, with all the services responsible for security issues. Current problems as well as main determinants of risks are discussed, and for each of the services possible preventive actions are planned. Of course, during these meetings ongoing investigations or operational issues are not discussed. Such things are of a confidential nature and may not be disclosed¹⁶. These meetings are also an opportunity for companies to indicate new data about protected objects, for which it is worth noting in providing their security. Preventive measures are also proposed, which can raise the security level of the patrolled area. The Police constantly recalls that patrols of security companies immediately informed about dangerous or any demanding interest of officers events, even if they occur outside the protected area. This is a model of cooperation, provided without formal agreement.

Author sees these practical solutions as the most important, basing on belief that it is worth to cooperate for security. A sensible solution is to conclude agreements¹⁷ between regional/county Police commandants

14 Zob. Ustawa z dnia 5 sierpnia 2010 r. o ochronie informacji niejawnych, Dz.U. 2010 nr 182, poz. 1228.

15 Jacek Gałuszka – younger inspector, County (Powiat) Commandant of the Police in Oleśnica, former: Vice-Chief in Main Bureau in Police HQ, City Vice-Commandant of the Police in Wrocław, County Commandant of the Police in Oława, County Commandant of the Police in w Strzeżelin. Author of many crime prevention projects, proponent of building a broad front of the Police cooperation with others in purpose of rising the feeling of security. Lecturer of WSPol. in Szczytno.

16 Zob. Ustawa z dnia 5 sierpnia 2010 r. o ochronie informacji niejawnych, Dz.U. 2010 nr 182, poz. 1228.

17 Administrative arrangement is a none-enforcing form belonging to forms of bilateral or multilateral actions of legal action from the scope of the administrative law, carried out by entities performing public administration, and played to the effect on the basis of the consistent declarations of intent. The subject of an agreement are liabilities (but not in the civil sense) on the implementation of the tasks of public administration. The agreement shall provide for or joint implementation tasks imposed on entities that are parties to the agreement, or the transfer of certain tasks from one entity to another. Administrative arrangement on civil law transactions primarily distinguished from his subject matter, which lies within the realm of administrative law and not civil. Parties of the agreement can be any administrative entities, administrative law, that is, units not being a subject of law. The terms of reference of the obligations covered by the agreement must lie in the range of independent control bodies containing the agreement. This means that the agreement may be concluded only in such a sphere of action of authorities of the Member State in which they are self-contained; E. Ochędowski, *Prawo Administracyjne*, Dom Organizatora, Toruń 2002 2;

and the security companies that streamlines collaboration, but cannot replace them.

In the study, it was founded that the agreement does not mean that the cooperation will be implemented and will bring the expected results. Hence it is worth to regularly supervise such cooperation and determine frequent and regular contact of persons responsible for implementation of the project. It should also be put under periodic evaluation with the possibility of making changes to its update. The agreement, which could be signed by security companies with the Police or municipal/city police, should provide in particular:¹⁸

1. the exchange of information about the risks in a particular area,
2. the organization of communications system for the Police, municipal/city police and security companies,
3. placement of intervention groups¹⁹, taking into account the risks occurring in the area,
4. cooperation to ensure peace and order in places of assembly, artistic, entertainment and sports events, as well as in other public places,
5. assistance in organizing and conducting the training of security personnel,
6. transferring information from observation and recording made by the security companies' technical means in places surveilled by them.

Concluding and implementing of such agreements could encourage better use of the big potential of the security companies, and can take place on the basis of the legal provisions currently in force.

Analysis of existing legal regulations in the security area has allowed to conclude that, at present, there is no legal regulation for the possibility of establishing the cooperation of security companies with other than the Police,

Wierzbowski M. *Prawo Administracyjne*, Wydawnictwo Prawnicze Lexis Nexis, Warszawa 2002.

18 A. Czop, op. cit., p. 266.

19 J. Piwowarski, P. Pajorski, *Ochrona obiektów. Zarys wybranych zagadnień*, Kraków 2015, p. 143.

municipal police, civil defence or fire brigade formations responsible for security²⁰.

According to the author, cooperation with such state security services as Military Police²¹, Border Guards²², Prison Guards²³, Road Transport Inspection²⁴, Forest Guards²⁵ and Railway Guards²⁶ is not only possible, but desirable. Studies show that the tasks of these uniformed formations allow to benefit from the support of private sector. In the case of Border Guards, Prison Guards, Road Transport Inspection, Forest Guards and Railway Guards cooperation could take place under similar conditions as with the Police. Cooperation with Military Police and Prison Guards could base on fast transfer by the security companies of any information important for those services. The obligation to transfer such information should be specified in a legal act of the Ministry Regulation rank. This would help to increase sense of security ties as a whole. It would also arrange the relationship between components of the security system by improving their interoperability, aimed at achieving a common goal of ensuring security. As a consequence, it could help to increase the effectiveness of security system and raise the efficiency of its operation.

