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THE NATIONAL SECURITY CULTURE AND THE POWER OF THE STATE. A SCIENTIFIC STUDY

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ABSTRACT

Article presents the form and perspectives for scientific research provided in the area of measurement of the power of state. Author sees the power of state as a part of security culture concept. Several ways of analysing and scientific research methods are presented, with their advantages and disadvantages, stressing both qualitative and quantitative factors. The theoretical basis is also included, with presentation of many different approaches.

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INTRODUCTION

Today, when concerning widely understood *security* and, connected with this phenomenon, future of *states* and *nations* of the world, to secure the future of all humanity¹, we are facing a probable risk of possible clashes between civilizations representing various cultural circles. This issues is analysed in the Samuel Huntington's concept, which does not, however, exclude another, more favourable human development possibility.

¹ Humanity is rated at 6.7 billion in mid-2009; between 2001 and 2009 the world's population has increased by half a billion.

It is a possibility for greater global scale processes leading to initiate *cooperative security* and its further prosperity. *Cooperative security* in the age of globalisation should be the result of victory of common sense over cases of misunderstanding or bigotry. Currently, our world is at a crossroads, having to take different possibilities in the age of information revolution, combined with an increase in dynamics of globalization, including the aggravating year-on-year crisis of core humanistic values.

There is therefore a huge, and urgent at the same time, need to redefine the main directions of further human development, including the need for resignation in development plans of countries and cultural circles from the primacy of purely economic issues, and to forge a consensus between the different civilizations.

The indirect possibility, allowing further duration, survival and development of humanity, are the alliances between the various cultural circles, or even just between states belonging to different civilizations.

This type of approach has become a sort of already proven and properly functioning reality-process, as for example in the case of United States of America and Japan.

By contrast, the alliance between representatives of Euro-American Western Civilization and Orthodox Countries is possible, however, may be only reached “with the help” of common enemy – what is fanatical and totally false version of modern Islam.

THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

Security is an epiphenomenon of threats phenomena, and is depicted as an idealized state without threats. Therefore, in order to show complete definition of *security*, it is crucial to recapitulate the basic for *security culture* issues and aspects.

Security is not only recognised as a status but at the same time, dynamically presented from the beginning, we rather associate with “continual social *process*, in which actors are acting, try to improve mechanisms to ensure them a sense of security”².

² J. Kukułka, *Bezpieczeństwo a współpraca europejska: współzależności i sprzeczności interesów*, [in:] „Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, Warszawa 1982, p. 31.

In turn, the holistic definition formulated in *CRISD APEIRON*³ by Juliusz Piwowarski, specifies in spectral way the following research category (and the concept) of Ingardenian security perspective, from the epistemological, ontological, axiological and sociological point of view:

Security is, for a specific acting person or entity, connected with them directly or indirectly, a multi-faceted phenomenon and the concept which spectrum is formed by the following four components⁴:

- the desired state, which is the level of effectiveness of control over possible, at a given location and time period, relevant risks for acting person or entity; in other words, security is a result of the potential difference is the *self-defenceness potential* of the one and of the *risks potential* of this acting person or entity, existing in a given space (*epistemic aspect*),
- the value providing our *needs of lack of (basic needs)* and the need for *higher needs, the never-ending need for constant development (meta-needs)* with *self-realisation* atop of hierarchy (*axiological aspect*),
- the process of development, in which personal and social growth of potential took place, increasing the autonomous defenceness of acting-in-security persons or entities; from the ontological point of view, close to this process is the concept of function of security (*ontological aspect*),
- the social construct, the potential of facing many risks as the effect of existence of social ties, interdependencies and interactions in a given human population, which is one of the acting-in-security entities (*sociological aspect*).

SECURITY CULTURE

The spectral definition of security culture by Piwowarski-Zaplatyński is following. This concept is based on trichotomal division of culture by Ameri-

³ *CRISD APEIRON* – Cracow Research Institute for Security & Defence *APEIRON*, affiliated with University of Public and Individual Security “Apeiron” in Cracow.

