

Aleksandra Tomaszewska

Influence of Eurojargon on Polish MEPS' discourse

Społeczeństwo. Edukacja. Język 3, 197-210

2015

Artykuł został opracowany do udostępnienia w internecie przez Muzeum Historii Polski w ramach prac podejmowanych na rzecz zapewnienia otwartego, powszechnego i trwałego dostępu do polskiego dorobku naukowego i kulturalnego. Artykuł jest umieszczony w kolekcji cyfrowej bazhum.muzhp.pl, gromadzącej zawartość polskich czasopism humanistycznych i społecznych.

Tekst jest udostępniony do wykorzystania w ramach
dozwolonego użytku.

INFLUENCE OF EUROJARGON ON POLISH MEPS' DISCOURSE

Summary

The purpose of this article is to analyze the influence of the language of EU's institutions (eurojargon) on the discourse of Polish Members of the European Parliament in the media and during public debates or speeches. The theoretical part presents different academic approaches and chosen literature related to the subject and describes linguistic features of eurojargon in the Polish language. The empirical part is devoted to the qualitative analysis of spoken data of Janusz Lewandowski, Marek Migalski and Jacek Kurski. The analysis focuses on finding the reasons for the usage of eurojargon elements, as well as defining dominating categories of foreign elements in their speeches.

Keywords: eurojargon, borrowings, code-switching, code-mixing, Anglicisms

Introduction

The EU's efforts to unify Europe, which included *inter alia* international meetings, conferences, many documents and legal regulations, have all contributed to the emergence of a new kind of language. This language, which is characterized by specific vocabulary concerning the essence of the functioning of the European Union, is called *eurojargon*. It has become a peculiar code of intercommunication in EU institutions. Recent research on the language used in the structures of the European Union shows that eurojargon, functioning as a potential source of new language forms both at the lexical and syntagmatic levels, exerts influence on the national languages of all 28 EU Member States, in particular the way that citizens, especially those involved in the European issues, speak and write in their national languages. This language phenomenon may also be noticed in the media and in different contexts in which MEPs comment on the issues of the European Community. One of the countries influenced by this phenomenon is Poland, where it is no longer uncommon to encounter in the media words and phrases borrowed from so-called *Brussels English*, or otherwise influenced by it. Such lexical items as, for instance, *kohezja* [cohesion], *subsydiarność* [subsidiarity] or *kompozycja personalna* [personal composition] may be heard more and more often, especially in the political context.

The increasing popularity of debates on this language phenomenon not only in academic fields, but also in the media and in broadly defined public context, has encouraged me to conduct my own analysis of the subject. I decided to focus on how the language used in the structures of the European Union influences the way that Polish MEPs speak, in particular to investigate the codes they use, how and when they code-switch, and how the forms of Polish and the forms of eurojargon are related in their discourse.

In this article I decided to use the term *eurojargon* to refer globally to the phenomenon analyzed, although some other alternative terms have also been coined in linguistic literature and media. One of the arguments for that choice is that eurojargon is the term officially

used by EU institutions (for instance by Europa.eu). What is more, it seems to be the most common of all alternative names for this phenomenon used in linguistic works that I have consulted [for example Goffin 1994; Kwiek 2012; Dobkiewicz 2013]. Finally, the term *jargon* emphasizes a group-specific character of this language variety: as defined by OED, *jargon* is “any mode of speech abounding in unfamiliar terms, or peculiar to a particular set of persons, as the language of scholars or philosophers, the terminology of a science or art, or the cant of a class, sect, trade, or profession” [OED Online]. This elite character is also the case of eurojargon, which is used and understood mainly by people acquainted with the matters of the EU, such as MEPs, journalists and politicians.

My hypothesis is that there can be a correlation between the *Brussels English* spoken by the officials working in the structures of the European Union, and the Polish language used by MEPs assumed to be similarly influenced by eurojargon. The diagnostic aim of my study is therefore to gather information on the influence of eurojargon on the Polish language, in particular to identify and describe elements of eurojargon in Polish MEPs’ discourse. Furthermore, I would like to verify if the Polish language faces a constant influx of EU terminology and to present which elements of the language system are now especially subject to such a change.

The materials presented in the article are chosen samples of speeches and interviews by Janusz Lewandowski, Marek Migalski and Jacek Kurski (with occasional examples from some other Polish politicians working in EU institutions) from my research, gathered mainly from Polish media, and analyzed qualitatively. I decided to focus on the presence of three major linguistic elements in the texts analyzed: code-switching, code-mixing and Anglicisms. The latter are particularly relevant, as English acts as *lingua franca* in the organs of the EU. I assume that mass and widespread communication in this language, especially in its *Brussels* variety, contributes to an increase in the frequency of English elements in MEPs’ discourse.

1. Language of EU institutions: eurojargon

Many researchers have made attempts to define *eurojargon*. According to Jędrzejowska [2011: 63], it may be defined as the lexis used by officials working on EU’s legislation and bureaucrats from all the Member States. Kajzer [2009: 467] describes it similarly, as a kind of political jargon that has emerged as an effect of a continuous interaction with other languages of the European Union. The most noticeable lexical features of this jargon are frequently used calques, acronyms, abbreviated forms and specialized terminology [Jędrzejowska 2011: 63-64]. However, although eurojargon has its own lexis, it cannot be defined as a language proper. According to Dobkiewicz [2013: 297], it should be rather described as a specific code of communication, especially because eurojargon has not shaped its own grammar, which is a definitional criterion of a language. It is therefore a code of narrow social reception used by some professional groups, *inter alia* politicians, EU consultants and journalists.