From the perspective of effectiveness of actions of the security personnel, both in the areas entrusted to their care on the basis of contracts, as well as those to be taken in public, an important issue is also to grant them permission to use coercive measures and weapons.

20 Dz.U. nr 161, poz. 1108.

21 Ustawa z dnia 24 sierpnia 2001 r. o Żandarmerii Wojskowej i wojskowych organach porządkowych, Dz.U. 2013 poz. 568.

22 Ustawa z dnia 12 października 1990 r. o Straży Granicznej, Dz.U. 2011 nr 116, poz. 6751.

23 Ustawa z dnia 9 kwietnia 2010 r. o Służbie Więziennej, Dz.U. 2010 nr 79, poz. 523 z późn. zm.

24 Ustawa z dnia 6 września 2001 r. o transporcie drogowym, Dz.U. 2012, poz. 1265 oraz 2013, poz. 21 i 567.

25 Ustawa o lasach, Dz.U. 2011 nr 12, poz. 59, z późn. zm.

26 Ustawa z dnia 28 marca 2003 r. o transporcie kolejowym, Dz.U. 2007 nr 16, poz. 94, z późn. zm.

Licensed security employee may apply coercive measures on the basis of art. 36 paragraph 1.1 section 4 of the Protection of persons and property act, as amended and supplemented by the Act of 24 May 2013 on direct coercion and firearms²⁷. In the research process, it was found that they were not allowed to use many coercive measures, which have been reserved for other formations by the cited legal act law. Security employees may not use physical force as an attack technique. The regulation is not uncontroversial, since protective measures should not rely on attacking, and only tend to defend people and property. So they have clearly defensive nature. Security employees also may not use handcuffs on your feet or the combined one (this kind of handcuffs the companies are not currently equipped with). Other services have the permission to use them against persons aggressive or arrested and accused of committing crime with the use of firearms, explosives or other dangerous tools. In a situation where in the object²⁸ under compulsory protection the security staff arrests such person, they should be able to use the measures that give guarantee for effective elimination of the threat²⁹. The legislature also excluded the use of straightjacket, waist or non-lethal security helmet and mesh by security companies' employees. Straightjacket or overpowering belt is used when using other direct coercive is not possible or may be ineffective, and there is the need to apprehend person, thwart her escape or chase after her. Security employees in these situations have the right to use other coercive measures³⁰ but if they can prove impossible to apply or useless, they should not be forbidden an attempt of effective action, which would give them the use of straightjacket or overpowering belt. Both of these measures do not have an

aggressive nature and their use does not cause a threat to the life or health of the person to which they are applied. So there is no reason for refusing security employees the tools without which, in certain situations, their intervention may be ineffective or impossible. Similar is the question of the use of non-lethal grid, which also has a subsidiary character. In the situation of defending against assassination, attack on health or freedom, preventing terrorist act against protected objects, in the need to apprehend the person or to chase, when using other measures is not effective, non-lethal grid is used. It is fired with a firearm, but it can also be thrown down by hand in order to immobilize a person or animal. Without the possibility of using this measures, in cases where specific circumstances does not allow the use of other coercive measures, the effective functioning of the security personnel is paralyzed.

Security staff do not have powers to use water cannons³¹, horses³² and shooting non-penetrating bullets³³. Security staff do not have the powers to use water cannons, horses and shooting non-penetrating bullets. There is no provision for the possibility of using chemicals such as back-pack throwers or tear gas gre-

27 Art. 2 ust. 1 pkt 20, Art. 65 pkt 1 Dz.U. 2013, poz. 628.

28 Z. T. Nowicki, *Ochrona osób i mienia*, Toruń 1995, p. 135.

29 PN-IEC 60300-3-9:1999.

30 Por. J. Piwowarski, P. Pajorski, *Ochrona obiektów...*, p. 50.

31 Water cannons are generally used against groups of persons in breach of order in public places. These measures are used by the Police units in the following cases: to fend off a violent attack, overcoming active and passive resistance, preventing the destruction of property. The decision of the water use shall take: Commander in Chief of the Police or the person authorized by him, Commander of the Voivodeship Police or a person authorized by him.

32 The horse as a direct coercion may be used in the following cases: to fend off a violent attack, overcoming active and passive resistance, pursuit of a person suspected of committing a crime, thwart the escape of the offender, temporarily arrested or detained criminals, restore public order during public or assembly affected by the misconduct of a rowdy character. Currently the Police uses the 57 horses.

