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NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY FOR THE WORLD RISK SOCIETY

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ABSTRACT

The *world risk society* is a product of “reflexive modernity” – the period in which the undesired side-effects of activity – risks force people, societies and states to concentrate all efforts to control them.

The introductory analysis of nature of threats and risks in that paper contributes to the discussion on what measures and tools the national security strategies offer or should offer the risk society to contain risk. The aim is to find possibly conclusive answer by analysis and comparisons of the selected material.

The presentation of concepts and practical solutions from literature and security strategies of Poland and the USA and policies helped conclude that both defensive and offensive approaches along with the traditional military power and soft power seem to be equally crucial to deal with internal and global risks. These measures include: risk management, international cooperation, cooperation of all internal institutions and forces, the international risks policy to conclude with the educational policy as a risk policy.

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Following Ulrich Beck theory, the period of “reflexive modernity” we live in is a consequence of the man-made, yet unplanned and unwanted side-effects producing growing societal uncertainties and risks. Reflex-

ive here should not be understood as “reflected” or “conscious”, it refers to a “boomerang” effect of unplanned results of processes in modern societies which forces them to change a chain of events. The society does not focus on the distribution of power and wealth, but on averting these risks. Risk is always a future, possible and threatening event. This anticipation infests our minds and controls our activities so becoming the political power changing the world. Hence U. Beck defines the contemporary society as “world risk society”¹.

U. Beck explains also what the nature of risk is. Earlier, the risks were natural dangers or hazards: earthquake, epidemic, famine and floods. The risks in the modern society are created by our own social development and by the development of science and technology. Risks are not catastrophes, not the “case of damage”. They are the believed expectation of catastrophes. They can be generalized and fabricated as a global phenomenon, successfully pushed through into public conscience as being “real”. He distinguishes three categories of global risks: ecological, economical and terror².

The process of environmental destruction is completely independent from this political and public perceptions and acceptance which emerged from the Rio conference in 1992. Obviously, process of environmental degradation commenced a long time before.

Yet, in natural disasters, a geophysical or biological event is implicated in some way as a trigger event and is directly linked to loss of life and damage to property; there are social factors involved that cause peoples’ vulnerability³ generated by social, economic and political processes. The impact

¹ J. Wimmer, T. Quandt, *Living in The Risk Society*, “Journalism Studies” 2006, 7:2, p. 336–347, DOI: 10.1080/14616700600645461. U. Beck developed the concept of *the world risk society* from *the risk society*, U. Beck, *Spółeczeństwo światowego ryzyka*, Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2012, p. 23.

² U. Beck, *Spółeczeństwo...*, p. 268.

³ *Vulnerability* – the characteristics of a person or group and their situation that influence their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from the impact of a natural hazard (an extreme natural event or process). It involves a combination of factors that determine the degree to which someone’s life, livelihood, property and other assets are put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event (or series or ‘cascade’ of such events) in nature and in society. There is now more interest in trying to quantify vulnerability as a tool of planning and policy making. B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis, *At Risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters*. Second edition 2003, p. 4–8, http://www.preventionweb.net/files/670_72351.pdf, accessed 11.04.2018.

of hazards, its strength and range depends on the distribution of assets, income and access to other resources, such as knowledge and information, among different social groups, not to mention various forms of discrimination in the allocation of welfare and social protection (including relief and resources for recovery).

Some risks created by technologically-driven society itself cannot be detected with senses of touch or sight. They include: nuclear radiation, carcinogens in foodstuffs, toxicity from pesticides and risks associated with lifestyle⁴.

The risk of terror did not need a long process of building public acceptance. Events organized in the way to attract attention become a fodder for the media that effectively meets terrorists' expectations: nowadays, we think of terror as a central political topic even in parts of the world that were never directly affected by acts of terror. U. Beck asks questions: if Europe with its pacifistic approach to the world is aware of the fact that Islamic terrorists do not act against America (as many Europeans think) but against the West, against Europe, in an anti-cosmopolitan way; and if Europe will support the USA having realized that terroristic Islamic fundamentalism destroys everything Europe professes: antireligious openness to the world, lack of center, respect for those who accept uncertainty as *conditio humana*⁵.