⁴ J. Piwowarski, *Ochrona VIP-a a czworokąt bushido. Studium japońskiej kultury bezpieczeństwa*, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo osób podlegających ustawowo ochronie wobec zagrożeń XXI wieku*, P. Bogdalski, J. Cymerski, K. Jałoszyński (ed.), Szczytno 2014, p. 451; J. Piwowarski, *Paradygmat kultury bezpieczeństwa – prolegomena*, „Security Economy & Law”, no 2, Kraków 2013, p. 10–11.

can sociologist, Alfred Louis Kroeber in *The Nature of Culture* (1952)⁵ – *material reality, social culture* and *ethical culture* and the related values.

Security culture is the whole material and nonmaterial elements of embedded legacy of people in military and nonmilitary spheres – that is, the widely understood autonomous defence of active persons or entities. This phenomenon is a trichotomy, that create three overlapping streams, that are consistent with the processes of creating them by people in a particular place, a particular social environment and at a specific time:

- a) mental and spiritual stream,
- b) legal and organizational stream,
- c) material stream.

Security culture is used for realization the specified aims and needs:

1. Effective control of emerging threats for *acting-in-security persons or entities*, obtaining the status of a satisfyingly low level of threats.
2. Recovery of *security* in a situation where it has been lost.
3. Optimization, for a specified *active persons or entities*, of the level of multiareal understood comprehensive security process, aiming at the harmonisation of the security sectors in the context of the appropriate hierarchisation of *acting-in-security persons' or entities' principals*.
4. To encourage in the social and personal consciousness about the need for self-improvement and trichotomal – a) mental, b) social, c) material development, along with enabling the motivation and attitudes that result in individual and collaborative activities, resulting in a comprehensive development of *acting-in-security persons or entities*, including their *autonomous defenceness*.

The definition exposing the self-defenceness suggests that behind this stands a concept of reality being a manifestation of potentiality of *acting-in-security persons or entities*, for example, human collectivities or *states*.

Most often it is about an important for the security level parameter, often referenced in security studies, as well as in geopolitics, referred to as power of the state, understood as an international and *national acting-in-security entity* (this parameter can also be used for other *acting persons or entities*, such as individuals, social groups).

⁵ A. L. Kroeber, *The Nature of Culture*, University of Chicago Press; Cambridge University Press, Chicago 1952.

Speaking of *security culture*, you should start from the base of functioning of individuals, human groups, social communities and whole societies. The basis for this is *culture*⁶, built by man over the long, busy and not really safe millennia.

Culture is the whole material and nonmaterial embedded elements of the heritage of people. Roger Scruton teaches, that “culture is important”⁷. However, in order to be able to preach to others, that “culture is important”, we must therefore first begin with ourselves. The current Western trends are often a false interpretation of freedom, resulting in reducing the level of many cultural fields. Wrongly understood freedom liberates man from alleged “ties” of human obligations which culture indicates but does not dictate. Today a lot of people happily and recklessly releases themselves from responsibilities and burden of any liability.

In a situation when a fairly wide popularised is the childish version of freedom, there is a considerable risk that the culture of the West may be lost for habits of barbarians, using advanced technology, but lame, in moral, emotional and intellectual terms. This is an extremely actual issue for the West and deserves a separate analysis, the contemporary version of Oswald Spengler’s considerations⁸.

A wide, roomy definition of the *security culture* was formulated by creator of Polish concept of this phenomenon, Marian Cieślarczyk. *Security culture* is a kind of social matrix, “the pattern of basic assumptions, values, norms, rules, symbols, and beliefs that influence the perception of the challenges, opportunities and (or) threats, and the way of feeling security and thinking about it, behaviour and activities (cooperation) of *active persons* or *entities* connected with this, in a variety of ways »articulated« and »learned« by them in the education of broad sense, including internal and external integration processes in natural adaptation and other organizational processes, as well as in the process of strengthening the widely (not just militarily) understood defence, serving the harmonious development of these *active persons* or *entities*, and the achievement

⁶ *Culture* – the whole complex of products of people’s activities, both tangible and intangible: spiritual, symbolic. Most commonly understood as the totality of the spiritual and material heritage of society. Comp. J. Kmita, G. Banaszak, *Spoleczno-regulacyjna koncepcja kultury*, Instytut Kultury, Warszawa 1994.