1.1. Alternative terms for *eurojargon*

There are many approaches towards what I refer to as *eurojargon*; also, researchers define the phenomenon in different ways. Although those names can be used as synonyms to the term *eurojargon*, they often imply slightly different evaluative approaches towards it: more or less positive. The most neutral term, which implies neither positive nor negative approach towards the described phenomenon, is the term *eurollect*. It was first used by Goffin in 1990 [Goffin 1990: 18]. Another term is eurojargon, which emphasizes the connection of the code with the profession shared by its users. Sometimes the pejorative aspect of this term is emphasized: it can be used as a derogatory name because the term *jargon* usually implies

a group-specific code, which is by definition unavailable for other groups or individuals. In other words, *jargon* implies a somewhat elitist character of the code.

Another relevant term is *eurofog* – used *inter alia* by Biel [2014] and Goffin [2005] – which underlines the lack of clarity of the language of EU institutions. It thus implies a certain helplessness of people trying to decipher it. On the other hand, there are also two terms which are relatively neutral and underline the legal context as the primary one where this code is used, namely *Eurolegalese* or *Union legalese*.

Finally, one should also mention *eurospeak*, which many scholars use interchangeably with *eurojargon*; they are used as synonyms for example by Goffin [1994]. However, some other scholars claim that *eurojargon* and *eurospeak* refer to two different codes in the structures of the European Union. Specifically, *eurojargon* is used by all the specialists and insiders from the EU to communicate with one another, and *eurospeak* is a way of expressing concepts that have no equivalent in national languages [Sosis 2004].

1.2. *Eurojargon: basic features and functions*

To understand the role of *eurojargon*, one needs to remember that the EU supports the policy of *multilingualism* [Sosis 2005: 39]. One of the aims of this policy is to preserve national identity in a multicultural environment. In consequence, there are 24 official languages of 28 Member States functioning in EU organs. Since people employed in the structures of the EU come from that many countries and they use that many different official languages, the main reason why they use *eurojargon* is that it facilitates their communication with one another and provides faster access to information essential to their work [Kwiek 2012: 22]. The jargon used within EU structures also frequently uses neologisms created to represent precisely those EU-related notions which do not exist at a national level, and, in consequence, have to be somehow described in the national language [Kajzer 2009: 467]. It also guarantees comprehension on conceptual levels and reduces the risk of dissonance in interaction.

Moreover, some aspects of *eurojargon* guarantee that people coming from 28 different countries will not offend one another as a result of miscomprehension. Some scholars describe – not without reason – such use of *eurojargon* pejoratively in terms of terminology consonant with the rules of *political correctness* [Pernice 2004: 11]. Since one of the tasks of the European Parliament and the European Commission is to promote EU discourse which would not offend anyone and would not express any bias, some peculiar lexis is used in EU legal documents and also in official debates or negotiations. Some relevant examples might be gender-neutral lexis, for instance avoiding gender-marked titles such as *Mr.*, *Miss* or *Mrs.*, or, in some cases, seeking for more neutral terms for certain phenomena or states, for instance *vision impaired* instead of *blind*, or *to have special needs* instead of *to be mentally retarded*.

1.3. *Pejorative aspects of eurojargon*

One of the latest trends in the media is to call *eurojargon* *European newspeak*. The term was initially used by right-wing activists, who compared the language used by EU officials to the fictional language from Orwell's novel *Nineteen Eighty Four*. The first person to use it was Jean-Yves Le Gallou, a far-right former member of the European Parliament from the French nationalist party *Front national* [Kwiek 2012]. The term *European newspeak* then became popular in French, firstly in colloquial speech and in the media. Eventually it was adopted in other countries, including Poland, where it has been used in quality press such as *Polityka* [Wilk 2014 [51/52]] and even in some academic works [for instance Dobkiewicz 2013].

Since the moment that the term appeared, researchers have been debating whether this undoubtedly pejorative term can be used as a synonym of *eurojargon*. According to Kwiek [2012: 23], *newspeak*, as understood by Orwell, was a tool used to manipulate reality and to impose one and unique vision of the world. For instance, it did not contain words that could express negative feelings towards the government. However, according to Dobkiewicz [2012: 308-309], who based her research on the characteristic features of *Newspeak* as defined by Głowiński [2009], comparing eurojargon to the language from Orwell's novel would be an over-interpretation because the European Union does not impose any expressions on its members and eurojargon is a natural consequence of the need for facilitating discussion between people of 28 Member States, though at the possible expense of other people's comprehension. Finally, the fact that it influences the way that more and more people speak is nothing unusual. According to Biel [2014: 76], one of the main reasons for this process is globalization, whose natural consequence is seeking linguistic uniformity.

2. Examples of Polish eurojargon

Before analyzing the corpus of excerpts from Polish MEPs' speeches and interviews, it would be essential to present some examples of features of Polish eurojargon focusing on its lexical aspects, especially borrowings. In general, neologisms are used by MEPs in the media, when they discuss some facts on the current functioning of the European Union, and in this context they can use lexical items from the language which they regularly use in the structures of the EU. As a result they can propagate some words that have not been present in the Polish language before:

Polish eurojargon	English equivalent
<i>subsydiarność</i>	subsidiarity
<i>prezydencja</i>	presidency
<i>konwergencja</i>	convergence
<i>akcesja</i>	accession

Table 1: Polish **eurojargon**: selected one-word literal translations

Table 1 presents some examples of adapted loanwords (i.e. borrowings adjusted to the morphological system of the native language) in Polish eurojargon. For example, the first one, *subsydiarność* (commonly used in the phrase *zasada subsydiarności*) is one of the most interesting cases in Polish *eurojargon*. It derives from the English term *subsidiarity* (and the above-mentioned phrase from *principle of subsidiarity*). The EU defines it as a principle ensuring that "decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made to verify that action at Union level is justified in light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level" (source: Europa.eu glossary). While there exists the native Polish equivalent (*pomocniczość*), it is not used as often as the loanword; however, as Kajzer (2009: 475) notes, the latter follows the Polish rules of affixation (i.e. *-ność* suffix denoting abstract nouns).