Propaganda and disinformation are another side-effect of media political and social activity. Media warfare (also 'public opinion warfare') is a constant ongoing activity aimed at influencing and conditioning perceptions. The China can be an example. It conducts this war through television programmes, newspaper articles (e.g.: *China Daily and the Global Times*), books, films, and the Internet, as well as through monitoring and censorship of social media networks and blogs such as Sina Weibo (China's equivalent of Twitter). China's global media network, the Xinhua News Agency and China Central Television (CCTV) broadcast "customized" information and programmes in foreign languages through Africa, Central Asia, Europe, and Latin America⁶.

⁴ B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis, *At Risk...*, p. 4-8.

⁵ U. Beck, *Spoleczeństwo...*, p. 290.

⁶ L. Jackson, *The Three Warfare – China's New Way of War*, [in:] *Information at War: From China's Three Warfare to NATO's Narratives, Beyond Propaganda*, September 2015, p. 5-9, <http://www.li.com/programmes/beyond-propaganda>, Legatum Institute www.li.com www.prosperity.com, accessed 11.04.2018.

Mass media along state communication and computer networks, the military information infrastructure and administrative structures of transportation and industrial enterprises is a principal target of the information – psychological confrontation of states/ warfare⁷.

Media is a powerful actor of reflexive modernity in the area of social and economic interactions on the world scale. The Brent Spar conflict between Greenpeace and Shell in 1995 is an illustration of that. As U. Beck describes:

It was like an open, real-life thriller, where people could influence the events by choosing or avoiding a certain gas station. It was like a wrestling match between the two protagonists, and by offering this type of fascination, the media exercise their power and their market interest. I am quite sure that whoever realizes this public interest as a market interest will be successful.

The technology-driven risk having destructive impact on structures of the state: social, economic, technical is a cyberattack, which according to NATO definition, is an action taken to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy information resident in a computer and/or computer network, or the computer and/or computer network itself. Note: A computer network attack is a type of cyber-attack⁸.

Implementation of new technologies produce also new forms of economic risks, series of interrelated changes within contemporary social life such as shifting employment patterns, heightened job insecurity, declining influence of tradition and custom, erosion of traditional family patterns and democratization of personal relations⁹.

Patrick J. Massey classifies them as “generational hazards” – we do them to ourselves, and adds to the list: soaring federal fiscal and current-accounts debts, global warming, inferior mathematics/ science/ engineering education, decaying physical infrastructure, mass-privatization of government services, foreign energy dependence, demographic pressures of low

⁷ T. Thomas, *Psycho Viruses and Reflexive Control: Russian Theories of Information-Psychological War*, [in:] *Information at War: From China's Three Warfares to NATO's Narratives, Beyond Propaganda*, September 2015, p. 17, <http://www.li.com/programmes/beyond-propaganda>, Legatum Institute www.li.com www.prosperity.com, accessed 11.04.2018.

⁸ NATO AAP-06 Edition 2014, p. 14.

⁹ B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis, *At Risk...*, p. 25–26.

birth-rates/aging population and mass-immigration. They have belated but significant negative impacts to national economy/living standards, social destabilization¹⁰.

In the categories of “globalization”, “generation conflicts” and “job market” U. Beck, comments on the “immigrants’ riot” of 2005, burning cars in the French “banlieues” shown on television as violent riots in Paris and other towns in the country:

The young protesters were second- or third generation descendants of immigrants, and paradoxically, their protests were rooted in the fact that they were fully assimilated into the French society, and they took the republican idea of “equality” as a reference point for their self-understanding. On this basis, they felt that their exclusion from the job market and from society was a permanent scandal. So it was not a status as immigrant, but on the contrary, the internalization of a typically French identity together with the synchronous discrimination that contributed to these riots¹¹.

The direct reason for the exclusion of these young people is the condition of the job market, similar all over Europe and other post-industrial countries around the world. The unskilled or low-qualified jobs are outsourced or replaced by machines. The low-income groups have no job perspective and no perspective for social integration: the economy can prosper without them and the governments can be elected without them. This is this side effect of a successful working society¹².

Risks seem to strengthen class society and discrepancies between classes. Poverty attracts risks, whereas the wealthy (in income, power, or education) can purchase safety and freedom from risk. The same applies to nations. The poor nations are more vulnerable to risks and suffer all the time while the rich nations are able to push many risks as far away as possible¹³.

However, in the reflective modernity, risk has become prevalent and affects individuals (a single individual), irrespective of their social and economic standing. The ability of the wealthy to withdraw into safe enclaves – asylums will no longer protect them against the pending risks. U. Beck explains that the risks are democratic, even for those who produce them. Ul-

¹⁰ J. P. Massey, *Generational Hazards, Homeland Security Affairs* 3, Article 3 (September 2007). <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/142>, accessed 11.04.2018.