⁷ R. Scruton, *Kultura jest ważna. Wiara i uczucie w osaczonym świecie*, Zysk i S-ka, Poznań 2010.

⁸ O. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes*, Bibliographisches Institut, Mannheim 2007.

by them widely understood security, for the benefit of each other, as well as the environment”⁹.

THREE DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY CULTURE

Security culture, as was aforementioned, can be analysed in three dimensions:

1. The first dimension – ideas, values, and spirituality of the human being¹⁰.
2. The second dimension – social impacts of the organisation and systems of law.
3. The third dimension – material aspects of human existence¹¹.

The above components Marian Cieślarczyk called “pillars of the security culture”¹². They are named, respectively, mental-spiritual¹³, organizational and legal, and material pillars. The components of these pillars interpenetrate, despite peculiarities. For example, knowledge as a compo-

⁹ M. Cieślarczyk, *Kultura bezpieczeństwa i obronności*, Wydawnictwo Akademii Podlaskiej, Siedlce 2010, p. 210.

¹⁰ *Spirituality* – the ambiguous concept, currently analysed scientifically, it is wider than the concept of religion; the term is associated with either the action of supernatural forces, or with a special, epithet of *higher*, used to the dimension of psyche; it can also be conceived by combining these two senses. Comp. J. G. Bennett, *A Spiritual Psychology*, Coombe Springs Press, Sherborne 1974; R. A. Emmons, *The psychology of ultimate concerns: Motivation and spirituality in personality*, Guilford Press, New York 1999; P. Socha (ed.), *Duchowy rozwój człowieka*, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Kraków 2000; R. Grzegorzczkova, *Co o fenomenie duchowości mówi język?*, [in:] *Fenomen duchowości*, A. Grzegorzczk, J. Sójka, R. Koschany (ed.), Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Poznań 2000, p. 21–29; J. Koziński, *Transgresja i kultura*, Wyd. Akademickie Żak, Warszawa 1997; H. Romanowska-Łakomy, *Psychologia doświadczeń duchowych*, Wydawnictwo Psychologii i Kultury Eneteia, Warszawa 1996; I. Heszen-Niejodek, *Wymiar duchowy człowieka a zdrowie*, [in:] *Zasoby osobiste i społeczne sprzyjające zdrowiu jednostki*, Z. Juczyński, N. Ogińska-Bulik (ed.), Uniwersytet Łódzki Łódź 2003; C. E. Thoresen, A. H. S. Harris, *Spirituality and Health: What's the Evidence and What's Needed?*, [in:] “Society of Behavioral Medicine Press”, Stanford University; M. Sokolik (ed.) *Wybrane zagadnienia duchowości. Perspektywa psychologiczna*, Wydawnictwo Mantis, Olsztyn 2006.

¹¹ A. Kłoskowska, *Socjologia kultury*, PWN, Warszawa 2007, p. 103 i n.; A. Kroeber, *Istota kultury*, PWN, Warszawa 2002, p. 195 and following.

¹² M. Cieślarczyk, *Fenomen bezpieczeństwa i zjawisko kryzysów postrzegane w perspektywie kulturowej*, [in:] *Jedność i różnorodność*, E. Reklajtis, B. Wiśniewski, J. Zdanowski (ed.), ASPRA-JR, Warszawa 2010, p. 96 and following.

¹³ P.M. Socha, *Duchowość – zarys koncepcji dla psychologii religii*, „Przegląd religioznawczy”, 1995, no 1.

ment of the first pillar, is also an element of the second pillar, having the organizational-legal and technical-innovative nature.

You can entail the potential of *national security culture* with the position, that the nation state enables on the world stage of interaction between states.

POSITION OF STATE

By the term “position” we mean the specific location of the *acting person or entity* in a given space. This is the placemark, the meaning and order in some kind of stratification. International position is “an objective phenomenon”, which shows what is the current position of particular state in relation to other states. In other words, it is about accurate determination of status, rank, correct order of potential (force) of state in international system¹⁴.

The position of state should be looked through the prism of a variety of factors and all the time it should be analysed in the context of changes that occur in the power of other states¹⁵. Basic mechanisms for raising the position of *acting-in-security person or entities*, are located in the area of internal politics of *nation state*, aimed on building the internal power of *state* as entity.