All the examples mentioned in this section have one thing in common – all of them are borrowed and adapted from English on the basis of semantic extension of common terms. In consequence of the adaptation process neologisms resemble Polish words. However, all of them have their recognized equivalents in Polish, which – at least to some extent – undermines the rationale for introducing such neologisms into Polish.

Polish eurojargon	English equivalent
<i>deficyt demokratyczny</i>	democratic deficit
<i>ojcowie założyciele</i>	the founding fathers
<i>wzmocniona współpraca</i>	closer co-operation
<i>kraje pierwszej prędkości</i> <i>twarde jądro</i>	one-speed countries hard core of the EU

Table 2: Polish eurojargon: selected calques

According to Dobkiewicz [2012], calques based on literal translation are the most common category in Polish eurojargon. Table 2 presents some examples of this kind of expressions.

An interesting example of a calque, especially used when referring to the history of the European Community, is the term *ojcowie założyciele* 'the founding fathers', a term referring to the politicians who founded the EU. The term itself was adapted from the name describing the representatives of American colonies who led the American Revolution (source: archives.gov). Another one, *kraje pierwszej prędkości*, is a *verbatim* translation of 'one-speed countries'. The phrase denotes the most important countries of the EU, especially the countries that entered the monetary union, for instance Germany and France. The term itself emerged from the discussions on the so-called *multi-speed monetary union*.

The most intriguing example is *twarde jądro*, a collocation translated from the English 'hard core' [of the EU], which collocation is not that much clear in Polish as it may be in English. In fact, its proper interpretation may require more knowledge of EU issues than any of the other expressions quoted in this section.

There are also different kinds of neologisms that I took into account:

- compounds consisting of a prefix and a head; the former of which is usually connected with the EU (*euro-*) or with community (*ko-*), as for instance *eurobarometr* [EN: Eurobarometer] or *koddecyzja* [EN: co-decision];
- non-adapted loanwords as *agenda* [EN: agenda] and *benchmarking* [EN: benchmarking],
- abbreviations and acronyms borrowed from the main languages of the EU featuring a diverse level of integration with the Polish language, as *EFTA* used instead of *Europejskie Stowarzyszenie Wolnego Handlu* [EN: European Free Trade Association], *CAP* [EN: Common Agricultural Policy], instead of *Wspólna polityka rolna Unii Europejskiej*, *TEN-TEA* [EN: The Trans-European Transport Network Executive Agency], in lieu of *Agencja Wykonawcza ds. Transeuropejskiej Sieci Transportowej*, and many more.

3. Influence of eurojargon on Polish MEPs' discourse – empirical analysis

Janusz Lewandowski

Janusz Lewandowski is a Polish MEP affiliated to the EPP (European People's Party) in the European Parliament, and to the Civic Platform in Poland. His political career started in the 1980s, when he worked as a financial advisor in the Solidarity movement. In the 1990s, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, he was one of the founders of *Kongres Liberalno-Demokratyczny* [Liberal Democratic Congress]. He was the Minister of Privatization from 1990 to 1993 and, after the merger of *Unia Demokratyczna* [Democratic Union] with Liberal Democratic Congress, he became a member of the newly founded *Unia Wolności* [Freedom

Union]. Several years later, in 2001, after his seceding from Freedom Union together with Donald Tusk, he was elected Polish MP representing Civic Platform. In 2003, he became an observer in the EP. A year later he was elected MEP and chair of the Committee on Budgets. He has a PhD in economics from University of Gdańsk; he is a founder of the Research Institute for Market Economy and a former lecturer at Harvard University¹. He speaks three foreign languages – in his Curriculum Vitae he mentions his advanced English and German skills and good French².

The first sample is an excerpt from an interview with Janusz Lewandowski broadcast in *TVN 24* on 28 December 2014 in “Fakty po Faktach”, the most popular current affairs program in the Polish TV industry in terms of audience size (data after KRRiT 2013). In the interview Lewandowski talks about the British “in-out referendum”:

1. *My Anglików naprawdę potrzebujemy. Oni są na kolizyjnym kursie z nami, z naszą racją stanu, dlatego nie wiem, dlaczego Polacy są w tych frakcjach, skoro chcą małego budżetu, a Polska jest głównym beneficjentem budżetu europejskiego.*

[We really do need the English. They **are on a collision course with us**, with our reason of state, and that is why I do not know why the Poles are in those fractions if they want a small budget, and Poland is the main beneficiary of the European budget.]

(Janusz Lewandowski in “Fakty po Faktach”, *TVN24*, 28th December 2014)

In example (1) the phrase “to be on a collision course” means “not to agree”. By saying *oni są na kolizyjnym kursie z nami* [They are on a collision course with us], Janusz Lewandowski means that actions of the English contradict in a sense the actions of Poles. However, the expression *kurs kolizyjny* ‘collision course’ is used in Polish only to refer to comets, asteroids or planets when talking about their ‘collision course’ with other celestial bodies. In English, nonetheless, this expression is used in several senses: first, “a course of moving bodies that will result in collision”, and second, “a course or antithetical philosophies that will result in conflict if continued unaltered” or “any plan, attitude or course of action that leads to a confrontation [...] with another” (*Macmillian Dictionary*). Lewandowski used the expression in the second English sense, unknown in Polish. It is therefore an example of neosemantization, a linguistic phenomenon of adopting new meanings, which may be caused for instance owing to semantic loan translations [Satoła-Staśkowiak 2014: 184].