33 Non-penetrating bullets can be fired by a smoothbore or alarm or signal gun in the case of: fend off a violent attack, fend off a sharp assault on property, fend off direct, unlawful assault against human life or health, or in pursuit of the perpetrator of such assault, the collective public disturbance.

nades. Security companies' employees also have been excluded from the category of persons allowed to use road spikes or other ways to retain and immobilize the motor vehicles. Security staff may not use vehicles as a coercive measure. During their activities they must not apply the measures designed to overcome building closures, among other things, such as explosives. They must not use pyrotechnics of stupefying substances or blinding. These legal exemptions are reasonable and justified. Security staff do not occur in situations where the application of the mentioned measures would be necessary. Their use requires special preparation and is associated with high risk in case of improper use. That is why the legislature, by introducing restrictive procedures for applying these measures, has reserved the possibility of their use only for a specific formation.

According to the studies, the legislature greatly restricted the scope of cases that allow the security companies' employees to use the coercive measures. They are not allowed to be used to enforce the law in accordance the security company's employee command, nor to prevent activities aimed directly to the assassination attempt on the employee or another person. In addition, for the security company's employee it is not possible to use direct coercive measures in order to prevent contravention of order or public safety, even for the protection or order in protected areas or objects. It significantly reduces the possibility of effective action.

In a situation when security company's employee carries out escort task or activities related to protected area hook-ups, also cannot take the advantage of direct coercive measures to ensure security. This situation is very unfavourable, due to the fact that the convoys often are carried out between the various objects that are located in an area under protection. The legislature also excluded the use of coercive measures in the situations of passive resistance, when a person opposes the execution of the commands given him on the basis

of the law, without using violence or threats. The legislature recognized that security company's employee cannot apply coercive measures to prevent direct self-harm operations³⁴. Many services received the right to use coercive measures in the preventive form, so as to prevent the escape of a person falling, feed, retained or escorted. Proactively the officers of those services may use direct coercive measures also to prevent acts of aggression or self-harm. Security staff are not permitted to use preventive measures listed.

Research has shown that security company's employee do not have the possibility of withdrawal from giving first aid³⁵ to the person to which coercive measures were used, as this would result in the need to discontinue the protective steps against persons, objects or areas or as part of the convoy. The officers of other formations have such right. This kind of exclusion is not of a rational kind because it is mostly the security companies' employees doing the most important security protection, strategic to the economy or defence of objects. They protect against attacks (including terrorism) electric plants, water intakes, hydraulic structures and other equipment and areas located in the so-called lists of Voivode's or conducted by the central authority of the state offices³⁶. A common practice is to grant companies the commercial protection of the Police, military or scientific research buildings. Also these entities perform convoys value, hazardous or toxic materials or explosive. Often they are responsible for the safety of people during important meetings and conferences of economic importance. They should, therefore, to ensure the safety of

34 Self-harm is an action or a series of actions aimed at causing physical or mental harm, it is aggression directed "inwards". This is some self-preservation instinct disorder, which is a tendency to self-injury, self-harm, health and even life. E. Sawaściuk, *Niebieska linia*, nr 2, Warszawa 2003.

35 J. Piwowarski, P. Pajorski, *Ochrona obiektów...*, p. 54–55.

36 Art. 5 Ustawy z dnia 22 sierpnia 1997 r. O ochronie osób i mienia, Dz.U. 2014, poz. 1099.

their custody, have the right for the effective pursuit of further action, even if this would imply a threat to life and health of the injured attacker. Since the officers of other formations can, in these situations, make use of right not to give first aid to the person to whom they had used the coercive measures, this deprivation security company's employee cannot be understood.

In the course of the study, it was found that security company's employee cannot use weapons during direct pursuit³⁷ after a person who committed an unlawful assault on life³⁸, health, freedom or others, important objects, facilities or areas, property, at the same time causing threat to life, health or freedom. This also applies to the situation of the pursuit after the perpetrator of a terrorist attack, murder, robbery, causing heavy damage, bringing danger to life and health in big sizes, rape or taking hostage. Security company's employee cannot use weapons, even when it is necessary to apprehend the perpetrators of these crimes. Certainly, in these situations, employee of the persons and property company shall have the legal ability to use weapons.

A separate issue is the use of a firearms³⁹, which should be understood as putting the shot with penetrative ammo towards an animal, object or in another direction which is not prohibitive risk to man. In the current state of the law, an employee may use firearms only in the need to alert about the threat or to call for assistance, as well as for putting a warning shot, which is not treated as the use of weapons. Security company's employee does not, however, have

the right to use firearms in order to stop the vehicle, even if the vehicle threatens life or health, or creates a threat to important objects or areas. They cannot also use firearms to eliminate the obstacle preventing or hindering the recognition of persons or rescue values such as property, life or health. It is not authorized to use firearms to neutralize the items or equipment that may pose a risk of explosion, causing at the same time a direct threat to health or life. This permission is not entitled them to disposal of the animal whose behavior threatens directly his life or health or any other person.