The variety of activities in area of foreign policy allow to obtain favourable conditions for national security of state as an *acting-in-security entity*, in order to accelerate economic growth, expansion of military capability, and finally, the activation of scientific, technical and socio-cultural development of the state. These elements influence the complementary development of *nation state* and allow meeting the needs of citizens of state and effective building the position of *acting-in-security person or entity* in relation to realities of international political scene¹⁶.

POWER OF A STATE

The category of *position* corresponds to another, key for determining the *position of state* concept of the *power* of the State; there are also used the terms of *might, strength of state*¹⁷. As French historian, an expert on social

¹⁴ Z. J. Pietraś, *Międzynarodowa rola Chin*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, Lublin 1990, p. 29.

¹⁵ T. Łoś-Nowak, *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Teorie – systemy – uczestnicy*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2000, p. 148.

¹⁶ R. Zięba, *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej państwa*, Wyd. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2005, p. 53.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 145.

sciences and international relations Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1917–1994) notes that the main aim of state's foreign policy is the development and growth of *power of the state*, the *puissance* and his wealth, *richesse*. "The power of *state* directly depends on its place in the hierarchy of actors in the international scene, and determinacy to maximize the power is treated as the immanent feature (...) of the states"¹⁸.

To understand the essence of international power it is crucial to clarify the term "power", closely related to the *position of the nation state* on international political arena¹⁹. As John Stoessinger George says, "power is the ability to use their tangible and intangible resources in a way that will affect the behavior of other countries"²⁰.

The power of state can be presented by the use of product of potential of material (M), brainpower (and) and moral potential (D)²¹.

Hans Joachim Morgenthau (1904–1980) names *power* as such kind of relations between the international actors, in which actor A and has a mind-control abilities over actions of actor B²². Raymond Aron (1905–1983), in turn, understands *power* as the ability of a particular *state* to impose its will to other states²³.

By Agnieszka Bógdoł-Brzezińska: "power, as seen from the perspective of classical realism is nothing more than a proof of obsessive anxiety about survival in anarchic international environment. In this situation states endeavour to maximise the power"²⁴.

¹⁸ B. Balcerowicz, *Siły zbrojne w państwie i stosunkach międzynarodowych*, Wydawnictwo Scholar, Warszawa 2006, p. 125.

¹⁹ M. Sułek, *Globalny układ sił*, [in:] *Rocznik Strategiczny 2007/2008*, Wydawnictwo Scholar, Warszawa 2008, p. 334–352.

²⁰ Comp. L. Moczulski, *Geopolityka. Potęga w czasie i przestrzeni*, Bellona, Warszawa 1999, p. 402–403; M. Sułek, *Prognozowanie i symulacje międzynarodowe*, SCHOLAR, Warszawa 2010, p. 74 i n.

²¹ J. G. Stoessinger, *The Might of Nations. World Politics in Our Time*, Random House, New York 1962, p. 27.

²² H. J. Morgenthau, K. W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations*, Columbia University Press, New York 1985, p. 29 and following.

²³ R. Aron, *Pokój i wojna między narodami*, Wydawnictwo Centrum Adama Smitha, Warszawa 1995, p. 74.

²⁴ A. Bógdoł-Brzezińska, *Mocarstwowość w teorii stosunków międzynarodowych*, [in:] *Państwo w teorii i stosunkach międzynarodowych*, M. Sułek, J. Symonides (ed.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2009, p. 97 and following.

To maximize the *power* is a response to a sense of a threat from environment, which can be compared with typology of states of consciousness of *acting-in-security persons or entities* proposed by Daniel Frei²⁵, that the level of obtained *power* determines the level of ability to provide security²⁶.

However, it is better to treat the power of states in terms of the amount of social energy processed in period of time measured in such quantities as, for example, the volume of GDP or military spending.

Citing Mirosław Sułek, it is a kind of power produced by certain society – constituting a *nation* of particular *state*. Sulek in his research suggests the following typology of power:

- overall power (*dispositional*),
- military power (*coordinative*)²⁷.