¹¹ J. Wimmer, T. Quandt, *Living...*, p. 336–347.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis, *At Risk...*, p. 20.

timately, central concerns become not the reduction of inequality and poverty but the knowledge of risk and the ability to secure oneself against it¹⁴.

This approach relates especially to the state, since securing the people is the fundamental duty. The state, its institutions is obliged to forecast risk and take proper actions¹⁵.

The introductory analysis of nature of threats and risks in that paper is to contribute to the discussion on what measures and tools the state through its national security strategies offer or should offer the society to contain risk.

One of the first practical applications of risk was the development of marine insurance, in 1688, in Lloyd's coffee house, with the merchant seaman and businessman underwriting insurance policies against the safe shipment of goods, later to become the Lloyds of London. Since then, Risk Management has become a prevalent discipline especially where the consequence of failure can be catastrophic to the stakeholders. The risks that can emerge from the complex relationships need to be effectively managed. The essential question is: "What can go wrong?" If the sum of the probability of occurrence and consequence of failure are high enough, response plans need to be implemented that will help ensure a successful outcome.

The Risk Management process is a five step process in which each step interacts with each other and overlap. The Table 1 presents the general overview of the notional Risk Management process¹⁶.

Risk response planning is often referred risk handling, mitigation, or simply risk strategy. Options for threats and opportunities may differ. Risk strategies for threats include:

- Avoidance: eliminating the risk by eliminating its cause,
- Mitigation: reducing the probability and/or the impact of the risk,
- Transfer: making another party responsible for the risk.

Response strategies for opportunities include:

- Exploit: increasing the opportunity by making it happen,
- Enhance: increasing the probability or impact values of the opportunity,

¹⁴ S. Bialostok, R. Whitman, *Education and the Risk Society: An Introduction*, [in:] *Contexts of Education* Volume 5, M. A. Peters (ed.), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA, p. 9.

¹⁵ U. Beck, *Spoleczeństwo...*, p. 25.

¹⁶ *NATO Standard Aramp-1 NATO Risk Management Guide For Acquisition Programmes*, Edition 1 Version 1 February 2012, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), p. 4.

- Share: sharing a positive risk involves allocating ownership to a third party who is best able to capture the opportunity for the benefit of the project.

Response strategies for both threats and opportunities include acceptance: accepting that the risk materializes. This strategy can be either passive or active. Active acceptance means preparing contingency plans to be executed when the risk occurs, whereas passive acceptance means leaving actions to be determined as needed after the risk occurs¹⁷.

TABLE 1. THE GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Step No	Step		Section	Actions
1	Risk Management Planning		4.5	Determining how to approach and plan the RM activities for a project, who will be involved and procedures to be used.
2	Risk Assessment	Risk Identification	4.1	Determining which risks might affect the project and documenting their characteristics.
3		Qualitative Risk Analysis	4.2	Performing a qualitative analysis of risks and prioritise them.
		Quantitative Risk Analysis		Numerically estimating the probability and risks impact on project objectives.
4	Risk Response Planning		4.3	Developing risk response strategies and actions to enhance opportunities and to reduce threats to the project's objectives.
5	Risk Monitoring and Control		4.4	Executing risk response plan. Evaluating its effectiveness throughout the project life cycle. Monitoring residual risks, identifying new risks.

Source: *NATO Standard Aramp-1 NATO Risk Management Guide for Acquisition Programmes* Edition 1 Version 1 February 2012, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), p. 25.

In the modern world, the management of risk is all pervading but it is particularly prevalent in the following areas: financial institutions, business enterprises, power/nuclear industry, defense sector, aerospace industry. This observation of the NATO experts converges with the sociological interpretation of risk management.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 37–39.

Ole Wæver¹⁸ argues that today's considerations of safety are increasingly about managing risks rather than achieving perfect security¹⁹. The risk strategy is a kind of regulatory power to govern populations and individuals. Populations are examined, compared against norms, normalized and rendered productive. Risk thinking means understanding and acting upon misfortune in terms of risk. The future present is translated into a calculable form. It is this form of calculation about reality, rather than the "naturally" occurring reality, that is the heart of risk.. This does not imply that dangers are not real. A range of risks exists and this argument is not about the reality of dangers, but about how they are politicized²⁰. Societies select certain dangers over others for attention for reasons that make sense to that particular culture²¹.