Examples 2 and 3 are fragments of Lewandowski’s speech at Polish Senate, delivered at Senate’s 47th session that took place on the 9th and 10th January 2014. The session was broadcast on the official page of the Polish Senate. Excerpt (2) is about the effects that the changes within energy industry have on the economy of certain European countries:

2. *Orientacja polska jest taka, aby uzgadniać te sprawy na forum globalnym. Chodzi o to, żeby nie być bardziej ambitnym niż inne kontynenty, które obecnie bardziej zatrują atmosferę niż Europa – bo Europa ma w tej chwili skromny udział w tej emisji CO2.*

[The orientation of Poland is to set these issues on the global forum. The point is not to be more ambitious than other continents, which now pollute the atmosphere more than Europe – because at the moment Europe takes a modest part in the emissions of CO2.]

(Janusz Lewandowski, 47th session of the Polish Senate)

¹ <http://www.premier.gov.pl>

² Based on the Curriculum Vitae of Janusz Lewandowski published on: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/commission_20102014/lewandowski/library/about/whoiam/cv_lewandowski_pl.pdf

The English equivalent of *orientacja*, which Lewandowski used in example (2), is 'orientation', for which Merriam Webster dictionary provides several definitions: "the act or process of orienting or of being oriented; a usually general or lasting direction of thought, intention, inclination, or interest; a person's sexual self-identification; a change of position by organs, organelles, or organisms in response to external stimulus" (Merriam Webster Online). The Polish dictionary SJP defines it similarly, as: *umiejętność rozpoznawania określonych miejsc i kierunków w terenie; rozeznanie w sytuacji, jakimś zagadnieniu oraz umiejętność ich oceny; określone poglądy polityczne lub preferencje seksualne* (SJP) [ability to identify specific locations and directions outdoors; being informed about a situation and being able to assess it; specific political views or sexual preferences]. However, the sense of "a usually general or lasting direction of thought, intention, inclination, or interest", which Lewandowski phrase most likely conveys, is only present in the English dictionary and not in the Polish one. Indeed, Lewandowski uses the expression *orientacja polska* 'the orientation of Poland' in the sense of a certain objective of Poland as a country. It is another example of neosemantization, since it adds a new meaning borrowed from a foreign language to a lexical item which has previously been used, but in a narrower way.

3. mamy do czynienia z zespoleniem kwestii energetycznej, czyli cen energii jako nośnika konkurencyjności, z **ambicjami klimatycznymi**. To jest zderzenie, którego nie ukrywamy – różnice zdań były prezentowane na forum rządowym pod koniec zeszłego i na początku tego roku. Dzisiaj o 8.30 było tak zwane śniadanie **uzgadniające**.

[we are dealing with a merger of energy issues – the prices of energy being a medium of competitiveness with the **climate ambitions**. It is a collision that we are not hiding. The differences in opinions were presented to the government at the end of the last year and at the beginning of this year. Today, at 8.30 a.m. we have had a so-called **negotiation breakfast**]

(Janusz Lewandowski, 47th session of the Polish Senate)

The expression *ambicje klimatyczne* 'climate ambitions' is used in Polish only when talking about the European Union; it was found in Polish media in the utterances of persons professionally related to the EU and discussing EU-related issues, e.g. *Polska organizuje szczyt, by zatrzymać unijne ambicje klimatyczne* [Poland is organizing the climate summit in order to stop UE's **climate ambitions**] (Beata Jaczewska, formerly employed in the EC, an excerpt from an interview for the *Forbes* magazine); *zamiast walczyć o ambicje klimatyczne, powinniśmy zawalczyć o bycie jedną z lepszych gospodarek świata* [instead of fighting for **climate ambitions**, we should fight for being one of the best economies in the world] (Jerzy Buzek; former President of the European Parliament, quote published at www.inzynierpv.pl). This expression was also used in a dispatch of Polish Press Agency. By contrast, the collocation is not mentioned in the SJP dictionary, which only defines *ambicja* 'ambition' alone, as *silne pragnienie odniesienia sukcesu lub osiągnięcia doskonałości* [a strong will to succeed or to be perfect] or *poczucie godności własnej* [a sense of self-esteem]. Thus it is clear that the collocation *ambicje klimatyczne* is an element of eurojargon.

The second example of eurojargon in excerpt (3) is *śniadanie uzgadniające* 'negotiation breakfast', which is frequently used by Janusz Lewandowski. For instance he used it again in a debate in one of the commissions of Sejm: *dzisiaj odbywa się – powiedziałbym – polityczne śniadanie uzgadniające w zakresie inicjatyw klimatyczno-energetycznych* [today we're having – I would say – a political **negotiation breakfast** on the climate and energy initiatives]. Like *ambicje klimatyczne*, *śniadanie uzgadniające* is also a literal translation of the English expression.

4. I dlatego pozostaje wrażenie, że **Polska jest w narożniku**, że jest tym krajem, który przeciwstawia się ambicjom klimatycznym czy środowiskowym. A tak nie

jest, to jest cały zestaw krajów, które się chowają – zacytuję po niemiecku – hinter den breiten Schultern Polens.

[And that's why there's an impression that Poland **is in the corner**; that it is this country that opposes the climate or the environmental ambitions. And that's not true, it's a whole set of countries that are hiding – I will say it in German – hinter den breiten Schultern Polens.]

(Janusz Lewandowski, 47th session of the Polish Senate)

In excerpt (4) Janusz Lewandowski speaks Polish and then switches to German *hinter den breiten Schultern Polens* 'behind the broad shoulders of Poland'. The sentence is a non-translated quote from a speech by Günther Oettinger, European Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society.