Note that the overall power is “objective”, that is to say, is independent from the political power in the short term, while the military has the more “subjective” character.

Yet another typology of power proposes Joseph Nye:

- hard power,
- soft power²⁸.

There is a lot of typology of *power*, among them we can mention the division by M. and H. Sprout on:

- active power,
- dormant power²⁹.

Raymond Aaron divides power on:

- offensive power,
- defensive power³⁰.

Hans Morgenthau in his typology of types of state’s power divides it in a way that can be directly associated with the potential of national se-

²⁵ Comp. R. Zięba, *Instytucjonalizacja bezpieczeństwa europejskiego: koncepcje – struktury – funkcjonowanie*, Wydawnictwo Scholar, Warszawa 1991, p. 29.

²⁶ S. Sałajczyk, *Wizje rzeczywistości międzynarodowej*, [in:] *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Geneza, struktura, dynamika*, E. Haliżak, R. Kuźniar (ed.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2000, p. 38.

²⁷ See M. Sułek, *Podstawy potęgonomii i potęgonometrii*, WSEiA, Kielce 2001, chap. IV.

²⁸ See J. S. Nye, *The Changing Nature of World Power*, “Political Science Quarterly” 1990, vol. 105, Issue 2 (Summer), p. 177–192 and *Soft Power. Jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2007.

²⁹ M. i H. Sprout, *Toward a Politics of the Planet Earth*, Publisher: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, New York 1971, p. 165–169.

³⁰ R. Aron, *Pokój i wojna...*, p. 69–70.

curity culture and its three pillars, of which the first two (*mental-spiritual pillar* and *organizational-social pillar*) are a non-material heritage of nation which is the resource of *nation state*:

- *non-material* power,
- *material* power³¹.

In scientific literature skepticism to the possibility of quantification and measurement of power can be seen. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to measure the power, because “if we understand what is the international power system (...) we will avoid the need to take senseless action”³².

The chief theme of research carried out on *power* is effective control over political items in the turbulent international environment, aimed at three objectives – the eternal security, development and the glory³³.

According to Ryszard Zięba, one of the aims of state’s foreign policy is to increase its position and prestige. This expresses coexistential interests growing out of the following needs:

- matter and space among the other nations,
- participation in the international system,
- confirmation of sovereignty, competition,
- cooperation and increase of its role³⁴.

Increasing of power and raising the position of state shall contribute to the strengthening of its security and strength. The position is closely associated with the prestige of state, a subjective factor³⁵. Therefore, the purpose of foreign policy is to strive to increase the power, and thus the international position and prestige of state³⁶.

Unfortunately, you must agree with Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Thompson, that still we have not been able to accurately measure the value of *power*, which would specify precisely the position of states³⁷. Authors mentioned above alleged that security studies researchers repeat three serious methodological errors.

³¹ H. Morgenthau, K. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations...*, p. 9 and following.

³² E. Todd, *Schyłek imperium. Rozważania o rozkładzie systemu amerykańskiego*, Wydawnictwo Akademickie DIALOG, Warszawa 2003, p. 225.

³³ M. Sufek, *Metody i techniki badań stosunków międzynarodowych*, Aspra JR, Warszawa 2004, p. 115.

³⁴ R. Zięba, *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej...*, p. 53.

³⁵ J. Kukułka, *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, PWN, Warszawa 1982, p. 44.

³⁶ R. Zięba, *Wstęp do teorii polityki zagranicznej...*, p. 54 and following.

³⁷ H. Morgenthau, K. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations...*, p. 172.

1. The position of states is not to be considered against the background of other actors and their positions. Position and power of state is always relative and it is determined in relation to the other.
2. The error caused by limited prediction potential is the assumption that the shaping factors are of constant value. By the fact that these elements are changing, you must relate the current position to a possible position it will take in the future.
3. Another error is the assignment of a single factor the dominant role and marginalize others. Meanwhile, even seemingly insignificant factor may err the final result³⁸.

It should also be noted that the consideration of qualitative factors is problematic on the one hand, and, however, on the other hand, is very much needed. Problematic, since they are on a low-objective basis, as evidenced by introduction by S. Celine of the variable to specify the factor of motivation. And even though it turned out that they are important, because when researchers tried to line the states up in the rankings based solely on quantitative criteria, they did not give objective reflection of the reality³⁹.