Tansey and O'Riordan, "cultural theory" experts explain how and why individuals form judgments about "danger, pollution and threat".

Steven Bialostok and Robert Whitman comment that things are not considered dirty in and of themselves, but because of their position in a system of categories, people or animate or inanimate objects: "Shoes aren't dirty in themselves unless they are placed on the dining room table". And quote Douglas: "dirt is essentially disorder. There is no such thing as absolute dirt: it exists in the eye of the beholder. If we shun dirt, it is not because of craven fear, still less dread or holy terror. Nor do our ideas about disease account for the range of our behavior in cleaning or avoiding dirt. Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organize the environment"²².

Risk and pollution are comparable. Objective dangers are mediated through sociocultural processes²³. Dangers guard the ideal order of so-

¹⁸ O. Wæver, *Four meanings of international society: A trans-Atlantic dialogue*, [in:] *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory*, B. A. Roberston (ed.), Continuum, New York 2002, p. 80–144.

¹⁹ H. G. Brauch, *Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks in Environmental and Human Security*, "Studies of the University: Research, Counsel, Education", Publication Series of UNU-EHS No. 1/2005, p. 68.

²⁰ M. Douglas, *Risk And Blame. Essays in cultural theory*, Routledge, London and New York, 1992, p. 3–20.

²¹ S. Bialostok, R. Whitman, *Education...*, p. 1–34.

²² Ibidem; M. Douglas, *Powers and dangers*, [in:] *Purity and Danger: An analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo*, 1966, <http://web.mit.edu/allanmc/www/douglas.powers-dangers.pdf>, accessed 20.04.2018, p. 2

²³ D. Lupton, *Risk and sociocultural theory, new directions and perspectives*, Cambridge University Press, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/65ad/2c0fb261be1e816ef756b15c63acc1ca3ca9.pdf>, accessed 20.04.2018, p. 25–30.

ciety against transgressions: for example the laws of nature can sanction the moral code: “this kind of disease is caused by adultery, that by incest; this meteorological disaster is the effect of political disloyalty, that the effect of impiety. The whole university is harnessed to men’s attempts to force one another into good citizenship”.

The national security strategies employ this would-to-be effective machinery of risk management which involves strengthening principles, integration of all forces, and consequently “good citizenship”.

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland states that integration of all forces and resources should help deal with risks and threats: “maintaining and demonstrating readiness of the integrated national security system for seizing opportunities, taking up challenges, reducing risks and preventing threats”²⁴.

Whereas the USA *National Strategy for Homeland Security* has a solid foundation of risk policy:

Ensuring Long-Term Success [...] we will continue to strengthen the principles, systems, structures, and institutions [...] to secure the Homeland. [...] The assessment and management of risk underlies the full spectrum of our homeland security activities, including decisions about when, where, and how to invest in resources that eliminate, control, or mitigate risks. [...] we accept that risk – a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences – is a permanent condition²⁵.

What differentiates security threats and risks is the certainty of expectation which has been strictly related to a clearly defined threat²⁶. For understanding of the risk-related terms the practical NATO definitions are quoted:

Risks and uncertainties by Frank H. Knight in “Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit”, are explained as follows: Risk is present when future events occur with measurable probability. Uncertainty is present when the likelihood of future events is indefinite or incalculable.

²⁴ *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*, BBN, Warszawa 2014 (later ref. NSS RP).

²⁵ *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, Homeland Security Council, October 2007, White House (later ref. NS HS) Washington https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nat_strat_homelandsecurity_2007.pdf.

²⁶ H. G. Brauch, *Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks...*, p. 68–75.

The definition of risk includes both positive and negative consequences. An opportunity is also an uncertain event since it is a possible future event. So both threats and opportunities are covered by this same description of risk as “uncertainty that matters”.

Threats and opportunities are important and they both need to be managed. Dealing with them together in an integrated process could bring synergies and efficiencies²⁷.

From the sociological standpoint, U. Beck explains: “Risks presuppose decision. These decisions were previously undertaken with fixed norms of calculability, connecting means and ends or causes and effects. These norms are precisely what ‘world risk society’ has rendered invalid”²⁸.