As can be seen in examples (3) and (4), Janusz Lewandowski sometimes flags his eurojargon; he uses *tak zwane* 'so-called' before the expression *śniadanie uzgadniające* 'negotiation breakfast' in example (3), and says *zacytuję po niemiecku* 'I will quote in German' before codeswitching with *hinter der breiten Schultern Polens* 'behind the broad shoulders of Poland'. It should be noted that the usage of such metadiscursive flags is quite frequent among MEPs, especially when they are about to use a noticeably foreign element, which, for various reasons, does not sound natural in Polish. Interestingly, the phrase *tak zwany* 'so-called' appears frequently in this function. For instance, in one of the interviews for *TVN24*, Janusz Lewandowski used it before the expression *race to the bottom*: *To będzie tak zwany race to the bottom* [It will be a **so-called** race to the bottom].

Interestingly, while Janusz Lewandowski relatively often code-switches in his speeches, other Polish politicians employed in European institutions code-switch even more often. A good example is Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz:

5. A jeśli kryzys odwagi, to on się bierze z kryzysu **leadershipu**. *Taki miękki leadership w UE, bardzo sfokusowanych na poparcie społeczne liderów bojących się podejmować odważne decyzje.*

[And if we are talking about the crisis of courage, it is taken from **the leadership crisis**. Such a **soft leadership** in the European Union of **highly focused** on public support leaders afraid of making brave decisions]

(Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz, TVN24)

As can be observed, it the word *leadership* is very curiously inflected by Marcinkiewicz, who declined it as a Polish masculine noun. In the next sentence he uses the expression *miękki leadership*, which is a calque of the English 'soft leadership'. He also uses *sfokusowanych na* 'focused on': a structural lexical borrowing from English, in which even the preposition was preserved.

Marek Migalski

Marek Migalski is a Polish politician, political scientist and Member of the European Parliament of the previous (VII) term. He was elected to the EP for *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* [Law and Justice], but he was expelled from this party's delegation in the European Parliament for criticizing its leader, Jarosław Kaczyński. Together with Joanna Kluzik-Rostkowska, Paweł Poncyliusz, Elżbieta Jakubiak and MEPs Michał Kamiński, Adam Bielan and Paweł Kowal, Marek Migalski created a more moderate party, Poland Comes First. He was also one of the creators of another party – Jarosław Gowin's Poland Together, of which he was vice-president until March 2014. He was a candidate in the European Parliament elections in 2014, but he was not reelected for the VIII term. A few days after the failure, he quitted Poland Together and resigned from political life.

In excerpt (6) Marek Migalski is talking about *Ojcowie Założyciele* 'Founding Fathers'; as has already been noted, this term is normally used to refer to American activists who signed the Declaration of Independence, for instance Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson and George Washington. In the context of *eurojargon* it is used to refer to people who have contributed to the EU's existence and integration, *inter alia* Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman (Europa.eu). The phrase has been calqued in Marek Migalski's utterance in his interview for *Rzeczpospolita*, one of the most popular Polish dailies:

6. *Jestem przekonany, że dobra przyszłość Europy, jej integracja, to przede wszystkim pozostanie przy podstawowych założeniach dobrowolności, wolności w poziomie integracji, o czym mówili już **Ojcowie Założyciele**.*

[I am convinced that the good future of Europe, its integration, lays primarily on remaining within the basic assumptions of voluntarism, freedom of the integration level, which has been claimed by **the Founding Fathers**.]

(Marek Migalski, interview for *www.rp.pl*, April 4th, 2014)

The same expression, also referring to EU founders, has also appeared in utterances of other Polish MEP's, for instance in interviews with Law and Justice's Mirosław Piotrowski:

(7) *Przecież niektórzy **ojcowie założyciele** są kandydatami na ołtarze – a to się przemilcza, o tym się nie mówi, lecz lansuje się całkiem inną ideologię, sprzeczną z wiarą chrześcijańską i z normalnością.*

[After all, some of **the Founding Fathers** are candidates for sainthood - and this fact is being omitted; it is not being mentioned. Instead, a different ideology is being promoted. The one that is contrary to Christian faith and to normality.]

(Mirosław Piotrowski, interview for *Niedziela*, text title: "Europejscy inżynierowie dusz" [European engineers of souls], July 22nd, 2013)

Compare similar use of the phrase in Ryszard Legutko's utterance from an interview for *Polskie Radio* 'Polish Public Radio' (December 25th, 2008): *Myślę, że **ojcowie założyciele** byliby przerażeni, oni nie wyobrażali sobie, że Europa może pójść w takim kierunku!* [I think that **the Founding Fathers** would be frightened. They have not imagined that Europe can go in this direction!] or by Jacek Kurski in an interview for *wnet.pl* radio (June 4th, 2013): *Nie takiej Europy życzyli sobie **ojcowie założyciele** UE, jak Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet, czy Konrad Adenauer.* [**The Founding Fathers** of the EU, as Robert Schuman, Jean Monnet or Konrad Adenauer did not wish for the Europe we have today].

Another example of how eurojargon influences the way that MEPs speak is the word *MEP* itself, used quite unexpectedly by Marek Migalski in one of his short movies on the European Union:

(8) *Otóż Unia Europejska tak dba o nasze zdolności językowe, że przeznaczą 5 tys. euro na każdego **MEPa** [...] na podszkolenie jego zdolności językowych [...].*

[The European Union cares so much about our linguistic competences that it provides 5000 Euro for each **MEP** [...] to ameliorate their language skills.]