Taking motivation or strategy into account in mathematical models is not a simple task, and on the basis of these concerns, a thesis arose that the measurement of power “is more an art than a science” (D. S. Papp)⁴⁰. It is said that the *power of state* is a form of contact between the *country* with the privilege of the use of force, and citizen-customer, which is a synonymous of its intangibility⁴¹. On the other hand, to rely solely on quantitative factors that arouse less controversy, also has disadvantages.

There were also some attempts to find one quantity factor, which determines the *position of state* to the greatest extent. Followed by this idea, the method involves “creating advanced indexes of potential of state, and then to sum them”⁴². Under consideration should be put the list of attributes of the individual state systems, developed by R. Rummel, or the *strength index* created by O. Morgenstern, K. Knorr and K. Heiss, which includes a network of interrelated factors.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 174–183.

³⁹ Z. J. Pietraś, *Międzynarodowa rola...*, p. 32.

⁴⁰ D. Milczarek, *Pozycja i rola UE w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Wybrane aspekty teoretyczne*, Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2003, p. 131.

⁴¹ H. Morgenthau, K. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations...*, p. 28.

⁴² Z. J. Pietraś, *Międzynarodowa rola...*, p. 32.

The issue of international position is therefore already problematic at theoretical level⁴³. Additional problems arise in the research of a specific state's position in the context of adopted by this state international roles. The *position of state* is treated as an objectively existing state, which is materialized in the country's potential, however the role is a state's attitude in the international arena, which uses that potential⁴⁴.

In addition, the "process of creation of roles" may be considered to be a continually evolving derivative of power and behavior of state in relation to other actors of the international political scene⁴⁵.

The *power of state*, as well as the *position of state*, may be researched and classified in a synthetic or a sectoral approach. Synthetic *state power* specifies the overall, comprehensive power and the outside position of state. Components of synthetic power are the sector powers referred to in specific areas. There are many classifications of the power indicators. Glen Fischer divided power indicators into:

- psychological,
- political,
- economical⁴⁶.

Raymond Aron suggests such components of state's power as:

- political space of state,
- available knowledge and materials to ensure a good condition of armaments,
- the number of population needed to serve in the army,
- ability to collective action⁴⁷.

John G. Stoessinger lists factors that can be measurable, and useful for calculating the power of states:

- population,
- form of government, geography,
- hardly measurable: morale of the nation or ideology⁴⁸.

⁴³ M. Dobraczyński, *Sprzężenie polityczno – gospodarcze w skali międzynarodowej*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 1986, no 6, p. 48 and p. 52–54.

⁴⁴ G. Lesie, R. Larson, B. Gruman, *Order and Change: Introductory Sociology*, Oxford University Press, New York – London – Toronto 1973, p. 197 and following.

⁴⁵ T. Łoś-Nowak, *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Teorie...*, p. 146 and following.

⁴⁶ J. Stefanowicz, *Anatomia polityki międzynarodowej*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2000, p. 94 and following.

⁴⁷ R. Aron, *Pokój i wojna...*, p. 77.

⁴⁸ Zob: M. Sułek, *Podstawy potęgonomii i potęgonometrii*, WSEiA, Kielce 2001 and M. Sułek, *Metody i techniki badań...* and M. Sułek, *Parametry potęgi (siły) państw – stale*

Hans Morgenthau, in turn, lists the following factors:

- natural resources,
- population potential,
- morale,
- quality of government,
- geographical location,
- military potential⁴⁹.

Saul Bernard Cohen says about:

- human and material resources,
- geographical location,
- resources of political and military energy,
- international links,
- national and political system's cohesion,
- forces compared to other,
- self-perception in international hierarchy⁵⁰.

On the basis of Polish science, in thematically similar scientific research on the superpowers issues, Iwona Wycichowska draws attention to the following attributes:

- economic potential,
- military potential,
- natural and human resources,
- ability to influence the international system⁵¹.

Stanisław Bieleń focuses primarily on these factors that can be clearly measured, for example:

- GDP,
- number of population,
- the size of the army, etc.⁵²

czy zmienne?, [in:] *Państwo w teorii i praktyce stosunków międzynarodowych*, M. Sułek, J. Symonides (ed.), Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2009.