Distinguishing between decision-makers and those affected by decisions U. Beck quotes Luhmann who explains that risks involve potential damage being a consequence of the decision whereas threats imply damage coming from outside, e.g.: death by a falling part of the airplane wing. Yet, what constitutes risk for one person can be a threat to another, e.g. a smoker risks cancer but for passive smokers the illness is just a threat²⁹.

The authors of *the USA National Strategy for Homeland Security* state that precisely calculated plans are not sufficient and the nation need anticipative and proactive decisions and measures:

As we secure the Homeland, however, we cannot simply rely on defensive approaches and well-planned response and recovery measures. We recognize that our efforts also must involve offense at home and abroad. We will disrupt the enemy’s plans and diminish the impact of future disasters through measures that enhance the resilience of our economy and critical infrastructure before an incident occurs³⁰.

The article 108 of the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland says: “Due to the variety of challenges and the unpredictability of threats, the national security system [...] should be transformed in such a way to monitor and forecast potential threats, respond to them in a fast and adequate manner, and develop the capabilities to eliminate consequences of crisis situations”³¹.

²⁷ *NATO Standard Aramp-1 NATO Risk Management Guide...*, p. 5.

²⁸ U. Beck, *Spółczesność...*, p. 167.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 167–200.

³⁰ NS HS.

³¹ NSS RP.

TABLE 2. THE RISKS AND THREATS IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES

The USA National Strategy for Homeland Security	National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Prevent and disrupt terrorist attacks; - Protect the American people, our critical infrastructure, and key resources; - Respond to and recover from incidents that do occur; - Continue to strengthen the foundation to ensure our long-term success 	<p>Global dimension</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The undermined credibility of disarmament agreements - The persistence of authoritarian orders and confrontational attitudes, disregard for rules of international laws - International terrorism and organised crime - Cybercrime, cyberterrorism, cyber espionage and cyber conflicts - Extremism - An increase in the demand for energy, food and drinking water 	<p>Regional dimension</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Potential destabilisation resulting from political and territorial disputes, as well as ethnic and religious tensions - A continuous downward trend in the size of defence budgets of NATO and EU countries - Russia's escalation of its confrontational policy - EU eastern neighbourhood countries under political, military and economic pressure of Russia - The ageing of the population - The dependence of EU states on the import of energy resources - Loss of biodiversity 	<p>National dimension</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Demographic structure - Unemployment, social exclusion - Social stratification and unequal access to goods and services - Challenges for public security and public order - Terrorism - Interest of foreign secret services - Corruption - Challenges for financial system and energy security

Source: own elaboration

The security strategies for risk societies should embrace both global risks and those internal ones generated by society itself: “to prosper, great societies must acknowledge and manage both external *and* internal threats. To simply focus on one while ignoring the other is a recipe for disaster”³².

This idea should be supported by understanding and individual approach to the risks, threats and hazards that a particular nation faces as an individual and as the element of global security constellation. The internal problems are often fueled by outside conflicts and crisis and internal conflicts spread across borders. They are interrelated. Table 2. presents the comparison of the sets of risks and threats in national strategies of two countries Poland and the USA.

Secretary Kelly enlisted the following internal problems the USA faces:

- Terrorism,
- Transnational criminal organizations,
- Human smuggling,
- “Special interest aliens” – they are from parts of the world where terrorism is prevalent, or nations that are hostile to the United States,
- Drug trade³³.

The strategies emphasize the importance of cooperation of all forces, institutions, organizations, social groups and individual citizens in combating threats and mitigating risks.

Giddens³⁴ explored the relationship between ‘risk’ and ‘trust’. In that context, trust between, for example, citizen-based organizations and municipal governments, is critical in mobilizing human resources for mitigating disaster loss and reducing vulnerability³⁵. The relations between society and state security forces determine the success of every homeland security operation. Secretary Kelly states this explicitly:

³² J. P. Massey, *Generational Hazards...*

³³ *Home and Away: DHS and the Threats to America, Remarks delivered by Secretary Kelly at George Washington University Center for Cyber and Homeland Security*, Release Date: April 18, 2017, <https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/04/18/home-and-away-dhs-and-threats-america>, accessed 11.04.2018.

³⁴ A. Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy Sexuality, Love, and Eroticism in Modern Societies*, Diane Publishing Company 1992, p. 58.

³⁵ B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis, *At Risk...*, p. 18.

I am proud to say that, with help from our international, interagency, private sector, and state and local partners, we are standing strong and winning the battle³⁶.