(Marek Migalski, *Warto się uczyć języków obcych, szczególnie jak się jest posłem* [It's worth learning foreign languages, especially when you're a MEP], September 17, 2013)

The abbreviation *MEP* is defined by various sources in English as a shortened form of the "Member of the European Parliament". The abbreviation is used very frequently, also in speech. It does not exist in Polish, though, where the word *europoseł* 'lit. euroMP' has been coined. Yet some politicians, e.g. Marek Migalski in the example, use the even shor-

ter *MEP*, pronounced as a word, which sounds catchy and is also easily pronounced: which all contributes to less effort in its pronunciation. Interestingly, in the example *MEP* is even inflected in the genitive case according to the rules of Polish grammar for masculine nouns. Thus *MEP* in Migalski's utterance is an example of an adapted loanword in eurojargon.

Another example of a foreign element adapted from eurojargon into Polish is the word *leadership*, frequently inflected in some MEPs' speeches and interviews. Excerpt (9) presents how the word *leadership* is used by Marek Migalski, who again adjusted its form to the Polish language system by means of declination for the genitive case:

(9) *I w tym fragmencie, który państwo puściliście przed chwileczką, widać za-mysł, który leży u... przynajmniej ten krótkowzroczny czy krótkoterminowy za-mysł Zbigniewa Ziobro i tego leadershipu obecnego PiS-u.*

[And in this passage that you broadcast a moment ago, there is a visible idea – the idea which is at the heart of... at least this shortsighted or short-term plan of Zbigniew Ziobro and of this **leadership** of Law and Justice.]

(Marek Migalski, Program 1 Polskiego Radia: Debata w Jedyńce, November 15, 2010)

In this case, the lexical item is not shorter than the Polish equivalent *przywództwo*, which means that the 'minimum effort' rule does not apply here. A possible reason is that such expressions may make the politician sound more educated, at least seemingly.

Another example of Marek Migalski's code-switching is shown in excerpt (10), which presents his switch into two English words:

(10) *Ja przyznaję na początku tego wpisu, że to może być traktowane jako wishful thinking, myślenie życzeniowe, ale wszystkie tendencje, które dzisiaj widzimy w sondażach, pokazują, że Lech Kaczyński odbija się od dna. [I admit at the beginning of this entry that it can be treated as as wishful thinking [EN], wishful thinking [PL], but all the trends that can be seen today in the polls show that Lech Kaczyński is on rebound.]*

(Marek Migalski, RMF FM, December 29, 2009)

Interestingly, the English phrase *wishful thinking* is immediately followed by its Polish calque, *myślenie życzeniowe*. What follows is that intrasentential switching was either unintended by Migalski, possibly used for emphasis, or it was a pragmatic device to make his speech more intellectual.

Jacek Kurski

Jacek Kurski is a former Polish MEP of the V and the VI term of the European Parliament and the current TVP Polish Television president. He graduated from the University of Gdańsk, where he studied international trade. In the 1990s he worked in his own marketing agency and as a journalist *inter alia* for TVP. Simultaneously, he was starting his career in politics – first working for *Solidarność* [Solidarity] and then for several different right-wing parties (including for instance United Poland, Law and Justice and *Liga Polskich Rodzin* [League of Polish Families]). In the classification of Polish MEPs made after the first year of working in the EP prepared by Polish experts and journalists, he was penultimate – as one of the Members with the lowest attendance and activity. He describes his English skills as: *komunikatywne, w porywach biegle* [communicative, sometimes fluent] (Dziennik.pl).

Excerpt (11) below is an interesting example of Jacek Kurski's code-switching to English:

(11) *Ale ludzie muszą poczuć, że jest jakiś window of opportunity, że jest jakaś nadzieja, że pojawia się jakieś nazwisko i tym pierwszym, które pojawia*

się od pięciu lat w kontekście kandydata na premiera, i nie jest Donaldem Tuskiem, jest Tadeusz Cymański.

[But people must feel that there's some kind of a **window of opportunity**; a kind of hope. That a new name appears. And the first one to actually appear in the context of candidate for Prime Minister in last five years; and this name is not Donald Tusk, it is Tadeusz Cymański.]

(Jacek Kurski, *Kontrwywiad*, RMF FM, October 1st, 2012)

Macmillian Dictionary defines 'window of opportunity' as 'an opportunity to do something that will only be available to you for a short time'. However, it is possible that Jacek Kurski interpreted the expression more literally. He explains what he meant in the next part of the sentence, as 'a kind of hope', on which he elaborates in the next part of the interview. This usage can be classified as neosemantization – a situation when a new meaning is added to a previously existing expression. This is the case with code-switched expression in (11): the meaning proposed by Jacek Kurski is contrary to the original English definition.

It is interesting that Kurski uses the indefinite Polish pronoun *jakiś* 'some' before switching to English. The pronoun is masculine, although the Polish noun for 'window' is *okno*, which is a neuter noun.

A possible reason for this usage is insufficient linguistic proficiency in the L2 used – as Kurski says, his English is rather 'communicative' and only sometimes 'fluent'.

The next example of Kurski's code-switching also comes from the same interview. Here Kurski presents his opinion on a potential candidate of Law and Justice for PM and explains why Tadeusz Cymański would be a better Prime Minister than any candidate proposed by Law and Justice:

(12) *Nie ma sensu eksperymentować z kimś nieznanym, **no name'em**, bądź z sfrustrowanym **outsiderem**, który będzie chciał na chwilę wrócić.*

[It does not make sense to experiment with someone unknown; with a **no name** or with a frustrated **outsider** who will want to come back for a while]

(Jacek Kurski, *Kontrwywiad*, RMF FM, October 1st, 2012)

Example (12) presents two instances of intrasentential code-switching, in one sentence at that. Both instances can be classified as either code alternations or loanwords, as they are treated in this fragment of the interview as Polish nouns (in terms of their declination).