In view of the above, the security company's employee should be granted the possibility of using legal weapons in situations described above. This would allow them to increase the safety of both the protected property, and security of your own and other people who are in a situation of real life or health endangerment.

In the research process it was found that it would be also desirable to grant the security company employee the same permissions that he or she has on the territory of the protected object, if he/she intervenes in the immediate surroundings. Indeed, it is difficult to separate and treat this area as the other, since the situation that takes place there directly affects its security. The line of the fence should not mean impunity for the perpetrator and powerlessness for the security staff of the object.

It would be reasonable to introduce the legal use of weapons by the security company's employee outside the protected object, given the need to repel unlawful assault on life, health and others. Now, if armed and equipped with direct coercive measures, security staff in the intervention group notice a life-threatening situation outside the protected area, they do not have the ability and authority to use weapons and coercive measures. If these measures are used for life-saving of the affected person, it can be done only on the basis of the provision

37 Por. Zarządzenie Nr 1355 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 20 grudnia 2007 r. w sprawie metod i form organizowania i prowadzenia przez Policję pościgów i zorganizowanych działań pościgowych.

38 In the dictionary sense (as well as colloquial) the notion of a coup has a narrower scope than the distinction within the meaning of the law. On the basis of the legal essence of this concept is most appropriately indicate comments to art. 25 ustawy z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Kodeks karny, Dz.U. 1998 nr 88, poz. 553, z późn. zm. (Criminal Code).

39 Art. 4 ust. 9 Ustawy o środkach przymusu bezpośredniego i broni palnej, Dz.U. 2013, poz. 628.

of the necessary defence⁴⁰, and so they must reckon with possible charges of exceeding the limits of self-defence⁴¹. Regulations should be clear and precise so that the security employee does not hesitate to help the person in need.

All requested changes in the regulations of using coercive measures and weapons by security personnel should therefore be taken into account while changing the law regulating these issues in the Direct coercive measures and firearms act⁴², and the Protection of individuals and property act⁴³.

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⁴⁰ Art. 25 § 1 kodeksu karnego, ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Dz.U. nr 88, poz. 553.

⁴¹ Art. 25 § 2 ibidem.

⁴² Dz.U. 2013, poz. 628.

⁴³ Dz.U. 2014, poz. 1099.

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SOURCES OF LAW

14. Rozporządzenie MSWiA z dn. 18 grudnia 1998 roku w sprawie określenia szczegółowych zasad współpracy SUFO z Policją, jednostkami ochrony przeciwpożarowej, obrony cywilnej i strażami gminnymi, Dz.U. nr 161, poz. 1108.
15. Ustawa o lasach, Dz.U. 2011 nr 12, poz. 59, z późn. zm.
16. Ustawa z dnia 12 października 1990 r. o Straży Granicznej, Dz.U. 2011 nr 116, poz. 6751.
17. Ustawa z dnia 22 sierpnia 1997 r. O ochronie osób i mienia, Dz.U. 2014, poz. 1099.
18. Ustawa z dnia 24 maja 2013 r. o środkach przymusu bezpośredniego i broni palnej, Dz.U. 2013, poz. 628.
19. Ustawa z dnia 24 sierpnia 2001 r. o Żandarmerii Wojskowej i wojskowych organach porządkowych, Dz.U. 2013, poz. 568.
20. Ustawa z dnia 28 marca 2003 r. o transporcie kolejowym, Dz.U. 2007 nr 16, poz. 94, z późn. zm.
21. Ustawa z dnia 5 sierpnia 2010 r. o ochronie informacji niejawnych, Dz.U. 2010 nr 182, poz. 1228.
22. Ustawa z dnia 6 czerwca 1997 r. Kodeks karny, Dz.U. 1998 nr 88, poz. 553, z późn. zm.

23. Ustawa z dnia 6 kwietnia 1990 r. o Policji, Dz.U. 2011 nr 287, poz. 1687, z późn. zm.
24. Ustawa z dnia 6 września 2001 r. o transporcie drogowym, Dz.U. 2012 poz. 1265 oraz 2013 poz. 21 i 567.
25. Ustawa z dnia 9 kwietnia 2010 r. o Służbie Więziennej, Dz.U. 2010 nr 79, poz. 523 z późn. zm.
26. Zarządzenie nr 1355 Komendanta Głównego Policji z dnia 20 grudnia 2007 r. w sprawie metod i form organizowania i prowadzenia przez Policję pościgów i zorganizowanych działań pościgowych.

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