Kelly also mentions a problem of public servants' image:

My people have been discouraged from doing their jobs for nearly a decade, disabled by pointless bureaucracy and political meddling, and suffered disrespect and contempt by public officials who have no idea what it means to serve.

My people—the men and women of the Department—do a difficult and at times nearly impossible job in the service of the American people. [...] We are moving in exactly the right direction.

Why? Because the best way to improve morale is to let employees do the jobs they were hired and trained to do, and recognize them for doing it³⁷.

The nation state as a guarantor of security seems to be still relevant although it fails to solve ecological, economic or terrorism threat on their own³⁸. U. Beck claims 'risk' "is the modern approach to foresee and control the future consequences of human action [...] it is not national, but global". The difference between national and international risk effaces, which calls for different approaches³⁹.

The national security strategies, then, should be the basis for developing the "international risk policy" which could have a supportive role from the individual state as well as global security perspective. The conception of the "international risk policy" consists of four ideal-type strategies for cooperation, intervention, compensation and preparation to contain risks. The goal of cooperation is to reduce the probability of risks becoming reality by reducing misperceptions and by fostering a cooperative risk management. The second goal of intervention focuses on reducing the probability of a future damage occurring by using political and military coercion. The third one aims at a cooperative reduction of the potential future damage by risk sharing strategies. The fourth strategy aims

³⁶ *Home and Away...*

³⁷ *Ibidem.*

³⁸ J. Wimmer, T. Quandt, *Living...*

³⁹ U. Beck, *Spółeczeństwo...*, p. 290.

at a repressive reduction of the potential damage with political, economic, legal and military measures⁴⁰.

The works on developing strategy following this direction can be traced in *The USA National Strategy for Homeland Security*, which says:

Many of the threats we face – pandemic diseases, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and natural disasters – also demand multinational effort and cooperation. To this end, we have strengthened our homeland security through foreign partnerships, and we are committed to expanding and increasing our layers of defense, which extend well beyond our borders, by seeking further cooperation with our international partners⁴¹.

The Strategy for National Security of the Republic of Poland defines one of many strategic goals of cooperative security: “developing close cooperation with all neighbours and building partnership relations with other states aimed, inter alia, to prevent and solve international conflicts and crises”⁴².

The educational policy has also become the educational risk policy equipped with all the necessary risk management tools to eliminate vulnerabilities and build up future capacity of the risk society – learning society.

The “excellence” reform movement within the United States was to improve the falling standardized test scores among growing numbers of students (especially among poor children of color). Having examined the quality of American public schools, in 1983 the authorities released *A Nation at Risk* report warning against a “rising tide of mediocrity” that threatened the nation’s future. It is worth quoting since quality of education and necessity of reforms is a hot issue also in Poland. The issues raised in the document reflect the concerns of Polish educational system as well.

Our Nation is at risk. [...] The educational foundations of our society are presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people. [...] If an unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre educational performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of war. As it stands, we have allowed this to happen to ourselves.

We live among determined, well-educated, and strongly motivated competitors. We compete with them for international standing and mar-

⁴⁰ H. G. Brauch, *Threats...*, p. 47.

⁴¹ NS HS.

⁴² NSS RP.

kets, not only with products but also with the ideas of our laboratories and neighborhood workshops. [...] these developments signify a redistribution of trained capability throughout the globe. [...] If only to keep and improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in world markets, we must dedicate ourselves to the reform of our educational system for the benefit of all—old and young alike, affluent and poor, majority and minority.[...] Our concern, however, goes well beyond matters such as industry and commerce. It also includes the intellectual, moral, and spiritual strengths of our people which knit together the very fabric of our society⁴³.

A mediocre educational system has produced the economic, cognitive-intellectual risks, and two additional risks: the moral and spiritual strengths of Americans were at risk; the culture itself was at risk.

S. Bialostok and R. Whitman comment that the Report has been marketing fear to a society already skeptical about public education and then risk management policy promoting standardized testing, accountability, competition, school choice, and privatization.

Achievement should occur at the individual level (“performance tests pushing individual ability to personal limits, in school and in the workplace”), school/college level (“sets high expectations and goals”), and society. Educational reform should aim at creating a “learning society” operating in global economies, politics, and all other global social life areas⁴⁴.

The educational reform in Poland has been also motivated by mediocre students’ performance.

The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), an international survey which aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-old students released the Report with results and interpretations for the surveyed countries.