Another notable example of code-switching in Kurski's discourse comes from the debate that took place after the 'late poll' issue of the presidential election results on May 25, 2015, when a former MEP of the latest VIII term, Andrzej Duda, won with president Bronisław Komorowski. When talking about *no name* and 'window of opportunity' in 2012, Kurski was in open conflict with Jarosław Kaczyński. In the excerpt below he is again working for Law and Justice after his dismissal from United Poland. In the debate broadcast by *Polsat* participated Jacek Kurski (currently Law and Justice) and Michał Kamiński (formerly Law and Justice and Poland Comes First, now with a more liberal Civic Platform; also MEP of the previous terms).

(13) *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość jest w stanie wygenerować wiarygodną, odpowiedzialną alternatywę dla obozu rządzącego, dlatego Andrzej Duda wygrał i musi być **follow-up**.*

Law and Justice can generate a reliable and responsible alternative for the ruling camp and that is why Andrzej Duda won and there must be a **follow-up**.

(Jacek Kurski, talking to Michał Kamiński, *To był dzień*, Polsat News, May 25, 2015)

As defined by *Merriam-Webster Dictionary*, ‘follow-up’ is ‘something that continues or completes a process or activity’ or ‘a news story presenting new information on a story published earlier’ (*Merriam-Webster Online*). This expression is sometimes used in Polish journalism jargon as a term for a tool to check the effectiveness of distribution of press materials consisting in calling to journalists from the distribution – in this jargon *follow-up* is also called *obdzwonka*. In the context of EU election, follow-up is sometimes translated into Polish as *działania powyborcze* (lit. ‘post-election activities’). It is possible that this is why Jacek Kurski used it in the debate, as he definitely heard or used this expression when working in the EP, and the context was similar. However, it is possible that in this case *follow-up* means something new, for example further successes of Law and Justice.

Conclusions

As the usage of foreign elements in the Polish media by Polish MEPs is more and more common, the influence of English, the EU’s *lingua franca*, on the Polish language should not be underestimated. Eurojargon, language of European Union’s institutions, should be studied and analyzed, especially because it contributes to creating many new words, either somehow adapted into Polish language system, or used in their original form. This linguistic phenomenon is sometimes a reason why the language spoken by the Members of the European Parliament is at times really difficult to understand by people who are not specialists in the field of European issues, agenda or *acquis communautaire*.

The results of my research have fully confirmed that the mass communication in European Union’s *lingua franca* is a very important factor which contributes to the usage of English elements in MEP’s discourse. It also proved that eurojargon indeed influences the way that Polish MEPs speak their native tongue in many different contexts – not only interviews in the mainstream media, but also official debates and speeches.

The analysis, which involved not only lexical and semantic analysis, but in a few examples also pragmatic elements, confirmed also that the motivations for the usage of foreign elements in Polish MEPs’ discourse can be diverse, and more or less conscious. Also, it proved that it is sometimes the case that when MEPs alternate between the codes, they create new meanings which have not functioned in Polish before. What follows is that one of the effects of the influence of eurojargon on national languages is frequent neosemantization, which may also result from the lack of English proficiency of certain MEPs.

The results of the analysis of eurojargon by three different Polish MEPs also showed that the level of eurojargon does not depend on a MEP’s political views, be it conservative or liberal or other. The study of particular examples also indicated that the frequency of foreign elements in MEP’s discourse, including both jargon terms and generally EU’s *lingua franca* elements, were present in the discourses of *inter alia* Jacek Kurski, Marek Migalski and Janusz Lewandowski, who represent (or represented, as in the case of Marek Migalski) different political parties.

The study also showed that borrowings and code-switching are used in different types of media and in different contexts – debates, speeches and interviews.

As for further research on the subject, it would be interesting to make a quantitative analysis of the usage of eurojargon elements in one or more languages of the EU. It is also worth focusing on flags preceding instances of code-switching, code-mixing and different kinds of direct and indirect loanwords. It would also be a good idea to check whether some better educated or more experienced MEPs tend to use less or more foreign elements in their discourse. Finally, it would be a good point for analysis to compare particular MEPs’ opinions on the issue: if they think that working in EU institutions has in any way influenced the way that they speak, and if their usage of foreign elements in discourse is a case of conscious decisions or not. If it is conscious, it would also be interesting to know why they used them.