⁴⁹ H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations...*, p. 80.

⁵⁰ S. Bieleń, *Podmiotowy aspekt równowagi międzynarodowej*, [in:] *Stosunki międzynarodowe i polityka. Wyzwania końca stulecia. Księga Jubileuszowa na 65-lecie Profesora Bogusława Mrozka*, ELIPSA, Warszawa 1995, p. 27. Comp. S. B. Cohen, *Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations*, The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Lanham 2015.

⁵¹ I. Wycichowska, *Ewolucja mocarstwowości w stosunkach międzynarodowych* and L. Kasprzyk, *Ekonomiczne aspekty mocarstwowości*, [in:] *Nowe role mocarstw*, B. Mrozek, S. Bieleń (ed.), Wyd. Książkowe „Linia”, Warszawa 1996.

⁵² S. Bieleń, *Podmiotowy aspekt równowagi...*, p. 27.

Mirosław Sulek lists factors the power of state:

- demographic-spatial,
- economic,
- military⁵³.

CONCLUSION

In author's opinion, the latter typology deserves appreciation because of the fact that the characteristics of factors referred to by Mirosław Sulek, allow to avoid the analysis' risk of the possibility of a non-scientific factor emergence, that is subjectivity; in addition, you can validate the analysis by presentation of relevant data. There are therefore three pure forms of a 1-d profile:

1. economic,
2. military,
3. demographic-spatial.

Next to pure forms, we can mention the forms of power coming from merging of three forms of power, which gives us the combination of mixed nature, for example:

1. economic-military,
2. demographic-spatial-military,
3. economic-military-demographic-spatial etc.⁵⁴

To measure the power primarily mathematical models are applied, build in order to better understand the reality. Despite criticism of mathematical models used to measure the power of states, it has to be said that they have the advantage that the results obtained are comparable to use them. At this point we can recall the following models for measuring the power of state by:

1. German⁵⁵,
2. Zagórski⁵⁶,
3. Ray Steiner Cline⁵⁷,

⁵³ Comp. M. Sulek, *Podstawy potęgonomii...*, p. 35–37 and 87–97.

⁵⁴ M. Sulek, *Prognozowanie i symulacje...*, p. 37–44.

⁵⁵ F. C. German, *A Tentative Evolution of World Power*, "Journal of Conflict Resolution", vol. 4, 1960.

⁵⁶ J. Zagórski, *Teoretyczny model potencjału wojskowego*, "Wojskowy Przegląd Ekonomiczny", Z. 3, 1969.

⁵⁷ R. S. Cline, *The Power of Nations in the 1990s: A Strategic Assesment*, Lanham 1994, p. 5.

4. Leszek Moczulski⁵⁸,
5. Fucks⁵⁹,
6. Farrar⁶⁰,
7. Virmani⁶¹,
8. Sułek⁶².

Ending with a brief conclusion, it should be noted that for the position of state the multidimensional power, is considered to be the most stable, in contrast to one-dimensional version⁶³. It is proposed at the same time that a roomy, sociological concept of Marian Cieślarczyk of *security and defence culture* is alternatively specified for *security studies* as the *security and power culture of acting-in-security person or entity*.

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⁵⁸ L. Moczulski, *Geopolityka...*

⁵⁹ W. Fucks, *Formalen zur Macht, Prognosen über Völker, Wirtschaft, Potentiale*, Stuttgart 1965.

⁶⁰ L. L. Farrar, *Arrogance and Anxiety: The Ambivalence of German Powers 1849 – 1914*, Iowa City 1981.

⁶¹ A. Virmani, *Global Power from the 18th to 21st Century: Power Potential (VIP2), Strategic Assets & Actual Power (VIP)*, Working Paper No. 175, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, 2005, <http://www.icrier.org/pdf/WP175VIIPP8.pdf> (14.04.2008), p. 7.

⁶² See M. Sułek, *Podstawy potęgonomii...*, p. 87–123, M. Sułek, *Metody i techniki...*, p. 102–115.

⁶³ Ibidem.

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