Many of the best-performing countries and economies in problem solving are those with better-than-expected performance on knowledge-acquisition tasks, which require high levels of reasoning skills and self-directed learning.

Students who do well in mathematics, reading and science also show strong performance in problem solving and do well when confronted with unfamiliar problems in contexts outside of school subjects.

⁴³ <http://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/index.html>.


⁴⁴ S. Bialostok, R. Whitman, *Education...*

Polish students display weaker-than-expected performance on interactive tasks and on knowledge-acquisition tasks (Fig.1).

The conclusion of the Report is also that teachers and schools can foster students' ability to confront – and solve – the problems that are encountered daily in 21st century life⁴⁵.

The rationality rule of the market, defined standards, control of teacher and student work, and students/officers educated to pro-actively manage potential risks in uncertain futures⁴⁶ apply to military education and training and education for security institutions as well.

FIG. 1. STUDENTS' STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN PROBLEM SOLVING



In interactive tasks, students must uncover some of the information required to solve the problem; static tasks have all the necessary information disclosed at the outset. For each country/economy and for each set of tasks, expected performance is based on the country's/economy's overall performance in problem solving and on the relative difficulty of tasks, as measured across OECD countries.

Source: OECD, PISA 2012 Database, Tables V3.1 and V3.6.

StatLink  <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933003592>

Source: *Are 15-year olds creative problem solvers?* PISA in Focus – 2014/04 (April) © OECD 2014, p. 34.

⁴⁵ *Are 15-year olds creative problem solvers?*, PISA in Focus – 2014/04 (April) © OECD 2014, OECD PISA, p. 30, <http://www.oecd.org/pisa/publications/>, accessed 11.04.2018.

⁴⁶ *Are 15-year olds...*

The USA *Executive Order 13434 of May 17, 2007* (“*National Security Professional Development*”) and the resulting *National Strategy for the Development of Security Professionals* is to establish multidisciplinary education in homeland with the cohesive systems of planning, execution of operations and exercises, and overall assessment and evaluation⁴⁷.

Educational policy for Polish National Security System is defined in the *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*.

Art 120 of NSS RP refers to changes in the military education system that should aim at consolidation and the effectiveness of training and research, better expenditure of public funds, as well as incorporation of education and vocational training of privates and non-commissioned officers into the national educational system based on the Polish Qualifications Framework. The military medical care system should be improved by reconstruction of medical corps and modernization of the field medical technology⁴⁸.

Whereas art. 141 states that education for security institutions should be more coordinated and of better quality especially in areas important for state and citizens’ security within the framework of the general education and higher education system. It refers also to vocational training of soldiers, officers, civilians. It requires the Minister of National Defence and Minister for internal affairs to create the coherent curricula on a trans sectoral and supraministerial level, which would allow to obtain the quality of teaching meeting the needs of the state⁴⁹.

Castel describes the reality of reflexive modernization as “a grandiose technocratic rationalizing dream of absolute control of the accidental [...] an absolute reign of calculative reason”⁵⁰.

The key point is that risk perception is determined by socio-cultural factors. It is not stable and may change in a political process. This could explain more focused demands on authorities to address the ‘root causes’ of vulnerability. The authorities respond in the form of the proactive ap-

⁴⁷ NS HS.

⁴⁸ NSS RP, BBN 2014.

⁴⁹ NSS PR, BBN 2014.

⁵⁰ R. Castel, *From Dangerousness to Risk*, [in:] *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Burchell, Graham; Gordon, Colin; Miller, Peter (ed.), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1991, <https://konspektikaust.wordpress.com/2012/04/18/robert-casel-from-dangerousness-to-risk/>, accessed 20.04.2018, p. 281–298, quoted in D Lupton, *Risk...*, p. 7; B. Wisner, P. Blaikie, T. Cannon, I. Davis, *At Risk...*, p. 17.

proaches, development of educational risk policies and security strategies and implementation of risk management tools to all spheres of social life.

Schools, hospitals, government, churches, social welfare systems has become a quasi-markets where officers /doctors, teachers are service providers and citizens/ patients/ students “clients”.

The presentation of concepts and practical solutions from literature and security strategies and policies helped conclude that both defensive and offensive approaches along with the traditional military power and soft power seem to be equally crucial to deal with internal and global risks. These measures include: risk management, international cooperation, cooperation of all internal institutions and forces, the international risks policy to conclude with the educational policy as a risk policy.

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