REFERENCES

- Biel, Ł. (2014). *Lost in the Eurofog. The Textual Fit of Translated Law*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Dobkiewicz, M. (2012). "Eurożargon. Czy istnieje europejska nowomowa?", *Przegląd Zachodni* 1 (346), 297-309.
- Głowiński, M. (2009). *Nowomowa i ciągi dalsze: Szkice dawne i nowe*. Kraków: Universitas.
- Goffin, R. (2005). "Quels corpus et quels contextes pour une description contrastive de l'eurolecte.", *Actes de septièmes Journées scientifiques du réseau de chercheurs Lexicologie, Terminologie, Traduction*. Bruxelles: Éditions des Archives, 1-6.
- Goffin, R. (1990). "L'Europe en neuf langues: champ d'affrontements et ferment d'intégration linguistique.", *Meta*, 31 (1), 13-19.
- Jędrzejowska, I. (2011). *Constitutional Terminology in Transition: The Drifting Semantics of the Supranational Discourse Under Negotiation*. Berlin: BWV.
- Kajzer, M. (2011). "Translation of Eurojargon as a source of neologisms in Polish – a corpus-based study". In: S. Goźdz-Roszkowski (ed.) *Explorations across Languages and Corpora*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 467-480.
- Kosecki, K. (2002). *Eurożargon jako język specjalny*. [English: *Eurojargon as a specialized language*]. In G. Szpila (ed.) *Język a komunikacja 4*. Kraków: Tertium, p. 336-337.
- Kwiek, K. (2012). "Jak mówić, by nic nie powiedzieć". *Mysliciel* 1 (5), Jan.– Mar. 2012, 21-22. *Macmillian Dictionary online*. Retrieved from: <http://www.macmillandictionary.com/>
- Merriam-Webster Dictionary online*. Retrieved from: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/>. DOA: June 16, 2015
- Oxford English Dictionary online*. Retrieved from: www.oed.com. DOA: June 16, 2015
- Pernice, I. (2004). "Institutional Settlements for an Enlarged EU". In: G. Bermann and K. Pistor (Eds.), *Law and Governance in an Enlarged European Union*. Portland: Hart Publishing, 11.
- Satoła-Staškowiak, J. (2014). "Different aspects of neosemantization on the example of the Polish and Bulgarian language", *Cognitive Studies* 14: 183-191.
- Sosonis, V. (2004). "Multilingualism in Europe: Blessing or curse?" In: A. Branchadell and L.M. West (Eds.), *Less Translated Languages*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins, pp. 39-49.
- Summaries of EU legislation website. Glossary. Retrieved from: www.europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/.
- Wilk, E. (2014). *Pogubione słowa*. [Lost words] *Polityka*, 51/52 (2989), 2014.
- Zychowicz, P. (2008). *Eurokraci nie gęsi*. Rzeczpospolita. Retrieved from: www.rp.pl/artykul/93504.html. DOA: June 16, 2015.

Eurojargon materials

- 47th session of the Polish Senate. Janusz Lewandowski. 9th January 2014. Debate.
- Broadcasts from Sejm debates. Retrieved from: www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/transmisje_arch.xsp. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Broadcasts from Senat debates. Retrieved from: http://senat.gov.pl/prace/senat/posiedzenia.commission_20102014/lewandowski/library/about/whoiam/cv_lewandowski_pl.pdf. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Dąbrowska, Z. Interview with Marek Migalski. *Rozmowy w Jedynce*. Polskie Radio, 5th November 2010. Retrieved from: <http://www.polskieradio.pl/7/158/Artykul/273344,Ofiary-Ziobry->. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Durczok, K. Interview with Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz. "Fakty po Faktach". *TVN24*, 1st January 2013. Retrieved from: <http://www.tvn24.pl/wiadomosci-ze-swiata,2/w-twardym-jadrze-ue-jesli-bedziemy-panstwem-silnym,297526.html>. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Kobus, Ł. Interview with Marek Migalski. 4th April 2014. Retrieved from: <http://www.rp.pl/artykul/1099439.html?print=tak&p=0>. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Lewandowski, Janusz. Curriculum Vitae. Europa EU. Retrieved from: <http://ec.europa.eu/archives/>. DOA: June 16, 2015.

- Migalski, M. *Warto się uczyć języków obcych, szczególnie jak się jest posłem* [It's worth learning foreign languages, especially when you're a MEP] Marek Migalski YouTube Channel. 17th September 2013. Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5anfFUxI7bI>. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- National Archives and Record Administration. *America's Founding Fathers - Delegates to the Constitutional Convention*. Retrieved from: www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_founding_fathers.html. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Petrović, P. Interview with Ryszard Legutko. *Polskie Radio*, 25th December 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/168025,Chrzescijanstwo-za-burta.__DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Piasecki, K. Interview with Jacek Kurski. Kontrwywiad. RMF FM, October 1, 2012. Retrieved from: <http://www.rmfm24.pl/fakty/polska/news-kurski-kaczynski-sie-przeliczyl-wierzyl-w-poparcie-schetyny-,nId,638908>. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Piasecki, K. Interview with Marek Migalski. *Kontrwywiad RMF FM*. RMF FM, 23rd December 2009. Retrieved from: <http://www.rmfm24.pl/tylko-w-rmf24/wywiady/kontrwywiad/news-marek-migalski-polacy-nie-ufaja-prezesowi-pis-trzeba-wyciagn,nId,65333>. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Premier RP. Official webpage. Retrieved from: <http://www.premier.gov.pl>. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Puchłowski, M. Interview with Jacek Kurski. *Radio wnet.pl*, 6th April 2013. Retrieved from: <http://www.radiownet.pl/publikacje/kurski-o-unii-europejskiej-i-kulisach-nocnej-zmiany>. DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Sakowska, M. Jacek Kurski and Michał Kamiński. To był dzień, otwarcie. Debate. Polsat, May 25, 2015. Retrieved from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ulQOs4lFs4w> DOA: June 16, 2015.
- Skubiś, I. Interview with Mirosław Piotrowski. *Niedziela*, 22nd July 2013. Retrieved from: <http://www.niedziela.pl/artykul/107109/nd/Europejscy-inzynierowie-dusz>. DOA: June 16, 2015.

WPLYW EUROŻARGONU NA Dyskurs polskich posłów DO PARLAMENTU EUROPEJSKIEGO

Celem pracy jest zbadanie wpływu języka instytucji europejskich (eurożargonu) na dyskurs polskich europosłów w mediach, publicznych wystąpieniach i debatach. W części teoretycznej opisano związane z tematem podstawowe zagadnienia i wybraną literaturę oraz zaprezentowano cechy językowe eurożargonu w języku polskim. Część empiryczna jest poświęcona analizie jakościowej wypowiedzi Janusza Lewandowskiego, Marka Migalskiego i Jacka Kurskiego. Analiza dotyczy przyczyn użycia elementów eurożargonu w ich wypowiedziach, a także określenia dominujących w nich kategorii elementów obcych.

Słowa kluczowe: eurożargon, zapożyczenia, przełączanie kodów, mieszanie kodów, anglicyzmy